金融体系的比较外文翻译.doc

毕业设计（论文）外文参考文献译文本原文出处 financial studies & research 毕业设计(论文)题目：人民币内外价值背离原因分析comparative financial systemsfranklin allen wharton schooluniversity of pennsylvaniaphiladelphia, pa 19104douglas galeeconomics departmentnew york universitynew york, ny 10003douglas.gapril 20011 what is a financial system?the purpose of a nancial system is to channel funds from agents with surpluses to agents with decits. in the traditional literature there have been two approaches to analyzing this process. the rst is to consider how agents interact through nancial markets. the second looks at the operation of nancial intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies. fifty years ago, the nancial system could be neatly bifurcated in this way. rich house-holds and large rms used the equity and bond markets,while less wealthy house-holds and medium and small rms used banks, insurance companies and other nancial institutions. table 1, for example, shows the ownership of corporate equities in 1950. households owned over 90 percent. by 2000 it can be seen that the situation had changed dramatically.by then households held less than 40 percent, nonbank intermediaries, primarily pension funds and mutual funds, held over 40 percent. this change illustrates why it is no longer possible to consider the role of nancial markets and nancial institutions separately. rather than intermediating directly between households and rms, nancial institutions have increasingly come to intermediate between households and markets, on the one hand, and between rms and markets,on the other. this makes it necessary to consider the nancial system as anirreducible whole.the notion that a nancial system transfers resources between households and rms is, of course, a simplication. governments usually play a significant role in the nancial system. they are major borrowers, particularlyduring times of war, recession, or when large infrastructure projects are being undertaken. they sometimes also save signicant amounts of funds. for example, when countries such as norway and many middle eastern states have access to large amounts of natural resources (oil), the government may acquire large trust funds on behalf of the population.in addition to their roles as borrowers or savers, governments usually playa number of other important roles. central banks typically issue at money and are extensively involved in the payments system. financial systems with unregulated markets and intermediaries, such as the us in the late nineteenth century, often experience nancial crises.the desire to eliminate these crises led many governments to intervene in a signicant way in the nancial system. central banks or some other regulatory authority are charged with regulating the banking system and other intermediaries, such as insurance companies. so in most countries governments play an important role in the operation of nancialsystems. this intervention means that the political system, which determines the government and its policies, is also relevant for the nancial system.there are some historical instances where nancial markets and institutions have operated in the absence of a well-dened legal system, relyinginstead on reputation and other implicit mechanisms. however, in most nancial systems the law plays an important role. it determines what kinds ofcontracts are feasible, what kinds of governance mechanisms can be used for corporations, the restrictions that can be placed on securities and so forth. hence, the legal system is an important component of a nancial system.a nancial system is much more than all of this, however. an important pre-requisite of the ability to write contracts and enforce rights of various kinds is a system of accounting. in addition to allowing contracts to be written, an accounting system allows investors to value a company more easily and to assess how much it would be prudent to lend to it. accounting information is only one type of information (albeit the most important) required by nancial systems. the incentives to generate and disseminate information are crucial features of a nancial system.without signicant amounts of human capital it will not be possible for any of these components of a nancial system to operate eectively. well-trained lawyers, accountants and nancial professionals such as bankers are crucial for an eective nancial system, as the experience of eastern europe demonstrates.the literature on comparative nancial systems is at an early stage. our survey builds on previous overviews by allen (1993), allen and gale (1995) and thakor (1996). these overviews have focused on two sets of issues.