TROLLS中文翻译.doc

“专利投机者”或“市场创造者”？非专利实施实体的实证分析Sannu K. ShresthaNPEs公司(NPEs)很少或从不实施他们的专利，将注意力集中在获得许可使用费。NPEs可能有自己专利的发明或购买其他发明家的专利。NPEs在过去几年一直存在许多争议。有些公司的评论者为他们贴上“专利投机者”的标签,宣称他们使用虚弱的和模糊的专利提取过分的许可费或者为轻微的侵权对制造商提起诉讼。另一方面, NPEs和他们的支持者 声称这些公司通过给独立发明家提供资金以及在技术信息中创造一个有效率的贸易市场来提高创新能力和竞争能力。这篇文章使用从美国专利和商标局(PTO)获得的专利数据和来自斯坦福法学院的知识产权诉讼票据交易所(IPLC)侵权诉讼信息来测试一些观点和反对NPEs的理由来决定是否这些公司利于或伤害创新。介绍2001年，NTP股份有限公司，一个小维吉尼亚公司，控告黑莓装置的制造商RIM在五个有关电子邮件的专利方面侵权。 See Complaint at 2, NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 2d 423 (E.D. Va. 2002) (No. 3:01CV767); Michelle Kessler, High Court Refuses to Hear BlackBerry-Maker Case, USA Today, Jan. 24, 2006, at 1A.专利方面的问题是授予NTP的创始人之一Thomas J. Campana，但是该公司没有专利诉讼方面的经历。 See Teresa Riordan, Patents; A Canadian Company Appeals in Court for the Right to Keep Selling Blackberries in the U.S., N.Y. Times, June 7, 2004, at C2 (“NTP does not make anything from the patents.”).地区法庭认为RIM有侵权的嫌疑，下令该公司支付5370万美元的损失，并且授予NTP一个永久的禁令，保留上诉，这可能使RIM关闭它黑莓的电子邮件服务。 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., No. 3:01CV767, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26837, at *1*3, *5 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2003).尽管RIM将案件上诉到美国联邦法院，并且挑战美国专利和商标局（PTO）的正确性，其最终尝试都是不成功的。 See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 132526 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding the case back to the district court);NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 2d 785, 78689 (E.D. Va. 2005) (describing RIMs efforts to challenge validity of NTP patents before the PTO and refusing to stay remand proceedings pending PTO reexamination).面对禁令对其业务带来的可能的破坏，RIM在2006年3月解决了诉讼，并同意支付NTP6.125亿美元来交换后者专利使用许可权利。 Yuki Noguchi, Patent Dispute Is Settled, Wash. Post, Mar. 4, 2006, at A1.轰动的处理引发了一场批评NTP的风暴，为原本已经很激烈的有关NPEs公司扮演的角色的争论火上浇油。 See, e.g., Ian Austen & Lisa Guernsey, A Payday for Patents R Us, N.Y. Times, May 2, 2005, at C1 (describing criticism of small patent holding companies); William M. Bulkeley, Aggressive Patent Litigants Pose Growing Threat to Big Business, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 2005, at A1 (same). The tone of the criticism was also unusually vituperative, with onecommentator comparing NPEs to “patent system bottom feeders.” Patent QualityImprovement, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop.of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 21 (2003) hereinafter Patent QualityHearings (statement of David M. Simon, Chief Patent Counsel, Intel Corp.). Anothercommentator referred to NPEs as the “mold that eventually grows on rotten meat.” TimWu, Weapons of Business Destruction: How a Tiny Little “Patent Troll” Got BlackBerry ina Headlock, Slate, Feb. 6, 2006, at /id/2135559/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review).NPEs是很少或从不实践他们的专利、关注收入而不是许可使用费的公司。NPEs可能已经把这些发明作为自己的专利，或者可能已经从发明者手中买下了专利。 See FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, ch. 2, at 31 (2003), available at /os/2003/10/ innovationrpt.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) hereinafter FTC, Innovation Report (“NPEs may be design firms that patent their inventions but do not practice them or patent assertion firms that buy patents from other companies . . . .”).批评家已经为NPEs贴上了“专利蟑螂”的标签，并且宣称他们使用微弱的模糊的专利来威胁产品制造商、提取过高的许可费、提起诉讼。 