LN08_Mish10E(lrw)_融资渠道的选择.ppt

Chapter8 AnEconomicAnalysisofFinancialStructure Take homeMessages FinancialStructure 不同融资渠道的统计特征关于不同融资渠道的特征 EightBasicFacts PatternWhataffectthestructure 不同渠道存在的原因Theory1 TransactionCosts重点讨论Theory2 AdverseSelectionindebtmarket Lemonsproblem重点讨论Theory3 MoralHazardinequitymarket Principal AgentProblem 重点讨论andtoobigtofailindebtmarket 2 本章的主要内容 以一个汽车贷款案例串联以上问题提出各种方案 问题 找出对策 思考题 汽车贷款案例 你的祖母过世了 留给你10000美元遗产 当你收到支票的时候 你最好的朋友陪你去银行 并计划把这笔钱存人银行 在银行里 你的朋友提醒你这家银行的存款利率为3 而其购车贷款的利率为9 你的朋友建议 你为何不站在购车贷款办事处的门口 自己直接向来一个来申请购车贷款的客户放贷 这样你可以获得比存款3 的利率更高的利息收入 并且排除中间人 1请解释你如果发放这笔贷款很难获得收益的原因 2请解释由银行发放这笔贷款能够获得收益的原因 视角一 间接金融vs间接金融 如果选择间接金融即银行问题 利率低 回报低解决方法 用直接金融 example 招财宝如果选择直接金融 个人贷款给个人问题 交易成本之一 合同制定和执行成本很高 解决方法 银行通过规模效应 与专业分工 降低成本 视角二 如果选择债券合同 逆向选择问题 问题 逆向选择信用差的才来借款解决方法 Privateproductionandsaleofinformation信用调查 央行信用 芝麻信用 Governmentregulationtoincreaseinformation温州私人借款 在政府部门登记Collateralandnetworth拿你们家牛和犁抵押 找有信用的人大户担保Financialintermediation经过银行借贷 视角三 如果选择债券合同 道德风险问题 问题 道德风险合同签订后 借款人投资高风险解决方法Networthandcollateral拿你们家牛和犁抵押 找有信用的大户做中保MonitoringandEnforcementofRestrictiveCovenants合同条款包含Incentivecompatible Discourageundesirablebehavior EncouragedesirablebehaviorKeepcollateralvaluable MarginrequirementProvideinformationFinancialintermediation经过银行借贷 视角三 如果选择股权合同还是债券合同 如果选择债券合同内容如上问题 如上述解决方法 如上述 新的方法 股权激励如果选择直接金融 股权激励问题 股权合同的道德风险解决方法 见下文 视角四 如果选择股权合同 道德风险 问题 委托代理问题我出钱你打工解决方法 Monitoring CostlyStateVerification 手机定位签到 Free riderproblemamongstockholdersGovernmentregulationtoincreaseinformationLaws standardaccountingprinciples imposestiffcriminalpenaltiesFinancialIntermediationventurecapitalfirm holdseveralpositionsinthemanagingbodyofthefirmDebtContracts 1 如果向律师支付佣金制定一份贷款合同仅仅使用一次的话 那么这一交易成本就过于高昂 如果你将所有资金都借给一个人 那么就像把所有鸡蛋都放在一个篮子里那样承担了较高的风险 实现风险分担 最后 你几乎无法获得避免信息不对称所产生问题的方法 在高风险水平的借款者筹借资金的时候 会产生逆向选择 而那些将贷款资金用于赌博而非 原计划的 的车的行为 将会导致道德风险 2 由于商业银行具有多笔同类贷款 所以它们向律师支付一次佣金 制定出一份可以重复使同的合同 规模效应 商业银行发放收益率并非总是同向变动的多样化贷款 通过这种方式从总体上降低这些贷款的风险水平 商业银行掌握了监督和控制借款者的方法 以此降低逆向选择和道德风险的危害 专业分工 Warning 本章的Pattern与theory脱节Pattern部分讨论 企业不同渠道的融资哪个多 哪个少的问题 但是理论部分却讨论 为什么选这种渠道 不选择那种渠道 FinancialStructure 金融合同的常见形式 股权与债券金融交易链条的长短 直接与间接 股权 债券 直接 间接都有存在价值都出现问题都有解决方案此消彼长的原因本书没有讨论量变的原因 而是关注存在价值 在于成本和收益的平衡 股权vs债权 股权为什么需要股权合同 视频 HowtheStockMarketWorks 9 12 股权的问题解决方法债权为什么需要债权合同债权合同的问题解决方法 直接金融vs间接金融 直接债权Why需要直接金融 视频的截图直接金融的问题解决方法间接债权 债权的金融中介 银行 为什么需要间接债权 也即为什么需要银行 间接债务的问题 余额宝的兴起与银行衰弱解决方法 BasicFactsaboutFinancialStructureThroughouttheWorld ThischapterprovidesaneconomicanalysisofhowourfinancialstructureisdesignedtopromoteeconomicefficiencyThebarchartinFigure1showshowAmericanbusinessesfinancedtheiractivitiesusingexternalfunds thoseobtainedfromoutsidethebusinessitself intheperiod1970 2000andcomparesU S datatothoseofGermany Japan andCanada Figure1SourcesofExternalFundsforNonfinancialBusinesses AComparisonoftheUnitedStateswithGermany Japan andCanada Source AndreasHackethalandReinhardH Schmidt FinancingPatterns MeasurementConceptsandEmpiricalResults JohannWolfgangGoethe UniversitatWorkingPaperNo 125 January2004 