外文翻译--港口集群治理.doc

Governance In Seaport Clusters Peter W. de Erlangen 1. IntroductionApart from well-known physical factors such as the location, maritime accessibility and hinterland infrastructure, the governance of seaports is an important determinant of their performance.An analysis of the governance of seaports has mostly been limited to the role of the port authority. Notwithstanding the central role of port authorities in ports, we argue that an analysis of governance in seaports requires attention for the role of (private) firms. Institutional economic literature offers a useful framework for ana lysing advantages and disadvantages of alternative governance mechanisms and provides a basis for ana lysing the roles of port authorities. In this paper we deal with the issue of cluster governance in seaports and illustrate our approach with an analysis of the port of Rotterdam.First, we briefly discuss the theoretical foundations of the cluster governance concept. Second, we discuss the role of port authorities in the governance of seaports. Third, we present empirical results of a survey among 43 cluster experts in Rotterdam on the governance of Rotterdams port cluster. We feminality the paper with conclusions.2.The Quality Of Cluster Governance We define cluster governance as the mix of and relations between various mechanisms of coordination used in a cluster. The quality of the governance differs between clusters. The quality depends on the level of coordination costs and the scope of coordination beyond price. Low coordination costs and much coordination beyond price improve the quality of governance.When the benefits of coordination are distributed unequally, when (the threat of) opportunistic behaviour prevents coordination or when benefits of coordination are uncertain, coordination beyond price does not arise spontaneously or instantaneously, even when benefits of coordination exceed costs. Therefore there is in general a shortage of coordination beyond price. More coordination beyond price improves the quality of the governance of clusters.2.1Trust In clusters where the level of trust is high, (average) transaction costs are relatively low, because of low costs to specify contracts and low monitoring costs. Furthermore, costs of coordination beyond price are lower and as a consequence, more coordination beyond price will arise. The level of trust in a cluster is influenced by the importance of reputation effects in a cluster. If reputation effects are strong, abusing trust has negative effects and therefore a culture of trust is sustained.2.2 IntermediariesThe presence of intermediaries lowers coordination costs and expands the scope of coordination beyond price, for three related reasons. First, they provide a bridging tie (Weevily and Zachery, 1999) between two or more otherwise not connected exchange partners. Second, intermediaries reduce coordination costs because they connect cognitions. Intermediaries can bridge cognitive differences between firms that operate in different market environments. This role of connecting cognitions is especially important in clusters given the fact that clusters are characterism by a cognitive division of Limbourg (Belus and Tardigrada, 2000). 2.3Leader firmsLeader firms are strategic Centre with superior coordination skills and the ability to steer change (Lorenz and Baden fuller, 1995). The behaviour of leader firms influences the performance of the cluster as a whole, because leader firms have both the ability and incentive to invest in the competitiveness of a whole network of firms. We identify three investments of leader firms with positive effects (these can be termed leader firm externalities) on other firms in the cluster: Internationalism; innovation; contributing to solving collective action problems (Olson, 1971)Thus, leader firms can enable or even enforce cooperation and for that reason add to the performance of clusters. 2.4Collective action in clustersThe problem of collective action (Olson, 1971) is relevant in clusters. Even when collective benefits of co-operation to achieve collective goals exceed (collective) costs, such co-operation does not (always) develop spontaneously. Different CAPs (Collective Action Problems), such as education and training and innovation are relevant in clusters. For each CAP a governance regime arises. In this context, a regime can be defined as a relatively stable collaborative agreement that provides actors with the capacity to overcome collective action problems.3.Port authorities as cluster managersEven though a variety of actors play a role in the governance of a seaport cluster, the port authority is the most central actor. The term cluster manager can be used to describe the role of the port authority. We discuss the role of a cluster manager in general, the institutional position of port authorities and sources of revenue and investment decisions of port authorities. 