国际贸易经济管理学与财务知识分析

Chapter8,FirmsintheGlobalEconomy:ExportDecisions,Outsourcing,andMultinationalEnterprises,8-2,Preview,MonopolisticcompetitionandtradeThesignificanceofintra-industrytradeFirmresponsestotrade:winners,losers,andindustryperformanceDumpingMultinationalsandoutsourcing,8-3,Introduction,Wheneconomiesofscaleexist,largefirmsmaybemoreefficientthansmallfirms,andtheindustrymayconsistofamonopolyorafewlargefirms.Productionmaybeimperfectlycompetitiveinthesensethatexcessormonopolyprofitsarecapturedbylargefirms.Internaleconomiesofscaleresultwhenlargefirmshaveacostadvantageoversmallfirms,causingtheindustrytobecomeuncompetitive.,8-4,Introduction(cont.),Internaleconomiesofscaleimplythatafirmsaveragecostofproductiondecreasesthemoreoutputitproduces.Perfectcompetitionthatdrivesthepriceofagooddowntomarginalcostwouldimplylossesforthosefirmsbecausetheywouldnotbeabletorecoverthehighercostsincurredfromproducingtheinitialunitsofoutput.Asaresult,perfectcompetitionwouldforcethosefirmsoutofthemarket.,8-5,Introduction(cont.),Inmostsectors,goodsaredifferentiatedfromeachotherandthereareotherdifferencesacrossfirms.Integrationcausesthebetter-performingfirmstothriveandexpand,whiletheworse-performingfirmscontract.Additionalsourceofgainfromtrade:Asproductionisconcentratedtowardbetter-performingfirms,theoverallefficiencyoftheindustryimproves.Studywhythosebetter-performingfirmshaveagreaterincentivetoengageintheglobaleconomy.,8-6,TheTheoryofImperfectCompetition,Inimperfectcompetition,firmsareawarethattheycaninfluencethepricesoftheirproductsandthattheycansellmoreonlybyreducingtheirprice.Thissituationoccurswhenthereareonlyafewmajorproducersofaparticulargoodorwheneachfirmproducesagoodthatisdifferentiatedfromthatofrivalfirms.Eachfirmviewsitselfasapricesetter,choosingthepriceofitsproduct.,8-7,Monopoly:ABriefReview,Amonopolyisanindustrywithonlyonefirm.Anoligopolyisanindustrywithonlyafewfirms.Intheseindustries,themarginalrevenuegeneratedfromsellingmoreproductsislessthantheuniformpricechargedforeachproduct.Tosellmore,afirmmustlowerthepriceofallunits,notjusttheadditionalones.Themarginalrevenuefunctionthereforeliesbelowthedemandfunction(whichdeterminesthepricethatcustomersarewillingtopay).,8-8,Monopoly:ABriefReview,AssumethatthedemandcurvethefirmfacesisastraightlineQ=AB(P),whereQisthenumberofunitsthefirmsells,Pthepriceperunit,andAandBareconstants.MarginalrevenueequalsMR=PQ/B.SupposethattotalcostsareC=F+c(Q),whereFisfixedcosts,thoseindependentofthelevelofoutput,andcistheconstantmarginalcost.,8-9,Fig.8-1:MonopolisticPricingandProductionDecisions,8-10,Monopoly:ABriefReview(cont.),Averagecostisthecostofproduction(C)dividedbythetotalquantityofproduction(Q).AC=C/Q=F/Q+cMarginalcostisthecostofproducinganadditionalunitofoutput.AlargerfirmismoreefficientbecauseaveragecostdecreasesasoutputQincreases:internaleconomiesofscale.,8-11,Fig.8-2:AverageVersusMarginalCost,8-12,Monopoly:ABriefReview(cont.),Theprofit-maximizingoutputoccurswheremarginalrevenueequalsmarginalcost.AttheintersectionoftheMCandMRcurves,therevenuegainedfromsellinganextraunitequalsthecostofproducingthatunit.Themonopolistearnssomemonopolyprofits,asindicatedbytheshadedbox,whenPAC.,8-13,MonopolisticCompetition,Monopolisticcompetitionisasimplemodelofanimperfectlycompetitiveindustrythatassumesthateachfirmcandifferentiateitsproductfromtheproductofcompetitors,andtakesthepriceschargedbyitsrivalsasgiven.,8-14,MonopolisticCompetition(cont.),Afirminamonopolisticallycompetitiveindustryisexpectedtosellmoreastotalsalesintheindustryincreaseandaspriceschargedbyrivalsincrease.lessasthenumberoffirmsintheindustrydecreasesandasthefirmspriceincreases.Theseconceptsarerepresentedbythefunction:,8-15,MonopolisticCompetition(cont.),Q=S1/nb(PP)QisanindividualfirmssalesSisthetotalsalesoftheindustrynisthenumberoffirmsintheindustrybisaconstanttermrepresentingtheresponsivenessofafirmssalestoitspricePisthepricechargedbythefirmitselfPistheaveragepricechargedbyitscompetitors,8-16,MonopolisticCompetition(cont.),Assumethatfirmsaresymmetric:allfirmsfacethesamedemandfunctionandhavethesamecostfunction.ThusallfirmsshouldchargethesamepriceandhaveequalshareofthemarketQ=S/nAveragecostsshoulddependonthesizeofthemarketandthenumberoffirms:AC=C/Q=F/Q+c=nF/S+c,8-17,MonopolisticCompetition(cont.),AC=n(F/S)+cAsthenumberoffirmsnintheindustryincreases,theaveragecostincreasesforeachfirmbecauseeachproducesless.AstotalsalesSoftheindustryincrease,theaveragecostdecreasesforeachfirmbecauseeachproducesmore.,8-18,Fig.8-3:EquilibriuminaMonopolisticallyCompetitiveMarket,8-19,MonopolisticCompetition(cont.),Ifmonopolisticfirmsfacelineardemandfunctions,Q=AB(P),whereAandBareconstants.Whenfirmsmaximizeprofits,theyshouldproduceuntilmarginalrevenueequalsmarginalcost:MR=PQ/B=cAsthenumberoffirmsnintheindustryincreases,thepricethateachfirmchargesdecreasesbecauseofincreasedcompetition.,8-20,MonopolisticCompetition(cont.),Atsomenumberoffirms,thepricethatfirmscharge(whichdecreasesinn)matchestheaveragecostthatfirmspay(whichincreasesinn).Atthislong-runequilibriumnumberoffirmsintheindustry,firmshavenoincentivetoenterorexittheindustry.,8-21,MonopolisticCompetition(cont.),Ifthenumberoffirmsisgreaterthanorlessthantheequilibriumnumber,thenfirmshaveanincentivetoexitorentertheindustry.Firmshaveanincentivetoexittheindustrywhenpriceaveragecost.,8-22,MonopolisticCompetitionandTrade,Becausetradeincreasesmarketsize,tradeispredictedtodecreaseaveragecostinanindustrydescribedbymonopolisticcompetition.Industrysalesincreasewithtradeleadingtodecreasedaveragecosts:AC=n(F/S)+cBecausetradeincreasesthevarietyofgoodsthatconsumerscanbuyundermonopolisticcompetition,itincreasesthewelfareofconsumers.Andbecauseaveragecostsdecrease,consumerscanalsobenefitfromadecreasedprice.,8-23,Fig.8-4:EffectsofaLargerMarket,8-24,MonopolisticCompetitionandTrade(cont.),Asaresultoftrade,thenumberoffirmsinanewinternationalindustryispredictedtoincreaserelativetoeachnationalmarket.Butitisuncleariffirmswilllocateinthedomesticcountryorforeigncountries.Integratingmarketsthroughinternationaltradethereforehasthesameeffectsasgrowthofamarketwithinasinglecountry.,8-25,Fig.8-5:EquilibriumintheAutomobileMarket,8-26,Fig.8-5:EquilibriumintheAutomobileMarket(cont.),8-27,Table8-1:HypotheticalExampleofGainsfromMarketIntegration,8-28,MonopolisticCompetitionandTrade(cont.),Productdifferentiationandinternaleconomiesofscaleleadtotradebetweensimilarcountrieswithnocomparativeadvantagedifferencesbetweenthem.Thisisaverydifferentkindoftradethantheonebasedoncomparativeadvantage,whereeachcountryexportsitscomparativeadvantagegood.,8-29,TheSignificanceofIntra-industryTrade,Intra-industrytradereferstotwo-wayexchangesofsimilargoods.Twonewchannelsforwelfarebenefitsfromtrade:Benefitfromagreatervarietyatalowerprice.Firmsconsolidatetheirproductionandtakeadvantageofeconomiesofscale.Asmallercountrystandstogainmorefromintegrationthanalargercountry.,8-30,TheSignificanceofIntra-industryTrade(cont.),About2550%ofworldtradeisintra-industry.Mostprominentisthetradeofmanufacturedgoodsamongadvancedindustrialnations,whichaccountsforthemajorityofworldtrade.FortheUnitedStates,industriesthathavethemostintra-industrytradesuchaspharmaceuticals,chemicals,andspecializedmachineryrequirerelativelylargeramountsofskilledlabor,technology,andphysicalcapital.,8-31,Table8-2:IndexesofIntra-IndustryTradeforU.S.Industries,2009,8-32,FirmResponsestoTrade,Increasedcompetitiontendstohurttheworst-performingfirmstheyareforcedtoexit.Thebest-performingfirmstakethegreatestadvantageofnewsalesopportunitiesandexpandthemost.Whenthebetter-performingfirmsexpandandtheworse-performingonescontractorexit,overallindustryperformanceimproves.Tradeandeconomicintegrationimproveindustryperformanceasmuchasthediscoveryofabettertechnologydoes.,8-33,Fig.8-6:PerformanceDifferencesAcrossFirms,8-34,TradeCostsandExportDecisions,MostU.S.firmsdonotreportanyexportingactivityatallsellonlytoU.S.customers.In2002,only18%ofU.S.manufacturingfirmsreportedanysalesabroad.Eveninindustriesthatexportmuchofwhattheyproduce,suchaschemicals,machinery,electronics,andtransportation,fewerthan40percentoffirmsexport.Amajorreasonwhytradecostsreducetradesomuchisthattheydrasticallyreducethenumberoffirmssellingtocustomersacrosstheborder.Tradecostsalsoreducethevolumeofexportsalesoffirmssellingabroad.,8-35,Fig.8-7:WinnersandLosersfromEconomicIntegration,8-36,TradeCostsandExportDecisions(cont.),Tradecostsaddedtwoimportantpredictionstoourmodelofmonopolisticcompetitionandtrade:Whyonlyasubsetoffirmsexport,andwhyexportersarerelativelylargerandmoreproductive(lowermarginalcosts).Overwhelmingempiricalsupportforthispredictionthatexportingfirmsarebiggerandmoreproductivethanfirmsinthesameindustrythatdonotexport.IntheUnitedStates,inatypicalmanufacturingindustry,anexportingfirmisonaveragemorethantwiceaslargeasafirmthatdoesnotexport.DifferencesbetweenexportersandnonexportersareevenlargerinmanyEuropeancountries.,8-37,Table8-3:ProportionofU.S.FirmsReportingExportSalesbyIndustry,2002,8-38,Fig:8-8:ExportDecisionswithTradeCosts,8-39,Dumping,Dumpingisthepracticeofchargingalowerpriceforexportedgoodsthanforgoodssolddomestically.Dumpingisanexampleofpricediscrimination:thepracticeofchargingdifferentcustomersdifferentprices.Pricediscriminationanddumpingmayoccuronlyifimperfectcompetitionexists:firmsareabletoinfluencemarketprices.marketsaresegmentedsothatgoodsarenoteasilyboughtinonemarketandresoldinanother.,8-40,Dumping(cont.),Dumpingcanbeaprofit-maximizingstrategy:Afirmwithahighermarginalcostchoosestosetalowermarkupovermarginalcost.Therefore,anexportingfirmwillrespondtothetradecostbyloweringitsmarkupfortheexportmarket.Thisstrategyisconsideredtobedumping,regardedbymostcountriesasan“unfair”tradepractice.,8-41,ProtectionismandDumping,AU.S.firmmayappealtotheCommerceDepartmenttoinvestigateifdumpingbyforeignfirmshasinjuredtheU.S.firm.TheCommerceDepartmentmayimposean“anti-dumpingduty”(tax)toprotecttheU.S.firm.Taxequalsthedifferencebetweentheactualand“fair”priceofimports,where“fair”means“pricetheproductisnormallysoldatinthemanufacturersdomesticmarket.”,8-42,ProtectionismandDumping(cont.),Next,theInternationalTradeCommission(ITC)determinesifinjurytotheU.S.firmhasoccurredorislikelytooccur.IftheITCdeterminesthatinjuryhasoccurredorislikelytooccur,theanti-dumpingdutyremainsinplace./trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/index.htm,8-43,ProtectionismandDumping(cont.),Mosteconomistsbelievethattheenforcementofdumpingclaimsismisguided.Tradecostshaveanaturaltendencytoinducefirmstolowertheirmarkupsinexportmarkets.Suchenforcementmaybeusedexcessivelyasanexcuseforprotectionism.,8-44,MultinationalsandOutsourcing,Foreigndirectinvestmentreferstoinvestmentinwhichafirminonecountrydirectlycontrolsorownsasubsidiaryinanothercountry.Ifaforeigncompanyinvestsinatleast10%ofthestockinasubsidiary,thetwofirmsaretypicallyclassifiedasamultinationalcorporation.10%ormoreofownershipinstockisdeemedtobesufficientfordirectcontrolofbusinessoperations.,8-45,MultinationalsandOutsourcing(cont.),GreenfieldFDIiswhenacompanybuildsanewproductionfacilityabroad.BrownfieldFDI(orcross-bordermergersandacquisitions)iswhenadomesticfirmbuysacontrollingstakeinaforeignfirm.GreenfieldFDIhastendedtobemorestable,whilecross-bordermergersandacquisitionstendtooccurinsurges.,8-46,MultinationalsandOutsourcing(cont.),DevelopedcountrieshavebeenthebiggestrecipientsofinwardFDI.muchmorevolatilethanFDIgoingtodevelopingandtransitioneconomies.SteadyexpansionintheshareofFDIflowingtodevelopingandtransitioncountries.AccountedforhalfofworldwideFDIflowsin2009.SalesofFDIaffiliatesareoftenusedasameasureofmultinationalactivity.,8-47,Fig.8-9:InflowsofForeignDirectInvestment,1980-2009,8-48,MultinationalsandOutsourcing(cont.),TwomaintypesofFDI:HorizontalFDIwhentheaffiliatereplicatestheproductionprocess(thattheparentfirmundertakesinitsdomesticfacilities)elsewhereintheworld.VerticalFDIwhentheproductionchainisbrokenup,andpartsoftheproductionprocessesaretransferredtotheaffiliatelocation.,8-49,MultinationalsandOutsourcing(cont.),VerticalFDIismainlydrivenbyproductioncostdifferencesbetweencountries(forthosepartsoftheproductionprocessthatcanbeperformedinanotherlocation).VerticalFDIisgrowingfastandisbehindthelargeincreaseinFDIinflowstodevelopingcountries.,8-50,MultinationalsandOutsourcing(cont.),HorizontalFDIisdominatedbyflowsbetweendevelopedcountries.Boththemultinationalparentandtheaffiliatesareusuallylocatedindevelopedcountries.ThemainreasonforthistypeofFDIistolocateproductionnearafirmslargecustomerbases.Hence,tradeandtransportcostsplayamuchmoreimportantrolethanproductioncostdifferencesfortheseFDIdecisions.,8-51,Fig.8-10:OutwardForeignDirectInvestmentforTopCountries,2007-2009,Source:UNCTAD,WorldInvestmentReport,2010.,8-52,TheFirmsDecisionRegardingForeignDirectInvestment,Proximity-concentrationtrade-off:Hightradecostsassociatedwithexportingcreateanincentivetolocateproductionnearcustomers.Increasingreturnstoscaleinproductioncreateanincentivetoconcentrateproductioninfewerlocations.,8-53,TheFirmsDecisionRegardingForeignDirectInvestment(cont.),FDIactivityconcentratedinsectorswithhightradecosts.Whenincreasingreturnstoscaleareimportantandaverageplantsizesarelarge,weobservehigherexportvolumesrelativetoFDI.Multinationalstendtobemuchlargerandmoreproductivethanotherfirms(evenexporters)inthesamecountry.,8-54,TheFirmsDecisionRegardingForeignDirectInvestment(cont.),ThehorizontalFDIdecisioninvolvesatrade-offbetweentheper-unitexportcosttandthefixedcostFofsettingupanadditionalproductionfacility.Ift(Q)F,costsmoretopaytradecoststonQunitssoldabroadthantopayfixedcostFtobuildaplantabroad.WhenforeignsaleslargeQF/t,exportingismoreexpensiveandFDIistheprofit-maximizingchoice.LowcostsmakemoreapttochooseFDIduetolargersales.,8-55,TheFirmsDecisionRegardingForeignDirectInvestment(cont.),TheverticalFDIdecisionalsoinvolvesatrade-offbetweencostsavingsandthefixedcostFofsettingupanadditionalproductionfacility.Costsavingsrelatedtocomparativeadvantagemakesomestagesofproductioncheaperinothercountries.,8-56,TheFirmsDecisionRegardingForeignDirectInvestment(cont.),Foreignoutsourcingoroffshoringoccurswhenafirmcontractswithanindependentfirmtoproduceintheforeignlocation.Inadditiontodecidingthelocationofwheretoproduce,firmsalsofaceaninternalizationdecision:whethertokeepproductiondonebyonefirmorbyseparatefirms.,8-57,TheFirmsDecisionRegardingForeignDirectInvestment(cont.),Internalizationoccurswhenitismoreprofitabletoconducttransactionsandproductionwithinasingleorganization.Reasonsforthisinclude:Technologytransfers:transferofknowledgeoranotherformoftechnologymaybeeasierwithinasingleorganizationthanthroughamarkettransactionbetweenseparateorganizations.Patentorpropertyrightsmaybeweakornonexistent.Knowledgemaynotbeeasilypackagedandsold.,8-58,TheFirmsDecisionRegardingForeignDirectInvestment(cont.),Verticalintegrationinvolvesconsolidationofdifferentstagesofaproductionprocess.Consolidatinganinputwithinthefirmusingitcanavoidholdupproblemsandhasslesinwritingcompletecontracts.Butanindependentsuppliercouldbenefitfromeconomiesofscaleifitperformstheprocessformanyparentfirms.,8-59,TheFirmsDecisionRegardingForeignDirectInvestment(cont.),Foreigndirectinvestmentshouldbenefitthecountriesinvolvedforreasonssimilartowhyinternationaltradegeneratesgains.Multinationalsandfirmst