欧盟俄罗斯油气管道连接分析

1、欧盟俄罗斯油气管道连接分析 欧盟俄罗斯油气管道连接分析 CERE Centre for Russia and Eurasia, Athens, GreeceAnalysis of the Oil- and Gas-Pipeline-Links between EU and RussiaAn account of intrinsic interestsBy: Ksenia Borisocheva1 欧盟俄罗斯油气管道连接分析 November, 2021Table of ContentsIntroduction .p.3 Part One: Existing Infrastructure.p.4

2、 Part Two: Diversification.p.8 Part Three: Future plans.p.13 Part Four: Policy Recommendations.p.17 Conclusion.p.19 Appendix.p.222 欧盟俄罗斯油气管道连接分析 The European Union and Russia are extremely interdependent in terms of their respective energy policies. The EU is currently dependent on energy from impor

3、ts by a factor of 50 percent, 25 percent of which originate in Russia. If no major changes in the policy regarding alternative energy sources occur the EU overall dependence on energy imports is expected to climb to 40-70 percent by 2030 according to various predictions.1 On the other hand, Russia h

4、olds the worlds largest natural gas reserves of 47.55 trillion cubic meters as well 60 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves.2 EU member states are the premier destination of Russian energy resources, consuming 70 percent of Russian energy exports and, thus, providing for the much needed nati

5、onal budget capital of the country.3 The transportation infrastructure, i.e. oil- and gas-pipelines, plays a vital role in this relationship of interdependence. The existing and projected routes offer the possibility of uninterrupted, secure supply energy. However, they are also a subject of a great

6、 deal of political and economic power-play, which, in turn, potentially undermines or endangers their efficiency. This work intends to bring to light the current state of affairs regarding the energy supply transportation infrastructure between the EU member states and Russia. Part One presents an o

7、verview of the existing transport infrastructure, both overland and sea routes, between the EU and Russia. Part Two introduces the concept of Diversification and its divergent meanings for the producer and supplier states. Projected new routes and the rationale behind them, including their economic

8、viability and political motivations, are presented in Part Three. Part Four attempts to make policy recommendations that could be useful in the attempt to improve the levels of trust between EU and Russia, or in other words, which could lead to an advancement of energy security between the regions.

9、Conclusion offers a summary.40-50 percent Russias share in European gas imports is planned by the Russian Energy Strategy to 2021, 66 percent by 2030 is predicted by Stern J., The Future of Russian Gas and Gasprom (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2021), p. 143, Table 3.6, “European Dependence o

10、n Russian Gas Supplies, 2021.” And 60 percent gas, overall 80 percent energy dependency on Russia is predicted by Euroactive, at http:/.euractiv/en/industry/geopolitics-eu-energy-supply/article-142665 2 Ganova Aglika and Ben Ayed Nizar, “European Union Energy Supply Policy: Diversified in Unity?” In

11、stitut Europeen des Hautes Etudes Internationales, May, 2021, p.71 3 Gazprom Export Company website, Export Dynamics, at: http:/.gazexport.ru/digits/?pkey1=0000413 欧盟俄罗斯油气管道连接分析 Part One Oil is the primary source of energy for the EU. It accounted for 37.2 percent of EUs gross inland energy consumpt

12、ion in 2021.4 Over 30 percent of total crude oil and oil products imports originate in Russia, which provides for over 25 percent of total EU oil consumption. The main importers of oil from Russia are Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Spain.5Table 1. EU Oil Imports, 2021Percentage of Imports Russi

13、a 33 % Norway 19% Saudi Arabia 11% Libya 9% Iran 6% Kazakhstan 5% Algeria 4% Nigeria 3% Iraq 2% Other 8% Source: European Commission SourceOil pipelines Currently the potential capacity of the Russian pipeline network allows for a supply of about 226 million tons of crude oil per year (or roughly 4.

