金融课讨论阅读材料一(12个小文章).doc

1、亚行专家：量化宽松可能毁掉美元的国际地位假设美元一旦贬值，欧元、日元、人民币就会面临升值的压力，这对其邻国而言都是极不公平的，“实际上美国是把自己的问题推给了别的国家。”在11日举行的中国国际经济交流中心（CCIEE）第17期“经济每月谈”上，亚洲开发银行研究所所长河合正弘说：“美国第二轮量化宽松可能整个毁坏美元作为全球储备货币的角色。”对于此轮6000亿美元的量化宽松对全球经济的影响，河合正弘认为货币的大规模投放不仅不能刺激美国国内经济，反而极有可能将流动性扩散到全球市场中，加大其他国家的通胀压力。假设美元一旦贬值，欧元、日元、人民币就会面临升值的压力，这对其邻国而言都是极不公平的，“实际上美国是把自己的问题推给了别的国家。”中国国际经济交流中心研究员张永军的研究显示，资本流动对汇率的变化非常敏感。只要美元明显贬值，大规模的资本很快就会流出美国，而不是像当初设想的那样进入美国需要投资振兴的产业。“一定数量的货币，要是先从美国流入一个小国家，待有风吹草动后再流回美国，很可能就会造成那个国家的经济危机。相反，美国可能受到的影响就未必那么大。”“对美元的第二次量化宽松政策，我认为它不符合美国人民的根本利益。”中国国际经济交流中心常务副理事长郑新立在演讲中称，保持美元在全球的信誉，是外国人愿意持有美元，外国政府愿意购买美国国债的原因所在。如果实施第二次量化宽松，政府大量向美元注水，带来美元大幅度的贬值，就会使美元丧失在全世界心目中的信誉，“这一举动就有可能终止美元作为主要的国际储备货币的地位”。对于上述悲观的观点，伦敦政治经济学院全球治理中心研究员斯蒂芬克里昂（Stefan Gollignon）教授则有不同看法，“坦率地说，我知道目前有很多人对这个政策持否定的观点，但我觉得耳听为虚，眼见为实。也许有很多钱会流出美国经济，但是我们并没有百分之百的把握会看到这种情况出现。” 他提到，欧元区在过去几年应对金融危机的时候也采取过某种程度的量化宽松政策，结果发现很多国家本国的基础货币也有了很大增加，欧元区的流动性越来越大。于是出于资本安全的考虑，欧洲的银行不再愿意轻易放贷，资本并没有出现大量外流。不过，随着美元的进一步疲软，斯蒂芬教授也担心量化宽松政策调整所带来的负面效果会全部由欧元区来承担。因为东亚大多数国家的汇率与美元挂钩，而这些国家又占据了美国一半以上的贸易额。如果美元大幅贬值，那欧元相对于美元以及这些东亚国家的货币汇率将会大幅升值，这对仍处于复苏期的欧洲来说，无疑又是一个沉痛的打击。2、Who Caused the Currency Wars?The “currency wars” themselves are merely a skirmish. The big problem is that the core of the worlds financial system has become unstable, and reckless risk-taking will once again lead to great collateral damage. By Simon JohnsonThe world is on the brink of a nasty confrontation over exchange rates now spilling over to affect trade policy (Americas flirtation with protectionism), attitudes towards capital flows (new restrictions in Brazil, Thailand, and South Korea), and public support for economic globalization (rising anti-foreigner sentiment almost everywhere). Who is to blame for this situation getting so out of control, and what is likely to happen next?The issue is usually framed in terms of whether some countries are “cheating” by holding their exchange rates at an undervalued rate, thus boosting their exports and limiting imports relative to what would happen if their central banks floated the local currency freely.The main culprit in this conventional view is China, although the International Monetary Fund is a close second. But, considered more broadly, the seriousness of todays situation is primarily due to Europes refusal to reform global economic governance, compounded by years of political mismanagement and self-deception in the United States.China certainly bears some responsibility. Partly by design and partly by chance, about a decade ago China found itself consistently accumulating large amounts of foreign reserves by running a trade surplus and intervening to buy up the dollars that this generated. In most countries, such intervention would tend to push up inflation, because the central bank issues local currency in return for dollars. But, because the Chinese financial system remains tightly controlled and the options for investors are very limited, the usual inflationary consequences have not followed.This gives China the unprecedented for a large trading country ability to accumulate foreign-exchange reserves (now approaching $3 trillion). Its current-account surplus peaked, before the financial crisis of 2008, at around 11% of GDP. And its export lobby is fighting fiercely to keep the exchange rate roughly where it is relative to the dollar.In principle, the IMF is supposed to press countries with undervalued exchange rates to let their currencies appreciate. The rhetoric from the Fund has been ambitious, including at the recently concluded annual meeting of