CCPS安全领导力和管理培训之管理角色和责任.ppt

1 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ManagementRolesandResponsibilities IndividualRolesandResponsibilities ThebestorganizationstakethetimetowritethemdownClarifiesgrayareastoallemployeesEliminatesmanyoversightswhenpeoplechangerolesServesasabasisforre mappingrolestootherpositionswhenmakinganorganizationalchange Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers TheRoleofPSSteeringCommittees Placethesewhereyouhavesignificanthazards andprotectivelayersthatneedhighlevelofintegrity RoleApprovecertainchangesaspartoftheMOCprocessAskalotofquestions Usethecollectiveexperienceoftheteamtouncoverareasofweaknessinwellintendedchanges Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers 4 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ManagementProcessSafetyCompetency Training andCertification Lodi NewJersey 1995 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ContributingFactors TollingoperationInadequatecommunicationofhazardsbetweenTechnicandNapp toller NoPHAconductedBlenderinappropriatefortheprocessSOPsandTraininglessthanadequateLackofunderstandingofconsequenceswithregardtoemergencyactiontooffloadblender Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ProcessSafetyCompetency 1 KnowthehazardsoftheprocessKnowwheretheprocesscanposeathreattoequipmentlimitsKnowtheprotectionlayers safeguards andwaysthattheycanbecompromisedUnderstandadministrative procedurallayersofprotectionandhowyoucanmeasuretheireffectiveness Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ProcessSafetyCompetency 1 BeabletocontinuouslyimprovetheriskprofileinyourareaofresponsibilitybyapplyinglessonsfromLocalproductionunit yourunit OtherproductionunitsinyourcompanyIncidentsatothercompanieswithinyourindustryIncidentsinindustriesdifferentthanyourown Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Ratethefollowinggroupsinyourplantagainsttheitemsinthe ProcessSafetyCompetency listTheprocessoperatorsTheshiftteamleaders supervisorsTheUnitleaderThemembersoftheSiteManagerstaff DiscussionQuestions Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers TrainingforEngineersTrainingforOperationsManagementShiftteamleadersUnitLeaderOperationsManagerSiteManager ProcessSafetyTraining Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers TrainingforEngineersForeachoftheCriticalPSMelementsintheOrganization ManagementTemplatefortheDesign Engineeringcolumn dothefollowing Createatableasshownbelow andfillitin Exercise Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Teamsgivethebestdecisions Correct WhatarewaystoprovideengineersthePScompetenciesthattheyneed Discussion Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers TrainingforOperationsManagementAskthefollowingquestionforeachoperationsmanagementlevel andforeachoftheprocesssafetycompetencyitems Doesthismanagementlevelneedtohavethiscompetencyinordertomakegooddecisionsinhis herrole Fillinthetableonfollowingpage using N for needtoknow andusing D for donotneedtoknow Exercise Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers TablefortheExercise Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Inyourorganization DoyoutestyourmanagerstomakesuretheyhavetheProcessSafetycompetencyknowledgetheyneedtomakethedecisionstheyarerequiredtomake Ifyes describe Whenanewpersontransfersintoanoperationsleadershiprole whatisthemechanismforthemtoacquirethePScompetencyknowledgethattheymusthavebeforetheystartmakingkeydecisions DiscussionQuestions Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers 16 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ManagementSelectandHireRightPeoplefortheRole ExerciseListthecriteriausedatyourworkplacetoHireoperatorsHireengineersAppointoperationsunitleaders Select HireRightPeople Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Manycriteriatothinkabout buttwothatweshouldhighlightCapableofgraspingtechnologyImportantintheoperatorranksEquallyimportantmanagementpositionselectionsAvoidrotationofindividualsintomanufacturingjobs togetthemexperience iftheycannotgraspthetechnology Enforcementofrulesissituational Screenthesetypesoutofthegroupaimingatleadershiproles Theycandestroyagoodprocesssafetycultureovernight Select HireRightPeople Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers 19 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ManagementCultureandEmployeeEngagement ProcessSafetyCulture WhatIsIt ThecombinationofgroupvaluesandbehaviorsthatdeterminethemannerinwhichprocesssafetyismanagedHowwedothingsaroundhereWhatweexpecthereHowwebehavewhennooneiswatching 20 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers WhyIsItImportant InvestigationsofcatastrophiceventshaveidentifiedcommonprocesssafetycultureweaknessesthatareoftenfactorsinotherseriousincidentExamples LackofenforcementofhighsafetystandardsNosenseofvulnerabilityPoorcommunicationsDelayedornoresponsetoprocesssafetyissuesandconcerns 21 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Challenger 1986 22 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers SolidRocket Cutaway 23 SolidRocketMotorpropellantandaftfieldjoint Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Immediate Technical Cause Failureduetofaultydesign unacceptablysensitiveto EffectsoftemperaturePhysicaldimensionsCharacterofmaterialsEffectsofreusabilityProcessingReactionofthejointtodynamicloading 24 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers CultureRelatedFindings Reportingrequirementsforissues problemsnotconcise Unabletogetcriticalinformationtotheproperlevelsofmanagementinpropertimeframe LittleornotrendanalysisIneffectiveorganizationalstructuresWorkforcedecreaseinreliabilityandqualityassuranceFlawedlaunchdecisionmakingprocess 25 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Recommendations ReviewofShuttleManagementStructureRedefinitionoftheProgramManager sresponsibilityEstablishShuttleSafetyPanelRepresentationfromthesafetyorganization missionoperations andtheastronautofficeAddressshuttleoperationalissues launchcommitcriteria flightrules flightreadinessandriskmanagement 26 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Recommendations CriticalityReviewandHazardAnalysisEstablishSafetyOrganizationOfficeofSafety ReliabilityandQualityAssurancetobeheadedbyanAssociateadministrator reportingdirectlytotheNASAAdministratorEnsureadequateoversightoffunctions 27 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ChemicalandRefiningIndustries SymptomsofWeakCulture 1 LackofawarenessofoperationalsafetyrisksbyseniormanagementPoorhousekeeping prevalentleaks spillsanddebrisLackofengagement involvementbymanagementindailyoversightofPSMsystems Superficialaudits checkthebox mentality Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ChemicalandRefiningIndustries SymptomsofWeakCulture 2 ChroniccostcuttingandproductionpressuresinabsenceofanincreasedfocusoncriticalPShazardsInadequatemetrics misplacedconfidenceininjuryratesLackoffollow uponprocesssafetyconcerns hugebacklogofactionitemsPoorincidentreporting learningandriskreview Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers CausesofWeakProcessSafetyCulture Lackofprocesssafetyleadership priorities involvement Low disciplineoperatingenvironmentNormalizationofdeviance relianceonluckandfalsesenseofsecurityNon responsivenesstosafetyconcernsFailuretolearnandadjustthestatusquoLackofeffectiveperformancemonitoringLackoftrust subordinatesandsupervisors Notlisteningtotechnicalexperts 30 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers HowToBuildaProcessSafetyCulture EstablishProcessSafetyasacorevalueProvidestrongleadershipatalllevelsEstablishandenforcehighstandardsofperformanceInsurethatallleadersarefullyawareofprocessrisksandthesafeguardlayersintheirareaofcontrolEmpowerindividualstosuccessfullyfulfilltheirsafetyresponsibilitiesDefercomplexproblemstoqualifiedtechnicalexpertsEnsureopenandeffectivecommunications fostermutualtrustProvidetimelyresponsetoProcessSafetyissuesandconcerns 31 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Questions Whataspectsofyourcompany sprocesssafetyculturearegood Top3 andwhichcoulduseimprovement Bottom3 basedonyourjudgment What2culturalweaknessescouldyoufixquicklyinyourareaafteryoureturnfromthiscourse What2culturalweaknesses ifaddressedcompany widewhereyouwork wouldbringthegreatestreductionofriskintheplant 32 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Thespecificactivitiesthatinsure Thatoperators mechanicsareengagedinprocesssafetyreviewsandincidentinvestigationsThatoperators mechanicshaveknowledgeofrecommendationsfromsafetyreviews audits andincidentinvestigations andarekeptawareofthestatusofthoserecommendations 33 WhatIsWorkforceInvolvement Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Engagingtheoperatorsandmechanicsprovidesfeedbackandinsightintotheprocessthatisonlyavailablefromthosewhooperateandmaintaintheequipmenteveryday Example Thehighestrisksinaprocessarealmostalwaysatnon steadystateconditions InaPHA engineersareexcellentsourcesofinsightonsteady statebehavioroftheunit butoperatorsarethebestsourcesofinsightfornon steadystateorabnormaloperations 34 WhyIsItImportant Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Describe giveexamplesbaseduponwhereyouwork Operator mechanicinvolvementincriticalPSincidentinvestigationsFeedbackandinformationsharingsystemswhichinsurethatoperators mechanicsareawareofstatusofallkeyProcessSafetyrecommendations PHA s incidentinvestigations etc 35 WorkforceInvolvement Questionsfordiscussion Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Whyareweonlyfocusingonengagementofoperatorsandmechanics WhatdidwelearnfromapplicationofTotalQualityManagementtomanufacturingoperations Exercise Name3stepsthatcouldbetakentoincreaseemployeeengagement andtellhoweachwouldcreatebetterperformanceinPSM 36 MovingfromWorkforceInvolvementtoEmployeeEngagement Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers 37 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ManagementMeasurementandMetrics WhyItIsImportant Facilitiesshouldmonitorthereal timeperformancemanagementssystemsratherthanwaitforincidentsorforinfrequentauditstoidentifymanagementsystemfailuresPerformancemonitoringallowsproblemstobeidentifiedandcorrectiveactionstakenbeforeaseriousincidentoccurs 38 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers WhyItIsImportant 39 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers YouCannotManageWhatYouCannotMeasure YouWillNotManageWhatYouDoNotChoosetoMeasure MeasurementandMetrics Establishperformanceandefficiencyindicatorstomonitorthenear timeeffectivenessofyourPSMprogram Needtoconsider Whichindicatorstouse leading lagging ormixture HowoftentocollectdataHowutilizethedata 40 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ProcessSafetyLeadingIndicators Examples