有关审计质量的研究外文翻译文献

1、有关审计质量的研究Wooten , Thomas C, Colson , Robert H术语“审计质量”对不同的人意味着不同的事情。例如，对财务报表用户的 一项调查(Epstein和Geiger, 1994)表明，有70%的投资者认为审计应绝对保 证财务报表中不存在重大错报或欺诈。审计师可能会以其他方式考虑审计质量。 除了严格遵守GAAS之外，审计师还评估业务风险，目的是避免诉讼，最大程 度地减少客户不满以及将损害程度限制在可能导致 “不良”后果的声誉上。审计。在这个连续体中的某个地方是法院的观点。当潜在的审计失败案件提交法官 或陪审团审理时，没人能确定结果。法院确定的审计质量有时会导致比G

2、AAS更为具体的标准，有时则要少得多。衡量审计质量也存在问题。审计质量的结果无法直接或立即观察到。审核质 量控制程序试图在审核过程中保持较高的控制标准，但是通常在业务失败的情况 下会发现审核失败。当一家大型公司遇到审计失败时，商业新闻将对其进行广播。 不可能知道根本未被发现和公开的劣质审核的数量。一家公司可能执行的审计质 量很差，但是如果不对财务报表进行实质性的错误处理，则在没有计划和现场工作知识的情况下，就无法表明这一点。同样，如果执行了质量低下的审核并且忽 略了重大错误陈述，则可能不会造成负面影响。由于审计质量是不可观察的，因此研究人员会查看审计质量的替代指标或指 标，例如专家的意见，以确

3、定质量审计的输入和输出。 其他研究人员使用更多客 观的输出作为确定审计质量的来源。如果一家公司的诉讼率很低，在同行评审中 获得很好的评价，并且很少需要重新发布审计意见，那么就可以推断出它执行了 高质量的审计。审核质量模型DeAngelo在1981年开发了一个二维的审计质量定义， 为解决该问题设定了 标准。首先，必须检测到重大错误陈述，其次，必须报告重大错误陈述。审计质 量也受许多其他因素影响。自1981年以来，会计研究人员就试图定义，衡量和 研究审计质量的多个维度。展览中展示的模型总结了这一理论构建和实证研究的 结果。与检测有关的因素。重大错报的发现受审核团队执行审核的良好程度的影 响，而审核

4、团队的审核质量又受审核公司的质量控制体系和管理资源的影响。许多研究已使用公司规模作为这些审计公司和审计团队因素的替代，具发现存在争议。审计公司规模。最常研究的因素是审计公司规模。研究人员通常将大型公司 定义为四大公司(或其前身)。结果表明，与小公司相比，大公司收取的审计费 用更高。即使在控制了审计风险，客户规模和审计复杂性之后，基于审计人员的 身份也会有额外的溢价。尝试确定此溢价是否应归因于较高的审计质量几乎没有成功。DeAngelo (1981)从理论上认为，较大的公司执行更好的审计是因为它们 的声誉受到威胁。另外，由于较大的公司可以使用更多资源，因此它们可以吸引 更多高技能的员工。其他人则

5、认为，大型审计师之所以会收取一定的佣金，是因 为他们的更多财富减少了客户在诉讼中的风险敞口(深囊理论)(Lennox, 1999)。其他人则认为没有真正的审计质量差异， 但之所以存在这种感觉，是因为大型公 司是众所周知的，并且已经获得了高质量的声誉。有趣的是， AICPA坚持认为 审计质量与公司规模无关。总体而言，证据不一，但似乎确实存在尺寸和质量之 问的某种关系。目前尚不清楚该差异是实际的还是可感知的。实际质量差异。Palmrose (1988)发现，与非大八国公司相比，大八国对他 们提起诉讼的可能性较小。Deis和Giroux (1992)检查了审计工作文件的样本， 发现大型公司的工作文件

6、不足。Krishnan和Schauer (2000)研究了非营利实体在公司规模与遵守报告要求 之间的关系。他们发现合规性随着公司规模的增加而增加。Hardiman等。(1987年)发现，在审查提交给GAO的审计报告时，较小公司的报告格式不合规率较 高，这表明较大公司有适当的流程来确保财务报表符合GAAP。但是，这些研究只是针对财务报告是否符合现行 GAAP,而不是审计证据或其文档的能力和充分 性。Mutchler等。(1997)发现六大审计师比非六大审计师更有可能发表持续经 营意见。这表明较大的公司愿意在发表适当的意见时采取更激进的立场，具有更好的技术能力来发现持续存在的问题，或有更多的客户解

