财务管理外文翻译--高管薪酬状况.doc

高管薪酬状况学校代码：11517 学 号：200911311226 HENAN INSTITUTE OF ENGINEERING 文献翻译题 目 高 管 薪 酬 状 况 学生姓名 徐 青 青 专业班级 财务管理0942 学 号 200911311226 系 （部） 会 计 学 院 指导教师(职称) 上官绪红教授 完成时间 2013年3月7日 高管薪酬状况Yazan Ramadan DamiriUniversity of Tennessee-Knoxville公司使用不同的方案来补偿高管。一个理想的薪酬方案可以使高管激励与股东的利益相一致，尽量减少代理问题。这些方法通常包括工资，奖金，股票期权，股票奖励，和养老金。由于安然公司和世通公司的丑闻与股票期权有关，使得股票期权的使用问题变得非常有争议，因此这一问题会被进一步细致的讨论。然而，第一部分将要讨论的报酬是平均雇员薪金。薪 金薪金是一个定额的薪酬方案，不会在短期内改变（Balsam 35）。然而，从长远来说，工资的改变取决于绩效。通常，公司的报酬合同里会有因为绩效和工龄而可能允许加薪的条款 。因为薪金是非常重要的吸引高管人员的薪酬组合中最无风险的成分，尤其是对于厌恶风险的人来说（Balsam 312）。奖 金大部分公司都会根据高管们的绩效来支付他们奖金。 奖金是一种建立在一个或更多措施的绩效上的报酬。 根据Balsam的著作，“An Introduction to Executive Compensation”，这些措施可以是或明或暗，客观或主观，金融或非金融。 通常，最高奖金是表示为薪金的百分比；一个员工在公司里升职，可赚取的工资的比例作为奖金经常会增加（Balsam 314）。一个CEO的奖金是工资的100%，这是很常见的事。 2005年，华尔街奖金以215亿美元创下新纪录，去年创纪录的195亿美元是在2000年的牛市(CNN.com)。 华尔街的奖金在2004年的水平上增加了15.5%（CNN.com）.股票期权股票期权通常是指允许别人在指定时间内以一定的价格购买股买的权利。有时，承授人必须等到授予期结束才能行使购股权。授予期是一个指定的时间量，是承授人行使购股权之前必须等待的时间。通常情况下，承授人可在行权限制期内行使部分期权。举个例子，让一个执行者在一个四年的管辖期和管辖期结束时休息的第一年享有25%的股权。股票期权的使用在九十年代得到了显著的提升但是因近期的争议而有所下降(Hall-Murphy)。期权可以使得企业以提供一种不需要现金支出的方式调整他们给管理者的激励措施。这种提供报酬的方式似乎对许多九十年代的高科技公司来说是很好的。由于一些事件和滥用，股票期权也是最有争议的一种报酬方式。Michael Eisner的大部分薪酬来自股票期权，还有一些比较有名的公司丑闻，例如安然公司和世通公司，似乎都和过多使用股票期权有关。其中最大的一个议题是股票期权的使用公司如何解释它们。财务会计准则委员会和在这之前存在的会计原则委员会确定了股票期权的管理会计制度。关注股票期权费用化的声明是发布于1972年的APB Opinion 25，其中规定，期权授予期股票的市场价格及行使价之间的差异就是股票期权的会计费用（Hall-Murphy）。因此，在期权授予期达到或超过市场价格的具有行使价格的期权不用费用化。然而，在1995年发布的FAS 123要求公司将使用期权定价模型（尤其是布莱克-斯科尔斯模型）公开市场价值的期权费用化 (Hall-Murphy)。在APB Opinion 25中，仍然允许公司继续报告期权。然而，如果他们选择这样做，他们也将被要求在财务报告的脚注中披露的期权的价值。直到2002年，仅有少部分公司按照FAS 123报告股票期权，尽管如此，在2003年的公司丑闻中有超过100家的公司开始按照FAS 123报告期权(Hall-Murphy)。这么多公司选择不将估计的期权的公开市场价值费用化的原因是它显著地有损了他们的底线。此外，许多创业公司用大量的股票期权为公司吸引人才，因为他没有资金来支付高额的工资和奖金。股票奖励股票奖励是将公司的股票，作为报酬给员工。他们以企业股票的市价计量，并没有行使价格(Balsam 38)。股票奖励分类为受限制的或无限制的，除非员工在公司工作了一定的时间，否则限制性股票奖励不能出售，而无限制的股票可以随时出售(Balsam 38)。股票奖励报酬并不像股票期权那样普遍，因为它们更加昂贵也不能有效的协调高管人员和他们公司的利益。养老金养老金是高管人员在他/她从公司退休之后仍收到递延酬劳的一种形式。在退休后高管人员收到付款或数量款项。该金额可根据养老金计划或者是高管也许在一个特定的养老金账户的累计金额。因此，养老金可分为固定福利计划及固定供款计划。固定福利计划是在预定效益公式的基础上向员工支付报酬，而固定供款计划中的雇主贡献被定义为计划和员工可以会给它增加。最近各大公司削减员工的养老金成为了公众关注的焦点。正如前面提到的，Michael Eisner仍然从迪斯尼（ Plitch ）得到每年支付给他的297779美元养老金。然而，相比每年支付6518459美元给辉瑞公司首席执行官Henry McKinnell，这似乎算不上什么（The Corporate Library）。 最近，类似以Eisner，Mckinnell为目标由辉瑞股东们举行了“投反对票”活动，支持Mckinnell的董事会成员中有高达22%的股东隐藏了他们的支持(Masters)。除了正常的养老金，企业甚至已经为主要的高管人员建立了专门的退休计划，被称为“Top Hat”计划，以避免税务后果（AFL- CIO） 。趋 势2005年，高层管理人员的工资和奖金上涨7.1%，继2004年上涨14.5%与2003年上涨7.2%之后(华尔街日报/ Mercer)。对于高管增加的工资及奖金有超过3.6%的增长是支付给了白领(华尔街日报/Mercer)。然而，高管总薪酬中位数的增加，其中包括工资、奖金、期权行权收益，其他长期激励奖金和限售股的价值收益从2004年上涨了15.8%到6,049,504美元(华尔街日报/ Mercer)。这看起来似乎是大幅跳，然而相比到2004年的590万美元增长40.9，它实际上是非常温和的(华尔街日报/ Mercer)。2005年，192个高管行使股票期权中位数收益3493440美元，在2004年197名高管行使股票期权中位数收益为3229072美元(华尔街日报/ Mercer)。通货膨胀不是一个有效的理由，因为很明显，高管薪酬的大幅增加的速度远远超过通货膨胀率，形成了越来越大的高管和员工的薪酬差距。目前，一个CEO报酬相当于平均工人工资的431倍。随着高管薪酬持续增长，员工薪酬保持相对停滞，这一比率继续变大。这可以从图1绘制的高管薪酬与员工薪酬的增长直接观测到。图表显示，员工薪酬已经相对稳定，而高管薪酬已经经历了显著的增长。通过观察员工工资CPI的关系，在最近几年，员工薪酬甚至尚未跟上通货膨胀的速度。也可以观察到，高管薪酬与企业利润成正比，但不是非常剧烈。这可以归因于高管薪酬组合的变量报酬部分如奖金、股票期权和股票奖励。然而，一些专家质疑使可变薪酬如股票期权是否真的能给公司带来利益。最近的研究发现使用CEO股票期权和会计还有其他财务报表之间存在相关性(诺里斯)。这种观点的支持者认为，股票期权怂恿高管人员“做假帐”。正如在图1中看到的高管薪酬均衡的随着企业利润的比例上升，我们可以得出一个相反的观点。这就引发了一个问题谁负责确定高管薪酬方案。有些人回答说是控制补偿数量的高管自己。高管薪酬的另一个趋势是公司治理的问题。 一个公司的董事会负责补偿高管。然而问题是，在许多情况下公司的CEO也是董事长。 在早些时候这个问题出现了在艾斯纳案例中。 事实上，美国劳工联合会-产业工会联合会估计，在三分之二的公司中，CEO同时也是董事长(劳联-产联)。这种情况会导致代理问题，使得高管可以得到“经济租金”。经济租金相当于从投资者那里占有的一种垄断利润(劳联-产联)。 这种现象对股东来说引发了代理成本与费用。然而，最近为维护股东利益用专门拟定了相关法规。 试行条例2006年1月17日证券交易委员会委员们提出了一项议案，该议案有可能会使自1992年以来高管薪酬的披露问题发生极大的改变（美联社） 。