See, e.g., Robin M. Davis, Note, Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls: Permanent Injunctions in Patent Infringement Cases Under the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005 and eBay v. Mercexchange, 17 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Poly 431, 438 (2008) (“Most patent trolling behavior thrives on the inequities of enforcing patent rights without contributing anything to either the invention or production of new technologies.”); Jason Kirby, Patent Troll or Producer?, Fin. Post, Jan. 14, 2006, available at http:/www.financial /story.html?id=1509d361-0144-4432-b6dc-2c14026c98d6 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Companies who do the costly grunt work of actually developing and marketing new technologies are being held ransom by tiny outfits whose only assets are kooky and vague patents . . . .”); Joe Beyers, Rise of the Patent Trolls, CNET N, Oct. 12, 2005, at /Rise-of-the-patent-trolls/2010-1071_3- 5892996.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Patent Trolls seek to quietly acquire significant patent portfolios with the intent of threatening lengthy and costly patent infringement lawsuits against operating companies.”); Maggie Shiels, TechnologyIndustry Hits Out at Patent Trolls, BBC News, June 2, 2004, at http:/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3722509.stm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“An added problem isthe growth of so called patent trolls who can be likened to modern day highwayrobbers . . . .”).另一方面，这些公司和他们的支持者宣称NPEs通过为独立发明人提供资本、在技术信息中创造一个有效率的市场来提高创新和竞争。 See, e.g., Spencer Hosie, Patent Trolls and the New Tort Reform: A PractitionersPerspective, 4 I/S: J.L. & Poly for Info. Socy, 75, 7886 (2008) (challenging “myths”about patent trolling); James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: AnAlternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 Emory L.J. 189,190 (2006) (“Patent trolls provide liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency tothe patent marketsthe same benefits securities dealers supply capital markets.”); MarcMorgan, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures: A Comment ExaminingWho Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 17 Fed. Cir. B.J. 165, 165 (2008) (“Manylegitimate businesses play a positive role by encouraging innovation, increasing liquidity,and providing market clearing.”).关注NPEs引起司法机关和国会的强烈反应。在一个被广泛认为是为了遏制NPEs滥用权力的行为的决定中,美国最高法院抛弃了联邦巡回法院20年来在侵权救济的先例,为申请禁止侵权建立新的指南. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); see also SteveSeidenberg, Troll Control: The Supreme Courts eBay Decision Sets Back Pesky PatentTrolls or American Innovation, Depending Upon Which Side Youre On, A.B.A. J., Sept.2006, at 51, 52 (discussing ramifications of the eBay case).国会也已经表现出对NPEs所扮演角色的关心，目前正在考虑多项专利改革法案 See Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Patents Depend onQuality Act of 2006, H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795,109th Cong. (2005); see also infra Part I.C (discussing proposed legislative reform of U.S.patent system).，如果付诸实施，将会导致美国专利系统自从1952年专利法案以来最大的变化。 See McDonough, supra note 9, at 195 (describing Patent Reform Act of 2005 as “the most substantial legislative reform to the patent system since 1952”).这些改革努力一直伴随学者之间有关NPES的优点和缺点的激烈辩论。 