欧盟的反倾销政策外文翻译.doc

欧盟的反倾销政策外文翻译 外文翻译原文 European Union anti-dumping polices Material Source: Springer Berlin/HeidelbergAuthor:Uta Mobius The traditional trade-policy measures deployed by the EU to protect its markets for industrial goods are declining in importance. The general level of tariffs is rather low and is set to fall further in the wake of the implementation of the Uruguay Round of the GATT. Quantitative restrictions on imports from GATT partner countries are banned under the Agreement and, for the restrictions still in existence in the textile sector, a schedule, albeit a long-term one, for abolition has been agreed. Even the popular so-called grey area measures, such as voluntary export restraint agreements, which enabled undesirable imports to be curtailed in the face of the rules imposed by the GATT, are to be more stringently punished within the framework of the new World Trade OrganisationWTO. It is against this background that attention has increasingly been drawn to anti-dumping policies as a legitimate strategy against the trend towards free trade. Against the background of a multilateral trade system based on most-favoured nation status and equal treatment of all member countries, anti-dumping policies, legitimised as a legal obstacle to unfair methods, enable a country to raise the price of, and thus hinder, undesired imports in a very precise, discriminatory fashion. It is increasingly being claimed that EU anti-dumping policies are being used less as a corrective for unfair trade practices than as an autonomous instrument of protectionism. Preconditions for anti-dumping procedures From the very outset the original GATT Treaty made provision in Article VI for anti-dumping regulations as a means of recourse against unfair trade practices. The conditions applying to anti-dumping procedures were specified further in the Uruguay Round. The rules of the game have been rendered more precise in order to improve legislative consistency and to ensure in both material and institutional terms that the authorities behave fairly vis gt vis the parties involved. In the wake of this amendment, changes were also made to the EC anti-dumping regulation. As was the case previously, it is oriented strictly towards the GATT text. A significant element in making the procedure as fair as possible is its transparency; the EC takes account of this requirement by publishing all the stages of the proceedings. If the European Commission takes the view that an application for anti-dumping measures contains sufficient evidence of dumping and the injury resulting from it, it initiates an anti-dumping investigation. It is to be noted, however, that it only announces those cases in which an anti-dumping investigation is actually implemented and not those cases it has rejected. In order to impose anti-dumping measures the Commission must then show that: 1 imports are occurring at dumping prices. 2 cause or threaten to cause material injury to an industry in the importing country. 3 intervention is in the interest of the Community. As regards the last point, the new regulation explicitly states that all interests are to be considered, including the interests of the domestic industry and users and consumersArticle 21. At the same time, the article accords special importance to restore effective competition, and the provision requiring that measures not be imposed despite evidence of dumping and economic damage are formulated rather vaguely. In the old regulation it was merely the general interest of the Community in joint intervention in cases of injurious dumping that was mentioned. The short-term benefits of low prices for industrial users and consumers are weighted against the injurious effects of the dumped imports in terms of the industrial and social costs of the contraction or elimination of firms, sectors or whole industries. It remains to be seen whether consumer interests will in fact be given greater consideration than was previously the case. Given that consumers are far less well organised than producers at both national and Community level, there are few prima facie grounds for supposing that their influence on EU trade policy will change fundamentally. The central problem, however, is determining when dumping has occurred. A product is considered as being dumped when it is sold abroad at a lower price than in its country of origin. The EU has adopted very precise provisions on the calculation of export price, normal value and fair price comparison, In concrete cases, however, its calculations cannot be effectively scrutinized. Generally, the calculation is based on prices of exporters or producers in various markets or on their costs; in the case of non-market economies the normal value is calculated with reference to prices or a constructed value in a market economy third country. Yet price differentiation is a rational, indeed even a necessary, strategy - one determined by varying market situations. If a heavily protected domestic market permits a firm to earn monopoly rents, export prices on open