公共管理者在公共政策中的作用【外文翻译】 .doc

本科毕业设计（论文）外 文 翻 译原文：the role of public managers in public policypublic managementpublic managers rarely play a leading role in policy theory, but they are not altogether missing either. in fact, public managers have played an important role in a number of frameworks, serving as one point in the iron triangles, providers of information, members of advocacy coalitions, facilitators of participatory policymaking, and many more. however, these treatments of public managers are often one-dimensional, and they rarely incorporate the knowledge that public management scholars have accumulated. for example, consider how principalagent models treat concepts of managers and management. scholars often lump public managers, street-level bureaucrats, and agency-specific characteristics into a single entity known only as “the bureaucracy.” the question then becomes one of how political institutions enable or constrain this composite bureaucratic monolith to obtain policy outcomes. management in these models, if it appears at all, takes place at the institutional level through various administrative and structural decisions made by congress (e.g., bawn, 1995, 1997; shipan, 2004; and mccubbins, noll, & weingast, 1987, 1989), or the president (e.g., wood & waterman, 1991).these models have contributed greatly to our understanding of policy design, but they miss some of the critical variation generated by individual behavior within the decision-making processes. one of the basic facts of implementation is that individuals, not institutions, make the majority of decisions that drive policy. the environmental protection agency (epa), as an institution, does not decide to selectively enforce against one company and not another. rather, the institution (i.e., the epa) supports the enforcement decision that was made by an individual somewhere within the policymaking system. thus, looking only at the constraints placed upon the institution paints a flawed picture, incapable of rendering an accurate portrayal of those factors that directed the micro-level decisions.looking at policy strictly from the street-level bureaucrats vantage (e.g., lipsky, 1980), however, results in an equally incomplete picture. from this perspective, public managers possess incentives that are at odds with those of the bureaucrats below them in the hierarchy. this sheds light upon a different facet of the principalagent problem, but remains unable to explain how two implementation systems, equally endowed with resources and similarly structured, produce different decision making patterns during the implementation of identical directives. one might be tempted to theorize that different bureaucrats prioritize different outcomes due to disparate preferences and motivations. the literature on bureaucratic motivation, however, offers the following answer when asked what motivates bureaucrats under different conditions“it depends” (golden, 2000; but see moe, 1990). this offers little to policy scholars who seek a systematic way to include individual decision making into their models.put simply, policy theory has a difficult time connecting the dots between how the design of policy instruments translates into street-level implementation. models that do well at predicting whether congress will employ “police patrols” or “fire alarms” (mccubbins & schwartz, 1984) to control an agency are unable to explain why some divisions of that agency implement congressional intent more faithfully than do others. these institutional-level models are simply ill-equipped to deal with behavioral variance that occurs at the programmatic levelthe same variance that can determine the success or failure of the program.conversely, the so-called “bottom-up” approach to studying public policy has proven equally limited in generating variables that provide useful traction across different policy theories. this line of research tends to treat institutional constraints as staticand therefore safe to ignorewhen examining how individual-level decisions by bureaucrats affect policy outcomes. this effectively ignores the possibility that top-down management adapts and responds to changes in policy environments, personnel, and political directives. literature in public management, however, has regularly shown that the activities and strategies pursued by public managers affect policy outcomes (lynn, 1996; meier & otoole, 2001). much of this scholarship considers how managers build relationships with other individuals and organizations, strategically direct resources within the organization, set goals for performance, and motivate employees to pursue the goals set. we know that these activities matter.research has shown that in many cases, the implementation of the same policy instrument can result in vastly different outcomes across organizations. for example, education policy research has shown that often the actual policy or program that is implemented is much less important than the people who are implementing it (meier, hicklin, hawes, rocha, & doerfler, 2006). so many of the hard-fought policy “solutions” to educational problemsdifferentiated teaching for special education students or english language learners, performance-assessment policy, school choice interventionsare found to be extremely successful at one institution and utterly unsuccessful in others.role of managerial qualityin discussions of policy outcomes and government performance, issues of “bureaucratic incompetence” or “bureaucratic failure” often become central to identifying why certain policies failed. we regularly see case studies that point to administrative failures, poor decision making, or unqualified leadership as the explanation for why things went wrong. both in scholarly and popular discourse, there seem to be at least two universally accepted truths: that there is substantial variation in the managerial abilities (or quality) of those who are appointed to head public agencies and that this variation in quality has a systematic effect on policy outcomes. if this is the case, why do aspects of managerial quality rarely seem to factor into our work on explaining and predicting when policies succeed and when they fail?again, we believe that policy scholars may be hesitant to incorporate managerial quality, because it seems idiosyncratic. and to be fair, managerial quality is not the easiest concept to measure. however, our casual discussions of “poor management” or “leadership failures” can uncover some basic themes that can be (and have been) useful to identifying what factors would likely lead to higher quality management. maybe the best way to identify these qualities would be to consider the indicators that are referenced when making allegations of poor management. for example, a number of critiques of presidential appointments often point to agency heads who were hired for their political affiliations, not their expertise. while “managerial quality” may be difficult to measure, “expertise” (which should be closely linked to quality) can offer more traction.a number of public management scholars have made considerable progress in studying managerial quality by measuring certain aspects of expertise. avellanedas (forthcoming) study of local government officials incorporated levels of formal education and years of experience in similar jobs to measure quality of management. in their work on texas schools, meier and otoole (2002) construct a managerial quality measure using a model that incorporates salary, education, experience, and a number of other related indicators. their subsequent work has found this measure of quality to have a substantial and systematic impact on organizational performance. other studies have included different aspects of managerial expertise, such as whether the manager had served in that particular agency before assuming the leadership role (hamidullah, wilkins, & meier, 2008; hill, 2005) and if the manager had held similar leadership roles in other organizations. overall, this work has established that managerial quality is an important predictor of policy outcomes, and that managerial quality is a concept that we can get some real leverage on measuring and incorporating into our studies of the policy process.networking in public managementin addition to incorporating varying levels of quality, scholarship in public management has focused on the ways in which public managers operate in organizations that are quite different than the traditional, hierarchical agency. often, a cursory treatment of policy implementation assumes that laws are passed down to agency heads who implement these changes through their particular organization, all the way down to the street-level bureaucrats. we know this is not always the case. in fact, it is likely the more unusual case. most public organizations exist in a dynamic environment in which their activities and performance are dependent (to different degrees) on other organizations.examples of government failure have been attributed to a lack of coordination between public managers and other organizations, and legislatures have responded by crafting policies that are intended to affect public managers. we have a number of recent examples. the poor response to hurricane katrina is regularly attributed to the inability of federal emergency management agency (fema) managers to coordinate with state and local government officials. the mistakes made in the lead up to 9/11 pointed to a lack of collaboration among intelligence agencies. environmental policy solutions regularly call for a network of public organizations and private industry, whether managed through cooperation or regulation, as way to combat a number of problems. some health-care policy relies on contracts between public agencies, private industry, and nonprofit organizations. many of our policy instruments require public managers to collaborate with other organizations. additionally, other public managers may choose to collaborate, not because they are compelled to do so, but because they believe that this collaboration will lead to positive results for the organization.scholars consistently find that increased collaboration leads to better policy outcomes for the organization (agranoff & mcguire, 2004; boyne, meier, otoole, & walker, 2006; milward & provan, 2000; meier & otoole, 2001). however, few scholars have explicitly considered how policy change affects collaborative behavior or how managerial collaboration affects the relationship between legislative policy adoption and outcomes. we know that increased networking and collaboration leads to higher levels of performance. we also know that there is substantial variation in the extent to which public managers are included in the policy design process.performance evaluationwe also join the work of james and jorgenson (2008) and believe that an exploration of bureaucratic performance evaluation