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台湾问题论文-War or Peace Over TAIWAN?.doc

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台湾问题论文-War or Peace Over TAIWAN?.doc

台湾问题论文WarorPeaceOverTAIWANThelikelihoodofamilitaryconflictintheTaiwanStrait,notsoonbutafteroneortwodecades,maybejudgedbyanswerstoseveralquestions1)WillChinastoppoliticiansdiscountthehighcostofusingforcetoasserttheirclaimtoTaiwan(Thismaybeunlikelyuntilafterthefirstdecadeofthenewmillennium,butitmoreprobablycouldhappenaftertheyear2010.)2)Atanearliertime,inthenearfuture,domutuallybeneficialtermsexistforaninterimtruceacrossthestrait,allowingaperiodofpoliticalevolutiononbothsidesthatwouldenableapeacefulfullsettlementlater3)Evenifmutuallyrewardingtermsforsuchatruceexist,dotheelitesinTaipeiandBeijinghavestructuresthatcanbringthemactuallytonegotiateit4)WouldTaiwansdefensecapabilitiesateachrelevanttimebeable(orunable)todeterthemostlikelykindofattackagainsttheisland,whichcouldperhapsbeginwithmarineminesandBeijingsannouncementofaneconomicblockade5)WouldtheUnitedStateshelpdefendtheislandatthosetimes,evenifChinaevolvesamoreopenpoliticalsystemand/oroffersTaiwanconditionsforaunificationwithautonomythatwouldbecrediblyenforceableandstableLeadersofthePeoplesRepublicofChina(PRC)haveneverforswornuseofthePeoplesLiberationArmy(PLA)toasserttheirclaimofownershipagainsttheRepublicofChina(ROC)。Thisessaywillargue,however,thatfairtermsexistforaninterimtrucelastingseveraldecades.Togivethereaderasenseofthisessaysdirection,possibletermsofsuchatrucecanbesuggestedbeforethereasonsforthemareexploredTheunofficialnegotiatingagenciesofthetwosidesmightagreethatTaipeiforsweardeclaringindependencefromChina,andBeijingforswearpursuingforceagainstTaiwan,foralongtime(suchas50years)。Toheadoffmisunderstandingsabouttruceviolations,theycouldnoteathirdpartyslistofcountrieswithwhicheachsideclaimscurrentdiplomaticliaisons,withoutfullylegitimatingthese.Theunofficialnegotiatingfoundationscouldreaffirmtheirpresentcommitmentstocontinuetalkstowardfurtheragreements.Thisessaywillalsoargue,however,thatcrucialleadersinbothTaiwanandChinagainshorttermdomesticpoliticalbenefitsfromcrossstraitstensions.Soinpractice,theyareunlikelytonegotiateevenatemporarytruce.Underthesecircumstances,theUnitedStateswillprobablyhelptodefendTaiwansdemocracyassuchuntileitherBeijingalsobecomesdemocraticoroffersTaipeiverycrediblyenforceabletermsunderwhichTaiwansdemocracycouldbemaintainedwithinaunifiedChina.ButbecauseofAmericasbroaderglobalinterestsandmajorconcreteinterestsinthemainlandspotentialdemocracyifBeijingoffersTaipeitermsforunificationwithpracticalautonomythatcanbecrediblyenforcedbymultiplemeansincludingtheislandsarmy,thenAmericasleadersarelikelytoconsidertheircommitmenttoTaiwanfulfilled.TheUSpremisethatChinaandTaiwanwillresolvetheirdisputeinpeacefulnegotiations,however,isincreasinglynave.SotheUSmaybedrawnintoawarwhoseeffectwouldbetokeepTaiwanpoliticallyseparatefromChina.ThatwouldbeadisservicetoAmericaslargerdemocraticandsecurityinterests.Explorationofthefivequestionslistedabovewillshowtheshapeofthissituation.1)WillChinasLeadersUseForcetoContinuetheirTaiwanClaimThisfirstquestioniseasytoanswer,becauseBeijingsleadershavealreadyusedforcesymbolicallytoassertthisinterestseveraltimes,asin1995and1996whentheyheldmilitaryexercisesandfiredmissilesnearTaiwan.TheyoftenavowanationalrighttotakeTaiwanwithforce,notjustsymbolically.Further,Beijingpoliticianspredictinpublicthattheirinfluenceoverworldpoliticswillgrowincomingdecades.Eventhoughtheynodoubtexaggeratetherateofincreaseoftheirpower,inthelongruntheyareprobablyright.Chinaisfinallyawakening,astheadagesays.ThePRCnowhasaneconomymorethanfourtimesthesizeofTaiwans,expandinghaltinglybutquickly.Ithasapopulation60timesthatoftheisland,andaterritorymorethan260timeslarger.ThegrowthofChinaseconomicproducthasbeenfasterthanofitsmilitarypower,butChinawillbecomerelativelystrongerintheworldduringcomingdecades,partlybecauseofitseconomicsize.BeijingleadersproudexpectationofthischangeisabasisforpossiblePRCpatienceaboutresolvingitsterritorialclaimonTaiwan.ItisalsothebasisofacertaintyinBeijingthatTaiwanmustsomedaybecomepartoftheChinesestate.ThetimingandspeedofChinasfutureempowermentforspecificpurposescanbesubjecttodifferentreasonableestimates.ManyscholarsincludingsomeinbothBeijingandTaipeiexpectChinatoremainclearlyunabletouseforcetoassertitsTaiwanclaimformorethanadecadeatleast.RecentjournalisminTaipeicitesthedate2010asalikelytimeofcrisisinislandmainlandrelations.Byaboutthattime,manyresearchersofvariouspoliticalviewpointsthinkChinasmilitaryshortcomingswillhavechangedtostrengthvisàvisTaiwan(thoughnotvisàvistheUnitedStates)。ChinasabilitytoraisethenonmilitarycoststocountriesaidingTaiwanevenifthePRCsowncostsaregreaterwillalsorise.,inJapanorIndonesia)couldalterthisprospectussomewhat.Butbysomeperiodafter2010,ChinawillbecomeabletoassertitsTaiwanclaimfarmoreeffectivelythanatpresent.ThiseffectivenessisdelayedcurrentlybyspecificmilitarydifficultiesthePLAwouldfaceinwinningaconflictitmightstart,byUSknowledgeofthePRCsilliberalism,andbyTaiwansmilitaryandeconomicprowess.ThenearcertaintyofChinasfuturesuperpowerstatusdoesnotmeanthatthewishesofitsleaderswillthenprevailautomatically.AstheUSdiscoveredinSomaliaandearlierinVietnam,superpowersarenotalwayssupremelyeffective.ButBeijingstoppoliticiansthinkovertimetheywillbecomeincreasinglycapableofrealizingtheirwishesintheirownneighborhood.IfChinabecomesrelativelystrongerandifPRCpoliticspluralizes,otherpowerssuchasJapanandtheUScanbeexpectedtoweightheiroverallinterestsindecidingwhethertocommitresourcestoopposeBeijingthen.TheUSwillpaythesecoststodefendTaiwansliberalsirrespectiveofanyincreaseofPRCstrength,butnotafterChinesepoliticsbecomemorerepresentativeorthePRCoffersTaiwanadealforpoliticalautonomywithinChinawhosetermscanbeguaranteedbyTaiwansownforces.SomeonTaiwanhopethatBeijingmayeventuallyrescinditsassertionthattheislandisChinese.TaiwannationalistscitethefactthatpostrevolutionaryRussiansallowedtheSovietempiretobreakup,althoughfewoutsideobservershadpredictedthis.ButbarelyhalfthepeopleintheUSSRwereRussian.InChina,overninetenthsareethnicallyHanasareTaiwanese(bylanguage,kinshipstructure,religion,andotheranthropologicalmeasures)。ThechancethatPRCeliteswillforgetthisisextremelylow,nowthattheythinktheirpowerwillincrease.ThispredictionthattheChinasclaimwillcontinuedoesnotnecessarilypresumetheCommunistPartywillruleinBeijingforalongtime.ThePartymaygoon,oritmaybeover.ButpracticallyallmainlandelitesingovernmentorindissentagreethatTaiwanisChinese.VeryfewinthePRCchallengethisview.TaiwansrecentdemocratizationisseenbysomemainlandconservativesasathreattotheirownstatusthatrequiresacontinuanceofChineseclaimstoTaiwan.Mainlandreformists,however,mayviewTaiwansdemocratizationasimportantonlyiftheislandisChinese.ManyinChinaarekeenlyenviousofTaiwanseconomic,political,andculturalsuccesses.TaiwansTVcomediansandtorchsingers(e.g.,inthepastthelateTheresaTengLichün)weresurelyworthanaircraftcarriergroup.ButthisPRCawarenessofTaiwanesewealthandfreedomprobablyunderminestheCommunistParty,morethanitpersuadesmainlandersthatTaiwanisnotChinese.Statepatriotismhashistoricallycomeinmanyforms,andinChina(likeGermany,Russia,andJapan)nationalismhasgenerallybeencollectivistandauthoritarian.InTaiwan,withitstraditionsofroughpioneeringonanislandthatwasputunderricecultivationbyHansonlyafewcenturiesagowithouthelpfromtheChinesestate,authorityamonglocalleadershasbeenmoreindividualisticthaninnorthChinaespecially.TheBeijingcentrismofmostPRCintellectuals,bycontrast,strikesmanyTaiwaneseasasevereaffliction.TheTaiwanesepeople,accordingtoaforeignscholar,increasinglydetestthebigotsfromBeijing,whothinkthatbeingbornintheshadowoftheForbiddenCitygivesthemtherighttobossaroundChinesepeopleeverywhere.About1.2billionChinese,however,donotliveinBeijing,eventhoughattitudesinthePRCgovernmentscarcelyreflectthisfact.PopularmainlandviewsassurveyedbyquestionnairesshowthatordinaryPRCcitizensviewsofstate(guojia)andnation(minzu)aredividingveryslowly.NationalismsareallcontestedandLiahGreenfeldshowstheychangebecauseofressentiment,aprocessbywhichonegroupenvieswhatanotherhas.IfthisdriftinChinaissluggishwhilePRCmilitarystrengthrises,warmightwinitsracewithenvy.Chineseconstructtheirnationalidentitycontinuouslyandinmanyways.Mainlandentrepreneurs,Southerners,andjustafewofChinasdissidents(thosewhohavegivenuphopesofcareersinBeijing)pressforunificationwithTaiwanlessardentlythanmilitarists,Northerners,andstatistintellectuals.Still,thisismainlyadifferenceofapproach,atacticaldisagreementratherthanastrategicpolicydifference.ManyaspectsofthisissueaboutChinaspossibleuseofforceagainstTaiwancanberephrasedinaquestionaboutdomesticPRCpolitics.WillgrowthorientedreformistsORpatrioticconservativesdominateinBeijingThisfactorseemstovaryovertime,anditislikelytosetthemaximumtermsthatBeijingwillconsiderforunification.Whensuchtermsaresufficientlyfavorabletopeace,theycouldgiveTaiwaneseleadersachancetosolvetheislandssecurityproblem.Alternatively,atatimewhenBeijingsxenophobicconservativesmaybeinpower,thisfactorcouldmeanblockades,theminingofports,andotherattacksagainstTaiwan.ThedirectcostsofsuchactionsbythePLAmaybedecreasing,andthelesscertainbuthighindirectcostsmaybeirrationallydiscountedbyPRCleaderswhoareferventpatriots.Thisvariablecouldbesufficienttobringlongterm(25years)ChinesesovereigntyonTaiwan,althoughitwouldnotdosointheshortterm(c.5years)。ReformistsarecurrentlyinchargeofPRCpracticaladministration.PresidentJiangZeminheadsaratheruncharismaticgroupoftechnocrats,andPremierZhuRongjismostpublicinterestsareeconomic.Taiwanraisesissuesofpatrioticidentity,however.Theseleadersarerationalists,andtheymayhavesometendencytodelayunificationwithTaiwanuntiltheythinktheprocesscanbecosteffectivelyengineered.ButsomeauthoritiesinBeijingortheirpatronsinthePLAcouldunderestimatethecostsofwaragainstTaiwan.Nationalisticzealotry(whichamongtheclassiczealotsledtodeathsatMasada)isalsoevidentinstatementsbyferventTaiwanesenationalists.VilfredoPareto,inhisworkaboutthecirculationofelites,explainswhyadistinctionbetweenhardlineconservativesandflexiblereformersisahardyperennialofallpolitics.Lionvs.foxpoliticsisnotlimitedtoeconomicandtechnicalmattersitalsoaffectsidentity.GrowthorientedPRCreformistelites(Southern,localentrepreneurial,andsometechnocraticleaders)maycometorepresentagreaterdiversityoftheirhugecountry.Ifthatprocesscontinues,Taiwanmightlaterbeabletogetalongwellwithamainlandstrongerthanitself.Thesearethemostprobableeventualconditionsofpeace,andnegotiationsforitismostlikelywhentheBeijingsideiscomposedoftechnocraticreformists.Ifso,thenextquestionwouldconcernthepresenceorabsenceofconceivablespecificterms.2)DoMutuallyBeneficialTermsExistforaPreliminaryTruceOnthemainland,mostpeoplearenoteagerforawaragainstTaiwan.Ontheisland,roughlyfourfifthsofthepeoplewishtoleavethequestionofChineseorTaiwaneseultimatesovereigntyundecidedforalongtime.ThesestancesarecompatiblewithatemporarytrucebetweenTaipeiandBeijing,bywhichthemainlandwouldnotpursueforcewhiletheislandwouldnotpursueindependenceduringacoolingoffperiod.Theirunofficialfoundationsmightagreetonoteathirdpartyslistofcurrentdiplomaticties(withoutlegitimatingtheseformally),sothatneithersidecouldlaterclaimtheotherwasbreakingthetrucebecauseofolddiplomacy.CrossstraitsnegotiationsonallothertopicscouldbemorefruitfulifatimeoutwerecalledonboththeislandsimplicitthreatofnonChinesesovereigntyandthemainlandsmilitarythreat.Ifatruceweretobenegotiated,whichagenciescoulddothatForonce,

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