产品伤害危机对品牌绩效指标的影响[外文翻译]

1、毕业论文（设计）外文翻译一、外文原文标题：the effects of product-harm crisis on brand performance原文： introductionthe term product-harm crisis refers to well-known events related to product defects or harm associated with some brands (siomkos & kurzbard 1994). for example, in 2000, when news spread that more than 100 peo

2、ple had died in accidents involving defective firestone tyres, the company had to recall millions of its products (advertising age 2000). in september 2008, 6244 babies in china were diagnosed as suffering from numerous ailments after ingesting the poisonous sanlu formula (people daily 2008). having

3、 used all of its cash reserves for product recall and medical payments, sanlu company was declared bankrupt in 2009. in 2005, nestl company mistakenly sold milk powder that contained more iodine than chinese national standards permit in the market. when the news broke, nestl had to make a public apo

4、logy and remove the defective product from shelves (abc news 2005). after this crisis, in an effort to restore reduced sales, nestl gave out samples and stationed doctors in beijing supermarkets to deal with customers concerns.these examples clearly suggest that a product-harm crisis can seriously i

5、mperil a brands performance - and even totally destroy a company, as in the case of sanlu. therefore, understanding how a product-harm crisis influences brands and the market structure is of great practical and theoretical interest.the nbd-dirichlet model (ehrenberg 1988) is a well-established stati

6、stical model and has been extensively used to audit and predict brand performance measures (bpms) under stationary and dynamic market structures (ehrenberg et al. 2004). however, this model has not been used to analyse the influence of product-harm crises. since a product-harm crisis can greatly aff

7、ect brand performance, it is reasonable to assume that, by monitoring the bpms through the product-harm crisis, we can indirectly observe how a product-harm crisis influences brands and the market structure of this product category. this approach should provide some practical benefits from a new per

8、spective.our main objective in this paper is to use the nbd-dirichlet model to monitor the leading brands bpms during the 2005 nestl product-harm crisis that occurred in china. by comparing the observed bpms of the pre-, during and post-crisis periods to those expected, and looking at the difference

9、s between these three periods, we may come to understand how a product-harm crisis influences brands (including both crisis brand and non-crisis brands) and market structure. limitations and managerial implications are discussed.the product-harm crisis and its influence on the brand after a series o

10、f product-harm crises over the years, related studies have been developed in a number of research fields. it has been widely accepted that product-harm crises have a negative influence on crisis-brand equity (heerde et al. 2007). for example, a brand under crisis may lose its baseline sales and beco

11、me more sensitive to a competitors market activities (heerde et al. 2007). the crisis may also affect the crisis brands stock price (salin & hooker 2001). compared to limited systematic research into crises market sequences, past research has focused on consumers and firms reaction towards such cris

12、es (dawar & pilluta 2000).depending on how it is conducted, most research in connection with product-harm crises can be classified into three categories. the first consists of descriptive checklists suggesting which strategies work or do not work in terms of business practices (mitroff 2004). becaus

13、e this kind of research cannot quantify the damage incurred, it can only provide limited guidance for understanding the underlying mechanisms of product-harm crises. another stream of such research focuses on laboratory experiments. equipped with psychological theories and different control variable

14、s, this kind of research can help us understand the moderators that play a part in influencing a product-harm crisiss effects, and perhaps provides some valuable insights (dawar & pilluta 2000; vassilikopoulou et al. 2009). however, external validity is one limitation of such research.another resear

15、ch stream has recently grown in popularity, where panel data gathered during real product-harm crises have been collected and analysed using advanced mathematical models (heerde et al. 2007; cleeren et al. 2008). how the crisis influences the performance of the crisis brand or the affected product c

16、ategory can be tracked by monitoring the brands stock price (salin & hooker 2001) or sales (heerde et al. 2007). by all accounts, this research stream provides more practical insights about the influence of the product-harm crisis.this study contributes to the third research stream in that we used t

17、he nbd-dirichlet model to quantify the product-harm crisiss effect on bpms (including penetration, market share, purchase frequency and share of category requirement) and market structure during the 2005 nestl milk powder crisis.discussion this study focused on the nestl milk powder crisis that occu