7、决此类问题。感知到的质量差异。其他研究发现更多地涉及用户对审计质量的理解， 而不 是审计质量的有形指标。 Palmrose (1986)和Francis and Simon (1987)发现八 家公司的审计服务要付出高昂的代价。Menon和Williams (1991)发现，使用“八强”的公司可以获得更好的股票 定价。Jang and Lin (1993)发现，与八强公司相关的信息对于参与 IPO的公司 而言更为可靠。莫里斯和斯特劳瑟(Morris and Strawser, 1999)发现，接受六 大公司修改后的审计报告的银行比接受非六大公司修改后的审计报告的银行更 容易被监管机构关闭。没有

8、质量差异。一些研究不支持质量差异的存在。 其他研究发现，八大服务 和非八大服务之间没有明显的价格差异(Sumunic, 1980年)。Nichols和Smith (1983)发现，从一家小型公司转为八大公司并没有给该转换公司带来任何股票 收益收益。Wyer, White和Janson (1988)发现较小的CPA公司发表不当意见 的可能性更大。规模与质量的关系将由会计研究人员继续研究。审核公司因素。研究人员已转向专家小组来确定公司级别的特征。能够投入 足够资源来聘用和培训最优秀的人才，然后为他们提供完善的审计方法的公司很 可能在检测财务报表中的错误方面表现出色。人力资源。专家将更高的质量与能够

9、派遣技术上和专业上最新的员工的公司 联系在一起。这个方面与招聘和培训有关。如果公司能够吸引最优秀和最聪明的 人才，他们就有可能成为更熟练的审计师。 同样，提供精心计划的培训的公司可 以使员工学习良好执行审计任务所需的技能和知识。控制过程。专家小组还将高质量的产品与在审计过程中拥有强大控制力的公 司联系在一起。GAAS要求公司维持质量控制体系，并要求审计师充分计划其审 计工作。但是，在确定这些系统的形式和规范性方面还有很多余地。具有更严格的质量控制体系和更系统的审计方法流程的公司，不太可能被审计程序发现重大 的错误陈述。多项研究支持这样的观点，即强大的审计方法与更高的质量相关。Carcello等

10、。（1995年）发现，结构化的审计方法与倾向于发布持续经营意见的公司相 关。GAAS要求审计师制定适当的流程来接受和维持客户。研究表明，六大巨头不太可能接受有风险的客户（Raghunanda吊口 Rama, 1999年）。研究表明，参与同行评审过程的公司更可能正确报告财务披露（Krishnan和Schauer 2000年）。密切监视其审计过程结果的公司与更高质量相关。Malone and Roberts （1996）发现，具有更强质量控制体系的审计师不太可 能参与降低的审计质量行为，例如不适当地签署审计步骤。因此，强大的质量控 制体系可以带来更高质量的审核。行业经验。在同一行业中拥有多个客户的

11、公司对特定行业所带来的独特审计 风险有更深入的了解。在特定行业中，客户很少的公司可能没有足够的数量来跟 上行业新闻和惯例。研究表明，特定行业的专业化趋势正在发展，研究人员发现 具有专业化知识的公司可以节省资金并提高质量 （Hogan和Jeter, 1999） °Craswell 等。（1995年）报道说，行业专业公司要求收取一定的佣金，这可能表明质量 存在价格差异。公司在特定行业中拥有的客户越多，就可以为该行业提供服务而 建立声誉。因此，研究人员假设，在特定行业中具有较高客户集中度的公司将具 有更高的质量，因为它们损失的更多（Deis和Giroux, 1992）。审核团队特征专家小组

12、确定的第二组特征专门与审核团队成员相关。在对会计和审计专家 进行调查时，他们指出，在确定审计质量时，审计团队因素比公司范围因素更为 重要。聘用良好，执行强有力的控制程序并具有行业经验的公司很可能会派遣一 支高素质的审计团队。合作伙伴和经理的注意。专家报告说，合作伙伴和经理对参与的关注与审计 质量有关。GAAS要求对审核进行适当的监督和分配。在现场工作期间，经验丰富的审核员经验丰富的判断力可以为技术和程序问题提供权威性的答案。计划和进行审核工作。GAAS指出，必须适当计划和执行审核，以合理保证 发现重大错报。具有强大的审计事务所因素的事务所可能会配备适当的人员和流程来确保适当的计划和绩效。专业，

