在公司治理中的关联方交易[文献翻译].doc

本科毕业论文（设计）外 文 翻 译题 目 上市公司关联方交易相关问题的探讨 专 业 会 计 学 外文题目 related party transactions in corporate governance外文出处 second university of naples ttaly 外文作者 michele pizzo 原文:related party transactions in corporate governanceintruductionuntil recent scandals related party transactions did not deserve indepth analyses; academic research mainly focused on different issues and limited attention was paid by regulators and overseers too. accounting was mainly concerned with potentially biased financial figures; not being carried out at arms length, they might diverge from market prices. meanwhile, in governance studies and codes topics such as board composition and independence, audit committee, directors remuneration, etc,largely prevailed. as a matter of fact, financial disclosure suited both accounting and governance studies because the information required was both a proxy of potential accounting bias and a tool for monitoring purposes .however, enrons, adelphias and parmalats2 crises shed light on the inherent risks, as related party transactions emerged as a powerful instrument of financial frauds, shareholders expropriation, etc.,turning the veil from the many relevant loopholes affecting existing requirements.such a discovery has obliged regulators and standard setters to strengthen current rules and principles and/or introduce new bans and requirements. a clear shift towards better and more detailed disclosure and the implementation of monitoring procedures (i.e. board approval,independent directors involvement, external qualified opinions) can be easily observed (i.e. o.e.c.d. 2004) and considered an effective strategy (djankov et al., 2005). such a process is still on-going and its impact cannot yet be properly examined.contemporarily, thanks to the substantial anecdotal evidence, provided also by former scandals, the suspicious attitude and the negative common perceptions, generally accompanying these operations, became more widely and profoundly accepted. review of the literature and the regulatory framework does not provide a clear and definite picture, but it supports many shades of opinion and reveals both theoretical and operational open issues, deserving further and more detailed analysis.this paper carries out a critical survey of the literature on the issue .and attempts to examine the economic rationale behind related party transactions. in the last part the european state-of-the-art is reviewed in order to assess its thoroughness and consistency with the economic nature of related party transactions.related party transactions as conflict of intereststhe topic has always been studied in the literature according to two different theories:a) conflict of interests;b) efficient transaction hypothesis.according to the former, related party transactions may imply moral hazard and may be carried out in the interest of directors in order to expropriate wealth from shareholders. by contrast, the latter considers these dealings as sound business exchanges fulfilling economic needs of the firm. academic research consistent with the former approach has thrown light on the drawbacks associated with related party transactions:a) weakening corporate governance. related party transactions may undermine non-executive directors functions, turning them into affiliated or “grey” directors, classified as non-independent outside (denis and sarin, 1999; klein, 2002; vicknair et al., 1993;weisbach, 1988), closer to dependent directors. furthermore, weaker corporate governance makes these transactions more likely to occur, while board independence and their lower probability are positively associated (kohlbeck and mayhew, 2004;gordon et al., 2004);b) earnings management (i.e. “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain”; schipper, 1989). directors have incentives to manage earnings to increase or legitimate their perquisites or to hide such wealth expropriation. related party transactions may turn out to be a useful tool for managing earnings (jian and wong, 2008; aharony et al., 2005), operating results and achieving roe or other targets (i.e. avoiding delisting, new equity issue placement) (jian and wong, 2003; ming and wong, 2003); c) tunneling, i.e. wealth