绩效报酬与对高层管理的激励外文文献翻译.doc

绩效报酬与对高层管理的激励资料来源: 作者： 股东的利益冲突的一家国有公司和公司的首席执行官(CEO)是一个典型的委托代理问题。如果股东完全关于CEO的活动和公司的投资机会,他们能设计一个合同规定和执行管理采取动作在每一个状态的世界。机会实行严格的管理措施,然而,完美的股东通过观察;的确,股东不经常知道行动或首席执行官可以将这些行动将会增加股东的财富。在这种情况下,代理理论预测补偿政策将设计给经理激励实施行为选择增加股东的财富。股东想要特别注意行为例如,首席执行官的问题、决定要做的,哪个项目所追求的下降-每当研究中的作用预期回报超过预期的成本。可是总裁只有他的个人所得和成本比较从追求某个活动。如果一个人撷取的CEO影响风险规避、补偿政策,把s股东价值 CEO的福利帮助把私人和社会成本和利益行为和选择的奖励,首席执行官们因此提供采取适当的措施。股东财富是受到许多因素除了CEO,包括采取员工和其他经营者的,供需条件、公共政策。然而,是否合适支付CEO股东财富的基础上的目的,因为这是股东。有许多机制补偿政策,通过提供增值鼓励政策,包括绩效奖金和工资的修改、股票期权、绩效解雇的决定。摘要本研究的目的是计算的大小提供激励每一个这样的机制。我们的预测意味着改变每1000美元相当于一个股东财富平均价格增幅在今年的明年的薪水和奖金约两美分。我们估计相关财富首席执行官工资修改,后果优秀股票期权和揣测解雇;我们的上限估计的总变化的首席执行官的财富,从这些来源的直接控制下董事会75/ 1000美元股东财富的变化。股权是用另一种方法执行的财富随企业的价值。在我们的样品首席执行官举行为0.25左右的10%,包括公司的普通股票可以持有的股份的公司股权和家庭成员或者有关的信赖。因此股票的价值属于平均首席执行官2.50每当美元变化企业的价值1000美元的变化因此,我们最后的各种估计的支付-性能敏感-包括补偿辞退、和股票是32.5美元每1000美元股东财富的变化。在大公司的首席执行官会减少补偿-基于股票不到比小公司的首席执行官的激励。特别是包罗万有的估计的支付-性能敏感性在公司首席执行官的上半部分,我们的样品(意译)市场价值每1000美元涨到1.85美元美元,相比8.05每1000美元,为首席执行官在底部一半的公司,我们的样品。我们相信,我们的结果不一致的影响,正式代理模型的最优承包。实证之间的关系进行了分析付出的高层管理人员和坚定的表现,积极统计学差异,但对一个职业小的奖金将扮演一个重要的角色。此外,我们的估计称解雇不仅仅是一个管理创新的重要来源自增加解雇由于糟糕的表现和概率相关的惩罚被解雇都是小的。执行内部股权可以提供激励计划,但是这些控股通常都不会公司董事会控制,而且大部分高管接受小型的个人股票持有。我们的结果比较吻合的几种主流代用假设,首席执行官可能是不重要的投入生产过程,例如,他们的行为可以轻松地监测和预测评价分析企业板。我们提供额外的假设有关政治力量的作用缔约过程,通过限制行政补偿调节暗示的类型可以写合同,资方和股东。这些政治力量,操作,无论是在政治部门和在组织中看来是至关重要的,但是很难文件,因为他们只在非正式的和间接的方式。公众的对立面的高回报似乎已经缩短了上尾巴的所得分配公司的行政人员。管理劳动市场均衡然后禁止课以处罚因表现欠佳,因此支付的依赖性能下降。我们的研究结果,支付性能,原始的变化关系的变化,并支付薪资水平有所下降,通货膨胀自从20世纪30年代是一致的,这样的隐式的规定。我们将支付性能灵敏度b,当美元的改变相关的首席执行官的财富一美元股东财富的变化。我们把较高的的b解释为显示出首席执行官和他的股东利益的密切配合。譬如说,一名首席执行官正考虑非生产性但昂贵的“宠物工程”,他值的原因,10万美元,但他公司的价值1000美元的股权。该公司的首席执行官会避免这个项目,如果他的支付性能灵敏度超过b = . 01(通过的某种组合,奖金、选择权、股权,或被解雇的概率为贫穷的股票价格性能),但是恐怕采用项目若b . 01。支付性能敏感性的履行所有估计2,213首席执行官列在主管薪酬调查发表在福布斯在1974 1986年。这些研究包括高管服务于1,295公司,总共10,400 的CEO年度数据。我们把这些补助金数据会计年度公司绩效的数据文件所获得的资料的统计,耸立着证券价格研究中心(CRSP)。他们用后被遗漏值,最后的示例包含7,750年度“第一差异”的赔偿金,包括1,688 1,049高管企业。财政年度的股票的回报率是不能的;7,750观察结果 219个是不可得的 日历年度回报,在这些情况下使用。(删除这些219观察不影响结果。)1平均每个1000美元与变化增加股东财富在今年的明年的薪水和奖金约两美分。由于现金赔偿CEO财富，作为他的全部补偿加上工资和奖金贴现后的现值的改变,约每1000美元股东财富的变化30。此外,首席执行官的股票的价值被定义为由流通股票的形式期权的收益价值确定， 15每1,000美元。我们最后的上限估计的平均赔偿的估值，股东价值改变1000美元，对于充分样本,改变45，40为大公司的和90为小公司的。2我们的加权平均估计的首席执行官的被解雇相当于一个一般大小的公司损失1000美元的股东损失，对于所有的样本来说，连续两年净50%的市场回报率是30,为充分样本,对大公司是5，对小公司来说是2.25美元。因此,总的薪金和支付敏感性包括工资和和解雇，对所有的样本来说是股东价值每改变1000美元救市75(每1000美元45和3.15美元,分别为大、小公司)。3.最大的首席执行官的奖励来自所有权的公司的股票,但这样的控股小而且在下降。1986年在福布斯中文版的首席执行官的薪酬调查平均为持股完全0.25个百分点,80%的这些首席执行官持有少于1.4个百分点的公司的股票。对大企业的CEO们所有权中位数为0.14%，对小企业是0.49%。总裁持股由我们原先的估计产生的激励给出的所有CEO薪酬和股票的总变化对于全部样本来说股东财富每变化1000美元是3.25美元，对大企业来说是每1000美元1.85美元，对小企业来说是每1000美元8.05美元。4.董事会并不随支付性能灵敏度的首席执行官与迥然不同持股内。5.虽然奖金代表50%的首席执行官工资,奖金颁发给的道路不高度敏感,性能的变化所测量的公平市场价值,会计盈利,或销售。6.低变异性的经理人报酬的变化反映了一个事实,尽管明显的奖金的重要性经理人报酬,他们不是很变量年复一年的。频率分布的年度百分比变动首席执行官的薪水和奖金和总工资是与一个样品10000随机选出的工人。因此,我们的结果显示薪酬和业绩的弱关系不是由于董事会使用措施所要买的管理业绩给我们。7120个最大的纽约证券交易所首席执行官的内部持股平均下降了从一个数量级从1938年的0.3个百分点下降到1984年百分之0.03。8. 纽约证券交易所公司首席执行官的最高阶层薪金变化从1934-38年的205,000美元降至在1974-86的127,000美元。9.支付性能灵敏度的下降了顶薪首席执行官们的一个数量级，从1934-38年的1000元17.5下降到1974-86年的190,每一千元。10.一般的薪水和奖金为顶薪的首席执行官从1934-38年的813,000美元降至在1974-86年的 645,000美元,而样本公司的市场价值增加了一倍。外文翻译原文Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives. Material Source: EBSCO Author: Michael C JensenThe conflict of interest between shareholders of a publicly owned corporation and the corporations chief executive officer (CEO) is a classic example of a principal-agent problem. If shareholders had complete information regarding the CEOs activities and the firms investment opportunities, they could design a contract specifying and enforcing the managerial action to be taken in each state of the world. Managerial actions and investment opportunities are not, however, perfectly observable by shareholders; indeed ,shareholders do not often know what actions the CEO can take or which of these actions will increase shareholder wealth. In these situations, agency theory predicts that compensation policy will be designed to give the manager incentives to select and implement actions that increase shareholder wealth.Shareholders want CEOs to take particular actionsfor example, deciding which issue to work on, which project to pursue, and which to dropwhenever the expected return on the action exceeds the expected costs. But the CEO compares only his