人民币在中国其价值、其可调节汇率和其未来发展

1、外文原文The Chinese RMB: Its Value, Its Peg, and Its Future-TRADE IMBALANCES HAVE MORE TO DO WITH THE U.S. THAN WITH CHINAThe valuation of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) has drawn lots of attention lately and a great deal of pressure on the part of developed nations for revaluation. In addressing the issue

2、of valuation, this paper develops a new purchasing power parity (PPP) index of Chinas exchange rate and finds that the while undervalued, the undervaluation is neither unusual nor bad policy. Moreover, Chinas overall external trade balance does not seem to be that far out of equilibrium. Chinas desi

3、re to join the G-7 club is likely to result in abandoning its peg, however, despite the increased risk to its economic development. The valuation of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) has drawn lots of attention lately. The IMF, theU.S. government, and the G-7 finance ministers are urging China to revalue i

4、ts currency,which is currently pegged at 8.28 to the dollar.The arguments for China to appreciate its currency roughly follow these lines: Chinas currency is grossly undervalued; the undervalued RMB is attracting a flood of hot money into China, complicating the authorities efforts to engineer a sof

5、t-landing for an overheated economy; and the RMBs undervaluation and its peg to the dollar are preventing other Asian countries from allowing currencies to rise against the dollar, since appreciation would damage competiveness relative to China.This last point is of particular concern because, it is

6、 argued , U.S. external imbalances cannot be addressed in the face of Chinas and other Asian nations historically unprecedented accumulations of U.S. dollar reserves in recent years .There have been many studies on the RMBs valuation with inconclusive, contradictory results (see, e.g.,Wang, 2004). T

7、o address that difficult valuation question, this paper develops a new absolute PPP index that measures Chinas PPP against the United States and other countries. The new index shows the RMB to be substantially undervalued in the context of “conventional wisdom.” However, the undervaluation is not un

8、usual, given Chinas level of economic development; and conventional wisdom does not apply to China, because by any measure it is an undeveloped nation for which a currency peg is useful to maintain domestic economic and political stability (Prasad et al., 2003). In terms of multilateral external bal

9、ances, we find it hard to argue that Chinas currency is contributing much to its trade and balance of payment surpluses, especially if one takes the 1997 perspective when the RMB was under tremendous depreciation pressure. Indeed, there is clear evidence that if Chinas trade balance was evenly distr

10、ibuted among its trading partners, there would be hardly any pressure for China to appreciate its currency. Thus, the pressure is political and structural in nature, originating from the large and growing multilateral trade imbalance of the United States. Unfortunately, it is much easier to blame Ch

11、ina than to attack the underlying structural causes of the U.S. trade deficit. We conclude that the political pressure on China to abandon the RMBs peg to the dollar is likely to persist, andas the most important growth market in the world todayChina is more likely to move sooner rather than later t

12、o demonstrate that, in spite of the risks to its fragile financial system, it will share its global responsibilities as it eventually joins the G-7. The paper wraps up by placing the exchange issue in the broader context and discussing the longer-term prospects of the RMB.Is the RMB Undervalued?The

13、RMB is undervalued in the conventional sense that there is too much demand for it relative to the supply .Fundamentally, demand for foreign currency comes from three sources: to buy goods or services, to invest in physical or financial assets, and to speculate on moves of the exchange rate itself.Wi

14、th a closed capital account, Chinas currency is largely, but not entirely, immune from currency speculators and short-term portfolio investors. Recent studies at the China National Economic Research Institute (2003) indicate that much of the so-called “hot money” inflows are not a result of foreign

15、hedge fund activities. Rather, they are a change in borrowing and deposit behaviors of domestic firms and individuals, taking advantage of the loopholes in the current foreign exchange regulations. Thus, we can focus our attention on the trade and long term investment flows in China and look at the

16、standard measures, such as purchasing power parity (PPP), trade balance, current account balance, balance of payments, and foreign reserves.PPP is an ancient economic concept, dating back at least to David Hume (1752), which has been experiencing something of a revival lately .The Economist (current

17、) defines PPP as “the exchange rate that equates the price of a basket of identical traded goods and services in two countries.” The theory is that PPP exchange rates represent the equilibrium levels among the nations and that any departure from these levels causes potentially significant and distor

18、ting trade imbalances. There are different measures of PPP: a strong version or “absolute” version that emphasizes the absolute equality of prices (sometimes called “the Law of One Price”) and a “relative” version that emphasizes the ongoing movement over time towards that equality.Should China Bow