(1)normative: how eective are dierent types of nancial system atvarious functions?(2) positive: what drives the evolution of the nancial system?the rst set of issues is considered in sections 2-6, which focus on issues of investment and saving, growth, risk sharing, information provision and corporate governance, respectively. section 7 considers the inuence of law and politics on the nancial system while section 8 looks at the role nancial crises have had in shaping the nancial system. section 9 contains concludingremarks.2 investment and savingone of the primary purposes of the nancial system is to allow savings to be invested in rms. in a series of important papers, mayer (1988, 1990) documents how rms obtained funds and nanced investment in a number of dierent countries. table 2 shows the results from the most recent set of studies, based on data from 1970-1989, using mayers methodology. the gures use data obtained from sources-and-uses-of-funds statements. for france, the data are from bertero (1994), while for the us, uk, japan and germany they are from corbett and jenkinson (1996). it can be seen that internal nance is by far the most important source of funds in all countries.bank nance is moderately important in most countries and particularly important in japan and france. bond nance is only important in the us and equity nance is either unimportant or negative (i.e., shares are being repurchased in aggregate) in all countries. mayers studies and those using his methodology have had an important impact because they have raised the question of how important nancial markets are in terms of providing funds for investment. it seems that, at least in the aggregate, equity markets are unimportant while bond markets are important only in the us. these ndings contrast strongly with the emphasis on equity and bond markets in the traditional nance literature. bank nance is important in all countries,but not as important as internal nance.another perspective on how the nancial system operates is obtained by looking at savings and the holding of nancial assets. table 3 shows the relative importance of banks and markets in the us, uk, japan, france and germany. it can be seen that the us is at one extreme and germany at the other. in the us, banks are relatively unimportant: the ratio of assets to gdp is only 53%, about a third the german ratio of 152%. on the other hand, the us ratio of equity market capitalization to gdp is 82%, three times the german ratio of 24%. japan and the uk are interesting intermediate cases where banks and markets are both important. in france, banks are important and markets less so. the us and uk are often referred to as market-based systems while germany, japan and france are often referred to as bank-based systems. table 4 shows the total portfolio allocation of assets ultimately owned by the household sector. in the us and uk, equity is a much more important component of household assets than in japan,germany and france. for cash and cash equivalents (which includes bank accounts), the reverse is true. tables 3 and 4 provide an interesting contrast to table 2. one would expect that, in the long run, household portfolios would reect the nancing patterns of rms. since internal nance accrues to equity holders, one might expect that equity would be much more important in japan, france and germany. there are, of course, dierences in the data sets underlying the dierent tables. for example, household portfolios consist of nancial assets and exclude privately held rms, whereas the sources-and-uses-of-funds data include all rms. nevertheless, it seems unlikely that these dierences could cause such huge discrepancies. it is puzzling that these dierent ways of viewing the nancial system produce such radically dierent results.another puzzle concerning internal versus external nance is the dierence between the developed world and emerging countries. although it is true for the us, uk, japan, france, germany and for most other developed countries that internal nance dominates external nance, this is not the case for emerging countries. singh and hamid (1992) and singh (1995) show that, for a range of emerging economies, external nance is more important than internal nance. moreover, equity is the most important nancing instrument and dominates debt. this dierence between the industrialized nations and the emerging countries has so far received little attention.there is a large theoretical literature on the operation of and rationale for internal capital markets. internal capital markets dier from external capital markets because of asymmetric information, investment incentives, asset specicity, control rights, transaction costs or incomplete markets there has also been considerable debate on the relationship between liquidity and investment (see, for example, fazzari, hubbard and petersen(1988), hoshi, kashyap and scharfstein (1991)that the lender will not carry out the threat in practice, the incentive eect disappears. although the lenders behavior is now ex post optimal, both parties may be worse o ex ante.the time inconsistency of commitments that are optimal ex ante and suboptimal ex post is typical in contracting problems. the contract commits one to certain courses of action in order to inuence the behavior of the other party. then once that partys behavior has been determined, the benet of the commitment disappears and there is now an incentive to depart from it.whatever agreements have been entered into are subject to revision because both parties can typically be made better o by “renegotiating” the original agreement. the possibility of renegotiation puts additional restrictions on the kind of contract or agreement that is feasible (we are referring here to the contract or agreement as executed, rather than the contract as originally written or conceived) and, to that extent, tends to reduce the welfare of both parties ex ante. anything that gives the parties a greater power to commit themselves to the terms of the contract will, conversely, be welfare-enhancing.dewatripont and maskin (1995) (included as a chapter in this section) have suggested that nancial markets have an advantage over nancial intermediaries in maintaining commitments to refuse further funding. if the rm obtains its funding from the bond market, then, in the event that it needs additional investment, it will have to go back to the bond market. because the bonds are widely held, however, the rm will nd it dicult to renegotiate with the bond holders. apart from the transaction costs involved in negotiating with a large number of bond holders, there is a free-rider problem. each bond holder would like to maintain his original claim over the returns to the project, while allowing the others to renegotiate their claims in order to nance the additional investment. the free-rider problem, which is often thought of as the curse of cooperative enterprises, turns out to be a virtue in disguise when it comes to maintaining commitments.from a theoretical point of view, there are many ways of maintaining a commitment. financial institutions may develop a valuable reputation for maintaining commitments. in any one case, it is worth incurring the small cost of a sub-optimal action in order to maintain the value of the reputation. incomplete information about the borrowers type may lead to a similar outcome. if default causes the institution to change its beliefs about the defaulters type, then it may be optimal to refuse to deal with a rm after it has defaulted. institutional strategies such as delegating decisions to agents who are given no discretion to renegotiate may also be an eectivecommitment device.several authors have argued that, under certain circumstances, renegotiation is welfare-improving. in that case, the dewatripont-maskin argument is turned on its head. intermediaries that establish long-term relationships with clients may have an advantage over nancial markets precisely because it is easier for them to renegotiate contracts.the crucial assumption is that contracts are incomplete. because of the high transaction costs of writing complete contracts, some potentially pareto-improving contingencies are left out of contracts and securities. this incompleteness of contracts may make renegotiation desirable. the missing contingencies can be replaced by contract adjustments that are negotiated by the parties ex post, after they observe the realization of variables on which the contingencies would have been