飞利浦以三A计划谋变.doc

飞利浦：以三A计划谋变 2007-8-17 16:35:02 经济导刊 近年来，荷兰皇家飞利浦集团似乎一直热衷于并购。2005年飞利浦以2.8亿美元收购Stentor；2006年1月又以7.5亿美元收购Lifeline Systems；2006年8月飞利浦以43.5亿美元出售半导体部门80.1股份；2007年2月正式将全球手机业务25的股权转让给CEC（中国电子）；其实，收购仅仅是飞利浦TOP计划中的一部分。那么什么是飞利浦的TOP计划？该计划背后又是什么？TOP计划助飞利浦转型自1891诞生至今，飞利浦已是世界上最“家大业大”的跨国公司之一，经营范围包括照明、彩电、音响、半导体、医疗和移动通信等，在全球50多个国家建立了65个地区总部和办事处，拥有约16万员工。但由于业务过于多元化，主业模糊不清、部分核心产品盈利能力不高，在1985-1999年的财务报表上，飞利浦年度收入几乎处于停滞。2001新CEO柯慈雷上任后大刀阔斧改革，提出“一个飞利浦”的TOP（Transforming into One Philips）计划，以“极简主义”为主线，飞利浦开始着手战略转型。简而言之，TOP可概括于文化、领域、组织三个层次。文化：“精于心，简于形”2004年9月13日，飞利浦在全球同时发布了新的品牌战略“精于心，简于形”（Sense and Simplicity）。在飞利浦所有的广告、产品包装和其他宣传品上，除了“PHILIPS”这个标识，还在相应的位置配上了这句“Sense and Simplicity”，不但阐述了“一个飞利浦”的精简理念，同时塑造飞利浦全球统一形象。飞利浦，百岁老人的谋变，必然带来理念上的更新，使得所有的战略步骤都统一于核心品牌理念之下。领域：“医疗保健、时尚生活和核心技术”2001年，飞利浦把下属的13个生产部门精编为5个，分别为医疗系统、家庭小电器、消费电子、照明及半导体。2003年，又把五大部门集中在医疗保健、时尚生活和核心技术三大领域，不断剥离利润率较低的IT业、消费电子业，并把医疗系统作为重要发展领域。构建一个清晰的架构，以现实盈利的需要，飞利浦开始通过购并、剥离等方式对公司进行重新整合，2002年3月，飞利浦CEO柯慈雷把语音处理电话制造业务部及相关专利出售；2002年8月，飞利浦又将其通讯、安全及图像业务部出售，2004年将PC显示器及部分纯平电视业务出售；2005年又将半导体业务剥离。与此形成对照的是，飞利浦一直在加大进入医疗产品行业的力度。从1998年以来，飞利浦不断并购医疗企业，使其医疗系统在全球医疗成像、监控、信息和服务市场上占据了有利地位。同时，飞利浦将目光放在中低端、但医疗需求大的发展中国家。2004年5月与东软合资成立的合资公司，借助合资企业生产的中低端产品，飞利浦把这些产品销往多个发展中国家。2005年飞利浦医疗系统业务收入达76亿美元，与1998年的6相比，占到了飞利浦总收入的21。美国营销咨询公司Klein Biomedical（KBC）报告指出，2005年飞利浦医疗公司超声波市场营销份额占美国市场的26。飞利浦公司盈利年度增长率12。在X光线学市场的份额增加了2个百分点。在心脏学仪器市场，2005市场收入增加10。组织：“服务共享”整合TOP的核心是对外强调飞利浦的统一性，对内通过“服务共享”整合企业内部IT、组织构架、人力资源、采购以及其他综合管理部门，大力简化运作程序。对非重心部分实行外包或服务共享，削减公司管理费用。中国是飞利浦全球范围内仅次于美国的第二大市场，目前在中国有35家独资、合资公司，总部位于上海。飞利浦在2003年在上海建立整合中心，把人力资源共享服务PPS（Philips People Service）作为中国TOP计划的切入点。TOP计划持续深入整合企业内部资源。特别是组织设计和财务处理上。飞利浦在亚洲地区共五个分区：中国、韩国、日本、印度和东盟，根据分区不同，有些时候飞利浦是将资源由几个国家分享，而有些时候则不是。如在曼谷建立一个会计中心来处理整个亚洲的会计事务，中国市场的庞大，飞利浦将在上海单独建立一个会计中心。飞利浦也2005年在上海首先建立了IT中心，飞利浦所有中国分支的IT功能都通过这个中心实现工厂资源共享。在一系列的整合之后，出于成本和效率的需要，飞利浦将逐步把一些部门外包出去的依据。皇家飞利浦财务报告显示，公司在2003年下半年扭亏为盈，2005年全球营运利润达17.7亿欧元，比2004年增长10。实行：三A战略一个跨国公司面临的最大挑战，必然是对全球跨边界差异的管理，通过全球资源的调整，获取可持续竞争优势。飞利浦谋求战略转型，就必须站在金字塔顶端，从全球战略角度对分散在在50多个国家的人力、物力、财力进行重新配置。那么，TOP计划就可看作飞利浦在这一战略下的策略选择及具体执行计划。Pankaj Ghemawat是美国哈佛商学院及西班牙IESE商学院教授，他认为跨国公司的战略可分为适应、聚合和套利三种并提出战略管理“三A”模型思想，。由飞利浦TOP中可看出，作为谋求变革的跨国巨头，飞利浦正是实行了其中一种战略。什么是“三A”战略“适应”是尽可能提高当地响应度，达到增加销售收入和扩大市场份额。最常见的做法是在每一个地区设立一个本土公司，每家公司都有完整的供应链。“聚合”是建立区域公司或全球公司，以获得规模经济，采取这种做法的公司对产品和服务实行标准化，并把开发和生产流程集中在一起。“套利”是第三种战略，它是利用国家或区域市场之间的差异谋取最大利益，一般是把供应链的各个环节部署在不同地区，如把生产部门置于东亚，而销售则在美国。具体详见图。管理者可以借助3A角形来判断哪一种战略或战略组合对公司或整个行业有利。公司损益表上的费用支出，为每一个战略的重要性提供了依据。如果公司的广告支出很大，则必须对当地市场的情况做出迅速反应。研发成本很高的公司，固定成本投入大，可能要通过聚合来提高规模效益。对于劳动力密集型的公司，套利就显得特别重要。通过三种费用的计算，可以估计三种战略的对公司的重要性。广告成本、研发成本占销售收入的比重很少超过10，而劳动力成本的最大比重几乎接近100。如果公司的任何一项收入超过中位数，管理者就应予以重视，如果超过九分位数，那就更不可忽视。从飞利浦TOP计划的内容来看，飞利浦在应用聚合战略。纵观飞利浦的历史，从最初的多元化发展本土适应，到目前的“精于心，简于形”的并购集中，飞利浦的TOP计划正可以用“聚合为主，适应为次，兼顾套利”来形容。飞利浦如何应用三A战略第一，集中一个或两个“A”。从飞利浦的战略转型看来，一个跨国公司的战略改变是一个漫长艰巨的过程，世界上除了GE之外，几乎没有一家公司能同时应用好三个A。飞利浦CEO柯慈雷果断地把飞利浦业务集中于“医疗保健、时尚生活和核心技术”，并把医疗系统作为重心，明确了“聚合”这个A。变革和强势领导力的CEO坚持和执行“聚合”战略，并以此为重心，这是战略成功的第一步。