13、执着和怀疑。专家小组还确定分配给参与活动的个人的完整性，作为 检测重大错报的一个因素。具有较高专业水平的员工更有可能正确执行审计任 务，而不是在未完成的审计步骤上签字。同样，持怀疑态度的员工也不太可能接 受不足的证据。与客户的经验。专家报告说，与特定客户的经验可以带来更高质量的审核。进行重复审核的员工更有可能更好地了解客户的业务流程如何运作以及客户会 计系统中的特殊优缺点。他们能够更轻松地确定与上一年相比存在风险和错误最 多的区域，然后将更多的时间投入这些区域。行业经验。在同一行业中的多个客户上工作可使员工成为该行业独有的流程 和程序方面的专家。通过了解特定行业面临的常见弱点，风险和问题，审计

14、师在 评估客户提出的证据时可以更加自信和执着。与报告有关的因素正确报告重大错报的能力取决于独立性。如果审计师遭受个人，情感或财务 压力的困扰，那么审计师的独立性就会受到损害，并且更有可能导致审计质量下 降。从理论上讲，审计定价，保有权和提供其他服务的因素不仅会影响独立性， 还会影响审计团队发现财务报表错报的能力。价钱。为了避免损失未来的审计费用（从而避免特定客户的最终获利能力）， 审计师可能面临避免报告某些会计缺陷的压力。 客户更换审计师要比审计师发展 新业务容易。因此，审计师有一定的动力去做任何保留客户的工作。研究人员还测试了价格压力（低调）是否会影响审计质量。显然，如果一家 公司收取的费用

15、低得多，那么只能通过减少审计工作量来恢复盈利能力，从而降低审计师发现错误陈述的能力。如果审计师主要将客户视为未来的收入来源， 则 会对审计师的财务独立性产生疑问。 因此，问题变成了定价和保有权的结合， 在 这种情况下，审计师必须抓住客户，以收回成本并最终实现盈利。任期。任期与审计团队因素和独立性有关。任期短和任期长时，审计失败似 乎更为常见。审计员接受新客户后，需要一些时间来了解客户，这使审计师容易 遗漏重大错报。随着任期的增加，审计师会更全面地了解客户的风险及其系统的 运行方式，并且审计师可以调整审计程序和流程以发现错误陈述。相反，与客户的长期任职关系到审计质量低下。 长期的协会有可能滋生自

16、满 情绪，不太严格的审核程序以及对管理层代表的过多依赖（Shockley, 1982； Deis和Giroux, 1992）。审计师可能会与客户过分自在，无法调整审计程序以反映不 断变化的业务和相关风险。审核员在收集证据时变得不再那么怀疑，也不那么勤 奋。额外服务向审计客户提供其他服务可能会影响定价。当一家公司同时提供审计和咨询 服务时，很可能会为客户节省某种费用。如果公司通过收取与审计无关的巨额费用而与客户建立经济联系，则可能会失去独立性。止匕外，如果其他服务与安装或 维护会计功能有关，则可以将审核员置于审核自己的工作的位置。直到SEC在2001年2月开始要求披露费用之前，研究人员一直无法收

17、集有 关与非审计费用有关的审计费用金额的大量数据。一项对4,200家公司的初步研 究初步表明，大量咨询费用会对审计师的独立性产生负面影响，并降低审计质量 (Elstein, 2001)。看来提供非审计服务的公司更有可能在记录和调整可用于操 纵未来收益的可任意分配储备金方面为客户提供更大的灵活性。最后，一些审计师认为，审计质量与提供附加服务之间实际上存在正相关关 系。他们认为提供其他服务可以使他们更好地了解客户及其业务流程。托马斯 C 沃顿(Thomas C.Wooter)和罗伯特 H 科尔森(Robert H.Thomas C Wooten博士，注册会计师，注册会计师，是田纳西州纳什维尔贝 尔

18、蒙特大学杰克C.梅西商学院会计学副教授。RESEARCH ABOUT AUDIT QUALITYWooten , Thomas C, Colson , Robert HThe term "quality audit" means different things to different people. For example, one survey of financial statement users (Epstein and Geiger, 1994) indicated that 70% of investors believe that audits shoul

19、d provide absolute assurancethat there are no material misstatementsor fraud in the financial statements.An auditor is likely to think about audit quality in other ways. In addition to strictly following GAAS, an auditor also assesses business risk with the intention of avoiding litigation, minimizi

20、ng client dissatisfaction, and limiting the damage to a reputation that could follow a "bad" audit.Somewhere within this continuum is the perspective of the courts. When potential audit failure cases are brought before a judge or jury, no one is certain of the outcome. Audit quality as det