3.1 The role of a cluster managerA perfect cluster manager would be an galvanization with the following four characteristics.1. A cluster manager has incentives to invest in the cluster, because its revenues are related to the performance of the cluster. The perfect cluster manager would receive a share of the value added generated in the cluster as revenue, for instance through a cluster tax.2. A cluster manager invests in activities with cluster benefits (instead of firm specific benefits). Furthermore, the cluster manager aims to invest when cluster benefits exceed costs.3. A cluster manager aims to distribute investment costs for investments to those firms that benefit. This involves co-finance arrangements with a specific group of beneficiary firms.4. A cluster manager operates self-sustaining: over time investments equal revenues.The port authority matches all four criteria: they have incentives and resources to invest in the cluster. The port dues and lease revenues are resources to invest in the port cluster. Furthermore, they generally are self-sustaining and invest in the performance of the cluster as a whole. Port authorities invest in activities with general benefits, such as port expansion, safety and dredging. Given their institutional position, most port authorities are not profit drivenThe port authority owns and exploits the port area and benefits when the port cluster is an attractive location because they can lease more land and charge higher prices. Furthermore, port authorities collect port dues. Thus, the more ships call a port the higher the port dues. For these two reasons, port authorities have a clear incentive to invest in the performance of the port cluster.Thus, port authorities can be regarded as cluster managers.3.2 Revenues of port authorities The port authority has various sources of revenue. The existence and relative importance of various charges differs between ports (Asar, 2001). In general, port authorities generate revenue from three sources: charges to shipowners/ ship operators; charges to tenants in the port, including terminal operators; charges to cargo-owners.Charges for shipowners/ship operators are termed port dues and in most cases related to the size of vessels. These port dues are justified by investments in dredging, safety systems, and investments in port basins. Charges for tenants are lease charges to firms such as terminal operators and warehousing and production firms. Charges for cargo owners are termed wharfage and are mostly related to cargo volume or to the value of goods. Some port authorities do not have wharfage charges, because cargo owners indirectly pay both other charges as well. In such cases, a part of both other charges can be conceived as pseudo-wharfage. This implies that the port charges do not have to be fully justified on the basis of investments with benefits for either tenants or shipowners. Investments for the benefit of cargo owners, such as investments in hinterland infrastructure, hinterland access or warehousing facilities, can be justified because the cargo owners as users of the port pay the port charges in the end. Therefore, investments with benefits for these cargo owners are justified, even if port charges are paid only by tenants and shipping firms.3.3 Investment decisions of port authoritiesThe port charges have to be justified by investments of the port authority. Investment appraisal on the basis of which criteria do port authorities decide to invest- is therefore a central issue for port authorities. We claim that the following simple rule is a guideline for investment appraisal of port cluster managers: benefits for the cluster of an investment should exceed costs for the cluster. Cluster benefits are the sum of all benefits of firms in the cluster, cluster costs are the costs of an investment for firms in the cluster. In most cases costs are incurred because port charges are required for cluster investments. Since costs equal revenues, a high investment level requires high port charges.4. Cluster governance in the port of RotterdamIn this section we present an empirical case study of the port of Rotterdam. We interviewed 43 port experts in the port of Rotterdam. First, we deal with the importance of cluster governance for the performance of the cluster. In the next four paragraphs, we discuss the empirical results for the four variables that influence the quality of the cluster governance. Sixth, we briefly discuss the role of the port authority in Rotterdam and end with conclusions.4.1 The importance of cluster governance in Rotterdams seaport clusterThese results show that cluster governance is less important than the structure of the cluster and the economic development in general, but more important than national and international policies. The experts were also asked to indicate the relative importance of the four variables of cluster governance, also