Unequal democracy The political economy of the new gilded age

1、unequal democracy:the political economy of the new gilded agelarry m. bartelscloth | june 2008 | $29.95 / 17.95328 pp. | 6 x 9 | 40 line illus. 4 halftones. 65 tables. talking points with larry m. bartelslarry bartels guest blog on dani rodriks weblog unequal democracy debunks many myths about polit

2、ics in contemporary america, using the widening gap between the rich and the poor to shed disturbing light on the workings of american democracy. larry bartels shows that increasing inequality is not simply the result of economic forces, but the product of broad-reaching policy choices in a politica

3、l system dominated by partisan ideologies and the interests of the wealthy.bartels demonstrates that elected officials respond to the views of affluent constituents but ignore the views of poor people. he shows that republican presidents in particular have consistently produced much less income grow

4、th for middle-class and working-poor families than for affluent families, greatly increasing inequality. he provides revealing case studies of key policy shifts contributing to inequality, including the massive bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 and the erosion of the minimum wage. finally, he challenge

5、s conventional explanations for why many voters seem to vote against their own economic interests, contending that working-class voters have not been lured into the republican camp by values issues like abortion and gay marriage, as commonly believed, but that republican presidents have been remarka

6、bly successful in timing income growth to cater to short-sighted voters.unequal democracy is social science at its very best. it provides a deep and searching analysis of the political causes and consequences of americas growing income gap, and a sobering assessment of the capacity of the american p

7、olitical system to live up to its democratic ideals.larry m. bartels is the donald e. stokes professor of public and international affairs and director of the center for the study of democratic politics at princeton university.endorsements:unequal democracy is the sort of book to which every politic

8、al scientist should aspire-it is methodologically rigorous, conceptually serious, and above all, it addresses urgent concerns of our fellow citizens. as bartels shows, much of what we think we know about the politics of economic inequality is dead wrong. bartelss perplexing and often unexpected disc

9、overies should help refocus the gathering public debate about inequality and what to do about it.-robert d. putnam, author of bowling alonethis is a fantastic book, a real tour de force. it is a hugely important study of increasing economic inequality in america and the failure of the political syst

10、em to mitigate its effects on poor citizens. it is the best work that has been done on the political economy of income inequality.-thomas mann, brookings institutionunequal democracy completes the story of why americas wealthy have become superrich. as larry bartels, one of the nations top political

11、 scientists, convincingly demonstrates, the rich get richer when the republicans are in power and when the less affluent fail to vote. this book is essential reading for anyone who wants answers to why so many of americas working- and middle-class families are struggling to get by.-thomas e. patters

12、on, harvard universitytalking points with larry m. bartelswhy is america becoming more unequal?technology, globalization, and other economic forces have contributed to growing inequality over the past 35 years. but politics has also played a major role. historically, republican policies on macroecon

13、omics, taxes, and social spending have produced substantial increases in inequality, while democratic policies have produced relatively equal income growth across the economic spectrum.how much does partisan politics matter?over the past six decades, the real incomes of middle-class families have in

14、creased twice as fast under democratic presidents as they have under republican presidents. the real incomes of working poor families have increased six times as fast under democratic presidents as they have under republican presidents. these differences are not attributable to long-term demographic

15、 or social trends, economic shocks such as oil crises, or other confounding factors.if income growth is greater under democrats than republicans, why have the republicans won the presidency so often?republicans win because voters tend to be narrow-minded and short-sighted in their assessments of eco

16、nomic performance-focusing on income growth only in the year of the election. republicans have generally produced greater income gains in election years, while democrats tend to produce greater income growth in earlier years of the administration. how has the republican party won over the white work

17、ing class?it hasnt. thomas franks portrait (in whats the matter with kansas?) of poor whites alienated by liberal democratic positions on abortion, guns, and gay marriage is highly misleading. economic issues still trump cultural issues for low-income voters. and outside the south, where republicans

18、 have made major gains in every income class due to the end of the unnatural democratic monopoly of the jim crow era, net republican gains have come entirely from middle- and high-income white voters. continues. . . . the minimum wage-why is it so low?the real value of the minimum wage has fallen su

19、bstantially over the past 40 years despite strong, consistent public support for minimum wage increases. minimum wage policy is driven not by public sentiment but by ideology and partisanship. the eroding value of the minimum wage is primarily attributable to the decline of labor unions and to repub

20、lican control of the white house and congress. why did congress pass the bush tax cuts?the tax cuts were driven by the ideology of conservative political elites, not by public demand. public support for the bush tax cuts was substantial, but remarkably shallow and confused. many people supported the