18、rred in china in 2005. based on panel data from 336 families in the beijing area, we studied the effects of a product-harm crisis on brands and market structure using the nbd-dirichlet model. we found, first, that the market structure in the pre-crisis period was stationary. the product-harm crisis

19、disturbed the balance, and the market during the crisis was no longer steady. as a consequence, the predictions of purchase frequencies and scrs were not consistent with the observed measures. four months after the outbreak of the crisis, the overall market was still not back to stationary status an

20、d there were some deviations of scrs and purchase frequencies. this indicates that the crisiss influence on the market still existed, and it might last for some time. however, it is interesting to point out that the observed market share and penetration seemed to match the predicted measures in all

21、three periods. when the market was not steady in the during-crisis and the post-crisis periods, detailed data show that in most situations the observed purchase frequencies (mengniu and wondersun) or scrs (nestl) were significantly lower than the estimated measures. this may indicate that mengniu an

22、d wondersun acquired some new customers from nestl, and these new customers did not commit heavy purchases to these brands. (this is explained in more detail in the following paragraph.) our data also show that, among those non-crisis brands, yili was an exception, with higher than expected scr in b

23、oth the during and post-crisis periods. in addition, the observed purchase frequencies of yili in the during and post-crisis periods were always greater than the predicted measures, even though the difference was less than 0.3. this may relate to its market position: in both periods, yili had the hi

24、ghest market share, with more than 3% margin, while its penetration was similar to that of its competitors.second, a product-harm crisis hurts the crisis brand greatly. our data clearly showed that the market share and penetration of nestl dropped significantly during the product crisis. even though

25、 these measures recovered during the post-crisis period, they were still significantly lower than their pre-crisis levels. on the other hand, those non-crisis brands benefited from this crisis with significantly higher penetration, although our data also show a trend of returning to their pre-crisis

26、 levels. the decreased market share of nestl redistributed to all other brands (more than 70 brands), and each of them took only a part of it. therefore, no significant change of market share was seen in the non-crisis brands.third, the crisiss influence on purchase frequency and scr of the crisis b

27、rand was not significantly different from those of the non-crisis brands. in terms of purchase frequency, this similarity lies in two aspects: in all three periods, nestls relative purchase frequency was always the same (significantly lower than yili but marginally higher than the other two brands);

28、 and during the transition from the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis period, all four leading brands dropped by around 0.3. similarly, the observed scrs of nestl, mengniu and wondersun all experienced a similar drop from the pre-crisis period to the during-crisis period, and recovered to some ex

29、tent in the post-crisis period. previous research shows that new brands garnered customer loyalty immediately after they were introduced (ehrenberg & goodhardt 2001). our data further show that even a product-harm crisis will not hurt the crisis brands customer loyalty.overall, nestls penetration an

30、d market share decreased dramatically, while other brands experienced an increase in penetration at the same time. associated with this transition, the purchase frequencies and scrs of most leading brands dropped significantly. combining these observations, one reasonable explanation can be given. t

31、he product-harm crisis drove some of nestls customers away to other brands. these switched customers did not form stable purchase behaviour in other words, they did not limit their purchases to any one special brand. these switched customers were somehow like change-of-pace customers (kahn et al. 19

32、88). even though the non-crisis brands attracted some new customers and increased their market share or penetration, the average loyalty of their new customer group was low. as a result, their purchase frequencies or scrs became even lower. this combination of higher penetration and lower loyalty is

33、 similar to what happens to change-of-pace brands (kahn et al. 1988) or to normal brands under deep price cuts (bhattacharya et al. 1996).finally, we may need to pay particular attention to yili. yili was special in many aspects. first, it always had the highest market share in all three periods. se

34、cond, in both the during and post-crisis periods, its observed scrs were significantly higher than the estimated scrs. third, its observed scr increased from the pre-crisis period to the during-crisis period, while all the other brands experienced scr drop. fourth, its observed purchase frequency al

35、ways led the market with a significant margin. all these may relate to one fact that yili was the biggest brand in the pre-crisis market. our research indicated that, even though all non-crisis brands benefited from nestls crisis, different brands gained differently; the most dominant brand gained m

