高盛-中国房地产L型复苏 Asia Economics Analyst China“L-shaped”Property Sector Recovery Ahead without a Quick Fix 20230611

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11June2023|5:20PMHKT

AsiaEconomicsAnalyst

China:“L-shaped”PropertySectorRecoveryAhead

withoutaQuickFix

nDespiteatransitoryreboundinMarchthanksmainlytopent-updemand,many

propertyindicatorshaveshownrenewedweaknesssinceApril.Recentnegativeheadlinesonsomedevelopersalsoincreasedmarketconcernsonthetailrisksinthesector.Againstthechallengingbackdrop,Qingdao(aTier-2city)recentlyrolledoutitscitywidehousingstimuluspackage,raisingmarketexpectationsthatperhapsmorewillcome.

nTheongoingpropertycycleisdifferentfrompreviousrounds,aspolicymakersappearverydeterminednottousethepropertysectorasashort-termstimulustool,duelikelytoheightenedconcernsonfallingdemographicdemand,ashiftinpolicyfocustosupportstrategicallyimportantsectors,andweakerhousingaffordability.Webelievethepolicypriorityistomanagethemulti-yearslowdownratherthantoengineeranupcycle,anddonotexpectarepeatofthe2015-18cash-backedshantytownrenovationprogram.

LishengWang

+852-3966-4004|

lisheng.wang@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.

HuiShan

+852-2978-6634|hui.shan@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.

MaggieWei

+852-2978-6962|maggie.wei@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.

XinquanChen

+852-2978-2418|xinquan.chen@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.

YutingYang

+852-2978-7283|yuting.y.yang@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.

AndrewTilton

+852-2978-1802|andrew.tilton@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.

nHowever,tocounteractstill-stronggrowthheadwindsandlingeringfinancial

risks,wedoexpectadditionalhousingeasingmeasuresahead,includingfurther

easingincreditconditionsfornewhomebuyersandupgraders,additional

reductionineffectivemortgageratesandmortgagedown-paymentratios,

furtherrelaxationinhomepurchaserestrictionsandresalesinlargecities,

additionalfundingsupporttosecurethedeliveryofpre-soldhomes,andmore

policypushforurbanizationandpublichousing.

n

Weseepersistentweaknessesinthepropertysector,mainlyrelatedto

lower-tiercitiesandprivatedeveloperfinancing,andbelievethereappearsno

quickfixforthem.Assuch,weonlyassumean“L-shaped”recoveryinthe

propertysectorincomingyears.Basedonourestimates,theproperty

weaknesswilllikelybeamulti-yeargrowthdragforChina,butitcouldbeless

painfulin2023(-1.0pptoheadlineGDPgrowth)thanin2022(-2.2pp).

nLookingahead,weexpectpolicymakerstosticktotheirlong-termpolicygoals

suchas“CommonProsperity”andthe“DualCirculation”strategy,which

suggestsalikelyendgameforthepropertysectorpolicy:reducingChina’s

economicandfiscalrelianceonthepropertysector,steppinguppublichousing

andgraduallyexpandingpropertytaxestomorepilotcitiesoverthelonger-term.

Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegACcertificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto

/research/hedge.html.

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GoldmanSachs

AsiaEconomicsAnalyst

China:“L-shaped”PropertySectorRecoveryAheadwithoutaQuickFix

Onthebackofunprecedentedpropertytighteningthatstartedin2021andstringentCovid(Omicron)lockdownsin2022,China’spropertysectorenteredaprolongeddownturn,withmostproperty-relatedactivityplunging,andalargenumberofprivatedevelopercreditdefaults.Households’faithinever-risinghomepriceshasbeenmeaningfullyshaken.Toppolicymakershaveshiftedtothemodeofpiecemealhousingeasingsincethestartof2022,butstillmaintaintheirlong-heldstancethat“housingisforlivingin,notforspeculationwhichmakesChina’spost-reopeningrecoveryquitedifferentfrompreviouscycles.

LatestdevelopmentinChina’spropertysector:renewedweakness,incrementaleasing

FollowingChina’srapidreopeninginlate2022,thepropertysectorexperiencedatransitoryreboundinMarchthanksmainlytothereleaseofpent-updemand.However,manypropertyindicatorshaveshownrenewedweaknesssinceApril,especiallyfornewhomesales(Exhibit1),startsandlandsales.1Newhomecompletionsremainedstrong,amidtheshiftinpolicyfocustosecurethedeliveryofpre-soldnewhomes(Exhibit2).RecentnegativeheadlinesonWandaandKWGalsoincreasedmarketconcernsonthetailrisksinthepropertysector.Againstthechallengingbackdrop,Qingdao,aTier-2cityincoastalShandongprovince,recentlyrolledoutitscitywidehousingstimuluspackage.Latestmediareports(yettobeconfirmedbyofficialsources)hintthatpolicymakersareworkingonnewhousingeasingmeasurestoboosttheeconomy.Thegovernment-runmediaoutletEconomicDailyalsocalledformorepatiencefortheeffectofongoinghousingeasingtokickinandforthepropertysectortostabilize.

