废除碳关税外文翻译

1、废除碳关税Park Seung-JoonThe Eighth Global Conference on Environmental TaxationMunich , 2007,10：18-20迄今, 每一个美国的气候政策的协商, 一个主要症结点一直是经济竞争力问题. 如果美 国或其它任何国家通过一个上限和贸易制度或者碳关税, 独立强加上碳价格, 例如, 国 内工业将面比照国际同行业更高的本钱, 并可能会在竞争中处于劣势. 当然, 美国可以把工 业搬迁到没有强制减排目标的国家而不支付这些费用.这种 “碳泄露 会导致美国的就业问题,而没有减少温室气体排放,这是一个两败俱伤的结果.对于美国的大多数产

2、业, 气候政策的出台将产生微缺乏道的影响. 同样也有例外, 但是, 最主要的是能源密集型产业, 例如钢铁和水泥. 幸运的是, 一些政策机制可以用来保护自己 的竞争力.拟议中的美国气候法案,美国的清洁能源和平安法案,有两点要求：第一,条例 草案旨在将退税通过自由分配给在碳排放量上增加了本钱的能源密集型产业.其次, 美国工业从没有碳关税的国家进口能源密集型商品需要购置这些商品的排放配额, 这等于他们国内 制造的费用. 这一关税就是边境税的调整类型, 保证进口商不获得超过国内其他行业的竞争 优势. 实施边境调节机制的想法,现在在欧盟得到普及, 其中法国和德国认为,如果其他国 家不同意减排,这将保护国

3、内产业.碳关税有两种设计方法, 这取决于包含什么类型的产品. 最简单的是仅仅包含最初级的 能源密集型材料, 例如钢梁或平板玻璃. 一个全面的关税应该涵盖所有形式的能源密集型材 料,包括那么嵌入式材料的制成品, 例如汽车刚或铝罐装苏打. 其中包括仅有一些嵌入式材 料也可应用的混合方式. 例如, 在拟议中的美国气候法案的关税, 包括所有能源密集型的原 料,但只有那些成品包含“实质性能源密集型材料的数量.作为一个坚持鼓励其他国家采取气候政策的国家, 碳关税对于美国是没有效果的, 由于 美国在这些国家的总生产中进口相对较小.例如,在 2007 年,虽然美国进口钢材约 50万总吨,在关税条件符合的国家以

4、原材料和嵌入式材料的形式生产, 这只占那些国家钢铁生产总 量的百分之五. 以前的材料显示出口其他原料的比例也很低. 对只占产量百分之五的国家征 收碳关税,这是促使这些国家坚持实施全面的气候变化政策的缺乏.贸易关税具有的感情上地感染力, 特别是在经济衰退时期, 这是在政治上非常流行的贸 易保护主义举措.但是这也许不可能,由于设计一个减少废气排放量的关税是非常昂贵的. 此外,它会成为其他国家不同意制定气候政策审议成立的理由.在美国的清洁能源平安法案的关税是最差的, 由于它并不涵盖所有嵌入式的材料, 而且 没有最正确地方案去解决气候问题, 但是涵盖足够的嵌入式材料使它几乎不可能得到实施. 特 别是考

5、虑到有其他举措保护国内产业, 例如被提议的谈津贴回扣, 实施碳关税的边际效益不 平衡的风险其中最显著的是潜在的贸易战和提供弹药的可能性使开展中国家拒绝国内 关于气候变化的行动.所以碳关税应该被淘汰.8碳关税或环境税改革：日本的艰难抉择Catherine izard, Christopher Weber , sCott MattheWsNature Reports Climate Change. 2021, 10： 17对于熟悉日本高效的高科技产品的世界公民来说, 这可能有点出乎意料, 那就是日本每 年排放 8%的温室气体超过了京都议定书的年基准.事实上,该国政府实施一项有效的气候 政策的水平被