markets in which competition is tougher will inevitably be lower. This is rational from a profit-imisation perspective, provided the fixed costs are covered by domestic sales and foreign sales at the lower prices at least cover variable costs. Price differentiation is very pronounced within the EU itself, and indeed this was one of the arguments put forward for the creation of the Single European Market. And even now, and in spite of pressure from the Commission, EU automobile producers, among others, take account of the different levels of taxation imposed in the Member States and differentiate their prices accordingly. As a means of showing that dumping has caused injury, market share losses by domestic industry, significant pressure on prices and the resultant decline in output, employment, profitability and productivity are examined. It is extremely difficult, however, to isolate the damage caused by dumping from other negative influences, e.g. those of a cyclical, structural or exchange-rate-related nature. Of central importance in evaluating the injury sustained are the volume and rate of growth of the dumped imports compared to other normal imports and to domestic output. In any case, anti-dumping measures only appear to be appropriate in the case of firms with a dominant market position. The form taken by anti-dumping measures On initiating anti-dumping investigations the Commission may impose provisional anti-dumping duties, but no sooner than 60 days from the initiation of proceedings and for a imum of nine months, m It is the Council that decides on definitive duties since March 1994 by simple majority. Such duties generally apply for five years and expire automatically, unless a review applied for by Community producers stablishes that the duty should be maintained. In anti-dumping proceedings against individual producers the margins of dumping are calculated on an individual basis, and the duty required to avert injury fixed. The Commission reports that between 1988 and 1992 the anti-dumping duties averaged only about half the average margin of dumping 40%, although even this marks a significant increase in prices. Moreover, it must be recognised that in 1995 many anti-dumping duties were above 50%, and some even reached in excess of 100% on espadrilles from China. A duty of more than 90% was imposed on TV camera systems and certain electronic microswitches PROMs from Japan. Anti-dumping proceedings can also be terminated by an undertaking by the exporters to charge minimum prices. However, in 1992 and 1993 the Commission did not terminate any proceedings exclusively on this basis and in 1994 just two Russia and Lithuania. In a number of cases, price undertakings were accepted from some of the firms involved while at the same time duties were imposed on the other firms. Frequently the EC also imposes anti-dumping duties retroactively if it takes the view that price undertakings made have not been adhered to. Whatever the method used, higher import prices result. The difference is that price commitments enable foreign suppliers to widen their margins, whereas, in cases where a duty is imposed, this extra revenue benefits the EC. Commodity groups affected by anti-dumping actions EU anti-dumping actions are concentrated on a small number of commodity groups. Strikingly high import coverage ratios were identified 1994 for a number of textiles cotton, synthetic or artificial spun fibres, spun material and silk, the commodity group stone, earth and cement, fertilisers and electronics el. table 3. In most cases these areas are those which in any case enjoy the highest levels of protection: in these areas the normal EU duties are above average with the exception of silk and the group stone, earth and cement, and the reductions agreed in the Uruguay Round were less significant than in other areas. In the case of the other eight commodity groups affected to an above-average extent by anti-dumping actions, this correlation is less clear; among them are several categories with relatively low duties. The very pronounced concentration of anti-dumping proceedings in 1994 on various areas of the textile is a new development, as the quantitative restrictions under the Multi-Fibre Agreement were until then considered to offer the best protection. Nor can the recent antidumping proceedings be seen as a precautionary measure against steps towards liberalisation in the course of the implementation of the Uruguay Round and the incorporation of the textile sector into the new GATT regime: in the fast phase the EU does not need to liberalise, because it already meets the requirements. Clearly the branch associations of European producers are making great efforts to erect new barriers, in most cases in addition to the existing quantitative restrictions. Most of the anti-dumping proceedings in the textile sector affected countries facing quantitative restrictions with respect to the commodities in question. These, however, had been fixed in tones, so that the exporting countries, faced with the weakness of demand in 