by ranking them.4.2 Trust in Rotterdams port clusterVirtually all cluster experts agree with the proposition that trust is important for the quality of the cluster governance, and as discussed above, argue that trust is the most important governance variable. The cluster experts evaluated the port of Rotterdam and its main competitors, Antwerp and Hamburg, with regard to the presence of trust.4.3 Leader firms in Rotterdams port clusterVirtually all cluster experts also agree that the presence of leader firms is an important determinant of the quality of cluster governance. The experts evaluate the three competing ports as follows:RotterdamAntwerpHamburgpresence of leader firms2.02.3b1.5b significantly better than in worst portAntwerp is evaluated the most positive, Hamburg has the lowest score. In general the experts indicate that all three ports do score relatively good with regard to leader firms.4.4 Intermediaries in Rotterdams port clusterWith regard to intermediaries, a significant majority of the experts agree with the presumed positive effect of intermediaries on cluster governance, but nine out of the 43 disagree.4.5 Solutions for CAPs in Rotterdams port clusterFinally, we discuss the quality of solutions for collective action problems. Out of the five proposed CAPs in seaports, the cluster experts judged four relevant：IssueCollective action problemRelevantNot relevantTraining and education38a3Marketing and promotion37 a4Hinterland access37 a4Innovation29 a12Internationalism1328 aa significant majority4.6 The role of the port authority in RotterdamThe Rotterdam municipal port authority (RMPM) is a public landlord port. The galvanization formally is a part of the municipality Rotterdam but operates to a large extent autonomous. Currently, a modification of the institutional structure, to grant the port authority more autonomy, and to change the monitoring and control function from the city council to an independent board of directors is discussed. However, even when the suggested new structure is approved, the municipality will remain the major shareholder.5. ConclusionsIn this paper we argue that an analysis of the governance in port clusters adds to our understanding port competition, port development and port performance. We have presented an analytic framework for ana lysing (port) cluster governance. The quality of the governance of a cluster depends on the level of transaction costs in a cluster and the scope of coordination beyond price. Four variables influence both: the presence of leader firms, the presence of intermediaries, the level of trust and solutions to collective action problems. Cluster governance can be evaluated by ana lysing those four variables. In this approach, port authorities are no longer Centre stage; they do play an important role in the governance of the cluster, but their role is interrelated with the activities of private firms, associations and public-private organicists. The scope of activities of the port authority has thus to be ana lysed in this broader framework.港口集群治理Peter W. de Erlangen 1、Introduction引言除了众所周知的地理因素，如位置、海上交通方便程度和腹地的基础设施，港口治理是其功能发挥的决定性因素。作者分析了港口治理大多被限定为港口当局的职能。尽管港口当局在港口中起着核心作用, 但我们认为分析港口治理对港口的作用同时需要关注（私营）企业。制度经济文献分析提供了一个有益的框架，分析优点和缺点替代治理机制提供基础分析港口当局的作用。在本文中,我们处理港口集群治理的问题，阐明我们的方法并分析了鹿特丹港。首先,我们简要的讨论了集群治理概念的理论基础。其次,我们讨论港口当局在港口治理中的作用。第三,我们分析了来自于43位专家对鹿特丹市鹿特丹港口集群治理的一项调查的研究结果。最后完成文章的结论。2、集群治理的质量我们定义集群治理为“混合之间的关系，以及各种机制的协调用于集聚。”集群之间的治理质量不同。质量取决于协调成本水平和“范围”的“协调无价”。 低协调成本和多协调成本无价能提高治理质量。当协调的利益分配不均，当（威胁）防止投机行为协调或协调利益不确定时，协调无价不会自发或立即产生，即使协调收益超过成本。因此一般缺少协调无价。更多的无价协调能改善集群治理的质量。2.1信任在集群中信任水平高，（平均)交易成本则相对较低, 因为低成本指定合同和监督成本低。此外,协调成本无价越低，更多的协调无价会因此出现。在一个集群中的信任水平受到声誉效应的影响。如果声誉效应强, 滥用信任会产生负面影响，因此信任文化是持续的。2.2中介机构中介机构存在降低协调成本和扩大协调无价的范围有三个相关的原因。首先, 他们提供了一个“桥梁纽带” 在两个或多个之间否则不能连接交换伙伴(Weevily and Zachery, 1999)。其次，中介机构降低协调成本，因为它们“连接认知”。 企业之间的桥梁中介机构可以认知不同市场环境中运作的差异。而连接认知有特别重要的作用在集群中考虑集群实际的特征是“认知分工” (Belus and Tardigrada, 2000)。2.3领导公司领导公司是“具有卓越协调能力和驾驭能力，改变战略中心” (Lorenz and Baden fuller, 1995)。领导公司的行为影响整个集群的功能，因为领导企业有能力和动力投资于一个有竞争力的整体公司网络。我们确定了三个投资于领导公司的其他公司的积极作用（这些可以被称为“领导公司外部性”）在集群中:国际化、创新、有助于解决集体行动问题(Olson, 1971)。因此, 领导公司能加强合作,甚至可以增加企业的业绩。2.4集群中的集体行动集体行动的“问题”在集群中是相关的 (Olson, 1971)。即使在合作的集体利益中实现集体（目标）超过集体成本，这种合作不（总是）自发发展的。不同的集体行动问题如教育、培训和创新是相互联系的在集群中。对每个集体行动问题会产生相应的管理体制。在这种情形下, 一个管理体制可以被定义为一种“相对稳定的合作协议处理克服集体行动问题的能力。”3、港口当局作为集群管理者虽然有各种行为者参与集群治理，但港务局起着最核心的作用。可以把“集群管理者”描述为港口当局的作用。我们讨论集群管理者的一般作用，港务当局所处的位置、收入来源和投资决策。3.1集群管理者的作用一个“完美”的集群管理者将是一个具有以下四个特点的组织：1、集群管理者激励来投资在产业集群中，因为它的收入与集群绩效有关。一个“完美”的集群管理者将收到一份增值产生的收入在集群中，比如通过“集群税”。2、集群管理者进行投资活动获得集群收益（替代公司特殊收益）。此外, 集群管理者的目标是当投资的“集群收益”超过成本。3、集群管理者的目的是把投资成本分配给那些投资获益的公司。这涉及到一起筹措资金安排于一组特定的受益人公司。4、集群管理者经营达到自给自足：经过一段时间投资等于收入。港务局匹配所有四项标准：它们有动机和资金投资于集群。在港口集群中港口费和租赁向投资提供资金。此外,它们通常自给自足及投资于整个集群的绩效。港口当局投资于一般福利活动，例如港口拓展、安全、疏浚。考虑到制度的关系 ,大多数港口当局没有利润的驱动。港务局拥有并开发港区而获得收益，港口集群是一个具有吸引力的位置，因为它们可以出租更多的土地，并且收取更高的价格。此外,港口当局还征收“港口费”。 因此,船只越多的港口会产生较高的港口费。基于上述两个原因，港口当局有明确鼓励投资于港口集群的性能。3.2港口当局的收入港口当局有各种来