19、to the Pressure?Aside from political considerations, which we will discuss later, the question of whether China should move now is a complex one, relating to several considerations. First, market expectations of the RMBs move have already caused a significant reversal of capital flight and increased

20、 upward speculative pressure. Second, cyclical global macroeconomic developments are likely to reduce upward pressure on the RMB. Third, China is in the midst of critical structural reforms, especially in the financial sector, that require focused attention. Fourth, it is increasingly clear that the

21、 current economic overheating is sectoral in nature, which is in sharp contrast with the 1993-4 episode. These considerations suggest that it is not in Chinas interest to revalue the currency at this time . Lets take a closer look at each of these issues. Re-pegging the RMB Re-pegging the RMB at a v

22、alue, say, 15-20 percent higher against the U.S. dollar would instantly vindicate the currency speculators, although they are mostly domestic players. Over the last couple of years, the net errors and omissions category in Chinas balance of payment has shown a large swing from persistent deficits to

23、 a surplus of $7.5 billion in 2003. The net errors and emissions category is believed to capture illegal capital movements. During much of mid- to late-90s, Chinas capital flight, as a percentage of GDP, was the second worst in the world (only Russia was worse). In fact, it was worse than Mexico in

24、1994 and South Korea in 1997 during the height of their currency crises. Recently, however, some of this capital is finding its way back, as expectations of RMB appreciation have raised. There is also strong indication that businesses and individuals are involved in currency speculation, which has c

25、ontributed to the overheating of real estate investment. Revaluing now will encourage future speculation, which could exacerbate the balance of payments pressure. More Chinese Interest Rate FlexibilityAs the Fed continues to boost U.S. interest rates, Chinese authorities have more flexibility to rai

26、se domestic interest rates without worrying about widening the interest rate gap and encouraging further hot money inflows. With global economic growth only moderating a bit lately, demand for energy and commodities remains strong, which is likely to keep oil and commodity prices high and to increas

27、e the import bill for China and other Asian countriesyet another source of reduced pressure on the RMB. Indeed, as long as oil demand remains firm and geopolitical risks persist, the negative impact on Asias oil importing countries and concomitant, market-driven downward pressure on its currencies w

28、ill not dissipate. Chinas Shaky FundamentalsPerhaps most important, the sharp cyclical upswing since the end of the SARS crisis is masking Chinas shaky fundamentals to the outside world. Despite modern factories, spanking new airports, highways, and shopping malls, Chinas social and financial instit

29、utions are perhaps comparable to those of the U.S. in the late 19th century period of the “Robber Barons.” A 2003 poll conducted by Peking University of about 100 China experts shows that one third of them believe there will be a major crisis in China before 2010. What is the most likely source of c

30、risis? The most frequently mentioned are social (21 percent), financial (19 percent), economic (12 percent), and employment (10 percent). Rapid growth over the last two decades has increased income and social inequality, environmental degradation, and regional disparity. The incomplete transition fr

31、om a centrally-planned economy to a market economy under authoritarian rule has enriched the elite and economic opportunists at the cost of generating a large underclass and eroding public wealth. As some Chinese economists point out, many Chinese local governments are effectively broke and eventual

32、ly will need a central government bail-out.Reminiscent of the age of the U.S. “Robber Barons,” the widespread, systematic corruption and abuse of power is estimated to cost as much as 14 percent of Chinas GDP per year. The financial systemwhich includes the banking, securities, and insurance sectors

33、 needs an urgent overhaul to improve efficiency and be ready for foreign competition under Chinas WTO commitment. Job creation remains a daunting challenge given continued efforts at transforming the state-owned-enterprises and improving productivity growth. Then there are long-term issues, such as

34、the aging population; under-funded pension and social security systems; and education, health care, and infrastructure issues. As one prominent economist in Beijing observed recently, “other than the central bank, few other high level officials want to talk about the exchange rate issuethere are far

35、 more urgent things to address.” To attack the problems on multiple-fronts, the top leaders clearly need to ensure stability and focus on the most urgent tasks of strengthening the Partys effectiveness and efficiency on one hand, and reforming the domestic financial sector on the other. Weak Link be

36、tween Revaluation and Internal AdjustmentFinally, based on international evidence (Rogoff, 2004) and Chinas own experience, it is not at all clear that a revalued RMB will facilitate internal reform efforts. Revaluation of the RMB may not help that much in terms of cyclical macroeconomic adjustment.