systems could prove fruitful in advancing policy theory. our colleagues in this series, workman, jones, and watson (2008), focus on the use of information in the policy process, and their work has convinced us that study of information may indeed be the way to break new theoretical ground. we believe that another way that public management scholarship may add to policy theory is through contributing to the discussion on the role of information by incorporating the work on performance measurement and evaluation.what may be of particular interest is a study of how the relationship between performance information (assessment of success and failure) and subsequent policy changes may be affected by the performance metric itself. scholars commonly point to the problems that are inherent in measuring performance and the ways in which these seemingly objective performance criteria are biased both in value-laden objectives and in the emphasis placed on what can be easily measured. if performance information affects policy adoption, and if this information is biased toward a particular interest, then we would hypothesize that different sources of information could affect policymaking in different ways. we know that there are substantial variations in the white houses program assessment rating tool (part) assessment, government accountability office (gao) reports, internal agency performance evaluations, program-level evaluations, and assessments conducted by external groups. but do these differences affect our understanding of the use of information and the influence of values in the policymaking process? would we expect that use of performance information generated by the white house would bias policymaking toward the presidents preferences? would the use of performance information generated within the agency have a different effect? if information is important, the source of the information should also make a difference.management in a policy worlddespite the lack of theoretical cross-fertilization between theories of public policy and the work on public management, many rich opportunities exist. while calls for integrating theories across subfields are nothing new, we find that the current state of both literatures offer opportunities that have not existed previously. exploiting the intersection of these two fields will produce new and interesting theories that could allow us to develop a more general understanding of how public managers, bureaucrats, or agents (whatever we choose to call them) affect the policy process.there are so many ways that policy scholars can move past the (often) onedimensional treatment of the bureaucracy, and we need not “reinvent the wheel.” scholars of public management have already begun to develop broad theoretical frameworks that link public management to the policy process (e.g., see lynn, heinrich, & hill, 2001; otoole & meier, 1999).whether this pursuit extends current lines of work (such as differentiating among sources of information) or delves into entirely new territory (through incorporating concepts of managerial quality or networking into policy theory), the end result will allow us to expand the scope of our field, open doors for future work, and build on the progress made in multiple subfields. we look forward to seeing the next generation of policy theory research.source：alisa hicklin and erik godwin，2009 policy studies organization，the policy studies journal, vol. 37, no. 1, 2009译文：公共管理者在公共政策中的作用公共管理公共管理者在政策理论中起主导作用，但也不完全是独当一面。事实上，公共管理者在大量的框架中占据很着很重要的角色地位，通常作为一个在三角形的支点作用，信息的提供者，宣传联盟，参与决策的推动者，还有其他很多角色。然而，公共管理者在策划中往往很片面，他们很少纳入公共管理学者已经积累下来的知识。例如，考虑如何将管理人员和管理概念嵌入到委托代理模型，公共管理学者往往将街道级官员和具有特点的实体机构总括为被人熟知的一种官僚作风。那么问题就变成政治制度如何启用或限制这种复合官僚庞然大物以获得政策成果。在这些模式管理，如果它出现在所有的，是通过各种行政和结构由国会（作出决定的机构一级的地方，例如，包恩，1995年，1997年石盘，2004年;和麦卡宾斯，诺尔，和温加斯特，1987，1989 ），或总统（例如，木材和沃特曼，1991）。 这些模型已经大大促进了我们对于政策制定的理解，但他们错过了在决策过程中的个人行为所产生的一些重要变化。对履行的基本事实之一是个人，在政策的制定中做了大多数的决定，而不是机构。环境保护署（epa），作为一个机构，不决定有选择地执行对一家公司而不是另一个。相反，机构（即epa）的支持执法系统内的某个地方决定是由个人作出决策。不能描述这些因素直接微观层面的决策。从政策看街道级别官僚的优势（例如，利普斯基，1980），完全是不一样的视觉效果。从这个角度来看，公共管理者具有激励机制，在层次结构中与他们下面的官僚的不一致。这种建立在对委托代理问题的不同侧面揭示，仍然无法解释如何实施两个系统，同样赋予了同样的资源和结构，在相同的实现模式里产生不同的决策指示。有人可能会受到诱惑而推论说，由于不同的官僚优先动机不同造成了不同的结果。对于官僚文学，提供了下面这种答案，当被问及在不同条件下的动力是什么，回答是（黄金，2000;看到更多，1990年）。这对于那些通过寻求系统化来制定个人决定的学者来说几乎没有作用。 简而言之，政策理论在如何连接点转会为政策工具街道一级实施的设计有一段困难的时期。一些模型如预测国会是否将采用“警察巡逻”或“火灾报警器”（麦卡宾斯与施瓦茨，1984），以控制机构以及无法解释为何该机构的一些部门执行国会的意图比其他人更忠实地。这些制度级型号根本没有能力处理行为差异，在方案层面相同的方差，可以判断是成功还是失败。 相反，所谓的用“自下而上”的方法来研究公共政策已经被证明是失败的。当研究官僚决策体制如何影响政策结果，这一研究路线往往将其作为静态的，因此可以忽略。这有效地忽略了自上而下的管理适应和响应政策环境，人员和政治指示的变化的可能性。但是，文学公共管理定期表明，公共管理活动和推行战略会影响到政策结果。本奖学金的大部分经理认为如何建立与其他个人和组织的关系，组织内的直接战略资源，设定绩效目标，并激励员工追求的目标设置。我们知道这些环节是很重要的。 研究表明，在许多情况下，相同政策手段的执行对于不同的组织会有很大不同的结果。例如，教育政策的研究表明，许多正在实施的政策，其效用是远远没有达到期望的。对于那么多基于解决教育问题的争议性政策特殊学生和英语学习者的有区别教育。绩效评估政策，学校的干预措施是非常成功的但是应用到其他机构却是一种失败。管理质量的作用 根据政府政策的结果显示，“官僚无能”或者“官僚失败”往往成为议论的重点，用以得出某些政策失败的原因。我们经常看到管理无能，愚蠢的决策或者不合格的领导导致了政府政策的失败。无论是在学术界还是大众媒体中，似乎有至少有两个普遍接受的真理：有相当大的变化的管理能力，那些谁是任命为公共机构（或质量），而这在质量变化对系统影响政策结果。如果是这样的话，为什么对管理质量方面似乎很少到我们的工作，用以解释和预测某些因素对政策成功和失败时。 同样，我们认为，政策学者可能不愿意纳入管理质量，因为它似乎很古怪。公平的说，质量管理不是用以衡量的最好载体。然而，“管理不善”或“领导失败”这些条件可以让我们破获那些能够达到更高管理质量的因素。也许识别这些因素最好的方法是审议时所用管理不善的指控指标。例如，许多机构的职位任命是根据其政治背景，而不是他们根据他们的专业知识能力。虽然“管理质量”可能是难以衡量，“专业知识”却（应该是密切相关的质量）可以提供更多的牵根据。 相当多的公共管理学者已经在通过测量质量管理的某些方面的专业只是取得了很大的进展。avellaneda（即将出版）关于政府纳入正规教育和工作经验相似的有关研究。他们在德克萨斯的学校，meier和奥图尔（2002）建立了一个用结合工资、教育、经验已经其他相关的一些指标的质量管理和衡量标准。他们后来发现这个工作质量的措施，对组织绩效有重大和系统的影响。其他研究也包含了不同的管理经验等方面，管理者是否曾在该特定机构在就职前担任领导角色（