NumberofopenrecommendationsfromPHAs IncidentInvestigations Audits etc NumberofnearmissincidentssubmittedNumber orpercent ofoverduePMtasksonsafetycriticalsystems Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ProcessSafetyLaggingIndicators Examples NumberoffiresandexplosionsNumberofLossofContainmenteventswithoutfireorexplosionNumberofinjuriesthattiedtolossofcontainment Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers LeadingorLaggingTheDebateisEndless TheshortcomingofLaggingIndicatorsis TheshortcomingofLeadingIndicatorsis Souseamixandproblemsolved Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers SelectingMetrics WhatDoestheAccidentPyramidTeachUs Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Thereisactionableinformationatthebaseofthepyramidtogiveusfeedbackonwhatisworkingandwhatisnot ProtectiveBarriers HolesorWeaknesses SelectingMetrics WhatDidtheBarrierModelTeachUs 45 ProcessDeviationFromEvent Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers MarsClimateOrbiter 1999 46 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers DiscussionExercise UsingtheBehaviorLeadingIndicatormodel develop10PSMmetricsthatwouldbeofvalue UsingtheAccidentPyramidmodel develop10PSMmetricsthatwouldbeofvalue UsingtheBarrierModel develop10PSMmetricsthatwouldbeofvalue 47 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers 48 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ManagementAuditing Auditing Asystematic independentreviewtoverifyconformancewithprescribedstandardsofcareEmploysawell definedreviewprocesstoensureconsistencyandtoallowtheauditortoreachdefensibleconclusionsAnRBPSmanagementsystemauditisthesystematicreviewofRBPSmanagementsystemstoverifysuitabilityandeffective consistentimplementation 49 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers WhyIsItImportant EvaluatesRBPSmanagementsystemstoensuretheyareinplaceandfunctioninginamannerthatprotectsemployees customers communities andphysicalassetsagainstprocesssafetyriskAreanimportantcontrolmechanismwithintheoverallmanagementofprocesssafety 50 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Longford 51 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers AuditingIssues AuditingbyExxonin1994 1997and6monthspriortoincident followingOIMS OperationalIntegrityManagementSystems goodreportcard findingsrelatedtoimprovingthesystems riskassessmentandmanagement slippedfrom4to3VictorianWorkcoverauditin1996 goodreport mappedH SmanagementsystemsESSOinternalreview4monthsprior positiveresults Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ComplianceAudits ConductauditAtleastevery3yearsCertifyevaluationofcomplianceVerifyproceduresandpracticesareadequateandbeingfollowedByself bycompanyrepresentatives byaconsultantAuditteamAtleastonepersonknowledgeableintheprocess 53 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ComplianceAudits ReportoffindingsDetermineappropriateresponsetoeachfindingCorrectdeficienciesDocumentactionsTracktocompletionRetaintwomostrecentauditreports 54 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers References GuidelinesforAuditingProcessSafetyManagementSystems 2ndEdition publishedbyCCPS 55 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers DiscussionQuestions Whoconductsprocesssafetyauditsforyourcompany Whataretheircredentials Canyouquicklyfindthelasttwo Havetheissuesbeenresolved 56 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers 57 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ManagementIncidentInvestigation IncidentInvestigation Aprocessforreporting tracking andinvestigatingincidentsthatincludes 1 Thetrendingofincidentandincidentdatatoidentifyreoccurringincidents2 Aformalprocessforinvestigatingincidentsincludingstaffing performing documenting andtrackinginvestigationsofprocesssafetyincidents3 Managingtheresolutionanddocumentationofrecommendationsgeneratedbytheinvestigations 58 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers WhyIsItimportant IsawaytolearnfromincidentsandcommunicatelessonslearnedtointernalpersonnelandotherstakeholdersFeedbackcanapplytothespecificincidentoragroupofincidentssharingsimilarrootcausesDeterminationofrootcausesofequipmentfailuresandpersonnelerrorscanresultinsolutionsthereducethefrequencyand orconsequencesofentirecategoriesofincidents 59 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers ColumbiaSpaceShuttle 2003 60 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers LessonsLearned CSBInvestigationsfound ThehazardsinvolvedintheincidentwerewellknownTherewerewarningsignsleadinguptotheincidentThereweremanagementsystemproblemsIncidentsoccurincompaniesofallsizesManychemicalrelatedincidentsoccurinbusinessesoutsideofchemicalmanufacturing 61 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers LessonsLearned continued Incidentsoftenoccurduringstartup shutdownormaintenanceratherthanduringnormaloperationsRegulationsareofteninadequateornotenforcedManagementthoughttheyhadagoodsafetyprogramThereareoftensafetycultureproblemsTheywereallpreventable 62 Copyright 2011CenterforChemicalProcessSafetyoftheAmericanInstituteofChemicalEngineers Incidents IncidentscomeinavarietyofformsThemostcommontypeofincidentsinvolve InjuryPropertydamageLossofproductionAlloftheabove 63 Sometimesanincidentdoesnotresultinanyoftheabove butcouldeasilyhaveifcircumstanceshadbeenslightlydifferent Wecallthese near misses Weshouldcallthemwarnings Copyrig