其次，变革以理念支持。2004年，飞利浦把最初的“让我们做地更好”换成了“精于心，简于形”，前者更加偏向于消费者，而后者兼顾了飞利浦简约的形象和公司战略的重心聚合。所有的变革均围绕“精于心，简于形”，公司上下员工皆谨慎遵循，“聚合”战略更容易从人本角度贯彻执行。一些国内企业“知其然，不知其所以然”，盲目照搬形式。或者变革中只涉及形式，却没有理念上的创新，导致转型失败。再者，组织符合战略变革。三种战略都有相应适合的组织。适应战略注重本土化和当地相应度，在组织结构图上一般可选择总部、亚太区、北美区、欧洲区等形式，各区又分子公司，每一个子公司都有完整的产品研发、生产和营销体系，各区互相联系少。聚合战略强调规模经济和标准化生产，一般选择矩形组织结构，把产品、地区或职能作为矩阵的两个维度。飞利浦的PPS、IT资源共享以及其中的TOP小组，跨区进行资源整合，是聚合战略在组织上的创新。利用国家或区域市场之间的差异谋取最大利益，可把供应链的各个环节部署在不同地区。飞利浦注重套利，为了削减成本，在2007年将尽快将LCD组装工厂迁移至中国。到2009年，全球80以上的液晶模组产能将转移到中国。最后，借助外来力量。在整个变革的TOP计划中，飞利浦借助普华永道的咨询小组来保证计划的执行和监督。另外，在切割业务流程中，适当的业务外包有助于降低成本，这在PSS计划中体现明显。自我革新的动力在上层很足，但在执行层面可能贯彻不足。很多企业变革失败往往不是方向性问题，而是具体的执行层面，借助外力，显示了高层变革的决心，也能确保贯彻执行。飞利浦TOP聚合是否完美一个战略的成功与否，财务报表是最好的判断。在TOP计划之前的1985-1999年，飞利浦年度收入几乎处于停滞。2000年，飞利浦业绩创下了最佳历史纪录，实现销售额407亿美元，净利润34亿美元。2003年实现扭亏为盈，公司净利润达到了8.87亿美元。2005年飞利浦净赢利达35亿美元，2006年销售额比2005年同期增长了6。飞利浦高层相信2007年营业额增长5至6、税前利润率不低于7.5的目标可以达到。飞利浦的战略的成功取决于两点：产业利润是否高，公司成本是否控制得当。在第一点上，Pankaj Ghemawat对飞利浦进入医疗影像业表示了担忧，GE、西门子在研发和劳动力投入上飞利浦更有优势，他建议飞利浦转向家庭医疗。但Pankaj Ghemawat忽略了一点，也就是飞利浦目前应用的策略-集中进入中低端、但医疗需求大的发展中国家。那么，飞利浦相对于GE和西门子的弱势，可以用较早进入中低端市场的优势来弥补。在公司成本控制上，飞利浦用“聚合”战略尽量统一各地区部门以达到规模效益和降低成本。20世纪80年代，宝洁公司也面临同样问题，将各部门生硬地套入矩形组织的框架，那么，飞利浦是否能在聚合过程中避免犯类似错误，或者在较短时间内及时纠正？市场之战，时间证明一切。战略是一种锲而不舍的承诺 加入日期:2006-5-16 11:11:07 作者:佚名 来自:中国办公网 阅读次数: 办企业，没有不想把企业做大、做到同行第一的。但办过企业或领导过企业的人都知道，成为同行中的佼佼者谈何容易。为什么同一产业中相互竞争的企业，有的成功，有的不成功？成功的企业为什么成功，失败的企业为什么失败？著名的美国战略管理学家迈克尔波特（Michael E. Porter）从战略角度的解释是，因为二者实行的战略不同，聚焦的产业关键成功因素（Key Successful Factors）不同。于是，许多企业按照波特的竞争战略理论，分析产业的关键成功因素，模仿成功企业的战略，以为这样就可以迎头赶上，后来居上。实践表明，事情并非如此简单。 问题在于，即使是针对同样的产业关键成功因素，并采取相似的战略，企业各自的绩效仍然差距巨大。这又怎么解释呢？为什么同样的战略会有不同的结果呢？ 哈佛大学战略管理教授潘卡盖莫沃特（Pankaj Ghemawat）的解释是，因为每个企业的投入和承诺（Commitment）不同。他以此为题的Commitment一书1991年发表后，在企业界和学术界颇受好评，一度许多商学院的战略管理课程，干脆就更名为：战略与承诺（Strategy and Commitment）。 按照盖莫沃特的观点，战略是一种坚持不懈的承诺和投入，是一种义无反顾的献身。承诺是战略本身固有的性质。战略之所以必须坚持不懈，是因为它投资的要素具有持久性、专用性、不可交易性，用盖莫沃特的话来说，就是被“粘牢”（Sticky）了。西尔斯（Sears）公司是美国消费品零售业一家久负盛名的连锁企业，上个世纪70年代以前，一直占据着美国零售连锁业的霸主地位，但后来为什么不敌沃尔玛（Wal-Mart）公司，为什么西尔斯做出了巨大的努力仍然超不过沃尔玛？因为西尔斯被它过去所投资的要素粘牢了。对于企业战略来说，过去的选择约束着目前的选择，而目前的选择又约束着未来的选择。盖莫沃特强调，战略承诺的不可逆转性，意味着必须在战略制定和抉择中坚决克服近视症。 盖莫沃特进一步指出，承诺和投入是对企业之间存在的持久差异的惟一一般性解释。从这个意义上说，关键成功因素对企业的成功并非是最关键的。当同一行业中相互竞争的企业都认识到该行业的关键成功因素时，最终的成功就取决于承诺和投入的决心和持久性。盖莫沃特列举波音公司开发747型宽体客机的例子来说明他的观点。开发747型客机的投资超过了当时波音公司的净收入，前后持续了十年时间，如果开发失败，波音公司将破产，但正是这种大投入、大承诺，使波音公司获得了巨大的成功。如果企业也承诺了，但决心不大，也投入了，但投入强度不够，最终会前功尽弃。 盖莫沃特还指出，企业在制定战略时可能面临多种选择，但战略的承诺理论引导企业家和经理人只专注于少数战略性的选择。如果某项选择包含大量的沉入成本、机会成本、要持续很长的周期、其成败对企业关系重大，那它就是战略性的。所以，凡是获得巨大成功的企业家都不做太多的决策，企业有限的资源也不允许他做太多的决策，他只关注少数投入密集型的决策。 我认为，盖莫沃特的上述观点和理论对中国的企业家和经理人极具指导意义。它揭示了为什么改革开放二十多年了，中国企业仍然在许多关键领域中与世界级竞争对手存在巨大的技术差距，为什么在众多行业我们的企业长期处于世界产业链的谷底？原因是我们在那些技术密集和要求长期大量投入的领域中，缺乏义无反顾的决心和承诺。对中国企业来说，重要的不在于制定战略，而在于实施战略的决心和承诺。 其实，对于处于追赶地位的中国企业来说，方向往往是清楚的，从而战略选择并不是最困难的，不必把战略搞得那么神秘。事实上，企业的重大战略无秘可保。像第三代移动通信设备的开发，数字电视设备的开发，电动汽车的开发等，你做还是不做，采取什么标准，什么技术路线，业界都清楚，捂也捂不住。关键在于决心、投入强度和速度，而速度又取决于投入强度，投入强度又取决于决心。所以最终取决于企业领导人的承诺。解放战争时期，第四野战军在胜利结束了辽沈战役后，中央指示他们迅速隐蔽入关，百万大军入关，怎么隐蔽？