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85Tex. L. Rev. 1991, 1993 (2007) hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup(describing burden of holdup and royalty stacking problems that NPEs impose onmanufacturers); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools,and Standard Setting, in 1 Innovation Policy and the Economy 119, 125 (Adam B. Jaffe etal. eds., 2001) hereinafter Shapiro, Patent Thicket (noting burden on manufacturersfrom improperly granted patents). But see Vincenzo Denicol o et al., Revisiting InjunctiveRelief: Interpreting eBay in High-Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J.Competition L. & Econ. 571, 575 (2008) (“The post-eBay case law seems to be leaningtowards a one-sided approach that favors a manufacturing licensees point of view withlittle consideration given to the impact on firms with other kinds of legitimate businessmodels, such as innovators with limited or no presence in downstream markets . . . .”);John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 2111, 2116 (2007)(questioning conclusion of Lemley & Shapiro, supra, that NPEs impose excessive burdenson downstream manufacturers). For further discussion on the pros and cons of NPEs, seearticles cited in supra notes 8 and 9.支持者和反对者简述了NPEs可能会伤害或促进创新的各种途径，但是他们的论据绝大部分是理论，并且只被轶事类的证据所支持。 See, e.g., the scholarly articles cited in supra notes 8 and 9. Professors Lemley and Shapiro have presented some empirical evidence to support their theory of holdup androyalty stacking. See Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 13, at 202535 (discussing selected case studies of royalty stacking in different industries and studyingreported court decisions awarding reasonable royalties as damages for patentinfringement).考虑到专利改革带来的深远意义和NPE争论在改革过程中所扮演的重要角色，这对形成支持和反对NPEs的测试参数、对检查他们是否能准确反映现实世界中的事情非常重要。 For example, Justice Kennedy relied heavily on the FTC, Innovation Report, supranote 7, in his concurrence in eBay. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).一个有关NPEs专利和诉讼的实证研究能提供一些NPEs在创新经济中所扮演角色的有益见解，展现出一个有价值的理论争论。PTO的专利数据和斯坦福法学院的IPLC的侵权诉讼信息，为分析NPE行为提供了大量信息，并确定这些公司是否像他们的拥护者或反对者宣称的那样有用或有害。一个专利和诉讼数据的实证分析不能提供一个有关NPEs好处和坏处的明确答案，但是它能作为一个有益的起点，为决策者衡量NPE反对阵营的观点提供帮助。该文试着通过对51家不注重他们自己专利的公司广泛的专利和诉讼的实证分析来为NPEs的有关争论提供补充。 For details on how these firms were selected, see Appendix B. This Note focuseson commercial firms that rarely or never practice any patents because they are the mostcontroversial and have borne the brunt of the criticism of troll-like behavior. The analysisin this Note ignores independent inventors and universities, even though these two groupsalso frequently do not practice their patents, because they have largely been in theperiphery of the “troll” debate. See, e.g., Ashley Chuang, Note, Fixing the Failures ofSoftware Patent Protection: Deterring Patent Trolling by Applying Industry-SpecificPatentability Standards, 16 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 215, 21819 (2006) (“Universities andother research institutions should not be considered patent trolls simply because theylicense their technology.”). But see Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 611, 61519 (2008) (discussing perception ofuniversities as patent trolls).这篇文章中包含的分析不仅仅检测支持和反对NPEs的观点，还提供一些核心线索来回答这样的问题：NPEs有助于还是有害于创新？它先用各种各样的例如专利引用的次数或者专利使用的广泛度等学者认定的专利价值，来检测NPEs所拥有的专利的价值和重要性。 See infra Part II.A.2.该文把NPE专利的诉讼样本和随机的专利诉讼进行比较，就像享有共同技术的专利与NPE的专利。 See infra Part II.A.2.该文然后转向NPEs专利的诉讼行为的分析，检测这些公司的成功率来决定他们是否能从事某项诉讼。 See infra Part II.B.NPE专利分析的结果和他们的诉讼行为展示了NPEs的一个美好愿景。这些公司拥有自己比其他被诉讼的专利更具价值和重要性的专利。 See infra Part III.B.NPE专利也比那些在案例分析中，享用相同技术等级的被诉讼专利的排名靠前。 See infra part III.B.最终，NPEs的诉讼行为表明了NPEs专利侵权诉讼的成功率类似于其他的诉讼。 See infra Part III.C.文中的案例分析很有限，因为它专注于NPEs专利诉讼的很小部分中的一个样本类型。然而，尽管结果来自这有限的分析，它仍然提供了一些关于NPEs在创新经济中所扮演角色的有趣证据。该文中的结果倾向于反驳NPEs的指控，并暗示了NPEs实际上通过扮演有前途的独立发明者和技术使用者的中介人，进而在创新经济中发挥重要作用。结果也暗示了决策者在制定那些阻碍NPEs能力发挥自己在创新方面的能力的条例时，要谨慎对待。特别是，文中的案例分析表明，在禁令裁决的行动中，法院不应该给侵权案中的原告过度的重视，立法者不应该允许花言巧语的“专利投机人”左右美国专利制度未来的改革。文章其余部分应当注意如下：第一部分是关于NPEs的反对者和支持者有关NPEs和检验参数争论的概述。接下来，它分析了立法和司法对NPEs引起的所谓的问题的回应。