based. the incomplete contract determines the status quo for the ex post bargaining game (i.e., renegotiation)that determines the nal outcome.an important question in this whole area is “how important are these relationships empirically?” here there does not seem to be a lot of evidence.as far as the importance of renegotiation in the sense of dewatripont and maskin (1995), the work of asquith, gertner and scharfstein (1994) suggests that little renegotiation occurs in the case of nancially distressed rms.conventional wisdom holds that banks are so well secured that they can and do “pull the plug” as soon as a borrower becomes distressed, leaving theunsecured creditors and other claimants holding the bag.petersen and rajan (1994) suggest that rms that have a longer relationship with a bank do have greater access to credit, controlling for a number of features of the borrowers history. it is not clear from their work exactly what lies behind the value of the relationship. for example, the increased access to credit could be an incentive device or it could be the result ofgreater information or the relationship itself could make the borrower more credit worthy. berger and udell (1992) nd that banks smooth loan rates in response to interest rate shocks. petersen and rajan (1995) and berlin and mester (1997) nd that smoothing occurs as a rms credit risk changes.berlin and mester (1998) nd that loan rate smoothing is associated with lower bank prots. they argue that this suggests the smoothing does not arise as part of an optimal relationship.this section has pointed to a number of issues for future research. what is the relationship between the sources of funds for investment,as revealed by mayer (1988, 1990), and the portfolio choices of investorsand institutions? the answer to this question may shed some light onthe relative importance of external and internal finance. why are financing patterns so different in developing and developedeconomies? what is the empirical importance of long-term relationships? is renegotiationimportant is it a good thing or a bad thing? do long-term relationships constitute an important advantage of bankbasedsystems over market-based systems? 金融体系的比较1、什么是金融体系？一个金融系统的目的（作用）是将资金从盈余者（机构）向短缺者（机构）转移（输送）。在传统文献中分析这个传输过程有两种途径。首先是考虑代理机构如何通过金融市场沟通；其次看金融中介机构如银行、金融公司是怎样运行的。五十年前，金融系统就是这样清楚地分开的。当较不富裕的家庭和中小等企业通过使用银行、保险公司和其它的金融机构时，富裕的家庭和大公司则使用了股票市场和债券市场。例如，表一显示了1950年公司产权的归属，其中家庭拥有百分之九十以上。到2000年为止可以看出，这种情况已经发生了巨大变化。在那时家庭持有的不到百分之四十，非银行金融中介机构，主要是养老基金和共同基金持有的超过百分之四十。这种变化说明了为什么考虑将金融市场和金融机构两者角色分开不再是可能的。不是直接地在家庭和企业之间充当中介，金融机构越来越倾向于一方面在家庭和市场之间充当中介，另一方面在企业和市场间充当中介。这使得有必要将金融系统视为不可小觑的整体。当然，金融系统在企业和家庭之间转移资源的概念只是一种简化。政府通常在金融体系中发挥 了要作用。他们是主要的借款人，尤其是在战争，经济衰退时，或大型基础设施项目正在开展的时候。他们有时还可以储蓄大量资金。例如，当如挪威和许多中东国家的国家获得大量的天然资源（石油）时，政府就可能获得代表的人口的大信托基金。除了作为借款人或储户的角色，各国政府通常发挥很多重要的作用。通常央行发行法定货币，并广泛参与支付系统。带有不受管制的市场和中介机构的金融系统，如在十九世纪后期美国的金融系统，经常经理金融危机。消除这些危机的愿望使得政府运用一些重大的方式干预金融体系。中央银行或其他监管机构将负责监管银行系统和其他中介机构，如保险公司。因此，在大多数国家政府在金融体系运作中发挥了重要作用。这种干预意味着决定政府及其政策的政治制度，也是与金融体系有关的。有一些历史实例：在那些有明确的法律制度的地方，金融市场和金融机构反而是以信誉和一些隐性机制为依托的。然而，在大多数金融系统中法律起着重要的作用，它决定什么样的合同是可行的，什么样的治理机制可用于各种公司，在证券上可以设置什么限制。因此，法律制度是金融体系的重要组成部分。然而对一个金融系统而言，这些远远不够。写合同能力和加强各种各样权利的一个先决条件是会计系统。除了允许被写入合同，会计制度允许投资者在评估公司价值时更容易而且更容易知道应该审慎地借给公司多少资金。会计信息只有一种类型的信息（尽管是最重要的）是金融系统所需的。提供资助，鼓励创造和传播信息是金融系统的关键功能。产生和传播信息的动机是金融系统的一个重要特征。如果没有大量的人力资本，要使金融系统内各个组件有效地运作是不可能的。正如东欧国家的经验证明：训练有素的律师、会计师和银行专业人士比如银行家对金融系统的有效运作至关重要。有关比较金融系统的文献在很早时期就有。我们的调查是建立在艾伦（1993）gale(1995)和 thakor(1996)以前的观点的基础上的。这些观点集中于两类问题：（1）规范性：不同类型的金融系统在不同种类的功能上效用有多大？（2）积极性：是什么推动金融体系的改革？ 第一类问题主要单独考虑第二至第六条，这些条例集中于投资和储蓄的增长、风险分担、信息提供和公司治理问题。第7条考虑了法律和政治对金融系统的影响，而第8条只要着眼于金融危机在塑造金融体系中的作用。第9条载有总结发言。2、投资和储蓄 金融体系的目的之一是允许将储蓄投资于企业。在一系列重要的文件里，迈耶（1988年，1990年）记载了在不同的国家的企业如何获得资金和资助。表2显示了运用mayer方法以1970-1989的数据为基础进行一系列研究的结果。使用的数据来源于资金来源和使用表。对法国来说，数据是来自于bertero（1994），而对美国、英国、日本和德国来说，他们的数据来自于corbett 和jenkinson (1996).可以看出，在所有国家，到目前为止，内部融资是最重要的资金来源。银行融资在大多数国家尤其在日本和法国适度重要。债券融资仅在美国很重要，在所有国家股权融资要么不重要和要么带有负面性（即股份是累积）。mayer的研究成果和那些使用他的方法取得的成果已经产生了重要影响，因为他们提出了金融市场在为投资提供资金方面的重要性问题。看来，至少在总体来说，股票市场是不重要的，而债券市场仅在美国比较重要。这些结果与在传统金融文献对股权市场和债券市场的重视形成强烈的对比。银行融资在所有的国家都很重要,但没有内部融资重要。另一个关于金融系统怎样运作的透视角度是通过看储蓄和资产持有来获得的。表3显示了在美国、英国、日本、法国和德国银行和市场的相对重要性。美国是其中一个极端，德国是另外一个极端。在美国，银行是相对不重要的：资产占gdp的比重只有53，大约是德国的（152%）三分之一。另一方面，美国的股票市值占gdp的比重为82，是德国24%的的三倍。日本和英国是有趣的中间情况：市场和银行都很重要。在法国，银行很重要但市场不是那么重要。美国和英国经常被指代为以市场为基础的系统，而德国，日本和法国通常被指代为以银行为基础的系统。表4显示了最终有家庭部门持有的资产配置的整体组合。相比日本，德国和法国，在美国和英国，股权是家庭持有资产里面