6、限制,不像其在商业上的创新表现.由于缺乏公民的支持,放抗工商企业的游说,财政部的漠不关心导致了自2004 来的徒劳,日本环境部提出了自己的碳税的建议. 其建议是低税率碳税, 专门用于反对全球变暖的 举措.实际上, 这项建议是环境部几个小组通过广泛研究理论和实际方面内容,包括研究自80 年代后期的外国的例子和几个模拟研究的成果.有趣地是,任何环境税制的改革方案都 会导致一个在这些实验中从未得到过测试的“积极的双重红利 . 环境税改革的权利平衡：1、政府方面：在政治决策系统,部级官僚的作用是至关重要的.在最近公布的大约85%条例草案中,其中大局部实际上是由政府里的各部委设计的. 政策在几个委员会进

7、行讨论, 委员会或主管 级的工作组, 但他们的成员通常是从部长级官员中挑选而不是从议员成员中挑选. 这种挑选 程序实际上决定了讨论的方向. 由于总所周知的行政职能的垂直划分, 这是很难协调各部委 之间的利益的. 对于高层的政治问题是多方面, 如环境税改革问题, 它需要跨部主管部委之 间的合作,女口 MOF财政部,METI 经济部、贸易和工业、能源政策治理 ,MLIT 国土资 源部、根底设施和运输、主管汽油税收支出,MAF农业部、日本林业和渔业或者MoEJ环 境部 .但是协调他们之间的利益时非常困难的.如前面所述,碳关税建议是由环境部提出 的.然而即使环境部和农业、林业、 渔业联盟一起支持环境部

8、的碳关税建议,但是经济贸易 联盟基于自身的利益强烈反对生态税, 而且最近财政部对碳关税的实施似乎也很不积极. 虽 然政府税务委员会内阁办公室,实际上是由财政部治理已经根据前主席弘光石井他书 中的财政专家关于生态税局部 了解到生态税相当有利, 但是今天委员会只能提出碳关税长 远讨论的必要性.在日本实施环境税改革面临非常大的障碍要去跨越.人们相信非经济的做法是有效的, 且没有负担, 如有道德的公民行动, 工业志愿行动或是由环境部治理的资助等. 这并不奇怪, 由于经济理论背后的环境经济举措时是相当难以去传达和理解的. 但随着看似人为造成的全 球气候变暖, 这将不可防止的要去落实一些真正有效的调控举措

9、或经济手段. 我们现在需要 的,首先是证实税收转移方法的有效性和有利于经济,而不是给人们一种救助气候的说教, 或是提供更好的政策举措去了解. 虽然在工业上的抗议非常强烈, 但是大多数的日本人民 包 括商人都想要为保护气候作出奉献,并想知道如何做到这一点.最近公布的结果显示有 40%的人支持碳关税,这是一个极好的兆头.Scrap the carbon tariffPark Seung-JoonThe Eighth Global Conference on Environmental TaxationMunich , 2007,10：18-20In every US climate policy

10、negotiation thus far, a major sticking point has been the issue of economic competitiveness. If the US, or indeed any country, independently imposes a price on carbon through a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax, for example domestic industries automatically face higher costs than their internatio

11、nal peers and could be at a competitive disadvantage. Rather than pay these costs, of course, US industry could relocate to countries without mandatory emissions targets. This carbon leakage ' could cost the US jobs while failing to reduce global emissions, a lose -ose seenario.For the majority

12、of US industry, the introduction of climate policy would have a negligible economic impact. There are exceptions, however, most notably energy-intensive industries such as steel and cement. Fortunately, several policy mechanisms can be used to protect their competitiveness. The proposed US climate b

13、ill, Americaan Energ'yasnCdleSecurity Act, usestwo: first, the bill aims to rebate the increased costs of carbon emissions to energy-intensive industries through free allocation of emissions allowances. Second, US industries that import energy-intensive goods from countries without a price on ca

14、rbon are required to purchase emissions allowances for those goods equal to what they would have paid had the imports been manufactured domestically. This tariff, a type of border tax adjustment, ensures that importers do not gain a competitive advantage over other domestic industries. The idea of i

15、mplementing border adjustment mechanisms is now gaining popularity in the European Union, where France and Germany argue it would protect domestic industry if other nations do not agree to cut their emissions.There are two designs of carbon tariff, depending on what types of products are included. T

16、he simplest covers only primary energy-intensive materials, such as steel beams or plate glass. A comprehensive tariff would cover energy-intensive materials in all forms, including those embedded in finished goods such as the steel in a car or the aluminium in a can of soda. A hybridapproach, which