21、ermined by the courts sometimes results in standards that are more specific than GAAS, other times less.Measuring audit quality is also problematic. The outcome of audit quality is not directly or immediately observable. Audit quality-control procedures attempt to maintain high standards of control

22、over the process of an audit, but an audit failure usually becomes known in the context of a business failure. When a major company experiencesan audit failure, the business press will broadcast it. It is impossible to know the number of poor-quality audits that simply go undetected and unpublicized

23、. A firm may perform a poor -quality audit but, without knowledge of the planning and fieldwork, there could be no indication of it if the financial statements are not materially misstated. Similarly, if a poor -quality audit were performed and a material misstatement overlooked, there may have been

24、 no negative repercussions.Since audit quality is unobservable, researchers look at surrogates or indicators of audit quality, such as the opinions of experts, to determine the inputs and outputs of a quality audit. Other researchers use more objective outputs as a source of determining audit qualit

25、y. If a firm has a low rate of litigation, gets very good ratings on peer reviews, and seldom has to reissue audit opinions, then one can infer that it performs high-quality audits.Audit Quality ModelDeAngelo developed a two-dimensional definition of audit quality in 1981 that set the standard for a

26、ddressing the issue. First, a material misstatement must be detected, and second, the material misstatement must be reported. Audit quality is influenced by many other factors as well. Since 1981, accounting researchershave attempted to define, measure, and study multiple dimensions of audit quality

27、. The model presented in the Exhibit summarizes the results of this theory building and empirical research.Factors related to detection. Detecting material misstatements is influenced by how well the audit team performs the audit, which in turn is influenced by the quality control system and managem

28、ent resources of the audit firm. Many studies have used firm size as a surrogate for these audit firm and audit team factors, and their findings have been controversial.Audit firm size. The most commonly studied factor has been audit firm size. Most commonly, researchers have defined large firms as

29、the Big Four (or their precursors). Results have shown that larger firms receive larger audit fees than smaller firms. Even after controlling for audit risk, client size, and audit complexity, there is an additional premium based on auditor identity. Attempts to determine whether this premium is att

30、ributable to higher audit quality have been mostly unsuccessful.DeAngelo (1981) theorized that larger firms perform better audits because they have a greater reputation at stake. In addition, because larger firms have more resources at their disposal, they can attract more highly skilled employees.

31、Others have theorized that large auditors attract a fee premium because their greater wealth reduces clients' exposures in litigation (the deep pockets theory) (Lennox, 1999). Others have theorized that there is no real audit quality difference, but the perception exists because large firms are

32、well known and have gained a reputation for high quality. Interestingly, the AICPA has maintained that audit quality is independent of firm size. On the whole, the evidence is mixed, but it does appear that there is some relationship between size and quality. What is unclear is whether this differen

33、ce is actual or perceived.Actual quality difference. Palmrose (1988) found that the Big Eight were less likely to have litigation brought against them than the non -Big Eight national firms. Deis and Giroux (1992) examined a sample of audit work papers and found that larger firms had less deficient

34、work papers than smaller firms.Krishnan and Schauer (2000) studied the relationship between firm size and compliance with reporting requirements by not-for-profit entities. They found that compliance increaseswith firm size. Hardiman et al. (1987) found a higher rate of reporting format noncomplianc

35、e by smaller firms when reviewing audit reports submitted to the GAO, indicating that the larger firms have a process in place to ensure that the financial statements are in compliance with GAAP. These studies, however, address the compliance of financial reports to current GAAP rather than the comp

36、etence and sufficiency of audit evidence or its documentation.Mutchler et al. (1997) found that Big Six auditors are more likely than non -Big Six auditors to issue going concern opinions. This indicates that the larger firms are willing to take a more aggressive stance in issuing the appropriate op

37、inion, have better technical ability to detect the going concern issue, or have more clients with such issues.Perceived quality difference. Other research findings deal more with a user's perception of audit quality rather than tangible indicators of audit quality. Palmrose (1986) and Francis an

38、d Simon (1987) found that a premium price was paid for Big Eight firms' audit services.Menon and Williams (1991) found that companies using the Big Eight get better pricing of stock issues. Jang and Lin (1993) found that information associated with a Big Eight firm is perceived to be more reliab

39、le for firms involved with an IPO. Morris and Strawser (1999) found that banks receiving modified audit reports by Big Six firms were more likely to be closed by regulators than banks receiving modified audit reports by non-Big Six firms.No quality difference. Some studies have not supported the exi

40、stence of a quality difference. Other studies have found that there is no significant price difference between Big Eight and non-Big Eight services (Sumunic, 1980). Nichols and Smith (1983) found that switching from a small firm to the Big Eight did not provide any stock return benefit to the switch