37、 Despite significant increases in the headline inflation, core inflation remains low. This is a sharp departure from Chinas historical overheating periods and suggests that there is no systematic price push from aggregate demand, as was the case in 1993-4 (Chu, 2003a). What is unsustainable is fixed

38、 investment growth in certain areas even while consumption and investment in other areas still need to be encouraged. Chinas gross investment as a share of GDP is running at above 40 percent, which is far beyond the 20-30 percent for most developing markets and higher than Japans and South Koreas le

39、vels at a comparable stage of development. Granted, the central government is using very blunt instruments such as credit rationing and administrative orders to address the sectoral imbalances; but this does not suggest that changing the exchange rate right now would be a better alternative. On the

40、contrary, an abrupt change in the foreign exchange regime would increase uncertainty and jeopardize the ability to fine-tune macro policies. Indeed, as Rogoff suggests, abandoning the peg to the dollar could be seen as abandoning Chinas commitment to stable and sustainable macroeconomic growth. The

41、Issue Is Mostly PoliticalThe growing U.S. external deficits are clearly unsustainable and must be addressed. It has been argued that the longer the United States waits, the higher the potential shock or damage there will be (Mann, 2004; BCA, 2004; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2004). But is revaluing the RMB

42、 part of the solution to this problem? A close look at the situation suggests that at best it may reduce the problem only marginally in the near term, while the longer-term impacts are unclear since foreign exchange policy changes can bring a host of unintended consequences. However, political reali

43、ty gets in the way: politicians need to show voters and powerful lobbying groups that they are doing something. Exchange rates are a low-hanging fruit for them, even though they are a small fruit andfrom the Chinese perspectivean unripe one. The really effective measures, such as addressing domestic

44、 demand imbalances and promoting U.S. goods and services exports, are unfortunately political non-starters in the United States. The perception that undervaluation of the RMB is the cause of U.S. trade deficits has also meant that Chinas efforts in adjusting export competitiveness through non-foreig

45、n exchange measures have received little attention in the political debate.Looking to the FutureThe central point of this paper is that while the RMB is clearly undervalued (especially by PPP measures), there really has been no fundamental change in the valuation that warrants intensive market press

46、ure for it to have depreciated in 1997-8 and to appreciate now. Looking at the broad picture, the relationship between the RMBs peg to the dollar and Chinas external account surpluses and rising foreign reserves is not as clear as often argued. The contribution of the RMBs undervaluation to external

47、 imbalances in both the United States and China is insignificant in comparison with other structural factors, such as domestic demand imbalances for G3 and improving the investment environment (for Foreign Direct InvestmentFDI) and export competitiveness in China relative to other countries. There a

48、re far better ways to address the imbalances with little distraction for Chinas challenging domestic reform agenda. In particular, labor costs in China are rising.Chinas political capital is best invested in other areas of structural reform. Unfortunately, given its much larger influence on the glob

49、al economy, China probably cannot say “no” this time to external political pressure and may move sooner than it would like. If history proves that China de-pegged before it is capable of handling the shock, the lesson would be that the G-7 failed to recognize that a stable, orderly progressing China

50、 is in the best interest of all. For the longer term, few doubt that China must adopt a more flexible exchange rate regime in this post-Breton Woods environment. A flexible RMB will allow China to conduct independent monetary policy (with an open capital account) and minimize the impact of fluctuati

51、ons of major currencies, especially the U.S. dollars gyrations against the euro and the yen. Chinas outward investment needs are growing rapidly and would benefit from a flexible RMB. But first, China needs to clean up the banking system, adjust capital accounts, and develop healthy and robust domes

52、tic financial markets. We can expect that a flexible exchange rate will improve Chinas overall financial system. China has so far learned valuable lessons of the perils of opening the market too soon and allowing a currency to appreciate too fast from the experience of Japan and Southeast Asia. Goin

53、g forward, it needs to study the positive lessons of liberalizing the exchange rates. The successful cases studies of Poland (from the dollar peg in 1990 to free float in 2000) and Chile (from fixed rate in 1981 to complete float in 1999) clearly show that liberalization can be accomplished without

54、a major crisis; but it requires many gradual, cautious steps to reach the final destination. 外文翻译人民币在中国：其价值、其可调节汇率和其未来发展贸易不平衡对美国的影响大于对中国的影响中国人民币的估值最近已引起很多关注，同时在人民币升值方面承受着大量来自发达国家的压力。在解决估值问题中，本文新引用的购买力平价（PPP）包含了中国的汇率指数，并认为人民币被低估，既不是不正常的低估，也不是糟糕的政策。此外，中国的整体外贸的平衡，似乎远远低于平衡。中国加入七国集团俱乐部的希望很可能导致放弃联系汇率，尽管增加