无密可保，关键还在于部队的运动速度。军事上如此，市场竞争也是一样。 那么什么妨碍了中国企业领导人做出长期的战略承诺呢？一个客观原因是我们的企业规模尚小，实力不足，许多企业长期为生存所困扰，无暇顾及长远的发展。市场的中高端产品利润丰厚，但要开发中高端产品，必须从低端产品一点一滴地做起，慢慢积累技术和运行经验。而低端产品又遭低价封杀，无利可图。难啊！这是我们的现实。要解决这个问题，只有缩短战线，先从点上突破。最初开发出的产品可能连一台都卖不出去，进一步开发的下一代产品可能还收不回投资，但只要坚持不懈，最终一定会走出来的。其实，对我国的许多企业来说，还不能说一点资源都挤不出来，问题是投向哪里。我们能不能省下一些投在广告上的费用，把它投在新产品、新器件的研发上；能不能省下一些花在渠道上的费用，把它花在制造工艺和管理的改进上？这是可以做到的。 可喜的是，中国已经有一些企业在关键技术的研发上、精密制造工艺的攻关上，以及国际市场的开拓上，显示出破釜沉舟的决心和承诺。像华为在网络核心设备领域，TCL在通讯终端领域，海尔在国际市场的开拓方面，都是屡战屡败，屡败屡战，直到曙光初现。他们是中国企业的榜样。他们的道路，是中国企业的必由之路。 虽然上个世纪，我们错过了世界经济在战后和两次石油危机后的大发展时期，但我们的未来还有巨大的商业机会。除了像第三代移动通讯、数字电视、家庭轿车、生物制药、教育、医疗等这些世界范围的技术革命带来的巨大商机，即使是传统产业中的交通运输、住宅、零售连锁、旅游、电力装备、数控机床、运输车辆等等，伴随着经济增长和人民收入水平的提高都还有巨大的发展空间。加入WTO，我们面临一个更加开放的市场，世界制造中心在向中国转移。面对未来的巨大商机，我们的企业必须横下一条心，在选定的战略方向上有锲而不舍地承诺，用愚公移山的精神，获取最终的成功。From Emerging Economies to the Global Market: The Case of EmbraerPublished:August 21, 2000Author:Martha Lagace窗体顶端窗体底端窗体顶端窗体底端About Faculty in this Article:Pankaj Ghemawat is the Jaime and Josefina Chua Tiampo Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. More Working Knowledge from Pankaj Ghemawat Pankaj Ghemawat - Faculty Research Page How can a company from an emerging economy manage to make waves in global business?Ask Embraer. The Brazilian firm also known as Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. is the fourth largest commercial aircraft manufacturer in the world, behind Boeing, Airbus and Bombardier. In mid-August, it posted a 54 percent jump in sales and a 35 percent gain in second-quarter earnings.A new HBS case study on Embraer, presented in Buenos Aires (in a modified version of how such a case might be taught in a standard classroom setting), offered plenty of room for lively debate among conference participants. Questions they considered: What key elements of strategy and competitiveness will help a firm from an emerging market suceed internationally? How can a government assist a company without smothering it?Another point of central interest in the Embraer example was an ongoing dispute between Embraer and the Canadian manufacturer Bombardier, which has yet to be settled by the World Trade Organization. Conference participants offered a variety of predictions on how they thought the dispute could and should pan out.According to Professor Pankaj Ghemawat, who led the discussion (while injecting what he called procedural asides to demonstrate how the case might be taught in a classroom), the Embraer case also illuminated ways that companies might craft a strategy to balance two spheres of influence: market and non-market forces.Issues unique to the regionThe case on Embraer, Ghemawat explained to the audience in his introduction, is one of the first outputs of the Schools new Latin America Research Center (LARC). It was co-written by Ghemawat with LARC executive director Gustavo Herrero and senior researcher Luis Felipe Monteiro. Ghemawat, who originally