17、 covers only some categories of embedded materials, can also be applied. For example, the tariff in the proposed US climate bill covers all energy-intensive raw materials but only those finished goods that contain a substantial -in'tenasmiveoumntatoefreianlse.rgyAs a stick to motivate other coun

18、tries to adopt climate policies, a carbon tariff is unlikely to be effective because US imports are small relative to total production in these countries. For example, in 2007, although the US imported about 50 million total tonnes of steel in the formof raw and embedded materials produced in tariff

19、-eligible countries, this represented only five per cent of total steel production in those countries6(Fig. 1). Previous work has shown that the percentage of exports is also low for other raw materials3. A tariff on only five per cent of production is an insufficient stick to induce such countries

20、to implement comprehensive climate change policy.Trade tariffs are emotionally appealing. Particularly in a recession, it is tempting to fall back on politically popular protectionist measures. But it may be impossible and would certainly be expensive to design a tariff that is effective in reducing

21、 emissions. Furthermore, the rationale that it would induce other countries to develop climate policies does not hold up to scrutiny.The tariff in America' s Clean Energy Security Act is the worst of both worlds, as it doesncover all embedded materials and is therefore not optimally designed to

22、address the climate problem but covers enough embedded materials to make it virtually impossible to implement. Especially given that other measures exist to protect domestic industry, such as the proposed carbon-allowance rebates, the marginal benefits of implementing a carbon tariff do not balance

23、the risks most notable of which are the potential trade wars and the possibility of supplying ammunition to developing countries for refusing domestic action on climate change. The carbon tariff should be eliminated.A Carbon Tax or an Environmental Tax Reform:Difficult Dicision for JapanCatherine iz

24、ard, Christopher Webe,r sCott MattheWsNature Reports Climate Change. 200,9(10)：17For a world citizen familiar with efficient Japanese high-tech products, it may be a bit of a surprise that Japan emits yearly 8% more greenhouse gases than the base year of the Kyoto Protocol. In fact, the ability of i

25、ts government to realize an effective climate policy is limited, unlike the innovative performance of its business.The Ministry of Environment Japan has presented its own Carbon Tax proposals three times since 2004 in vain, because of lacking civic support, a resistant business lobby and the Fi-nanc

26、e Ministry 'indsifference. Proposed is a low -rate carbon tax earmarked for anti-global-warming measures. Actually, this proposal is the fruit of the internal discussions of several working groups in the Environment Ministry, which have studied theoretical and practical aspects broadly, includin

27、g the research of foreign examples and several simulation studies, since the late ' 80s. Interestingly, any environmental tax reform (ETR) scenari o which can result in a“ positive doubledividend has never been tested in these experiments.Power Balance of the Environmental Tax Reform1) Ministrie

28、sIn the political decision making system, the role of ministerial bureaucrats are crucial.About 85% of the recently enacted bills are cabinet laws most of which are practically designed by government officials in different ministries. Policies are discussed in several committees, councils or working

29、 groups inside of the competent ministry, and members of them are usually selected not by parliament members but by ministerial officials. This selection process factuallydeterminesthe direction of the discussion. Because of the well-known vertically divided administrative func tions ( “ tatewari it

30、is), fairly hard to harmonize the interests of ministries. For highly multifaceted political issue such as the environmental tax reform, it requires inter-ministerial cooperation between competent ministries such as MoF (Ministry of Finance), METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry; competent

31、for energy policy), MLIT (Ministry of Land,Infrastructure and Transportation; competent for spending of gasoline tax revenue), MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan) or MoEJ (Ministry of Environment). But it is very hard to harmonize their interests. As mentioned, the car-bo

32、n tax proposal was made by MoEJ. While MoEJ and MAFF made coalition for the carbon tax proposal of MoEJ, the METI is strongly against eco-tax re flecting the interest of its patron (“ industry ), and the MoF seems notvery active for the implementation of the carbon tax recently. Although the Government Tax Commission (in the Cabinet Office, virtually managed by the MoF) has been fairly pro-eco-tax under the former chairperson Hiromitsu Ishi (a fiscal scientist known by his book on eco-tax), today the commission can only mention the necessity of the further discussion on carbon tax.The im