its shareholders the worlds central banks and finance ministries in Washington. But the reality is that the IMF has no power over China (or any other country with a current-account surplus); the final communiqu last weekend was arguably the lamest on record.Unfortunately, the IMF is guilty of more than hubris. Its handling of the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 severely antagonized leading middle-income emerging-market countries and they still believe that the Fund does not have their interests at heart. Here, the West Europeans play a major role, because they are greatly overrepresented on the IMFs executive board and, despite all entreaties, simply refuse to consolidate their seats in order to give emerging markets significantly more influence.As a result, emerging-market countries, aiming to ensure that they avoid needing financial support from the IMF in the foreseeable future, are increasingly following Chinas lead and trying to ensure that they, too, run current-account surpluses. In practice, this means fervent efforts to prevent their currencies from appreciating in value.But a great deal of responsibility for todays global economic dangers rests with the US, for three reasons. First, most emerging markets feel their currencies pressed to appreciate by growing capital inflows. Investors in Brazil are being offered yields around 11%, while similar credit risks in the US are paying no more than 2-3%. To many, this looks like a one-way bet. Moreover, US rates are likely to stay low, because Americas financial system blew itself up so completely (with help from European banks), and because low rates remain, for domestic reasons, part of the post-crisis policy mix.Second, the US has run record current-account deficits over the past decade, as the political elite Republican and Democrats alike became increasingly comfortable with overconsumption. These deficits facilitate the surpluses that emerging markets such as China want to run the worlds current accounts add up to zero, so if one large set of countries wants to run a surplus, someone big needs to run a deficit.Leading Bush administration officials used to talk of the US current-account deficit being a “gift” to the outside world. But, honestly, the US has been overconsuming living far beyond its means for the past decade. The idea that tax cuts would lead to productivity gains and would pay for themselves (and fix the budget) has proved entirely illusory.Third, the net flow of capital is from emerging markets to the US this is what it means to have current-account surpluses in emerging markets and a deficit in the US. But the gross flow of capital is from emerging market to emerging market, through big banks now implicitly backed by the state in both the US and Europe. From the perspective of international investors, banks that are “too big to fail” are the perfect places to park their reserves as long as the sovereign in question remains solvent. But what will these banks do with the funds?When a similar issued emerged in the 1970s the so-called “recycling of oil surpluses” banks in Western financial centers extended loans to Latin America, communist Poland, and communist Romania. That was not a good idea, as it led to a massive (for the time) debt crisis in 1982.We are now heading for something similar, but on a larger scale. The banks and other financial players have every incentive to load up on risk as we head into the cycle; they get the upside (Wall Street compensation this year is set to break records again) and the downside goes to taxpayers.The “currency wars” themselves are merely a skirmish. The big problem is that the core of the worlds financial system has become unstable, and reckless risk-taking will once again lead to great collateral damage.Simon Johnson, a former chief economist of the IMF, is co-founder of a leading economics blog, http:/BaselineS, a professor at MIT Sloan, and a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.