Thedataarefrom1970 2000andaregrossflowsaspercentageofthetotal notincludingtradeandothercreditdata whicharenotavailable SourcesofExternalFundsforNonfinancialBusinesses AComparison 杨玉琳林明英奚雅芝付佩雯 直接融资 间接融资stock bond loan SourcesofExternalFundsforNonfinancialBusinesses AComparison Fact2 marketabledebtandequitysecuritiesisnottheprimaryway Fact1 Stocksarenotthemostimportantsources SourcesofExternalFundsforNonfinancialBusinesses AComparison Fact3 Indirectfinanceismanytimesmoreimportantthandirectfinance Fact4 Financialintermediaries particularlybanks arethemostimportantsource 直接融资的发展趋势 EightBasicFacts StocksarenotthemostimportantsourcesofexternalfinancingforbusinessesReally Why IssuingmarketabledebtandequitysecuritiesisnottheprimarywayinwhichbusinessesfinancetheiroperationsWhy IndirectfinanceismanytimesmoreimportantthandirectfinanceWhy Whatisadvantageofindirectfinance Whatisadvantageofdirectfinance Financialintermediaries particularlybanks arethemostimportantsourceofexternalfundsusedtofinancebusinesses Arethesetrueinchina EightBasicFacts 5 8 ThefinancialsystemisamongthemostheavilyregulatedsectorsoftheeconomyOnlylarge well establishedcorporationshaveeasyaccesstosecuritiesmarketstofinancetheiractivitiesTherulesischangingastimegoesby Howaboutcrowd funding Kickstarteristheworld slargestfundingplatformforcreativeprojects 雷锋网 Collateralisaprevalentfeatureofdebtcontractsforbothhouseholdsandbusinesses Why Anyexamples Thinkaboutthestoryofruralloansinrepublicofchina Isthistrueinchina Debtcontractsareextremelycomplicatedlegaldocumentsthatplacesubstantialrestrictivecovenantsonborrowers Theory1 Transactioncost WhyFinancialintermediaries Transactioncost EconomiesofscaleandExpertise TransactionCosts Whytransactioncostsiscauseproblems 1 Thresholdofinvestment largecommissiononsmalltrade 2 restrictedchannelofinvestment youhavetoputallyoureggsinonebasket FinancialintermediarieshaveevolvedtoreducetransactioncostsEconomiesofscaleExamples Bundlesmallinvestor sfundstogether Mutualfunds 1 Overcomethresholdproblem 2 diversification Expertisetheexpertiseincomputer internettechnologyreducethecost supplyside Case Alibaba sYu EBao 余额宝 Hits2 5MUsers 1BillionAlreadyDeposited Yongjinbao 国金证券 佣金宝 Theory2 Adverseselection 原理 lemonprobleminsecondhandcarmarket股权 PE债权 lemonprobleminLoanmarketForinstance ifyouofferanaverageinterestrateforyourloans thepeoplewhoarebetterriskswillgoelsewherefortheirmoney whiletheriskypeoplewillgladlytakeyourmoney AsymmetricInformation AdverseSelectionandMoralHazard AdverseselectionoccursbeforethetransactionMoralhazardarisesafterthetransactionAgencytheoryanalyseshowasymmetricinformationproblemsaffecteconomicbehavior TheLemonsProblem HowAdverseSelectionInfluencesFinancialStructure Ifqualitycannotbeassessed thebuyeriswillingtopayatmostapricethatreflectstheaveragequalitySellersofgoodqualityitemswillnotwanttosellatthepriceforaveragequalityThebuyerwilldecidenottobuyatallbecauseallthatisleftinthemarketispoorqualityitemsThisproblemexplainsfact2andpartiallyexplainsfact1Cases theused carmarket