21、 tax cuts out of unenlightened self-interest, ignoring or misunderstanding their implications for the government budget, the progressivity of federal tax burdens, and prevailing levels of economic inequality. if americans want less inequality, why is the estate tax so unpopular?americans dont like t

22、he estate tax, even if they have modest incomes, want more spending on government programs, regret growing economic inequality, and say that rich people pay less than they should in taxes. it is tempting to attribute this odd antipathy to a decade of propagandizing against the “death tax” by conserv

23、ative interest groups; but there is good reason to believe that the estate tax has always been quite unpopular. the fact that it survived for several decades (and will almost certainly return once the current temporary repeal expires) is another testament to the importance of elite ideologyin this c

24、ase, the support of liberal democrats since the new deal era for what one liberal economist has called the closest thing to a perfect tax we have. why do the rich always win?elected officials respond to the views of affluent constituents, but the preferences of people in the bottom third of the inco

25、me distribution have no discernible impact on their representatives behavior in washington. this striking pattern of unequal responsiveness should be troubling to anyone who values political equality as a democratic ideal. however, it does not imply that the rich always win in the policy-making proc

26、ess. the contrasting ideologies of democratic and republican officials lead them to support very different policies, even when they represent exactly the same constituents. thus, the interests of middle-class and poor people are likely to be furthered when democrats win. chapter 1 the new gilded age

27、 in the first sentence of one of the greatest works of modern po liti cal science, robert dahl posed a question of profound importance for democratic theory and practice: “in a po liti cal system where nearly every adult may vote but where knowledge, wealth, social position, access to officials, and

28、 other resources are unequally distributed, who actually governs?”1 dahls answer to this question, for one american city in the late 1950s, was that po liti cal power was surprisingly widely dispersed. examining politics and policy making in new haven, connecticut, he concluded that shifting, largel

29、y distinct co ali tions of elected and unelected leaders influenced key decisions in different issue areas. this pluralistic pattern was facilitated by the fact that many individuals and groups with substantial resources at their disposal chose not to devote those resources to political activity. ev

30、en “economic notables”the wealthy property own ers, businessmen, and bank directors constituting the top tier of new havens economic elitewere “simply one of the many groups out of which individuals sporadically emerge to influence the policies and acts of city officials.”2 the significance of dahls

31、 question has been magnified, and the pertinence of his answer has been cast in doubt, by dramatic economic and po liti cal changes in the united states over the past half- century. economically, america has become vastly richer and vastly more unequal. perhaps most strikingly, the share of total in

32、come going to people at the level of dahls “economic notables”the top 0.1% of income- earnershas more than tripled, from 3.2% in the late 1950s to 10.9% in 2005. the share going to the top 1% of income- earnersa much broader but still very affluent groupmore than doubled over the same period, from 1

33、0.2% to 21.8%.3 it seems natural to wonder whether the pluralistic democracy dahl found in the 1950s has survived this rapid concentration of vast additional resources in the hands of americas wealthiest citizens.4 meanwhile, the political process has evolved in ways that seem likely to reinforce th

34、e advantages of wealth. politi cal campaigns have become dramatically more expensive since the 1950s, increasing the reliance of elected officials on people who can afford to help finance their bids for reelection. lobbying activities by corporations and business and professional organizations have

35、accelerated greatly, outpacing the growth of public interest groups. membership in labor unions has declined substantially, eroding the primary mechanism for or ga nized repre sen ta tion of working people in the governmental process. how have these economic and po liti cal developments affected “wh

36、o actually governs?” in 2004, the task force on in equality and american democracy, convened by the american politi cal science association, concluded that po liti cal scientists know “astonishingly little” about the “cumulative effects on american democracy” of these economic and po liti cal change

37、s. however, based on what we do know, the task force members worried “that rising economic in equality will solidify longstanding disparities in po liti cal voice and influence, and perhaps exacerbate such disparities.”5 this book provides a multifaceted examination of the po liti cal causes and con

38、sequences of economic in equality in contemporary america. politi cal scientists since aristotle have wrestled with the question of whether substantial economic in equality is compatible with democracy. my evidence on that score is not encouraging. i find that elected officials are utterly unrespons

39、ive to the policy preferences of millions of low- income citizens, leaving their po liti cal interests to be served or ignored as the ideological whims of incumbent elites may dictate. dahl suggested that democracy entails “continued responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizen

40、s, considered as po liti cal equals.”6 the contemporary united states is a very long way from meeting that standard. economic in equality clearly has profound ramifications for democratic politics. however, that is only half the story of this book. the other half of the story is that politics also p

41、rofoundly shapes economics. while technological change, globalization, demographic shifts, and other economic and social forces have produced powerful pressures toward greater in equality in recent decades, politics and public policy can and do significantly reinforce or mitigate those pressures, de

42、pending on the po liti cal aims and priorities of elected officials. i trace the impact of public policies on changes in the u.s. income distribution over the past half- century, from the tripled income share of dahls “economic notables” at the top to the plight of minimum wage workers at the bottom

43、. i find that partisan politics and the ideological convictions of po liti cal elites have had a substantial impact on the american economy, especially on the economic fortunes of middle- class and poor people. economic in equality is, in substantial part, a political phenomenon. in theory, public o

44、pinion constrains the ideological convictions of po liti cal elites in democratic po liti cal systems. in practice, however, elected officials have a great deal of political leeway. this fact is strikingly illustrated by the behavior of democratic and republican senators from the same state, who rou

45、tinely pursue vastly different policies while “representing” precisely the same constituents. on a broader historical scale, political latitude is also demonstrated by consistent, marked shifts in economic priorities and perfor mance when democrats replace republicans, or when republicans replace de

46、mocrats, in the white house. in these respects, among others, conventional democratic theory misses much of what is most interesting and important about the actual workings of the american po liti cal system. my examination of the partisan politics of economic in equality, in chapter 2, reveals that

47、 democratic and republican presidents over the past half-century have presided over dramatically different patterns of income growth. on average, the real incomes of middle- class families have grown twice as fast under democrats as they have under republicans, while the real incomes of working poor

48、 families have grown six times as fast under democrats as they have under republicans. these substantial partisan differences persist even after allowing for differences in economic circumstances and historical trends beyond the control of individual presidents. they suggest that escalating in equal

49、ity is not simply an inevitable economic trend and that a great deal of economic in equality in the contemporary united states is specifically attributable to the policies and priorities of republican presidents. any satisfactory account of the american political economy must therefore explain how a

50、nd why republicans have had so much success in the american electoral arena despite their startling negative impact on the economic fortunes of middle- class and poor people. thus, in chapter 3, i examine contemporary class politics and partisan change, testing the popu lar belief that the white wor

51、king class has been lured into the republican ranks by hot-button social issues such as abortion and gay marriage. contrary to this familiar story, i find that low- income whites have actually become more democratic in their presidential voting behavior over the past half-century, partially counterb

52、alancing republican gains among more affluent white voters. moreover, low- income white voters continue to attach less weight to social issues than to economic issuesand they attach less weight to social issues than more affluent white voters do. the familiar image of a party system transformed by r

53、epublican gains among working- class cultural conservatives turns out to be largely mythical. then why have republican presidential candidates fared so well over the past half- century? my analysis in chapter 4 identifies three distinct biases in politi cal accountability that explain much of their

54、success. one is a myopic focus of voters on very recent economic perfor mance, which rewards republicans surprising success in concentrating income growth in election years. another is the peculiar sensitivity of voters at all income levels to high- income growth rates, which rewards republicans suc

55、cess in generating election- year income growth among affluent families specifically. finally, the responsiveness of voters to campaign spending rewards republicans consistent advantage in fundraising. together, these biases account three times over for the republican partys net advantage in preside

56、ntial elections in the post- war era. voters seemingly straightforward tendency to reward or punish the incumbent government at the polls for good or bad economic perfor mance turns out to be warped in ways that are both fascinating and politically crucial. in chapter 5, i turn to citizens views abo

57、ut equality; their attitudes toward salient economic groups such as rich people, poor people, big business, and labor unions; and their perceptions of the extent, causes, and consequences of economic in equality in contemporary america. my analysis reveals considerable concern about in equality amon

58、g ordinary americans and considerable sympathy for working- class and poor people. however, it also reveals a good deal of ignorance and misconnection between values, beliefs, and policy preferences among people who pay relatively little attention to politics and public affairs, and a good deal of p

59、olitically motivated misperception among better-informed people. as a result, political elites retain considerable latitude to pursue their own policy ends. chapters 6, 7, and 8 provide a series of case studies of politics and policy making in issue areas with important ramifications for economic in equality. chapter 6 focuses on the bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, which dramatically reduced the federal tax burdens of wealthy americans. i find that publ