问责“货币战争”所谓“货币战争”，不过是一场小冲突，更大的症结在于：世界金融体系的核心已变得不稳定，且不计后果的冒险行为将再度导致巨大的间接伤害西蒙约翰逊/文在当前国际形势下，汇率战一触即发，火药味弥漫开来，影响到贸易政策、政府对资本流动的态度及公众对经济全球化的反应。失控局面归咎于谁？局势将如何发展？论及此类问题，更常见的问法是：是不是有些国家在搞“欺诈”，通过其央行有意做低本国货币汇率以扩大出口、限制进口？实际上，这种问法暗示中国就是货币战的罪魁祸首，而IMF是主要帮凶。但若做更全面的考虑，当前严峻局势的形成，主要是由于欧洲反对全球经济治理机制改革及多年来美国政策上管理不善。中国负有一定责任。约十年前，由于中国人民银行买进由持续贸易顺差带来的美元，中国积累了大量外汇储备。在其他国家，这可能引发通胀，因为央行为回收美元必须发行本国货币。但由于中国金融体系处在严格控制下，加之投资领域仍有限，通胀并未出现。对一个贸易大国而言，中国拥有前所未有的外汇储备积累能力，其经常项目盈余在2008年金融危机期间达到顶峰，约为GDP的11。而出口行业的利益集团仍在激烈呼吁基本保持人民币与美元的汇率挂钩。IMF应要求汇率低估的国家让本国货币升值。IMF的言论一直很有气势，在最近于华盛顿闭幕的年会上也是如此，但实际上它无权干涉中国，或任何有经常项目盈余的国家。IMF令人不满之处不止言过其实这一点，其应对1997年亚洲金融危机的措施使主要中等收入新兴市场的国家颇感恼火，这些国家至今认为，IMF未将它们的利益放在心上。这主要因为在IMF的执行委员会中西欧人占多数，他们不顾新兴国家的要求，拒绝重排席位。因此，新兴市场国家为在可预见的将来不再依赖IMF的资金支持，正效仿中国尽力保持经常账目盈余，并竭力防止本国货币升值。然而在很大程度上，当前全球经济的高风险是由美国造成的。首先，大多数新兴市场认为，不断增长的资本流入会使本国货币面临升值压力。目前，在巴西的投资收益率可达到11，而在美国的相应领域却不超过23。对许多人来说，在哪下注是再明显不过的事。此外，因美国的金融体系元气大伤，美国的利率可能会维持在较低水平，再加上其他国内因素影响，后危机时代的美国经济政策走向尚不明朗。其次，过去十多年，美国政治精英逐渐习惯了过度支出，这促使美国经常项目赤字一直保持在历史最高水平。由于全球经常账目总和为零，所以正是美国的赤字使得中国等新兴市场国家的盈余成为可能。小布什政府的主要官员常把美国经常项目赤字称为对其他国家的“馈赠”。而过去十年美国一直在超前消费。所谓减税会提高生产力并最终填补财政赤字的说法纯属无稽之谈。第三，资本净流动是从新兴市场国家流入美国，也就是说，前者产生经常项目盈余，后者有赤字。但资本总流动是在新兴市场国家间，由大型银行（背后多有美国和欧洲各国支持）提供动力。从国际投资者的角度看，只要其背后的主权国家仍有还债能力，“大而不能倒”的银行就是他们投资的最佳选择。但这些银行用这些资金做什么？上世纪70年代曾出现过类似情况，即所谓的“石油盈余循环”，西方各大银行向拉美、波兰和罗马尼亚大举放贷。1982年的巨额债务危机证明银行这一决策并不明智。目前，银行的投资方向与之相似，只是规模更大。在这一趋势下，银行等金融市场参与者的确没有理由担心风险：利益是他们的，损失是纳税人的。所谓“货币战争”，不过是一场小冲突，更大的症结在于：世界金融体系的核心已变得不稳定，且不计后果的冒险行为将再度导致巨大的间接伤害。作者为IMF前首席经济学家、麻省理工斯隆商学院教授、彼得森国际经济研究所资深研究员）3、The Renminbi Goes ForthThe dilemma that officials face is that the impact of a fall in exports as a result of RMB appreciation will be felt acutely and immediately, whereas the large welfare losses due to the evaporation of the value of Chinas foreign-exchange reserves will be borne by society as a whole but not immediately.By Yu YongdingBEIJING In June, the Peoples Bank of China (PBC), Chinas central bank, announced an end to the renminbis 23-month-old peg to the dollar and a return to the pre-crisis exchange-rate regime adopted in July 2005. So far, however, the RMBs appreciation against the dollar has been slow. Will the pace of appreciation accelerate enough to satisfy American demands? If it does, will global imbalances disappear sooner?It is hard to argue that the RMB is not undervalued, given Chinas large and persistent current-account and capital-account surpluses. But, despite ending the dollar peg, faster appreciation of the RMB seems unlikely for the foreseeable future.Chinas official position is that, to avoid the negative impact of a stronger RMB on Chinas exports and hence employment, appreciation must proceed in an autonomous, gradual, and controllable manner. The current exchange-rate regime, which links the RMB to a basket of currencies, was designed to give the PBC leeway to control the pace of RMB appreciation, while creating two-way fluctuations in the exchange rate against the US dollar in order to discourage speculators from making one-way bets on the RMB.RMB appreciation should have started earlier and at a faster pace, when