Akelof 1970 Stockandbondmarkets Discuss Whytherearestillpeachintheused bysiclemarket AdverseSelection lemonsproblem Whatislemonsproblem Howtodealwithit Video TheLemonProblem 2 46 lemonsprobleminfinance Good Bad Governmentregulationtoincreaseinformation Privateproductionandsaleofinformation Financialintermediation Collateralandnetworth ToolstoHelpSolveAdverseSelectionProblems Privateproductionandsaleofinformationthatdistinguishesgoodfrombadfirmsandthensellit 征信公司 Free riderproblem 与盗版有何区别 Howaboutpublicgoods GovernmentregulationtoincreaseinformationNotalwaysworkstosolvetheadverseselectionproblem explainsFact5 Case Cheatwithnopunishmentinchina sstockmarket Specialtreatmentstock ST forshort Isitlemonmarket FinancialintermediationExplainsfacts3 4 6 Peachorlemon Intheused carmarket used cardealers Inthefinancialmarket bank CollateralandnetworthExplainsfact7 Collateralv s information Equitycapitalascollaterral republicofchinaruralloan EightBasicFacts cont d Theory3 Moralhazard 原理 PrincipalAgentproblem股权 MoralHazardinEquityContracts 1 PeoplewhoinvestedinAIG thoughtthattheirmoneywasrelativelysafe 2 However AIGwasalsosellingCDSandMBSsthatstartedtodefaultinlargenumbersin2008 3 AIGistoobigtofail债权 MoralHazardinDebtContracts Moralhazard Moralhazard的特点 成本 Video MoralHazard 1 21 Video Tobigtofail CEORichardFuldgot 483 800 000toBankruptLeheman Isthisfair 6 41 Video IntroductiontoMoralHazard 4 09 Video SolutionstoMoralHazard 5 55 Video SolutionstoMoralHazard Signaling 6 45 HowMoralHazardAffectstheChoiceBetweenDebtandEquityContracts CalledthePrincipal AgentProblemPrincipal lessinformation stockholder Agent moreinformation manager Theoryormath SeparationofownershipandcontrolofthefirmManagerspursuepersonalbenefitsandpowerratherthantheprofitabilityofthefirm Howtosolvetheprincipal AgentProblem Video BusySecretary ThePrincipal AgentProblem 4 17 ToolstoHelpSolvethePrincipal AgentProblem Monitoring CostlyStateVerification Free riderproblemamongstockholdersFact1GovernmentregulationtoincreaseinformationFact5 Laws standardaccountingprinciples imposestiffcriminalpenalties FinancialIntermediationFact3 venturecapitalfirm holdseveralpositionsinthemanagingbodyofthefirmDebtContractsFact1 fixedpaymentinsteadofflexiblereturn Mechanismdesign incentive compatible truth tellingcondition participationconditionEightBasicFacts HowMoralHazardInfluencesFinancialStructureinDebtMarkets Borrowershaveincentivestotakeonprojectsthatareriskierthanthelenderswouldlike Thispreventstheborrowerfrompayingbacktheloan ToolstoHelpSolveMoralHazardinDebtContracts NetworthandcollateralLowerthecollateral greaterthemoralhazardproblemIncentivecompatibleMonitoringandEnforcementofRestrictiveCovenantsDiscourageundesirablebehaviorEncouragedesirablebehaviorKeepcollateralvaluableProvideinformationCovenantMonitoringandEnforcementareoftencostlyFinancialIntermediationFacts3 4 Bank privateloansavoidingfree rideproblem insurancecompany SummaryTable1AsymmetricInformationProblemsandToolstoSolveThem AsymmetricInformationinTransitionandDevel