private gain and cost from pursuing a particular activity. If one abstracts from the effects of CEO risk aversion, compensation policy that ties the CEOs welfare to shareholder wealth helps align the private and social costs and benefits of alternative actions and thus provides incentives for CEOs to take appropriate actions. Shareholder wealth is affected by many factors in addition to the CEO, including actions of other executives and employees, demand and supply conditions, and public policy. It is appropriate, however ,to pay CEOs on the basis of shareholder wealth since that is the objective of shareholders.There are many mechanisms through which compensation policy can provide value-increasing incentives, including performance-based bonuses and salary revisions, stock options, and performance-based dismissal decisions. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the magnitude of the incentives provided by each of these mechanisms. Our estimates imply that each $1,000 change in shareholder wealth corresponds to an average increase in this years and next years salary and bonus of about two cents. We also estimate the CEO wealth consequences associated with salary revisions,outstanding stock options, and performance-related dismissals; our upper-bound estimate of the total change in the CEOs wealth from these sources that are under direct control of the board of directors is about 75 per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth.Stock ownership is another way an executives wealth varies with the value of the firm. In our sample CEOs hold a median of about 0.25 percent of their firms common stock, including exercisable stock options and shares held by family members or connected trusts. Thus the value of the stock owned by the median CEO changes by $2.50whenever the value of the firm changes by$1,000.Therefore,our final all inclusive estimate of the pay-performance sensitivityincluding compensationDismissal, and stockholdingsis about $3.25 per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth.In large firms CEOs tend to own less stock and have less compensation-based incentives than CEOs in smaller firms. In particular, our all-inclusive estimate of the pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs in firms in the top half of our sample (ranked by market value) is $1.85 per $1,000, compared to $8.05 per $1,000 for CEOs in firms in the bottom half of our sample.We believe that our results are inconsistent with the implications of formal agency models of optimal contracting. The empirical relation between the pay of top-level executives and firm performance, while positive and statistically significant, is small for an occupation in which incentive pay is expected to play an important role. In addition ,our estimates suggest that dismissals are not an important source of managerial incentives since the increases in dismissal probability due to poor performance and the penalties associated with dismissal are both small. Executive inside stock ownership can provide incentives, but these holdings are not generally controlled by the corporate board, and the majority of top executives have small personal stockholdings.Our results are consistent with several alternative hypotheses; CEOs may be unimportant inputs in the production process, for example, or their actions may be easily monitored and evaluated by corporate boards. We offer an additional hypothesis relating to the role of political forces in the contracting process that implicitly regulate executive compensation by constraining the type of contracts that can be written between management and shareholders. These political forces, operating both in the political sector and within organizations, appear to be important but are difficult to document because they operate in informal and indirect ways. Public disapproval of high rewards seems to have truncated the upper tail of the earnings distribution of corporate executives. Equilibrium in the managerial labor market then prohibits large penalties for poor performance and as a result the dependence of pay on performance is decreased. Our findings that the pay-performance relation, the raw variability of pay changes, and inflation-adjusted pay levels