Chinas trade surplus was much smaller and its growth was much less dependent on exports. Delay has made current-account rebalancing via RMB appreciation costly. And now China faces a dilemma.As a result of the global financial crisis, Chinas export growth in 2009 dropped by 34% compared to 2008. In the first seven months of 2010, Chinas trade surplus was $84 billion, down 21.2% from January-July 2009. This large, steady fall in the countrys trade surplus makes the Chinese government hesitant to allow the RMB to appreciate significantly, for fear of the lagged impact on the trade balance.But the PBC is also reluctant to buy dollars constantly. The PBC knows that rapid deterioration in Americas fiscal position and continual worsening in its external balance may create an irresistible temptation for the US to inflate away its debt burden. The more the PBC intervenes, the larger the national welfare losses that China may suffer in the future. The Chinese government must, therefore, strike a balance between protecting Chinas export sector and preserving its national welfare. The dilemma that officials face is that the impact of a fall in exports as a result of RMB appreciation will be felt acutely and immediately, whereas the large welfare losses due to the evaporation of the value of Chinas foreign-exchange reserves will be borne by society as a whole but not immediately.Moreover, the increase in Chinas overall price level and wage levels in particular has caused the RMB to strengthen steadily in real terms, reducing (to a certain extent) the need for nominal RMB appreciation. True, commerce ministry officials recently declared their wish to see a further fall of Chinas trade surplus in 2010. But RMB appreciation is not the preferred instrument for achieving this goal. Thus, nothing dramatic will happen to the RMB exchange rate in the near term unless something dramatic happens.At the same time, the effect of currency appreciation on the trade balance should not be exaggerated. The RMB appreciated by 18.6% in real effective terms, and by 16% in dollar terms, from June 2005 to August 2008. Yet, from 2006 to 2008, Chinas annual exports grew 23.4%, outpacing import growth of 19.7%.Exchange rates are just one of many factors that affect trade balances. For Chinas, the income effect of global demand is significantly larger than the price effect of the exchange rate. The fall in Chinas trade surplus since late 2008 is attributable mainly to the global slowdown and the stimulus package introduced by the Chinese government, rather than to changes in the RMBs exchange rate.But if the RMB is allowed to float, isnt a balanced trade account likely? Probably not. With a fast-rising RMB, net capital outflows will increase, which is what Japan experienced after the Plaza Accord of 1985 pushed the yen upward. As a result, balance-of-payments equilibrium would be reached at a certain exchange-rate level, but a current-account surplus (albeit smaller) would still exist.America should not pin too much hope on a weakening dollar to correct its trade imbalances. For the US, the fundamental cause of imbalances is not a strong dollar, but Americas over-consumption and over-borrowing. A strengthening dollar would worsen the US trade balance, but a weakening dollar could cause panic in capital markets, which might push up risk premia on dollar-denominated assets, including US government securities, in turn leading to an economic slowdown and a further weakening of the dollar.Of course, RMB appreciation