36、ore in terms of market share, even increasing scr, while the smaller brands had smaller gains in market share and also had to sacrifice scr. this looks like another double jeopardy smaller brands may have to face in reality. interestingly, according to heerde et al. (2007), smaller brands are more d

37、amaged than bigger brands after a product-harm crisis. our research is consistent with that of heerde et al. (2007) in supporting that it is always good to be a bigger brand and it is always bad to be a smaller brand.conclusionto the best of our knowledge, this study is one of the first attempts to

38、apply the nbd-dirichlet model to investigate the effects of a product-harm crisis. this paper provides a methodology by which to assess the impact of a product crisis in a quantitative way, and applies the model to a product-harm crisis for nestl milk powder in the chinese market. the research shows

39、 that this model is a great tool by which to monitor or track the development of a product-harm crisis. the modelling and estimation processes are straightforward, and the required data can easily be collected. using this model helps us to monitor the crisiss influence on the crisis brand, non-crisi

40、s brands and even the entire category market.our research shows that a product-harm crisis can greatly damage the crisis brands market share and penetration. however, purchase frequency and scr were not damaged at similar levels. these combined data indicate that the market was not steady, and a pro

41、duct crisis changed customers purchase behaviours. more specifically, a product-harm crisis drove away some customers of the crisis brand and these switched customers did not make up their minds about which brand to eventually switch to. the periods during and after the crisis were critical to both

42、of the crisis brands and non-crisis brands. for crisis brands, they need to maximise their efforts to attract back this group of customers before they commit to other brands. however, for non-crisis brands, even though they had improved their market share and expanded their customer base, they shoul

43、d realize that this is just a temporary improvement. they need to try their best to keep these new customers satisfied, and eventually make them loyal customers. their strategies and practices during this period will eventually affect whether they can keep these new customers.出处：baolong ma,lin zhang

44、,fei li and gao wang.the effects of product-harm crisis on brand performancej.international journal of market research.2010.52(4), pp.443-458标题：产品伤害危机对品牌绩效指标的影响译文：介绍产品伤害危机就是一些品牌产品因存有缺陷或有害而广为人知的事件（siomkos和kurzbard 1994）。例如在2000年，当有消息说有超过100人死于因有缺陷的凡士通轮胎引起的车祸事件时，凡士通公司被迫召回成千上万的产品（广告时代 2000）。在2008年9月，中国

45、的6244个婴儿在食用了有毒的三鹿婴儿奶粉后被确诊患上许多疾病（人民日报 2008）。在产品召回和医疗费用上用光其所有的现金储备后，三鹿公司在2009年被宣告破产。在2005年，雀巢公司错误地出售了含有超过中国国家标准允许在市场上销售的碘含量的奶粉。当新闻爆出后，雀巢不得不做出公开道歉并把其缺陷产品下架（abc新闻 2005）。这场危机后，为了恢复减少的销售，雀巢给出了样品，并在北京超市里驻扎医生来处理顾客的问题。这些例子表明产品伤害危机可以严重影响到了一个品牌的绩效甚至像三鹿公司那样摧毁整个公司。因此，了解产品伤害危机是如何影响品牌和市场结构具有重要的实践意义和理论兴趣。nbd-dirich

46、let模型（ehrenberg 1988）是一个非常稳定的统计模型，并广泛运用于审计和在静态和动态市场结构下预测品牌绩效测量（bpms）（ehrenberg等人 2004）。然而，这个模型却并没有被用来分析产品伤害危机的影响。由于产品伤害危机可以极大地影响品牌绩效，我们有理由相信，通过监测产品伤害危机期间的品牌绩效测量，我们可以间接地观察产品伤害危机是如何影响品牌和这类产品的市场结构的。这种方法可以从一个新的视角提供一些实用的益处。这篇文章的主要目的是使用nbd-dirichlet模型监测2005年雀巢公司在中国爆发产品伤害危机期间，中国领导者地位品牌的品牌绩效测量。通过对比观察这些品牌在产品