started the case for his elective course on Globalization and Strategy, said that it also illustrates the first efforts of the LARC advisory committee to address business issues unique to the region.We started talking about what was distinctive about the Latin American context, Ghemawat said of their early meetings, and about what research and course development efforts in this areawhether by Harvard or by other institutionsreally needed to reflect.The basic macro environment in emerging economies, he explained, is very different from that of developed economies that sometimes end up getting treated as a base case.We talked about the role of government. And, while its useful to focus on market strategy, the non-market components of strategy were things that needed to be highlighted as well.Keys for strategyTheres a lot going on in the case, Ghemawat warned the audience as the discussion began. Theres a lose-to-a-billion dollar commitment that Embraer is close to making for a new family of aircraft. Theres an extraordinarily complex and bitter dispute at the WTO between the Canadian and Brazilian governments about Embraer versus Bombardier in the regional jet market. In addition, Embraer is selling or has sold a fraction of its equity to a French consortium. Plus, an IPO is being planned.What problems confront a company thats trying to become internationally competitive? What sorts of problems are Embraers partnerships trying to overcome?As a company, conference participants said, Embraer had made a number of smart moves. Its human resources strategy was rejuvenated for flexibility, so people were motivated to work there. The company had lowered the cost of capital by sharing risks, first with the government and then, through outsourcing, with suppliers. It focused very early on foreign markets, rather than just on the domestic market.While the company had clearly benefited from its relationship with the government, said one participant, it had somehow avoided being trapped in the governments embrace.As Ghemawat told the group, In some sense the Embraer strategy is not very unusual. Its almost a prototypical strategy from one of these environments trying to become internationally competitive.When we looked at India and Argentina and a number of other countries, we see islands of competitiveness, where companies have managed to succeed in decoupling themselves from the most negative elements of the domestic environment while retaining the positive elements, as they attempt to become competitive.Embraer is an example of the power of not just assuming that because you are based in a country, you necessarily have to be subject to all the disadvantages imposed by that particular context.Wrapping up in the brazilian flagWhen Ghemawat turned the discussion to the WTO dispute and asked participants for their reactions, most suggested that companies in emerging economies need to brace