该计划接受60天的公众评议期，最早在明年春天才能生效（美联社）。在新法例下，公司将被要求提供其年度报表并显示该公司董事长、财务总监及未来三年最高薪行政人员的年度报酬总额（美联社）。新法例的其条例规定：行政津贴水平从$ 50,000降低至$ 10,000，管理人员的退休福利和董事会成员的薪酬的披露必须详细（美联社）。此外，非独立的薪酬委员会成员必须予以披露（ ） 。最后，公司将被要求解释高管薪酬背后的目标。面对蓬勃发展的高管薪酬，以恢复投资者的信心，新的规定已经提出。未来的高管薪酬最近的丑闻和过度滥用公司资源造成了公众对过高高管薪酬的强烈反对。然而，首先要对什么是过度这个问题进行定义。高管们执掌公司大权，做出决定公司命脉的决策。一个CEO领导一个跨国公司因为他的努力而得到高额的薪酬似乎是很有道理的。但是目前的高管薪酬问题中主要存在三个问题：绩效、信息披露和公司治理。我们应该采取一定的措施来评估CEO的绩效，根据绩效来支付CEO的报酬。这些措施应该包括长期和短期目标。这可以防止高管为了获得激励薪酬而去牺牲公司的长远利益以达到短期财务目标。一个不良的或平庸的CEO不应该得到超过他价值的报酬。没有会质疑像Jack Welch这样增加股东财富显著超过他所收到的报酬的CEO。因此，我相信首要的问题是相对于一般高管薪酬的增长，CEO付出的是否与他得到的相匹配。CEO们的薪酬太高这一观点部分是适当的，部分是由于企业不断的丑闻和滥用公众信任从而导致公众对企业充满怨恨而造成的根据图1，高管薪酬比例随着公司利润的增长而增长。如果公司利润下降而高管薪酬增加，那么就能很好的验证高管薪酬过高。另一个主要的问题就是信息的披露，目前美国证监会正在处理。为确保投资者的信心，高管薪酬要以最大程度披露，特别是在发生了最近的公司丑闻之后。 股票期权应根据它们的公开市场价值计入当期损益。很显然，当被赋予价值时它们才会有价值，否则，它们便不属于薪酬组合的一部分。高管福利的披露似乎是合理的,因为本质上是股东支付给他们的，股东有权知道。为确保董事会能够着力于公司利益，必须加强公司治理问题 。公司的CEO不应该被允许作为董事会主席，因为这会引起了代理问题，并导致可能的利益冲突。根据现行法例规定，所有薪酬委员会的成员不是独立披露的（）。然而，这个法案是远远不够的。高管人员不应该被允许持有董事会主席的位置。在公司治理结构中应该有一个有权责的分立和系统的检查的制衡制度。虽然像公司治理和代理问题将如何处理等问题并不明确，但有一件事是清楚的，公众已经不再对当前的制度抱有幻想。为了维持公众的信任，必须在高管薪酬范围内的责任和披露作重大改变。本文摘译自：Yazan Damiri；The State of Executive CompensationD；University of Tennessee-Knoxville；5-2006参考文献AFLCIO.org. Golden CEO Retirements. Anderson, Sarah and John Cavanagh. Executive Excess 2005. Institute for Policy Studies. 2005. Associated Press. SEC Moves to Require More Disclosure on Executive Pay. 2006. Balsam, Steven. An Introduction To Executive Compensation. San Diego: Academic Press, 2001. CNN.com. Wall $t. Bonuses Balloon to New Record. 2006. Hall, Brian, and Kevin Murphy. The Trouble With Stock Options. National Bureau of Economic Research . 2003 Hodgson, Paul. Incentivizing Michael Eisner. Fortune. 2004. Masers, Brooke. A Campaign to Tighten Executive Pay. Washington Post: 2006 Plitch, Phyllis, and Dwight Oestricher. Disney Moves to Give Shareholders More Say in Board Votes. Dow Jones News Service. 2005 Norris, Floyd. Stock Options: Do They Make Bosses Cheat? The New York Times: 2005. /news/press/2006-10.htm. SEC Votes to Propose Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning Executi ve Compensation and Related Matters. The Corporate Library. CEO Golden Years: The Top 25 Largest CEO Pensions. WSJlMercer. The WSJlMercer 2005 CEO Compensation Survey. The Wall Street Journal. :2006The State of Executive CompensationYazan Ramadan DamiriUniversity of Tennessee-KnoxvilleCompanies use different methods to compensate executives. An ideal compensation package aligns executive incentives with shareholder interests to minimize agency problems. These methods often include a combination of: salary, bonus, stock options, stock grants, and pensions. Since the use of stock options has recently been a subject of great controversy, they will be discussed in greater detail since corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom have been linked to stock option grants (Hall-Murphy). However, the first component of compensation that will be discussed is one that the average employee can relate to-salary. SalarySalary is a fixed amount of a compensation package and does not vary in the short run (Balsam 35). However, salary can vary in the long run depending on performance. Normally, companies include clauses in compensation contracts allowing for raises that are contingent on performance and duration. Since salary is the most risk-free component of a compensation package it is very important in attracting executive talent, especially if that individual is risk-averse (Balsam 