第二部分概述了一个两部分的关于NPEs专利和诉讼的实证分析。第三部分表明，有关NPEs滥用诉讼是夸大的，这些公司可以通过为有前途的独立发明者和小公司提供资金和资源来提高创新能力。1、NPE的争论这部分提供了一个整体的有关NPEs在创新经济中扮演的角色的概述，并审视了立法和司法被NPEs关注的行动，第一部分A.总结NPEs的反对者和支持者的主要论点，审视两个阵营言语中显现出的弱点。第一部分B.分析2006年美国最高法院在eBAY公司诉讼MercExchange公司和当当网的决定， 547 U.S. 388 (2006).并讨论了它对NPEs的影响。最后，第一部分C.介绍了国会目前的专利改革法案，分析了关系到NPEs的法案的潜在价值和利益，并将其和美国专利制度作为一个整体。A. 专利投机者或市场创造者？对于NPEs和创新的两种观点1、批评者对于NPEs的说法。NPEs的反对者宣称这些厂商对创新不利，因为他们a)从事轻佻的诉讼;b)向制造商索要许可费用增加了产品的成本；c）恶化了专利问题，使问题错综复杂。本节依次探讨了每个言论，并阐明了他们的优势和劣势。a.NPEs使用劣势专利来从事轻佻的诉讼。其中一个对NPEs最突出的批评是获取薄弱和模糊的专利，并使用他们来进行毫无根据的诉讼。 See Chuang, supra note 16, at 232 (“Because of a patent trolls approach to generating revenue, a trolls charges of infringement and litigation can often be baseless and thus clog the legal system.” (citation omitted); see also Hosie, supra note 9, at 78 (“Perhaps the most common refrain in the patent debate is that plaintiffs will bring frivolous cases to extort unjustified settlements.”); Kirby, supra note 8 (“Critics argue that patent trolls, or patent holders who threaten companies with costly court battles unless theyre offered licensing fees, are a serious threat to legitimate businesses.”); Beyers, supra note 8 (“Patent trolls seek to quietly acquire significant patent portfolios with the intent of threatening lengthy and costly patent infringement lawsuits against operating companies.”).批评者认为NPEs带来的没有价值的侵权诉讼不仅仅压倒了法律制度, 也使产品制造商花费宝贵的时间和资源来捍卫侵权索赔，进而抬高生产成本。 Chuang, supra note 16, at 234 (“For many companies, dealing with patent trolls is simply a business expense that drives up costs by diverting time and resources away from business development.” (citation omitted).此外，他们认为通过恶劣的诉讼抬高目标公司的生产成本，NPEs增加了商品的成本，因为他们的目标公司将增加的成本转嫁给了消费者。 Id. at 235 (arguing NPE lawsuits result in a “hidden tax” on software products);Davis, supra note 8, at 438 (noting patent trolls “drive up the price of new consumer technology because manufacturing corporations . . . often pass the costs of royalty payments and patent litigation along to consumers”).作为证据，他们指出公司的立场，公司不得不抵御NPEs带来的法律诉讼。 See, e.g., Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Patent Investment Trusts: Lets Build a PIT to Catch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 367, 377 (2005) (“For eBay, dealing with the patent troll incidents . . . has driven up its costs . . . .”).举例来说，Jay Monaham，易趣的副总法律顾问，被引述说：NPE的法律诉讼已经抬高了易趣的成本，他们把时间和资源转向建设世界上最大的电子商务平台。大量的钱花费在聘请律师上，对内部法律人员，工程师和各级生产工作人员都有影响。我们已经对这一点进行大力辩护，如果你们这样下去，我们将不会支付赎金。 Shiels, supra note 8.专利侵权索赔的成本是一个制度不幸但却不可避免的特征，这个制度奖励有发明产权的发明者。批评者争论的是，NPEs昂贵的诉讼费用即使潜在索赔也是不值得的。但是这种说法似乎存在两点可疑之处。第一，通常来说，原告要求200万美元的侵权费用。 John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore, & R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 Geo. L.J. 435, 441 (2004) (“Total direct litigation costs for the median patent case with between $1 million and $25 million at stake were $2 million per side in 2003.”).考虑到侵权诉讼巨大的花费，就存在这样的疑问，理性的NPE，或者一个意外开支费用的律师，如果产生积极结果的概率很低的情况下，是否会起诉被告。 See Hosie, supra note 9, at 80 (“No sane plaintiffs lawyer would spend this kind of money on a frivolous case . . . . Frivolous cases simply do not pay.” (emphasis omitted). Of course, the NPE might bet that the defendant will choose to settle quickly even if it doubts the merits of the infringement claim to avoid the cost of drawn out litigation. On the other hand, an NPE seeking to sell licenses to an extensive portfolio of patents willprobably not be able to play the “sue and see” game because manufacturers are unlikely to repeatedly pay money to make the claims go away. Moreover, defendants may take an aggressive approach to defending against all the claims so as to discourage meritless claims in the future. See text accompanying supra note 28 (stating intention of defendant to vigorously defend against claims).