themselves for such legal battles on the global stage.One commentator thought this particular dispute would blow over. I think theres a lot of saber-rattling going on, he explained. Canada has a very large number of investments in Brazil. Things will calm down.Added another: My impression is that the arguments are very biased in favor of the developed country. Secondly, the developed countries are a lot more professional in hiding their own tricks.If we got rid of the biases and put all the tricks on the table, the situation is a lot of more balanced than people tend to believe, at least in the developed countries.Commented a third, It looks like the company will need to develop a new set of skills. They have managed to be competitive with their global competitors, but now the arena is moving to the WTO, and thats different competition. They are not competing with similar airplanes, they are competing on who convinces the WTO better; and probably they need to work on their government skills.Which government will be more efficient in convincing the WTO? Its striking that Canadians are fighting Brazilians Embraer has to develop, with their government, a way of defending the company, and defending the countrys interests, as well.The temptation is to wrap up in the Brazilian flag and say, The big guys always win.There are skills you need negotiating in that new forum that are absolutely critical, he asserted.No delusionsOne of the purposes of writing the Embraer case, Ghemawat reminded the group, was to bring business-government relations back to the fore. As business moves forward, he said, its important to keep in mind that in any industry the scope of strategy vis-vis government has expanded beyond traditional musings about How will we influence the government on domestic regulation?We should start thinking about the potential scope for these kinds of issues in globalization. If this is the positive of globalizationthe ability to try and transcend the difficulties of your domestic context in order to improve your competitiveness, Ghemawat said, then one of the downsides, or at least one of the managerial challenges, is that its hard to imagine these kinds of disputes ceasing very quickly.One of the biggest delusions in world business, he added, is that governments will entirely step out of the way. You still need the government for dealing with other national governments, and for representation before groups such as the WTO.And non-market strategy also has to expand beyond just thinking about relationships with the government, to thinking about non-governmental organizations which are very much on the rise as well. Keywords:Global Strategy, Aircraft, Manufacturing, Transportation, Latin America The Dubious Logic of Global MegamergersPublished:October 2, 2000Authors:Pankaj Ghemawat and Fariborz GhadarExecutive Summary:Many of todays hugeand priceycross-border mergers are based on a mistaken assumption, write Pankaj Ghemawat and Fariborz Ghadar in the Harvard Business Review. In the face of globalization, they say, companies may have better alternatives than the pursuit of the big deal.