2018版-International Relations and Asias Northern Tier

Asan-PalgraveMacmillanSeriesSeriesEditorJamesKimAsanInstPolicyStudiesSeoul,Korea(Republicof)Moreinformationaboutthisseriesat/series/14779GilbertRozmanSergeyRadchenkoEditorsInternationalRelationsandAsiasNorthernTierSino-RussiaRelations,NorthKorea,andMongoliaEditorsGilbertRozmanTheAsanForumWashington,DC,USASergeyRadchenkoDepartmentofInternationalRelationsCardiffUniversity,Cardiff,UKAsan-PalgraveMacmillanSeriesISBN978-981-10-3143-4ISBN978-981-10-3144-1(eBook)/10.1007/978-981-10-3144-1LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2017949526TheEditor(s)(ifapplicable)andTheAuthor(s)2018Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsaresolelyandexclusivelylicensedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpartofthematerialisconcerned,specicallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseofillustrations,recitation,broadcasting,reproductiononmicrolmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionorinformationstorageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilarmethodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped.Theuseofgeneraldescriptivenames,registerednames,trademarks,servicemarks,hispublicationdoesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecicstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfromtherelevantprotectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse.Thepublisher,theauthorsandtheeditorsaresafetoassumethattheadviceandinformationinthisbookarebelievedtobetrueandaccurateatthedateofpublication.Neitherthepublishernortheauthorsortheeditorsgiveawarranty,expressorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinorforanyerrorsoromissionsthatmayhavebeenmade.Thepublisherremainsneutralwithregardtojurisdictionalclaimsinpublishedmapsandinstitu-tionalafliations.Coverillustrationkosmozoo/GettyImagesPrintedonacid-freepaperThisPalgraveimprintispublishedbySpringerNatureTheregisteredcompanyisSpringerNatureSingaporePteLtd.Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:152BeachRoad,#21-01/04GatewayEast,Singapore189721,SingaporeCONTENTS1Introduction:AsiasNorthernTierGilbertRozmanandSergeyRadchenkoPart1Sino-RussianStrategicRelations2TheRussianPivottoAsiaGilbertRozman3EvolutionofSino-RussianDefenseCooperationsincetheColdWar(Part1+Part2)PaulSchwartz4RussiasPolicyTowardChina:KeyPlayersandtheDecision-makingProcessAlexanderGabuev5Russia,China,andtheEmergingGreaterEurasiaAlexanderLukin6Russo-ChineseRelationsinStrategicPerspectiveStephenBlank11327597593vviCONTENTSPart2Sino-RussianRelationsandMongolia7Sino-RussianCompetitioninMongoliaSergeyRadchenko8MongoliaHangsintheBalance:PoliticalChoicesandEconomicRealitiesinaStateBoundedbyChinaandRussiaSergeyRadchenko9AStrongerKorea-MongoliaLinkinaChangingNortheastAsiaMarkMinton10MongoliasDilemma:APoliticallyLinked,EconomicallyIsolatedSmallPowerMendeeJargalsaikhan11MongoliasPlaceinChinasPeripheryDiplomacyJeffreyReevesPart3TheRussianFarEastandNortheastChina12TheRussianFarEast:PositiveScenariosandNegativeScenariosArtyomLukinandGilbertRozman13NortheastChinaandtheRussianFarEast:PositiveScenariosandNegativeScenariosGayeChristoffersenandIvanZuenkoPart4StrategicThinkingtowardNorthKorea14ChineseStrategicThinkingRegardingNorthKoreaChengXiaohe111127147157175193215241CONTENTS15ChinasInterests,Actors,andtheImplementationofSanctionsagainstNorthKoreaCatherineJones16RussianStrategicThinkingRegardingNorthKoreaAlexanderLukin17MakingSenseoftheRusso-NorthKoreaRapprochementStephenBlank18NorthKoreasPlaceinSino-RussianRelationsandIdentitiesGilbertRozmanIndexvii253267283301315CHAPTER1Introduction:AsiasNorthernTierGilbertRozmanandSergeyRadchenkoThefourcountriesonthenorthernfringeofAsiawenttheirseparatewaysaftertheendoftheColdWar,butstrengtheningSino-RussianrelationsandwhatmaybetheloomingendgameinNorthKoreasstrategyofthreatsandisolationaresignsthatwenowneedtothinkaboutthisareaalsothroughitsconnections.Mongoliastillisratheraloofinitsforeignpolicy,butgeographyleavesitnoescapefromdynamicsparticulartotheNorthernTier.SouthKorea(outsideofourconceptionofthetier)hasstruggledtopreventarevivaloftheNorthernTier,butitsleverageisprovinglimited.LookingbacktowhatexistedinanearlierincarnationoftheNorthernTierandfocusingonChineseandRussianviewsofNorthKorea,weareabletoexploretheimplicationsofincreasinglycloseSino-Russianrelations.TensionswithNorthKoreahavegrownmoreseriousafteritsprovocativemovesthroughout2016,butthatdoesnotmeanthatweshoulddismissthestrategicreasoningin201415abouthowChinaandRussiahavebeenapproachingnotonlytheimmediatechallengeG.Rozman(*)TheAsanForum,Washington,DC,USAS.RadchenkoDepartmentofInternationalRelations,CardiffUniversity,Cardiff,UKTheAuthor(s)2018G.Rozman,S.Radchenko(eds.),InternationalRelationsandAsiasNorthernTier,Asan-PalgraveMacmillanSeries,/10.1007/978-981-10-3144-1_112G.ROZMANANDS.RADCHENKOcomingfromtheNorth,but,moresignicantly,wheretheywouldlikeittoheadfromhere.TherewasaNorthernTieruntiltheendoftheColdWar.Forthedecadeafter1949,itwasunambiguouslytheRedBlocoftheSovietUnion,China,Mongolia,andNorthKorea.StalinandMaochosetosupportKimIl-sungsplantounifythepeninsulabyforce,makingthisthefrontlineintheColdWar.TheKoreanWarreectedthinkingthatthe“eastwindprevailsoverthewestwind.”DressingtheattackonSouthKoreaintermsoftheendjustiesthemeans(liesaboutwhostartedthewar,whowasghtinginit,andwhatwastakingplace),SovietandChinesecommentariessetapatternfornarrativesontheKoreanPeninsulaandNortheastAsiathatremainedhighlydistortedduringthe“coldpeace”throughthe1980s.TheyrefusedeventorecognizeNorthKoreascontinuedbelligerencedestabilizingthepeninsula.ThedefensivecharacteroftheUSalliancewithTokyonothoughtbeinggiventoanysortofaggressivebehaviorwasnallyacknowledgedinChinaafteritfoundcommoncauseagainsttheSovietUnion.Yet,itssupportforNorthKorearemainedsteadfast,asdidMoscows.TheSino-Sovietsplitdidnotmeantheendofshared(competitive)supportforNorthKoreaanditsroleinopposingUSalliances.Inthissense,theNorthernTiersurviveduntiltheearly1990s,leavingalastinglegacy.NortheastAsiawasanunlikelyfocusofgreatpowermaneuveringfollowingtheendoftheColdWar.Therewereplansforturningitintothecenterpieceofgreatpowercoordinationforanewregionalandworldorder:multilateralenergycooperationintheRussianFarEastandEasternSiberia,cross-borderregionalismaroundtheSeaofJapan,and,aboveall,collectivesecurityassurancestosteerNorthKoreaintoaregionalframe-workconducivetoreducedtensionsontheKoreanPeninsulabutalsotogreatpowertrust.ThatPyongyangwouldbalkatsuchplansdemilitar-ization,lossofitsabilitytoplayonegreatpoweragainstanother,reformsthatthreatenedtoshakethelegitimacyofahermitdictatorshipafraidtounsealitschamberofhorrors,andaTumenRiverdevelopmentprojectopeningthecountrytotransitmovementshouldhavecomeasnosurprise.Moreunexpectedly,strategiestouseNorthKoreatorekindlesplitsbetweengreatpowersratherthantofacilitatetrustaswellascoop-erationdeedhopesforputtingtheColdWarinthepast.WhilenocountrysblueprintforthefutureofNorthKoreawasrealistic,itsrevivalasthenexusofcontestationwasthepredictableoutcomeofgreatpowerdynamicsfromthe1990s.INTRODUCTION:ASIASNORTHERNTIER3TheUSposturetowardNorthKoreahasrepeatedlybeenperceivedinBeijingandMoscowasoverridingpotentialbilateralconcerns.ThiswasthecaseforBeijingin2003whenitfearedthatthe“axisofevil”speechandtheinvasionofIraqwouldbeapreludetoapushforregimechangeinNorthKorea,anditwastrueagaininthefallof2005whenunilateralUSsanctionsagainstBancoDeltaAsiarevivedthechargethatregimechangewasbeingaggressivelypushed.1OnlywhenNorthKoreadeedbothChinaandRussiainlate2006bybrazenlytestingbothalong-rangemissileandanuclearweapondidBeijingpressurePyongyang,resultingintheFebruary2007JointAgreement.Yet,aftersimilartestsinthespringof2009,Beijingsresponsewasdifferent,encapsulatedinitsthreeeuphe-misms:“maintainingdomesticstabilityinNorthKorea,peaceontheKoreanPeninsula,andsocialstabilityinChina.”Thesewereinvokedin200910for“enablingNorthKoreasmisdeeds,”beforeChinainlate2010mayhaverestrainedtheNorthfrommilitaryretaliationagainstplannedSouthKoreanmilitaryexercises,andtheyareusedtojustifyputtingblameonUSaggressivenessmorethanNorthKoreasbelligerenceandoverlookingChinasownpassivity,acquiescence,orenablementoftheNorthKoreanregimesconduct.2THECHINESENARRATIVEONNORTHKOREAINTHE2010SDiscordantvoiceswereheardin2004whenajournalwasclosedforitscoverage,in2006and2013afternucleartestsbyNorthKorea,andoccasionallyatothertimesaswell.Yet,theprevailingtonewasinsharpcontrasttowhatthesevoiceshadtosay.In200203,whenPyongyangbrokeawayfromtheIAEAregimesetbytheJointAgreement,againin200809,whenitabandonedtheAgreedFrameworksetbytheSix-PartyTalks,in2010,whenNorthKoreatwiceattackedSouthKorea,andnallyin201415,whenmanythoughtChinasdissatisfactionwithKimJong-unmeantasharpshiftinpolicy,Chinesepublicationsoverwhelminglyreafrmedanarrativeoflittlecomforttothosearguingfor5vs.1orforreuni-cationledbySouthKorea.TheSpecialForumarticleinJune2015ofChengXiaohecharac-terizesChinasstancetowardtheKoreanPeninsulaasa“drawn-outcompetition,”inwhichChinaistakinganincreasinginteresttothepointitmaytipthebalanceonthepeninsula,whichhasbeentiltingtowardSouthKorea.TreatingNorthKoreasnuclearweaponsprogram4G.ROZMANANDS.RADCHENKOasameanstoreversethetrendandSouthKoreasprospectofachiev-ingunicationonitsowntermsasveryunlikely,ChengcallsforresumingtheSix-PartyTalksasawaytochangeNorthKoreascalcu-lus.HisperspectivedrawsequivalencebetweentheNorthandtheSouth,treatsthestandoffasastruggleoverthesecurityinterestsofthegreatpowers,andassumesthatbalancebetweenNorthandSouthandamongthegreatpowersisthepathwaytounication.TopersistinSouthKoreascurrentapproachtounicationasa“bonanza”isanillusion,headds,neglectingonlytonotedirectlythatChinadoesnotviewthisoutcomeasinitsinterest.WithoutpraisingtheNorthsnuclearprogram,ChengcreditsitwithhelpingPyongyangturnthetablesinitscompetitionwithSeoul.Thus,itmakesChinasgoalofpursuingapathtoreunicationbasedonequalityeasier.HearguesthatwhetherSeoulcangoforwardwitheffortsaimedatreunicationdependsheavilyonChinascooperation,which,inturn,dependsonSeoulnotsupportingtheUSrebalancetargetedagainstChina.TheobviousconclusionisthatSeoulfacesazero-sumgreatpowerclash,anditstiestoPyongyang,asinuencedbyBeijing,dependonhowitbalancesthetwopowers.Deterrenceandtrustbuildingareatodds.Chinacanhelpwiththelatter,buteffortstobolstertheformerthatplayintotheUSrebalancingwillnotwinChinassupport.ChengsarticleinEnglishisbutthetipoftheicebergofChinesewritingsinsistingthatSeoulmustabandonitscurrentstrategyandchangecourseforreunication.EvenifSino-DPRKtiesarestrained,BeijingseesanalignmentversusUSalliances.ChinaappearstobeseekingregimereorientationasthepathtodomesticstabilityinNorthKorea.ThismeansitsreadinesstoworkwithChinaondiplomacy,economicreform,andregimerevitalization.ChinaalsoseemstobeinpursuitofpeaceonthepeninsulathroughabalanceofNorthandSouthsecurityconcernswithinputfromChinaandotherpowers,butthereisreasontoexpectthatChinasinputwillcarrythegreatestweight,givenitslikelyimpactontheNorthandtheSouthsawarenessthatChinahasfarmoreleverstoshapetheprocessthananyothercountry.Finally,successasthehostofthereconvenedSix-PartyTalksandtheprotectoroftheNorthwouldgiveaboosttothelegitimacyandstabilityoftheCommunistPartyinChina.Inthebackground,theSino-RussianpartnershipinAugust2015conductingmilitaryexercisesatseaneartheKoreanPeninsulaisareminderoftheirbilateralinterests.INTRODUCTION:ASIASNORTHERNTIER5THERUSSIANNARRATIVEONNORTHKOREAINTHE2010STheRussiannarrativeontheKoreanPeninsulacloselyparallelstherhetoricfoundinChina.IntheDecember2014,SpecialForumRozmananalyzedtheRussian“turntotheEast,”emphasizingChinascentralrole,but,increasingly,NorthKoreassalienceisalsobeingemphasized.BlamingtheUnitedStatesfortryingtodestroytheregimeinNorthKoreawhilealsondingmeritintheargumentthattheSeptember19,2005agreementwasviolatedbytheUnitedStates,SouthKorea,andJapan,provokingNorthKoreatoresumeitsnuclearactivity,ValeriiDenisovwasparaphrasedinTheAsanForumassug-gestingthattherealdangertopeaceintheregioncomesfromtheUS-ROKalliance,notNorthKorea.HejustiesRussiaswarmingtoNorthKorea,mentioningthesouringofSino-NorthKoreanrelationswithoutputtingmuchblameoneitherparty.TheburdenisplacedonWashingtonandSeoultowinthecondenceofPyongyang,leadingtotheresumptionoftheSix-PartyTalks,notablyofthe5thworkinggroupheadedbyRussiatoaddressaregionalsecurityframework,whichDenisovputsforemostinhisanalysisofwhatisneededtoresolvethecrisis.AstrongChinaandacloseSino-RussianpartnershiparedecisivefactorsinreachingthekindofarrangementDenisov,andmostotherRussianwritersonthepeninsulaareseeking.TheyfocusonreassuringNorthKorea,bolsteringit,transformingtheUS-ROKalliance,anddevelopingaregionaleconomicprogramforanorth-southcorridorfromRussiathroughSouthKorea.InlightoftheexpectedhesitationofSeoultoembracethisagenda,Russiansleanmoretopressurethanpersuasion.StrengtheningbilateraltiestoNorthKoreabothmakestheNorthamoreviableforceandputsRussiainalessmarginalposition.BehindthefacadeofcooperativeRusso-ROKrelationsParkGeun-hyesEurasianInitiativewasstillbeingpursuedParkoffendedPutinbynotattendingthe2014SochiOlympicsceremoniesandtheMay9,2015celebrationofthe70thanniversaryofvictoryonRedSquare.Relationshavecooled,ashighofcialsvisitlessoften.Yet,discretelySeoulstrivestosustainrela-tions,recognizingthatitneedsRussiatomanageNorthKorea.AslongasRussiaafrmsitssupportforthenon-proliferationtreatyanddenuclear-izationofNorthKoreaandsuspicionsarenotconrmedthatitis,throughofcialorunofcialties,assistingtheNorthsmissileprograms,Seoulislikelytoavoidgivingfurtheroffense.Inthesecircumstances,Russiahas6G.ROZMANANDS.RADCHENKOconsiderableroomtoboosttieswithPyongyang,usingthepossibilityofclosermilitarytiesandarmstransfersasakindofblackmail.GeorgyTolorayanotedinhisJune11,2015paperfortheKoreanEconomicInstitutethatRussia“isincreasinglylessinterestedinamomen-tousKoreanunicationundertheROKsguidancewhichwouldresultinasuddenshiftofbalanceofpowerintheregion.”3Headdedthatthenuclearissueislessurgentnow.WhatreallymattersaresecurityguaranteestoNorthKoreaandforWashingtonandSeoultoofferthose,theregimemustbemoreresilient.RussiansupportforeconomicprojectsandappealsforSeoultoliftsanctionsandbacktrilateralprojectsservethatend.TolorayanotesneitherMoscownorPyongyangwouldacceptanydete-riorationinthestrategicbalance,whichleavesSeoulinthepositionofnoprospectsforunicationunlessitdeesWashington,putsasidedenuclear-izationforthedistantfuture,andengagesPyongyangaswellasMoscowandBeijingonamassiveeconomicprogramtreatedasthefoundationofreconciliation,whilesimultaneouslyrefocusingawayfromtheUSallianceandsecuritytieswithJapaninordertoforgethekindofpowerbalanceinNortheastAsiaconducivetoregionaldiplomacyandregimereassurance.RussiacouldbemarginalizedbyChinaandwantstocapitalizeonargumentsaimedatPyongyangandSeoulthattheonlyrealisticalternat