第二，目前尚不清楚，NPE发起的诉讼是不是真的对大多数产品的成本有重大影响。举例来说，文中所提及的51家公司只对2000年到2008年间三分之二的专利侵权诉讼案负责。 See infra Part III.C, Table 3 (showing number of NPE lawsuits as percent of total infringement lawsuits by year).其他NPE发起的诉讼在美国专利诉讼案的十二分之二的范围内。 See Nathan Myhrvold, Inventors Have Rights, Too!, Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 2006, at A14 (“Court records show that only 2% of all patent lawsuits are due to plaintiffs that have no ongoing product business. Of that 2%, the vast majority are perfectly legitimate companies or universities. A tiny minority of patent suits are due to bad actors, but its hardly a crisis.”); Gwendolyn G. Ball & Jay P. Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls: Individual Inventors, Small Firms and Entrepreneurs in Patent Litigation 24 (2008) (Ill. Pub. Law Working Paper, No. 08-21, 2008), available at /sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1337166 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting NPEs initiated about two percentforty-nine cases out of a total of 2,486of all infringement suits between 2000 and 2002); Patent Freedom, Current Research: Litigations Over Time, at /research-lot.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2009) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting NPEs initiated about twelve percent of all infringement suits in 2008).最近的一项表明，更全面的、也是基于斯坦福国际专线数据的研究发现，NPEs从 2000年1月1日到2008年3月21日发起了大约17%的专利诉讼。 Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1571, 1572, 1600 (2009).与此相反，实践自己专利的公司占了专利诉讼案的76%。 Id. at 1600.这些估计表明了NPE诉讼在所有侵权诉讼中所占比例较小，因此可以怀疑NPE诉讼是否造成了这个国家的企业的显著的成本的增加。最后，NPE发起的诉讼的一个统计结果,这个结果在文中第三部分C.出现，它表明了NPEs获胜率与通常的侵权原告没有显著的差异。 See infra Part III.C, Table 5 (comparing success rate of NPEs and plaintiffs from random sample).这表明对NPE毫无根据的诉讼声明应该持怀疑态度。b、NPEs从制造商那边提取高额的许可费用来抬高产品成本。另一个对NPEs的控告是他们从产品生产商那边提取高额的许可费用提高了商品的价格。 See, e.g., FTC, Innovation Report, supra note 7, ch. 3, at 40 (“Commentators have also observed that companies seeking to hold up rivals can set the licensing fees below thecost of litigation, including the managerial distraction, so as to make the taking of a licensethe only economically sensible alternative, regardless of the strength of the patent.”);Davis, supra note 8, at 438 (“Patent trolls licensing practices drive up the price of new consumer technology because manufacturing corporations forced to take licenses on atrolls patents often pass the costs of royalty payments and patent litigation along toconsumers.”).批评人指出类似NTP有限公司的情况，并且宣称高昂的特许费用和审判后支付给NPEs的费用使那些通过涨价的形式将成本转嫁给消费者的厂商蒙受巨大的损失。 See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 13, at 1993 (“The threat of an injunction can enable a patent holder to negotiate royalties far in excess of thepatent holders true economic contribution. Such royalty overcharges act as a tax on newproducts incorporating the patented technology, thereby impeding rather than promotinginnovation.”); Chuang, supra note 16, at 235 (“End users of software products are subjected to a hidden tax on software technology of companies that have been targeted bypatent trolls.”).然而，这种观点仅仅从整体上对专利系统做出了回应。美国的专利系统通过使他们的发明在一段有限的时间内保持垄断来回报发明者。 U.S. Const. art. I, 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress power to “promote the progress ofscience and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusiveright to their respective writings and disco