（会计学专业论文）高新技术上市公司高管薪酬影响因素的实证分析.pdf

i ? ? ? ? ? !#$%?a7?bcdef?ghijk?lm? no?pqrstu?vwx3y?z? ?_t;a? ? ?bc;de?fgh?ijk?lmn?o?pnq? rs7?tu?pqvw)xy?zbz?*+fgh?ijk?|? ?;?#?v?tu?vw?0? ?pvw?q?gq?34?gh?b? ?v? ? ? q?h?v?q?)? ?“ufi ?fl ?g?0q?fl ?)-?oizh ”uv?fl ?9?q?”u ?fl ?ut?9?zdv ;?c?v?;? ?0?|?v? q? ? ?t? 0?ijkt? ?zh? fl ?t? ?vq?)?c?s9? l?ev?)?)? ?q? ? there are many problems such as different objective, incompatible benefit, information asymmetry which exist in modern enterprises between owners and executives. the complexity and uncertainty of operating enterprise urged the gravity of this problem; we can solve it through designing and carrying out a benign compensation scheme. in knowledge economy era, the competition among enterprises in essence is the competition of person with ability; executive especially excellent executives become the core resource of modern enterprise, because of the particularity of executive human capital, how to motivate, attract executive and enhance the profits of enterprises is key to development of enterprises, furthermore, executive compensation has this effect. so, it has become a highly urgent and realistic task to set up a system to encourage the managers, so as to reduce the agency costs to the lowest and improve the operational performance. this dissertation falls into four sections. the first chapter is the introduction. it introduces the reasons of choosing this topic, the theoretical and empirical significance of this topic, provides an overview of the domestic and overseas scholars research on this topic, and also explains the analytical methods, the layouts of the content and the innovation. the second chapter describes the relative theories. it defines several basic concepts related to the main topic of the dissertation, explains related theory of senior executive compensation. it discusses how the regulation on the disclosure of senior executive compensation evolves. the third part is an empirical research on the factors that affect senior executive compensation. the fourth part comes to the conclusions and suggestion. the empirical study of executive compensation in chinese listed companies in 2004-2006 concentrates on compensation amount, compensation structure, and the incentive intensity of compensation with the statistic method of line regression. this paper analyses on the factors about the executive compensation of chinese publicly listed companies. we set up hypotheses from firm performance, firm size and ownership structure. from the empirical researches, we find a significant positive association between executive compensation and firm performance, firm size, district. lower the top block holder owns, higher the compensation get. when we use the return on equity performance indicators, senior executives salary is correlated positively with the performance for current year and last year. but the coefficient between the senior abstract iii executives salary and performance for last year is smaller. there is a weak negation relation between compensation levels of senior executive and proportion of the state-owned stock. key words?high-tech firm senior executive compensation ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? $%.?abc defg$%h?ijk.lmn?opq. rl?stug+vwexyz_abc.defwde xghijk%lmnopqr.storl?sw ughivwq xymz|?pjk?.?p?+?.?t? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? $%?z?xymz|? ?de.? ?t?-de.?w?de? p?6de.?pastwp;? ?pjk?“?det? ?.deh?fi fl ? ? ? ? !#$ ? % 1 3y?p?v? !a?ijk?#$?|? %?a?v?ijk?jk?bc?56? de? ?./:?;?,1996 2 ab?c?defgh?ijk-?lm-2000n3o ? !#$ ? % 2 ?g ?6|?p? ?7? ?vc?0? ?bc;?fl ?y?fi ?svt?o;?2?r? r?v|?s ?c?e? ?o+? ?%?=v?#c? ?q?efvfl ?|? 1 taussings f wb?baker w sb?american corporations and their executivesb?a statistical inquiryb?journal of economics-1925n3o p1-51 ? !#$ ? % 4 ?4?t?lt?p?3n?o+?4? ;9?v? ? ab46? oc?jh?dt? ?h?q? 0?*?e?9 d?f?7zh./fl ?|?s9?g?o3n?o+? ?h#%h?i?jk0?t? ? ?7zh3/fl ? |?o?89:? ?s? yg? b?qstobinq?g? ?tstobinq ? !#$ ? % 5 ?y? ?0?r?) ?4?lt?q? 0?4?7?v? !? ?70a!?:?jk? ? e?y?0?ij? 4 ?);9?v?t? kl4? ?70a!?h? ?-mro?no 2?&;97v? p31?o7?d?t?h?q?# e?4?vw?t?34?p? fl ?hh?t? ?4? ?t?34?p?q?$?ijk?vw? !?8?ohlm?.?vw? u?f?2tu?=?z?v? ?r?g?50?o?7)?ijkt?h? q?#e?%)hi?%?g?%?vfl ?|? ?%?hi?%? y.? ?k? g?%?ft? ?v0?fl ?(?4? 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