transfers out of a company for the benefit of shareholders with a controlling interest (johnson et al., 2000). a company may pay a related party transaction above market prices or pay market prices for goods or services of inferior quality3. such a phenomenon does not necessarily imply opportunistic behaviour,but may be due to an overconfident approach or biased judgement (for instance, overestimating ones relatives, ryngaert and thomas, 2007).transfer of assets and profits, although common in developed countries, becomes more relevant and frequent in emerging economies where external markets are inadequate or corporate governance rules are lacking and, presumably, less effective (jian and wong, 2004; jiang et al, 2005); d) employment of relatives in family firms. a director can be appointed or promoted owing to his family influence over the company;e) misleading statement. many studies provide evidence of their role in many financial crises (swartz and watkins, 2003; mc tague,2004) and in the achievement of specific aims (erickson,2000). moreover, apart from these cases, these transactions are generally regarded as less reliable than arms length ones.because of these factors, related party transactions may be associated with abnormal stock returns (cheung et al., 2006), firms poor performances (chen and chien, 2004) or lower value (gordon et al., 2004;jian and wong, 2004).the previous circumstances support the idea that these transactions represent a conflict of interest (conflict of interest hypothesis) and that they are inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximization (emshwiller,2003). to this extent, such a view encompasses agency issues and is consistent with an agency prospective (berle and means, 1932; jensen and meckling, 1976) where owners face moral hazard (lack of effort or misuse of company resources) and adverse selection by the ceo (misrepresentation of ability). thus, risk sharing policies, monitoring, information systems are adopted and, in particular, mechanisms like ceo compensation and board structure are suggested. once framed in such a context,related party transactions may imply the misuse of firm resources (moral hazard) and the misrepresentation of private information (adverse selection)too: their potential harm in eluding alignment mechanisms, like ceo compensation and board composition, is increasingly perceived.moreover, the potential bias in financial statements, with a negative impact on their reliability and relevance, introduces further uncertainty and weakens the effectiveness of contracts aiming at reducing agency conflicts.in particular, according to agency theory (fama, 1980; fama and jensen, 1983) an optimal board composition requires both executive members as well as external (non-executive) directors, thus monitoring becomes even more crucial when non-executive directors are involved (gordon et al., 2004). not surprisingly, these findings contributed in definitely shifting opinion in favour of the view that related party transactions represent conflict of interests, compromising directors independence and monitoring functions, potentially serving deceptive and fraudulent purposes. indeed this idea, has always largely prevailed, but corporate collapses and, to some extent, literature provided ultimate evidence of possible abuses and, moreover, a difficult point to challenge. the risks of harm to company shareholders through self-interested decisions by directors, spoiling corporate wealth, are often stressed in business press and in regulators positions, thereby favouring widespread acceptance of the prevailingly negative meaning of the term. the ability to influence the counterpart even in contrast with its own interests, the departure from terms applied in relationships with third parties and, last but not least, the potential wealth transfers are often recalled by s.e.c. and f.a.s.b. (f.a.s. 57).the following quotation from the 2008 consob draft on related party transactions enlightens as to the cautions and adverse approach lying behind the suggested changes: “in general, , the existence of companies interest in carrying out related party transaction cannot be a priori excluded. in a few