312). BonusA large portion of companies pay their executives a bonus based on performance. A bonus is a form of compensation that is conditioned upon the performance of one or more measures. According to Balsams book, An Introduction to Executive Compensation, these measures can be implicit or explicit, objective or subjective, or financial or non-financial. Usually, the maximum bonus is expressed as a percentage of salary; as an employee moves up in the corporate ladder, the percentage of salary that can be earned as bonus usually increases (Balsam 314). It is not uncommon for a CEOs bonus to be 100% of salary. In 2005, Wall Street bonuses set a new record of $21.5 billion; the last record of $19.5 billion was during the bull market of 2000 (CNN.com). Wall Street bonuses increased 15.5% over their levels in 2004 (CNN.com). Stock OptionsStock options allow the person who receives them to purchase stock at a certain price usually over a certain period of time. Sometimes the grantee has to wait until the vesting period is over before the options can be exercised. A vesting period is a specified amount of time that the grantee must wait before exercising the options. Typically, grants are exercisable by allowing the grantee to exercise a certain percentage of the entire grant over the vesting period. An example is allowing the executive to exercise 25% of the grant in the first year of a four year vesting period and the rest at the end of the period. The use of stock options increased significantly during the 90s and has declined amid recent controversy (Hall-Murphy). Options allowed companies to align their incentives with those of managers and provided a form of compensation that did not require an initial cash outlay. For many of the high tech startup firms of the 90s this form of compensation seemed optimal. Stock options have been the most controversial form of compensation due to several events and misuses. The majority of Michael Eisners compensation came in the form of stock options, and some of the most prominent corporate scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, have been linked to the excessive use of options (Hall-Murphy). One of the biggest issues surrounding the use of options is how companies should account for them. The rules that govern the accounting for stock options are established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Accounting Principles Board (APB), which existed before FASB. The pronouncement that is concerned with the expensing of stock options is APB Opinion 25, issued in 1972, which states that the accounting charge for stock options is the difference between the market price of the stock and the exercise price on the date that the options are granted (Hall-Murphy). As a result there is no charge for options that have an exercise price that is at or above market price on the date the options are granted. However, in 1995 FASB released FAS 123 which recommended that companies expense the fair market value of options using an option pricing model, most prominently the Black-Scholes model (Hall-Murphy). The pronouncement still allowed companies to continue reporting options under APB Opinion 25, however if they chose to do so they would also be required to disclose the value of the option grant in a footnote to the financial statements. As late as 2002, only a few companies were reporting stock options using FAS 123; although, amid corporate scandal in 2003 more than a 100 companies began to report using