14、5 million barrels per day (bpd) aimed at the Western European states outside the former Soviet Union. During 2021, Russia exported roughly 204 million tons of crude oil (4 million bbl/d), and over 2 million bbl/d of oil products.6 1.3 million bbl/d were exported via the Druzhba pipeline, another 1.3

15、 million bbl/d were send via the port of Primorsk near St.Petersburg, and around 900,000 bbl/d via the tankers from the Black sea port of Novorossiisk. Exports of both oil and gas that occur through the use of pipelines fall under the sole authority of the state pipeline monopoly, Transneft. However

16、, around 300 bbl/d of oil was transported by non-Transneft-controlled sea or rail routes. (See Table1)Table 1Russian Oil Exports by Export Outlet, 2021 (1000 bbl/d) Novorossiysk (after boats) 768 Other Black Sea (after boats) 217 Primorsk (after boats) 1,255 Druzhba Pipeline Germany 437 Poland 466 H

17、ungary 136 Czech Republic 104 Slovakia 118 Total 1,261 Other Exports Non-Transneft Sea 170 China (Rail) 178 Murmansk (Rail) 47 Other Non-Transneft Rail 47 CPC 53 European Union, “Energy Transport in Figures 2021. Part 2: Energy“, European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, Bru

18、ssels, 2021, p.13 5 EurActiv Website, “EU, Russia to Explore Reciprocity in Energy Trade”, 17.10.2021, at: l44 欧盟俄罗斯油气管道连接分析 Total Crude Oil Exports 4,155 Source: Energy Intelligence, 18.1.2021Figure 1. Primary Oil Pipeline Routes from Russia to EUSource: EIA, 2021“Druzhba” or “Friendship” pipeline

19、is the worlds longest oil pipeline of 4,000 km. With approximately 70 percent of overall Russian crude levels destined for Europe passing through this pipeline network, it is the largest principal artery for the transportation of Russian (as well as Central Asian) oil across Europe. Constructed in 1

20、964 with an aim to supply oil to the socialist allies in the former Soviet bloc as well as to western Europe, its current capacity is 1.2 to 1.4 million bpd. The pipeline begings in Samara, southeastern Russia, where it collect oil from western Siberia, the Urals, and the Caspian Sea. It runs to Moz

21、yr in southern Belarus, where it splits into a northern (Druzhba I) and a southern branch (Druzhba II). (Another section of the pipeline splits of on the territory of Russia, tresspasses Ukraine and comes to an end at the Black sea port of Odessa.) The northern branch crosses Belarus to reach Poland

22、 and Germany. Due to its overuse (it has been working for some time at full capacity) expansion works are currently underway to increase a section between Belarus and Polan. There have also been proposals to extend this branch to the German North Sea port of Wilhelmshave, which would reduce oil tank

23、er traffic in the Baltic Sea and make it easier to transport Russian oil to the United States. The southern branch runs in the direction of Ukraine, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Germany. Black Sea port of Novorossiysk is another export route for Russian and Central Asian oil. It is connected to the

24、Russian Samara-Tihorek pipeline, which transports oil from Makhachkala and Baku (Azerbaijan). This route is also deemed attractive for Kazakhstan, especially after an expansion of an Atyrau (Kazakhstan)Samara (Russia) pipeline. From here oil is transported to the Mediterranean and then to the Europe

25、an and Asian markets. However, the efficiency of this route is hindered by the limitations set for the passage of tankers though the Bosporus Strait.5 欧盟俄罗斯油气管道连接分析 The Baltic Pipeline System (BPS), completed in December 2021, is a another major export link, that carries around 74 million tons of cr

26、ude oil per year from Russia's West Siberian, Ural-Povoljye and TimanPechora regions westward to the newly completed port of Primorsk in the Russian Gulf of Finland. From there the supplies are shipped via tankers, to various markets, including the Nordic European states. Even though this route

27、does not extend beyond the borders of Russia, it enables Russia to reach the western markets and has reduced dependence on the transit through Baltic countries7, thus, lowering transportation costs by 3-4 dollars per ton, which together with services for transport cost saves Russia more than a billi

28、on dollars a year.8 Gas pipelines: In terms of natural gas, the relationship between EU and Russia is even more pronounced. Two-thirds of the overall Russian gas exports, which amounted to 156.1 bcm in 2021, are destined for the European markets, with largest EU importers being Germany, Italy, Franc

29、e and Hungary.9 However, in terms of consumption, Central and Eastern European countries are even more dependent on Russian energy imports. In this region Russian gas accounts for an average of 87 percent of total imports and 60 percent of consumption. (see Table 2). Due to a variety of factors such