cases, they may be seen as efficient transactions ”. their economic soundness is not, in principle, rejected, but is clearly limited to few cases, and even then the asymmetrical information among insiders and outsiders leads to stricter regulation.indeed, definitions like “accounting minefields” (sherman and young, 2001) clearly express the general mood.not surprisingly, growing concern for abuses, lack of information symmetry, negative influence on directors independence and integrity and weakening of monitoring functions is warranted among overseers and standard setters. in actual fact, newly introduced rules or principles,aimed at improving disclosure and implementing more effective monitoring procedures, represent a clear attempt to balance the above-mentioned risks and perceptions.specifically, solutions enhancing conflict of interest provisions, such as:- monitoring procedures like board approval, independent directors involvement, audit committee evaluation, external independent opinion, assembly approval;- increasing disclosure concerning subjects, type of transactions,amount, terms and conditions, alignment with market conditions,etc. in fact, investors can analyse the possible expropriation and weight it in order to discount equity prices (barth, 1994; wilkins and zimmer, 1983; harris and ohlson, 1987; sami and schwartz,1992);- ban on some operations i.e. employment-loans, prohibited by sox in 2002.gain wide support and seem unavoidable measures to cope with the perceived risks.at the same time, the consistency of the above-mentioned measures with agency theory principles, that suggests monitoring, incentive alignment and control of managers to minimize the agency problems (tosi,2008), can be easily perceived.however, costs of monitoring and of reporting complexity increase sharply because of the former measures and they add on the potential economic costs associated to related party transactions (due to wealth transfers, earnings management, etc.) as well as the associated opportunity costs (often widely neglected). the overall resulting negative impact on performance can be legitimately presumed and could improperly represent a cage for this sort of transaction, to which recourse may be limited. the efficient transaction hypothesis in contrast with the previous approach, the efficient transaction hy-pothesis assumes that related party transactions represent sound business exchanges, efficiently fulfilling underlying economic needs of the firm. therefore, they do not harm the interests of shareholders and emerge as an efficient contracting arrangement where incomplete information there is. moreover, possible benefits may be: -contracting parties representatives appointed as board members facilitate the achievement of better coordination of the different activities, quicker feed back or more insights; -deeper reciprocal knowledge as well as greater familiarity can justify transactions that are not feasible at arms length or create more convenient terms and conditions for both parties; - hold up problem may be mitigated; -these transactions may also supplement ceo and director cash remuneration or compensate them for increased risk. the view of related party transactions representing internal dealings, alternative to contractual or market exchanges, able to reduce transactions costs and overcome difficulties impairing production is consistent with the transaction cost theory (coase, 1937; williamson, 1985) and support-ing evidence has been provided by many studies (fan and goyal, 2006). in particular, in institutional contexts without efficient capital, labour and product markets, like many developing economies, information and agency problems, as well as market imperfections, increase risks associ-ated to firm activity, while group structures and internal dealings may provide a better allocation of financial resources, economies of scale, easier access to finance, more opportunities, increased influence, etc. therefore, internal capital markets may be created with beneficial effects for the entire group when external funds are scarce and uncertain (khanna and palepu, 1997); scale and scope of the groups permit difficulties impairing production in emerging