have declined substantially since the 1930s are consistent with such implicit regulation.We define the pay-performance sensitivity, b, as the dollar change in the CEOs wealth associated with a dollar change in the wealth of shareholders. We interpret higher bs as indicating a closer alignment of interests between the CEO and his shareholders. Suppose, for example, that a CEO is considering a nonproductive but costly “pet project” that he values at $100,000 but that will diminish the value of his firms equity by $10million. The CEO will avoid this project if his pay-performance sensitivity exceeds b=.01(through some combination of incentive compensation, options, stock ownership, or probability of being fired for poor stock price performance) but will adopt the project if b .01.The pay-performance sensitivity is estimated by following all 2,213 CEOs listed in the Executive Compensation Surveys published in Forbes from 1974 to 1986. These surveys include executives serving in 1,295 corporations, for a total of 10,400 CEO-years of data. We match these compensation data to fiscal year corporate performance data obtained from the data files of the Comp stat and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). After observations with missing data are eliminated, the final sample contains 7,750 yearly “first differences” in compensation and includes 1,688 executives from 1,049 corporations. Fiscal year stock returns are unavailable for 219 of the 7,750observations; calendar-year returns are used in these cases. (Deleting these 219 observations does not affect the results.)1. On average, each $1,000 change in shareholder wealth corresponds to an increase in this years and next years salary and bonus of about two cents. The CEOs wealth due to his cash compensationdefined as his total compensation plus the discounted present value of the change in his salary and bonuschanges by about 30 per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. In addition, the value of the CEOs stock optionsdefined as the value of the outstanding stock options plus the gains from exercising optionschanges by 15 per $1,000. Our final upper-bound estimate of the average compensation-related wealth consequences of a $1,000 change in shareholder value is 45for the full sample, 40 for large firms, and 90for small firms.2. Our weighted-average estimate of the CEOs dismissal-related wealth consequences of each $1,000 shareholder loss for an average-size firm with 50 percent net-of-market returns for two consecutive years is 30 for the full sample, 5 for large firms, and $2.25 for small firms. Therefore, the total pay-performance sensitivityincluding both pay and dismissalis about 75 per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth for the full sample (45 and $3.15 per $1,000 for large and small firms, respectively).3. The largest CEO performance incentives come from ownership of their firms stock, but such holdings are small and declining. Median 1986 inside stockholdings for 746 CEOs in the Forbes compensation survey are 0.25 percent, and 80 percent of these CEOs hold less than 1.4 percent of their firms shares. Median ownership for CEOs of large firms is 0.14 percent and for small firms is 0.49 percent. Adding the incentives generated by median CEO stockholdings to our previous estimates gives a total change in all CEO pay- and stock-related wealth of $3.25 per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth for the full sample, $1.85 per $1,000 for large firms, and $8.05 for small firms.4. Boards of directors do not vary the pay-performance sensitivity for CEOs with widely different inside stockholdings.5. Although bonuses represent 50 percent of CEO salary, such bonuses are awarded in ways that are not highly sensitive to performance as measured by changes in market value of equity, accounting earnings, or sales.6. The low variability of changes in CEO compensation reflects the fact that in spite of the apparent importance of bonuses in CEO compensation, they are not very variable from year to year. The frequency distributions of annual percentage changes in CEO salary plus bonus and total pay are comparable to that of a sample of 10,000 randomly selected workers. Thus our results indicating a we