FAS 123 (Hall-Murphy). The reason that so many companies choose not to expense the estimated fair market value of the options is that it could significantly hurt their bottom line. Furthermore, many startup companies use a tremendous amount of stock options to attract talent to the firm because they do not have the resources to pay high salaries or bonuses. Stock GrantsStock grants are shares of the companys stock that are given to employees as compensation. They are valued at the market value of the companys stock and have no exercise price (Balsam 38). Stock grants are either classified as restricted or unrestricted; restricted grants cannot be sold until the employee has been with the company for a certain amount of time, whereas unrestricted shares can be sold at any time (Balsam 38). The stock grants method of compensation is not as popular as stock options because they are more expensive and they are not as effective in aligning the interests of the executives with those of the company. PensionsPensions are a form of deferred compensation which the executive receives after he/she retires from the company (Balsam 39). After retirement the executive receives a payment or a number of payments. The amounts can either be in accordance with a pension plan or the executive may have an amount accumulated in a specific pension account. Accordingly, pensions are classified into defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans. Defined benefit plans distribute payments to employees based on predetermined benefit formulas, whereas in a defined contribution plan the employers contribution is defined by the plan and the employee may add to it (Balsam 175-176). Recent cuts in employee pensions by major companies have brought pensions to the public spotlight. As mentioned earlier, Michael Eisner still draws an annual pension payment of $297,779 from Disney (Plitch). However this seems like nothing when compared to the annual payment of $6,518,459 to Pfizer executive Henry McKinnell (The Corporate Library). Recently, similar to Eisner, Mckinnell was the target of a Vote No campaign by Pifzer shareholders and up to 22% of shareholders withheld their support from board members that supported Mckinnells pension (Masters). In addition to normal pensions, companies have even created special retirement programs known as Top Hat plans for key executives to avoid tax consequences (AFL-CIO). TrendsIn 2005 salaries and bonuses for executives rose 7.1 %, after having risen 14.5% in 2004 and 7.2% in 2003 (WSJ/Mercer). The increase in salaries and bonuses for executives exceeded the 3.6% increase in pay for white-collar workers (WSJ/Mercer). However, the increase in the median total compensation for executives which includes salary, bonuses, gains from option exercise, other long-term incentive payouts, and the value of restricted shares is up 15.8% from 2004 to $6, 049,504 (WSJ/Mercer). This may seem like a drastic jump, though when compared to the 40.9% increase to $5.9 million in 2004 it is actually very modest (WSJ/Mercer). In 2005, 192 executives exercised stock options for a median gain of $3,493,440 in comparison to the 197 executives in 2004 for a median gain of $3,229,072 (WSJ/Mercer). Inflation is not a valid justification, because it is obvious that the dramatic increase in executive compensation far outpaces the inflation rate. There is a growing disparity between executive and employee pay. Currently, a CEO earns 431 times the average workers pay (Anderson). As