30、 as rigorous EU regulations regarding the environment, with special emphasis on the replacement of high-carbon-emission fossil fuels such as coal, social resistance to nuclear power, and the steadily depleting intra-EU resources10, the gas import figure is predicted to climb to a 60 percent mark by

31、2030, with most experts agreeing that natural gas would soon replace oil as the EUs dominant energy source.11 Since Russia provides for the most readily available supplies, with other gas exporting countries such as Algeria lacking necessary quantities or transportation links, the importance of Russ

32、ias gas exports would continue to grow in the near to medium-term future.Table 2Major Recipients of Russian Natural Gas Exports, 2021 Rank Country Imports % of Domestic (bcm/year) NG Consumption 1 Ukraine 60.4 79 2 Germany 36.5 43 3 Italy 23.3 65 4 Belarus 20.2 100 5 France 22.6 26 6 Hungary 8.3 62

33、7 Czech Republic 7.1 ?4 8 Austria 6.9 70 9 Poland 6.4 47 10 Slovakia 6.4 108* 11 Baltic States 5.7 100 12 Finland 4.2 105* 13 Romania 4.1 23 14 Fmr Yugoslavia 4 57 15 Azerbaijan 3.4 36 16 Bulgaria 2.8 89 17 Greece 2.4 96 18 Georgia 1.3 100 19 Switzerland 0.36 12Source: IEA, BP (2021), CIS and E. Eur

34、ope Energy Yearbook * Percentages above 100 imply stocking of extra supplies.The growth of the BPS has come at considerable cost for the Baltic countries, as Russian crude which traditionally moved through the Baltic region has been re-routed through the BPS. Energy Profile of Russia, Encyclopedia o

35、f Earth, at: 8 Ibrahimov R., The Journal of the Turkish Weekly Opinion Website, 25.2.2021, at: 9 Gazprom Gazprom Export Company website, Export Dynamics, at: http:/.gazexport.ru/digits/?pkey1=00004 10 Intra-EU resources account for 50 percent of EU needs and originate in Britain, Denmark, the Nether

36、lands, Italy, Romania, and Germany/ 11 Czernie W., “Structural Change in the European Gas Industry: Risk and Opportunities,” World Energy website, 2.6.2021, at: 欧盟俄罗斯油气管道连接分析 What follows is a brief summary of the current gas pipeline routes between Russian and EU. Figure 2. Primary Gas-Pipeline Rou

37、tes from Russia to EUSource: The Economist, 2021Yamal I (Yamal-Europe) pipeline is a 4,196 km pipeline which is runs through Belarus and Poland to Germany. It is Russia's only natural gas export route to Europe that does not cross Ukrainian territory. Even though only about 17 bcm of gas are cur

38、rently exported each year through the Yamal-Europe gas pipeline, the pipelines maximum capacity is about 33 bcm. The objective of this route is to meet the market demand of Germany, and eventually of the Great Britain, since after planned connection with the Interconnector pipeline12 is completed, i

39、t will become the shortest route for Russian gas to the British Isles.13 Brotherhood, a 2,750-km long gas pipeline that connects Russia, Ukraine, Slovakia and Western Europe. Completed in 1967 it has an annual capacity of about 30 bcm. Natural gas exports through this pipeline represent about 25 per

40、cent of the natural gas consumed in Western Europe and about 70 percent of Russian gas exports to Western Europe. Northern Lights (Urengoi-Uzhgorod) is a 4,500 km long pipeline, completed in 1983, with a capacity of 27.9bcm of gas per annum. It trespasses the territory of Ukraine, where it joins the

41、 path of Brotherhood pipeline and heads in the direction of Slovakia, Austria and Germany. It transports another third of the overall gas destined for Europe. Blue Stream is a 1,250 km pipeline that connects Russia to Turkey. It runs from the Izobilnoye gas plant in southern Russia across the Black

42、Sea bed (at record debths of 2,150 meters belowe the sea level) to the Turkish port of Samsun, and onwards to Ankara. Online since November 2021, the pipeline was built with an intention to diversify Russian gas deliveries to Turkey and at the same time avoding third countries, such as12Interconnect

43、or pipeline, completed in 1998, connects continental Europe to the British Isles. 20 bcm export and 25.5 bcm import capacity.13Alexanders Gas Oil Connections Website, Vol. 8, Issue 11, 3.6.2021, North Central Europe, at: 7 欧盟俄罗斯油气管道连接分析 Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. By 2021, Blue Stream is expected