55、的风险能促进经济的发展。最近，我国人民币的估值已经引起了广泛的关注。就连国际货币基金组织、美国政府和金融七国的负责人都以人民币来估计他们的通货价值，人民币对美元的汇率为8.28人民币。对于我国人民币汇率升值的讨论大约有下列几点：中国人民币被普遍的低估；被低估的人民币正在吸引大量的热通货进入中国，复杂的货币当局努力致力于过热的软着陆经济。并且人民币被低估和它对美元的汇率是用于防止允许对美元的通货升值的其他亚洲国家的，因为人民币升值将破坏其他国家与中国的竞争关系。竞争理念的最重要核心是因为它被过度的讨论。近年来，美国外部失衡触及中国和其他亚洲国家的历史上前所未有的美元储备危机。出现了许多关于人民币

56、不确定估值的研究和自相矛盾的结果。为了解决这一困难的估价问题，本文开发了一个对美国和其他国家来说是新的绝对购买力平价指数：中国购买力平价的措施。新指数显示了“传统智慧”下，人民币被大幅低估的具体情况。然而，人民币被低估是不同寻常的，鉴于中国的经济发展水平，传统智慧并不适用于中国，因为任何标准来衡量它都不是一个发达的国家，没有发达国家有较稳定的货币汇率以维持国内经济和政治稳定（普拉萨德等，2003）。对多边外部平衡方面而言，我们觉得很难说中国的货币对其贸易和国际收支盈余有很大的促进作用，尤其是如果从1997年的角度来看，人民币承受巨大的贬值压力。事实上，有明确的证据表明，如果中国的贸易平衡，均匀

57、地分布在其贸易伙伴，将几乎没有任何中国的货币升值的压力。因此，从美国发起的范围越来越大，次数越来越多的多边贸易不平衡来看，压力是政治和结构性的。不幸的是，它是非常容易的，而不是指责中国攻击美国贸易赤字的结构性根源。是对中国政府施加政治压力，放弃人民币只钉住美元，并作为世界上最重要的增长市场上，迟早中国更容易证明，尽管中国有其脆弱的金融风险体系，但它最终加入了七国集团并将分担其全球责任。本文包含更广范围内的交流问题，并讨论了人民币的长期前景。是人民币被低估？人民币在传统意义上被低估，从根本上讲有太多的需求相对于供应。从根本上来说，对外币的需求来自三个方面：购买商品或服务，投资于实物或金融资产，要

58、猜测汇率本身的变化。随着封闭的、独立的资本账户的产生，中国的通货变得数量较大而重要，但对于货币投机者和短期投资者的投资组合情况来看，这一事实也不完全适用。在中国国民经济研究所（2003）最近的科学研究表明，所谓的“热钱”流入的多少并不是国外对冲基金活动的结果。相反，他们是利用在当前外汇汇率管制规定存在漏洞这一优势，改变当地企业和个人的借款和存款行为。因此，我们可以着眼于对中国的贸易和投资流动的长期关注，并期待产生标准的措施，例如购买力平价（PPP）、贸易收支平衡、经常帐差额、国际收支和外汇储备。购买力平价学说是一个古老的经济概念，至少可以追溯到大卫休谟（1752），已经经历了至少一次复兴。经济

59、学家（目前）将购买力平价学说定义为“汇率，相当于在两个国家的商品交易和服务中的一篮子价格相同的购买力平价的东西。”该理论认为，购买力平价的汇率代表国家之间的均衡水平，而从这些层面出发的任何潜在的重大原因和扭曲贸易存在不平衡。PPP有许多不同的购买力平价措施：一个强大的版本或“绝对”的版本，强调了价格的绝对平等（有时称为“单一价格法则”）和“相对”的版本，强调随着时间的推移，趋于平等运动。中国会屈服于这些压力吗除了政治上的考虑，我们将在后面讨论，人民币是否流动现在变成一个复杂的问题，涉及到几个因素。首先，人民币的移动市场预期已经造成了重大逆转资本外逃，并且增加了更多的投机压力。第二，周期性的全球宏观经济发展有可能减少对人民币升值的压力。第三，中国正处于重要的结构改革中期，尤其是在金融行业部分需要重点关注。第四，人们越来越清楚，目前的经济过热的现象是暂时的，这与1993-4事件形成鲜明对比。这些因素表明这个时候不是中国货币升值的关