47、伤害危机发生之前、之中和之后的品牌绩效测量，看这三个不同时期间的不同，我们可以得出产品伤害危机是如何影响品牌（包括发生危机的品牌和未发生危机的品牌）和市场结构的。也会讨论局限性和管理的意义。产品伤害危机以及它对品牌的影响经过过去几年的一系列的产品伤害危机时间，相关的研究已经发展到许多的研究领域。人们普遍认为产品伤害危机对产生危机的品牌价值有负面的影响（heerde等人 2007）。例如，一个危机下的品牌可能会失去它的基线销售，变得对竞争对手的市场活动更加敏感（heerde等人 2007）。这种危机也会影响危机品牌的股票价格（salin和hooker 2001）。相较于对危机市场的序列的受限的系

48、统研究，过去的研究集中在消费者和公司对这些危机的反应上 （dawar和pilluta 2000）。根据它是如何进行研究的，多数有关产品伤害危机的研究可分为三类。第一个由描述性的清单组成的研究提议什么策略在商业行为上可行或者不可行（mitroff 2004）。由于这类研究不能量化遭受的损失，它只能提供有限的指导来理解产品伤害危机最基础的原理。另一个流派的研究主要集中在实验室的实验上。运用心理学的理论和不同的可控变量，这类研究能帮助我们理解调解人在影响产品伤害危机效果的作用，也许能提供一些有价值的见解（dawar和pilluta 2000；vassilikopoulou等人 2009）。然而，外部

49、有效性是此类研究的限制。另一个研究流派最近开始风行，固定样本数据在真正的产品伤害危机过程中收集整理，采用先进的数学模型进行分析（heerde等人 2007；cleeren等人 2008）。通过监视这些品牌的股价（salin和hooker 2001）或者销售（heerde等人 2007）可以跟踪危机是如何对产生危机的品牌或者受影响的产品类别的绩效产生影响的。被所有人接受的是，这个研究流派对产品伤害危机的影响提供更实际的见解。这项研究能为第三类研究流派做贡献，因为我们使用nbd-dirichlet模型定量地研究产品伤害危机对品牌绩效测量的影响（包括渗透、市场占有率、购物频率和这类产品需求的比例）和

50、在2005年的雀巢奶粉危机期间的市场结构。讨论这个研究主要关注2005年发生在中国的雀巢奶粉危机。基于在北京地区收集的336个家庭的固定样本数据，我们使用nbd-dirichlet模型研究产品伤害危机对品牌和市场结构的影响。我们发现，首先，市场结构在危机前的时期是固定的。产品伤害危机扰乱了这个平衡，市场结构在危机期间不再稳定。作为一种结果，购买频率与品类需求份额的预测与观测的方法不一致。爆发危机4个月后，整体市场仍然没有回到稳定状态，购买频率与品类需求份额仍有偏差。这表明危机对市场的影响仍然存在，并且它可能会持续一段时间。然而，有趣的是，观察市场份额和渗透似乎与预测的在这三个时期的措施相符。当

51、市场在危机中和危机后还不稳定时，详细的数据表明，在大多数的情况下观察购买频率（蒙牛和完达山）或品类需求份额（雀巢）均显著低于估计的测量。这也许说明了蒙牛和完达山从雀巢那里得到了新的顾客，而这些新顾客并不会承诺在这些品牌商花费很多。（这是用来解释接下来的更详细的段落的。）我们的数据还表明，在那些没有爆发危机的品牌中，伊利是个例外，无论在危机中还是危机后的时期，它的品类需求份额比预期的要高。此外，观察危机中和危机后的伊利的购买频率总是比预期的测量要好，尽管差别小于0.3。这可能与它的市场地位有关：在这两个时期，伊利都占有最高的市场份额，有超过3%的利润，而其市场渗透与竞争者差不多。其次，产品伤害危机对爆发危机的品牌影响很大。我们的数据明显表明雀巢的市场份额和市场渗透在危机期间显著下降。即使这些测量数据在危机后的时期中恢复过来，但仍大大低于危机前的水平。另一方面，那些没有爆发危机的品牌受益于这场危机而大大的进行市场渗透，虽然我们的数据也显示这个市场份额会趋向于回到危机前的水平。雀巢公司减少的市场份额重新分配到其他所有品牌（超过70个品牌），每个品牌只分配到了一小部分。因此，没有爆发危机的品牌的市场份额没有