44、operate at full capacity, delivering 16 bcm of gas annually. By 2025 Russia plans to export 311 bcm of gas to Turkey via this route.14 Part II. Diversification Europe Throughout the last four decades, including the politically strenuous years of the Cold War, EU and Russia enjoyed very stable energy

45、 import-export relations. However, since recently Europe is becoming increasingly worried about the stability of oil and gas exports from Russia. As local production of energy is declining15, and the Russian share of total EU bound energy imports is on the rise, Europe is growing concerned about ove

46、r-reliance on one supply country for its energy import needs.16 Moreover, the overall energy dependency of EU-27 would increase to 55% by 2021 and up to 64.9 % by 2030. However, if EU expands once again to include Switzerland, Turkey and Norway, EU-30 energy import would decrease to 44.4 percent in

47、2021 and 56.3 by 2030 due to domestic Norwegian energy production. (Table 3) Table.3 European Import dependency, 1990-20301990 EU-25 44.7 EU-27 44.6 EU-30 38.9 Source: PRIMES 2021 47.2 46.7 36.4 2021 55.0 54.4 44.4 2021 63.5 62.9 52.4 2030 64.9 64.2 56.3The Russian-Ukrainian dispute during the winte

48、r months of 2021 has served as a catalyst for the expression of the buildup fears.17 Additionally, the event produced a new degree of concern that Russia is becoming an unreliable supplier or is using its dominant position to promote its political aims.18 Thus, as a reaction the national governments

49、 of EU member states and the EU Commission have begun to eagerly promote the need for energy diversification aiming to improve the overall energy security level within the EU borders. Energy diversification is the main concept behind the aim for greater energy security of EU. It, in turn, could be s

50、eparated into three main aspects; firstly, diversification of overall energy sources; secondly, diversification of suppliers; and third, diversification of transport routes.19 In terms of diversification of energy sources Europe is on the right path of finding a right fuel mix, with sustainability i

51、ssue at the foreground. In 2021 oil and natural gas accounted respectively for 37.2 and 23.9 percent of EUs gross inland consumption, followed by solid fuels and nuclear power, 17.9 and 14.6 percent respectively. The share of renewables stood at 6.3 percent. By 2021 the EU aims to more than triple i

52、ts share of renewable energy to 20% and to increase the level of biofuels in transport fuel to at least 10% by 2021.20 Also, a debated issue of nuclear energy is reviving in some countries like the UK, and in others such as Finland and France it already enjoys strong support. Finally, Europe is aimi

53、ng at improving its energy efficiency and developing low carbon technologies. These policies, apart from strengthening of the European energy security position, would also contribute to the EUs strategy for jobs and therefore growth.Gazprom Company Official Website, Europe Projects- Gasprom Export p

54、age, at: l 17 During the first few days of 2021, following Russian disagreement with Ukraine regarding export and transit energy prices, and a lack of signed contracts, Russia cut off supplies to Ukraine. Ukraine, in turn, was substituting its loses by siphoning off European bound supplies which led

55、 to lower deliveries to Europe. European supplies were therefore temporarily affected. 18 Cohen A., “Backgrounder”, The Heritage Foundation, No, 1980, October 26, 2021, p.5at: 19 Yergin, Daniel, “Ensuring Energy Security”, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol.85, No.2, March/April, 2021, p.76 20 The EU is alrea

56、dy the global leader in renewable technologies. It has 60% of the world market share in wind energy. These technologies account for an annual turnover of 20 billion and employ 300 000 people in Europe.148 欧盟俄罗斯油气管道连接分析 With regard to suppliers, EU receives its energy from a variety of sources; howev

57、er, Russia was and will remain the predominant one.21 (see Figures 3 and 4) The supplier states that Europe is currently aiming to expand relations with African countries like Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria, and Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in the Caspian Region. In North Africa there is a p

58、roposal for a 4,000 km Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, that would transport up to 30 bcm to the EU annually, scheduled for 2021. Also, EU is planning to invest in Libya (a country with extensive oil reserves of 39.1 billion barrels of oil, which represents 42 percent of all African reserves) and Algeria (with 4,551 Bcm natural gas reserves, which is already providing for about 20 percent of EUs natural gas demand, most of it via liquefied natural gas (LNG) routes). Th