窗体顶端窗体底端窗体顶端窗体底端About Faculty in this Article:Pankaj Ghemawat is the Jaime and Josefina Chua Tiampo Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. More Working Knowledge from Pankaj Ghemawat Pankaj Ghemawat - Faculty Research Page Editors Note: The assumption that industries will become more concentrated as they become more global, that the global economy is a winner-take-all economy, has become common wisdom. But, according to Pankaj Ghemawat and Fariborz Ghadar, empirical research indicates that globalor globalizingindustries have actually been marked by steady decreases in concentration since World War II.Executives, they write, need to break free of the biases that lead them to pursue larger and larger cross-border deals. There are better, more profitable strategies for dealing with globalization than relentless expansion.In this excerpt, they detail seven such strategies that corporate leaders can pursue.Pick Up the Scraps. As Peter Drucker recently noted, for every megamerger or large acquisition, there are usually several spin-offs, divestments, or asset sales that can give companiesespecially smaller oneslots of growth opportunities. The 1998 merger of BP and Amoco, for example, led to the disposal of 12 oil-storage terminals scattered across North America. The terminals were purchased by the Williams Companies, a small business compared with BP Amoco but hardly an insignificant one. In 1998, Williams had nearly $8 billion in sales. The oil industry is becoming more competitive in part because of such cast-off purchases by companies like Williams.Stay Home. For many companies, it still makes a lot more sense to grow domestically or regionally than to try and establish a global presence. Think of Maytag and Lloyds Bank; both companies have prospered by focusing on their home markets of the United States and Great Britain, respectively. Telefnica de Espaa, a midsize telecommunications company, has rejected the role of global consolidator as being too expensive. Instead, it has focused on building a strong regional presence in Latin America. Even if Telefnica has to sell its assets, or itself, its regional position will command a high price.Keep Your Eye on the Ball. A big deal takes lots of time and consumes lots of managerial attention. If others in your industry are busy with their mega-deals, you can exploit that fact to improve your own competitive position. For instance, while pharmaceutical players such as Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham have made headlines with their merger news, one large competitor, Merck, has so far refrained from making any such moves itself. According to industry observers, Merck intends t