executive pay continues to grow this ratio continues to get larger as employee pay remains relatively stagnant. This can be observed directly from Figure 1 which plots the growth of executive compensation against the growth of employee compensation.The graph shows that employee compensation has been relatively stable, whereas executive compensation has experienced significant growth. Employee compensation has not even kept pace with inflation in recent years, as can be seen by the relationship of CPI to employee salaries. It can also be observed that executive compensation varies directly with corporate profits, but is not as volatile. This can be attributed to the variable compensation components of an executive compensation package such as bonuses, stock options, and stock grants. However, some experts question as to whether the use of variable compensation such as stock options is really in the companys interest. Recent studies have found a correlation between the use of CEO stock options and accounting and other financial restatements (Norris). Supporters of this view argue that stock options encourage exec uti ves to cook the books. A counter argument can be made that executive compensation rises proportionately with corporate profits as is seen in the Figure 1. This raises the question of who is charged with determining executive compensation packages. Some would say it is the executives themselves who control how much they are compensated.Another trend in executive compensation is the issue of corporate governance. The board of a company is charged with compensating the executive, however the problem is that in many instances the CEO of a company is also the chairman of the board. This issue was witnessed earlier in the Eisner case. In fact, the AFL-CIO estimates that the CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors at two-thirds of companies (AFL-CIO). This situation causes agency problems within a company and allows the executive to extract rents, the equivalent of a monopolistic profit, from shareholders (AFL-CIO). This phenomenon raises agency costs and costs to shareholders. However, recent legislation has been proposed in the Securities and Exchange Commission to protect shareholders.Proposed RegulationOn January 17, 2006 the members of the SEC moved to propose a plan that would make the biggest changes to the disclosure of executive compensation since 1992 (Associated Press). The plan is open to a 60 day public comment period and can take effect as early as spring of next year (Associated Press). Under the new legislation companies would be required to provide tables in their annual filings showing the total annual compensation for the companys chairman, chief financial officer and the next three highest paid executives (Associated Press). Other provisions of the new legislation include: the reduction of the level at which executive perks must be detailed from $50,000 to $10,000, and disclosure of executives retirement benefits and board members compensation (Associated Press). Furthermore, members of the compensation committee that are not independent must be disclosed (). Finally, companies would be required to explain the objectives behind their executives compensation. These new regulations have been proposed to restore investor confidence in the face of booming executive compensation.Future of Executive CompensationRecent scandals and exorbitant abuses of corporate resources have incited public backlash against excess