1993, had clearly attempted to ensure that they made full use of their quotas by cutting their prices. As a result they had to face anti-dumping proceedings in 1994, none of which had been decided by 1995. Thus the EU has added a new sector - textiles - to its previous anti-dumping loci in chemicals, electronics, iron and steel; in 1994 the investigations were directed largely against cotton fabric, fabrics made of synthetic spun fibres, bed linen and polyester thread from India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Thailand. In 1995 too, it was largely the southern and southeast Asian countries - more specifically the second generation of newcomers, rather than the tigers ? that were in the firing line of new anti-dumping proceedings, although increasingly with respect to electronics rather than textiles. Outlook The new GATT regulations have specified provisions on anti-dumping proceedings. While this has made proceedings more transparent and has increased the protection against arbitrary action, the provisions on the calculation of dumping and comparative prices still offer the European Commission considerable leeway. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the new GATT, although actually intended to restrict such measures, will be used to legitimize selective, unilateral protection by means of anti-dumping measures. Given that the deployment of other non-tariff trade barriers was made even more difficult, anti-dumping measures are likely to increasingly become the first-choice instrument of protectionism. Increases in duties - still permitted under the new GATT - are unpopular because they hit all suppliers equally, are therefore more difficult to impose and have to be paid for in the form of compensation in other areas. In the case of the EU, an additional point is that the multifarious non-tariff barriers of individual Member States have become inoperable in the wake of the Single European Market and the associated abolition of internal border controls. The renewed high number of new anti-dumping proceedings initiated last year is evidence of the will of the EU to continue to deploy this instrument as a highly specific means of averting cheap or rapidly expanding imports. This affects not only EU consumers in the form of higher prices for consumer goods, but also industrial firms processing imported goods, whose competitiveness is reduced by the higher prices paid for inputs; they in turn may then call for protective measures. Far more serious, however, is the effect this has on the sales opportunities of the exporting countries punished by the imposition of anti-dumping duties. This is particularly the case for those countries for which the EU constitutes the most important sales market - in particular the central and eastern European countries and Turkey and also for those whose exports are concentrated on commodities affected by anti-dumping measures. They suffer a loss of the foreign exchange revenue they require to develop their economies and thus all too often the opportunity to purchase investment goods produced in the EU. 译文欧盟的反倾销政策 资料来源: Springer Berlin/Heidelberg 作者:Uta Mobius 传统贸易保护措施作为欧盟为保护其工业产品市场而采取的政策,其重要性正在不断减低。在关贸总协定乌拉圭回合谈判后,各国关税水平得到了进一步的降低,关贸总协定中,各成员国之间限制进口数量的行为是被禁止的,要废除那些被依赖的政策,这显然是一个长期的议程,在纺织品部门就仍然存在限制。那些受欢迎的被称为“灰色地带”的措施,例如:“自愿的”出口限制协议,使不受欢迎的进口在面对关贸总协定规定的强加征税规则前收到限制。正是在这种背景下,反倾销作为可以抵抗自由贸易趋势的合法措施,受到越来越多的关注。在以多边贸易体制下的最惠国待遇和平等互惠原则为基础的背景下,反倾销政策被合法化为“从法律上阻止不公平竞争的方法”,是促使出口国家提高价格,从而精确地阻止不受欢迎的进口,本质上是一种歧视性的方法。人们越来越多的声称,欧盟反倾销政策被用来纠正不公平贸易行为的概率要少于作为一个自主的保护主义手段。 反倾销程序的前提 从一开始原来的关贸总协定条约(第六条)作出的规定:反倾销是作为针对不公平贸易行为的诉讼手段。反倾销程序的适用条件在乌拉圭回合谈判中得到了进一步的明确。“游戏规则”变得更加精确,当局表现的像燃气轮机中的各个部件一样协调,以此提高立法的一致性并在物质和体制上确保公正公平。在这项修正案后,欧盟反倾销规章制度也发生了变化。正如先前的情况一样,它是严格面向关贸总协定的协议的。制造一个尽可能公平透明的程序是它的一个重要要求;欧盟还考虑到公布所有诉讼程序阶段这项规定。如果欧盟委员会认为反倾销申请书中包含了倾销存在的充分证据,并且对进口国的相关产品或产业造成了损害,那么该进口国就可以发起反倾销调查。在此应该指出的是,它只公布那些实际上实施了反倾销调查的案例,而不是那些已经被撤销的案例。 为了实施反倾销措施,委托书必须表明: (1)进口的产品的价格确实存在倾销行为 (2)对该进口国的相关行业造成实质性损害或实质性损害威胁 (3)参加诉讼是为了社会的利益 至于最后一点,新规定明确指出“所有的利益包括国内行业、用户和消费者的利益”(第21条)。同时,条款协定对恢复“有效的”竞争给予了特别的重视,规定确定倾销和经济损害的证据比较模糊,不够充分时,不能采取强制征税的措施。在旧的规章里,它仅仅是共同体联合干预,保护其整体利益的措施,在损害性倾销案件中充分体现了这一点。“低价销售带来的短期利益使工业用户和消费者加重了进口产品倾销的有害影响,使得产业和社会成本收缩,消除了公司,部门甚至整个行业。”与以前的情况相比,消费者的利益是否会在实际中得到更多的考虑这还有待观察。在这里有一些初步性的假设,在国家和社会层面上给予消费者一个好的组织,即使这个组织远不如生产者的组织好,那他们对欧盟贸易政策的影响最终将发生根本性地改变。 最重要的问题是如何确定倾销的发生。一个产品在国外的销售比在原产国的价格低时,就视为“倾销”。欧盟在出口价格、正常价值和公平价格的比较上已做了非常明确的规定。但在具体的案件中,它的计算仍不能得到有效的审议。一般来说,计算是基于出口商或生产商在不同市场的价格或成本上得来的;在案件中的非市场经济国家的正常价值是参考市场经济体制下的第三国的价格或推定价值计算得来的。 然而,价格差异是一个合理的、事实上是必要的,由不同市场情况决定的战略。如果被高度保护的国内市场允许企业赚取垄断租金开放市场,竞争者在开放市场的出口价格将不可避免地被降低。从利润最大化的角度来看这是合理的,它提供了用于国内和国外销售的较低价格,至少包括产品生产和销售的固定费用和可变成本。 在欧盟内部价格差异是非常明显的,并且这也是促进欧洲单一市场建立的原因之一。即使是现在,不顾欧盟委员会的压力,欧盟汽车生产商考虑到各成员国征收的税率不同,从而对产品制定了不同的售价。 对由国内产业市场份额降低、价格的重大压力和产量、就业、盈利、生产率等的下降进行审查,是显示倾销已造成损害的手段。然而,要排除倾销其他负面的影响,例如那些周期性、结构性或者汇率变动所造成的损害,这是非常困难的。在评估持续损害中至关重要的是:“倾销”产品与其他“正常”进口的国内的产量相比,它的进口数量和增长速度是否有大幅度的上升。在任何情况下,反倾销措施只出现在适当的公司占有市场主导地位的案件中。 所采取的反倾销措施 发起反倾销调查时委员会可以征收临时的反倾销税,但要在提起诉讼后的60天才可以征收,最高期限为9个月。在1994年3月,欧盟委员会以少数服从多数的方式确定了明确的职责。这些职位采取五年制,过期自动失效,除非向共同体组织申请复审,则该职位将会被保留。 反倾销个体生产者的倾销幅度是个别计算的