41、ing company. Wyer, White, and Janson (1988) found no greater likelihood that smaller CPA firms would issue inappropriate opinions. The question of size versus quality will continue to be studied by accounting researchers.Audit firm factors. Researchershave turned to panels of experts to identify cha

42、racteristics at the firm level. Firms that are able to devote a sufficient amount of resources to hiring and training the best people and then giving them a wedeveloped audit methodology are likely to excel in detecting errors in the financial statements.Human resources. The experts associated highe

43、r quality with firms able to field employees that are up to date technically and professionally. This dimension is associatedwith hiring and training. If firms can attract the best and brightest, they have the potential to become more proficient auditors. Likewise, firms that provide well-planned tr

44、aining enable their staffs to learn the skills and knowledge needed to perform their audit tasks well.Control processes. Panels of experts also associate high quality with a firm that has strong controls in place over its audit process. GAAS requires a firm to maintain a quality-control system and r

45、equires auditors to adequately plan their audits. There is much leeway, however, in determining how formal and prescriptive these systems need to be. Firms with a more rigorous quality-control system and a more systematic audit methodology process are less likely to have material misstatements go un

46、detected by their audit procedures.Several studies have supported the idea that a strong audit methodology is associatedwith higher quality. Carcello et al. (1995) found that a more structured audit approach is associated with firms that have a higher propensity to issue going concern opinions.GAAS

47、requires the auditor to have processesin place for the acceptanceand continuation of clients. Research indicates that the Big Six were less likely to accept risky clients (Raghunandan and Rama, 1999).Researchindicates that a firm participating in a peer-review process is more likely to correctly rep

48、ort financial disclosures (Krishnan and Schauer,2000). Firms that closely monitored the outcome of their audit process were associated with higher quality.Malone and Roberts (1996) found that auditors with stronger quality control systems were less likely to participate in reduced audit quality beha

49、viors, such as inappropriately signing off on audit steps. Thus, a strong quality control system produces a highe-rquality audit.Industry experience. Firms that have multiple clients in the same industry bring a more in-depth understanding to the unique audit risks presented by a particular industry

50、. Firms that have few clients in a particular industry may not have the critical mass to keep up with industry news and practices. Research indicates that specialization in a particular industry is a growing trend, and researchers have found that firms with specializations have financial savings and

51、 quality gains (Hogan and Jeter, 1999). Craswell et al. (1995) reported that industry specialist firms command a fee premium, which may indicate a price differential for quality. The more clients a firm has in a particular industry, the more it can build a reputation for servicing that industry. Thu

52、s, researchers have hypothesized that firms with a higher concentration of clients in a particular industry will have higher quality because they have more to lose (Deis and Giroux, 1992).Audit Team CharacteristicsThe second group of characteristics identified by the expert panels relates specifical

53、ly to the audit team members. When the accounting and auditing experts were surveyed, they indicated that audit team factors were more important than firm -wide factors in determining audit quality. The firm that hires well, implements a strong control process, and has industry experience will likel

54、y field a high-quality audit team.Partner and manager attention. The experts reported that partner and manager attention to the engagement is associated with audit quality. GAAS requires that audits be properly supervised and assigned. The availability during fieldwork of the seasonedjudgment of an

55、experienced auditor provides authoritative responses to technical and procedural questions.Planning and conduct of the audit work. GAAS states that the audit must be properly planned and performed to have reasonableassuranceof detecting material misstatements. Firms that have strong audit firm facto

56、rs will likely have the people and processes in place to ensure proper planning and performance.Professionalism, persistence, and skepticism. Expert panels also identify the integrity of the individuals assigned to the engagement as a factor in detecting material misstatements. Staff that exhibit a

57、high level of professionalism are more likely to perform their audit tasks correctly and not sign off on uncompleted audit steps. Similarly, staff that maintain persistent skepticism are less likely to accept insufficient evidence.Experience with the client. The experts reported that experience with

58、 a specific client leads to a higher-quality audit. Staff on repeat audits are more likely to gain a better understanding of how the client's business processeswork and the particular strengths and weaknessesin the client's accounting systems.They are able to more readily identify the areas

59、that had the most risk and errors from the previous year and then devote additional time to these areas.Experience in the industry. Working on multiple clients within the same industry allows the staff to become expert in the processes and procedures unique to that industry. By understanding the common weaknesses, risks, and issues faced by a particular industry, an auditor can be more confident and persistent when assessing the evidence presented by the clien