会计信息与管理者报酬激励契约研究综述

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The paper finds that the ultmi atecontrolling shareholdersw ill like to disclose lessprivate information, that is themore divergence ofthe ultmi ate voting rights and cash flow rightsand the larger ultmi ate voting rights, the lower levelofvoluntary disclosurewillbe. The board ofdirectors has some activemonitoring to the ulnulltmi ate controlling shareholders.StudyonAccounting InformationValueonSegmentedCapitalMarketsLu JingAbstractBy means ofEventStudy andPanelDataRegression, the paper studies the relevance between theCAR and earningsandbook value ofannual reportsdisclosed by Chinese dual listing companies according to PRC- GAAP, HK- GAAP or IASs, which issueA shares andH sharessmi ultaneously. InA share marke,t the accounting information ofdomestic reportshasnot value relevance toCAR ofA share, the reconciliationofearningsand book values from PRC- GAAP toHK- GAAP or IASshas notye.t However, inH sharemarke,t themain accounting informanulltion in international reports can influenceH share ROA), market performance index (Tobinnullq) and owner fortune (OF) to construct a model to analyze the relevance betweencash compensation schemes and the change of performance ofpublic listed companies, including dealing with multinullcollinearly problem. Thepaper discovers that there ispositive relation between compensation schemesofmanagementand current period change and lastperiod change ofROE, ROA andOF. There is negative relation between compensation schemes ofmanagementand currentperiod change ofTobinnullq and posinulltive relation between compensation schemesofmanagement and lastperiod change ofTobinnullq. M oreover, the paper also discovers thatdirectioncommittee or bonus committee dependsmore on accounting earnings index than on ownerswealth index to decide the compensation scheme.On the ImprovementofGoingnullconcernAuditJudgment:OperationalEfficiencyEvidencenullsIntroductionZhangX iaolan et al.null null On? the? basis? o?f the mi portance of goingnullconcern? audi?t judgmen?t and? the state? o?f research? and? application of operationnulla?l status? evidence, this? paper? analyses? the? uncertainty? o?f audi?t standards, incompleteness of study conditions and slight probanullbility ofpracticalapplications; restates that operational status is the mi portant evidence for goingnullconcern audit judgmen;t and discusses thatoperationalefficiency is the core indicator forweighing operational status. Then itutilizesFactorAnalysis to choose financial indicators, usesDEA to calculate operationalefficiency, constructsbasic judgmentmodelbased on presentguidesand mi provementmodelafter introducing opernullationalefficiency throughLogisticRegression, and proves the validity for operational efficiency evidencenulls introduction.AccountingInformationand theManagerialCompensationContracts: A LiteratureReview13Lu Jing& Hu Yunquannull null The paper base on a review of the literature on accounting information and the compensation ofmanagerial incentive contracts, discuss theaccounting information actsupon the compensation ofmanagerial incentive contracts, and further exploresmeas