may displace Chinese goods sold in the US. But if the US fails to narrow its savings gap, its current-account deficit will not disappear, regardless of where the dollar goes. Whether America can achieve decent growth while keeping its current-account deficit in check depends on whether it can reinvigorate its ability to innovate and create, thereby restoring competitiveness and creating demand at the same time.For both China and America, the RMB-dollar exchange rate is important for achieving growth and a more balanced current account. But that dual objective requires structural change in the Chinese and US economies.Yu Yongding, currently President of China Society of World Economics, is a former member of the monetary policy committee of the Peoples Bank of China, and a former Director of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and Politics.人民币升值之困政府所面对的两难困境在于，国民会切实并迅速地感觉到人民币升值导致出口下降的影响，而外汇储备价值蒸发所致的国家财富损失将由全社会来承担，且不会那么快被感受到余永定/文在经历了随后近三个月的双向窄幅波动后，人民币汇率在9月中旬急速升值。但迄今为止人民币兑美元的升值速度依旧缓慢。人民币升值的步伐是否足够迅速，足以满足美方的要求？如果是的话，全球贸易不平衡是否又会很快消失？尽管结束了与美元的挂钩，人民币的更快升值似乎在可见的未来不会发生。在中国官方的立场上，为了避免强势人民币对中国出口（以及就业）的打击，升值必须在中方自行决定、逐步推进而且可控的情况下实施。而目前这种将人民币与一揽子货币挂钩的汇率管理措施，就是为了让中国人民银行能够灵活控制人民币升值过程而设计的，通过制造对美元汇率的双向波动来遏制投机者赌人民币升值的单向交易行为。当中国的贸易顺差规模已经大幅缩小，经济增长对出口的依赖也进一步减轻之时，人民币的升值本应更早更快地启动，但这一进程的延迟令通过人民币升值来平衡经常账户所付出的代价更大。而如今中国正面对着一个两难困境。由于全球金融危机，中国2009年度的出口增长比前一年下降了34。在2010年前七个月，中国的贸易顺差为840亿美元，相比去年同期下降了21.2。这种大幅下降的局面令中国政府不敢让人民币大幅升值，害怕可能对贸易平衡产生长远影响。但中国人民银行也不敢持续买入美元。因为他们知道美国财政状况以及外部贸易平衡的迅速恶化可能诱发美国人用美元贬值的方式来减轻债务负担。人行买入得越多，未来中国国家财富的损失可能就越大。对此，中国政府必须在保护出口部门和维护国家财富之间取得平衡。而政府所面对的两难困境在于国民会切实并迅速地感觉到人民币升值导致的出口下降的影响，而中国外汇储备价值蒸发所导致的国家财富损失将由全社会来承担，且不会那么快被感受到。此外，中国整体物价水平的上升特别是工资水平已经实现了人民币的稳步走强，并在某种程度上减低了名义升值的需要。没错，商务部官员最近宣布希望能看到2010年中国的贸易顺差进一步缩小。但他们可能不太会用人民币升值来实现这一目标。因此短期内人民币汇率都不会发生太大的波动除非发生了某些重大事件。与此同时，货币升值对贸易的影响作用不应被夸大。从2005年6月到2008年8月，人民币实际有效汇率升值了18.6，兑美元则升值了16。在2006年到2008年间，中国的年度出口增速达到了23.4，超过进口增速19.7。影响贸易平衡的因素很多，汇率只是其中一个。对中国来说，全球需求所带来的收入效应比汇率所带来的价格效应大得多。中国贸易顺差自2008年年末开始的下降，主要来自于全球增长的放缓以及政府的经济刺激计划，而不是人民币汇率的变化。如果人民币汇率可以浮动，是不是就能实现经常账户平衡？答案可能是否定的。随着人民币的快速升值，资本净流出可能增加，而日本在1985年签订了广场协议之后正是经历了这一幕。结果是，贸易支付差额将在某个汇率水平上达到均衡，但经常账户的顺差（虽然变得更小）依然会继续存在。美国不应寄望于用弱势美元来扭转其贸易不平衡的态势。对美国来说，贸易不平衡的深层原因不是强势美元，而是过度的消费和借债。对于中美两国来说，人民币/美元汇率对于实现增长和更平衡的经常账户都非常重要。但这两个目标都要求中美两国经济实施结构性的革新。作者为中国世界经济学会会长，中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所研究员4、Negative Interest Rate may Feed House Prices Bounce, State Media WarnsLow interest rates will help reduce financing costs of the companies, but at the same time, the negative rate will further enhance inflationary expectations.Chinas state-run media Xinhua News Agency yesterday sounded a warning in a report saying the current negative interest rates may feed the countrys house prices bounce, a rare move of the countrys mouthpiece after it posted strong August CPI, the main gauge of inflation, which increased at a record high rate of 3.5 from a year earlier.Compared with the 3.5 percent hike in CPI, Chinese banks deposit interest rate was kept unchanged at around 2.25 percent during the same period. The return on deposits keeps dipping since the starting of the year.Negative Interest RateThe yearly growth rate of Chinas CPI continues to spike, data from the National Bureau of Statistics shows. In February, CPI growth hit 2.7 percent, overwhelming 2.25 percent of one-year deposit rate during the same period. However, updated figure shows that the current consumer prices have for the first time surpassed the 3.33 percent of three-year deposit rate.The money on deposited for one-