countries to be overcome and make investment in these regions more likely and profitable (fisman and khanna, 2004); sharing technological skills and advertising, associated with available group financial resources, contributes to profitability, supplementing inefficient capital markets and reducing transaction costs (chang and hong, 2000; moscariello, 2007). nevertheless, evidence is not yet decisive (khanna and palepu, 2000) and the possibility of wealth transfers through internal dealings (chang and hong, 2000) is not excluded. moreover, agency issues still play a role in shaping benefits and costs of group affiliation and related problems reduce the beneficial effects deriving internal markets (claeessens and fan, 2002; claessens, et al., 2006). a different conceptual framework: some guidelines both the above-mentioned theories are affected by inconsistencies or deficiencies and, in providing almost diametrically opposite interpretations, they are unable to cope with different kinds of possible cases. the conflict of interests theory seems probably more sensitive to social needs, such as minority protection and capital market fairness and efficiency. not surprisingly, its solutions are coherent with the growing concern for these dealings and the political climate around the issue. it could be argued that, to some extent, this perspective offers a “political excuse” to legitimate more binding, disclosure and monitoring requirements.however, this approach is weakened by significant drawbacks or loopholes, some of which are hereinafter briefly examined.empirical evidence neither always nor consistently accomplishes the expected outcomes. as previously seen, the literature supports contradictory conclusions too and gradually reveals, instead of a black and white picture, a multicoloured portrait, introducing distinctions and warnings which call for specific treatment.source:university of naples italy译文：在公司治理中的关联方交易介绍直到最近，关联方交易的丑闻还没有值得深入分析，学术研究主要侧重于不同问题的局限性引起了规管机构及监督员很大的注意力。会计是最受关注的可能有误差的财务数字，我们尽自己最大的努力不让这种误差存在，他们可能会偏离市场价格。然而审计委员会、董事的报酬等在很大程度上占了上风。事实上，财务信息的披露适合会计和管理研究，因为这两个研究方向的潜在会计偏见和监控目的。然而安然、阿德菲亚的骗局和帕玛拉特等危机揭示了固有的风险，由于关联方交易的出现作为一个强有力的金融欺诈工具被股东利用等，至于从影响现有要求来看，如发现不得不规管机构及标准的制订，加强目前的规则和原则或介绍的很多有关漏洞表面的工具，其实适合会计和治理研究新禁令和要求。明确转向更好和更详细的披露监测程序（即委员会批准、独立董事参与、外部合格的意见）的实现可以被方便地观察到（即 o.e.c.d.2004 年)和被视为有效的战略 （2005 djankov 等人）。 这一进程仍在进行中，其影响还不能恰当地测算。可观的是，多亏了之前提出的丑闻、质疑的态度和负面的共同看法，通常伴随这些操作的逸闻实证更广泛以及更深入地被接受。回顾文献和规管架构的检讨并没有提供一个明确的画面，但它支持很多细微的意见，并显示理论和业务值得进一步打开的问题和关键问题，这份文件尝试对检查关联方交易的经济理据文献的调查进行更详细的分析。最后部分，欧洲国家的文献被审查，以评估其与关联方交易的完整性和一致性。相关方交易的利益冲突主题总是围绕研究两个不同文献的理论：利益的冲突 ；有效事务的假设；根据之前所述，关联方交易可能意味着道德风险，并可能在侵占股东财富方面侵犯董事会的利益。与此相反，后者认为这些交易是满足经济需求的公司的良好交易。符合前述办法的学术研究与关联方交易相关联的缺点已明朗化。a) 削弱公司治理。关联方交易可能会破坏与外界（丹尼斯和沙林，1999 年；使用非独立把它们变为附属或灰色董事分类的非执行董事职能；克莱因 2002 年 ；vicknair 等人，1993年 ；weisbach，1988年）密切相关的董事之间的关系。此外，较弱的公司治理使这些交易更有可能发生，然而董事会的独立性和其较低的发生概率却是有效的关联（kohlbeck和mayhew，2004 年；松等人，2004 年）；b）盈余管理（即一个明确体现在外部的财务报告流程的管理目标，获得一些个人利益的意图；schipper，1989年)。董事有管理收入的增加在合法的前提条件或隐藏这种财富征用的奖励下。关联方交易可能是一个有用的工具，用于管理收入 （建和黄，2008 年；aharony 等人，2005年)，经营成果和实现预期盈利或其他目标（即避免除名、新公平问题放置，建和黄，2003年；明、黄，2003年)；c) 隧道效应，即财富转移出的一家公司控制权益（2000年约翰逊等人）与股东的利益。一家公司可能支付相关方交易价格以上的市场价格或以市场价格支付的劣质货物或服务，这种现象并不一定意味着投机行为的机会，但可能是由于一个自误的方法或判断高的见解（为例估之一的亲属，ryngaert 和托马斯，2007年).资产和利润的转化虽然在发达的国家中变得更切合实际和频繁，在外部的市场不充分和公司体制缺乏的新兴经济中大概很少有效（建和黄，2004 年；江报，2005年）；d）家族企业的亲属就业问题。一名董事由于他家庭的影响可以在该公司中被任命或晋升。e)误导性的陈述。很多研究提供他们在金融危机（瓦金斯 2003 年，mctague，2004年)和实现具体目标（埃里克森 2000年）的角色的证明。此外,除了这些情况下,这些交易普遍被认为比正常交易要缺少可信度。因为这些因素,关联交易可能伴有异常股票的回报率(张五常、苏达权等,2006年8月),企业的糟糕的表现(陈和简,2004)或更低的价值(戈登、苏达权等,2004;剑而吕志宗,2004)。以前的情况下都支持这样一个观点,即这些交易代表利益冲突(利益冲突的假设),他们不符合股东财富最大化(emshwiller,2003)。从这个意义上来说,这样的一种观点包括代理问题,与一个机构未来的(berle和手段,1932年,延森和meckling,1976年)业主面临道德危机(缺乏努力或滥用公司资源)和首席执行官逆向选择(误传的能力)是一致的。因此,风险分担政策、监控、信息系统就被采纳了,特别是有些机制如首席执行官报酬和董事会结构被允许了。一旦框以这样一个背景,关联交易可能意味着滥用公司资源(道德风险)和过度歪曲私人信息(逆向选择):他们潜在的有害作用在规避对口机制,像经理人报酬和董事会组成,正变得越来越被感知到。此外,存在潜在偏见的财务报表,在可靠性和相关性方面有负面的影响，介绍了进一步的不确定性以及削弱了针对减少机构冲突的代理合同的效力。特别是，根据代理理论（法玛，1980;法玛和詹森，1983）董事会的组成，需要一个最佳的以及外部的（非执行）董事和执行成员，从而在非执行董事参与时监控就显得更加重要。（高登等人，2004）。毫不奇怪，这些研究结果有助于转移舆论从而以赞成关联方交易是代表利益冲突，损害董事的独立性和监测职能，可能提供以欺骗或欺诈目的服务的观点。事实上这种想法，在很大程度上一直盛行，但企业倒闭，并且文献提供了最终可能被滥用的证据从而使其成为一个挑战难点。对损害公司股东利益从而利己的决定，破坏企业的财富，站在商业媒体和监管者的立场上往往是被抨击的，从而有利于一般性的负面含义广泛被接受。影响同行的能力甚