Exhibit1:Wind30-citydailypropertytransactionvolumehasshownrenewedweaknesssinceApril

Exhibit2:Newhomestartsandcompletionshavedivergedsignificantlysincethestartofthisyear

%yoy

Thousandsqm,7-daymovingavg1000

Thousandsqm,7-daymovingavg1000

%yoy

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

-20

120

Property-relatedactivitygrowth(volume)

30-cityaveragedailypropertytransactionvolume

Floorspacesold

Newstarts

100

800

800

80

Completions

60

600

600

40

20

400

400

0

2019

200

200

2020

-20

2021

-40

-60

2022

-40

2023

0

-60

0Jan

2020

2021

2022

2019

2023

FebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec

Source:Wind,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchSource:Wind,DatacompiledbyGoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Theongoingpropertysectorrecovery:notadéjàvu

1InMay2023,NBSreviseddownthecomparisonbasewhenreportingyear-on-yearpropertyactivitygrowthdata,resultinginadivergencebetweenofficially-reportedleveldataandgrowthdataforthefirsttimeonrecord.However,NBShasnotreleasedtherevisedleveldataforpreviousyears.Weadjustedforthisdistortionwhenestimatingsingle-monthyear-on-yeargrowthforthisyear.

11June20232

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AsiaEconomicsAnalyst

GoldmanSachs

Evengiventhesharpcontractionin2022,China’spropertysectorremainsthelargestsinglesectorinChina’seconomy,anditsupsanddownsstillhaveameaningfulimpactonGDPgrowth.Unlikepreviousgrowthrecoverycycleswhenthepropertysectorusedtobeamajordriver,duringtheongoingpost-reopeningrecoveryithasshownpersistentweaknesses,especiallyrelatedtoupstreamactivity(e.g.,landsales,newhomestartsandthatunderconstruction),lower-tiercitiesandprivatedevelopers.

RecentpolicycommunicationssuggestChinaappearsquitedeterminednottousethepropertysectorasashort-termstimulustool.Mostnationwidetighteningmeasures(e.g.,the“ThreeRedLines”tocontainpropertydeveloperdebtandthePBOC/CBIRC’s“TwoRedLines”tocurbbanklendingtothesector)remaininplace,althoughpolicymakershavesteppeduptheirsupportfornewhomebuyersandupgraders,andhavegivenlocalgovernmentsmorediscretiononregionalhousingeasing.

Weseethreemajorreasonsbehindtheirstrongdetermination:

1)Fallingandageingpopulationpointedtodecliningdemographicdemandforhousingincomingdecades(Exhibit3),particularlyforregionswithnetpopulationoutflows(seeBox1:Thechallenginglong-termhousingdemandoutlook,formorediscussions).

2)EscalatedUS-Chinatensions,growinggovernmentdebtlevels,andfallingreturnoncapitalincreasedtheimportanceandurgencytoreducedomesticvulnerabilityandtochannelmoreresourcestostrategicallyimportantsectorstosecurekeysupplychains(suchasfood,energyandhigh-techmanufacturing),awayfromthepropertysector(Exhibit4).

Exhibit3:China’sfallingandageingpopulationappearsalong-termtrend,notacycle

Exhibit4:Banklendingtotheindustrialsectorhasbeenoutperformingthattothepropertysectorsince2020

mnpersons

1600

Totalpopulationvs.theshareofelderlypopulation

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0

1950

Totalpopulation

Shareofelderlypopulation(RHS)

Forecast

196019701980199020002010202020302040

%

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

2050

%yoy35

30

%yoy35

Banklendingtothepropertysectorvs.totheindustrialsector

Medium-andlong-termloan:IndustrialPropertysectorloan

30

2525

2020

1515

1010

55

00

-5-5

2014201520162017201820192020202120222023

Source:UnitedNations,DatacompiledbyGoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchSource:Wind,PBOC,DatacompiledbyGoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

3)China’shousingaffordabilityhasbeendecliningoverthepastdecadeamidroundsofpropertyupcycles,andthusanotherroundofhousingpricerallylikewhatChinaexperiencedduring2015-18,ifany,wouldmakethingsworseandgoagainstthegovernment’spursuitof“CommonProsperity”.

Onedifferencefrompreviouseasingphasesisthatalthoughhousingeasingmeasuresduringtheongoingcyclehavebeenbroadlybasedacrosseasingcategories,theyhavebeenintroducedmainlyatregionallevelsbasedonlocalconditions,intheabsenceofanationwidecash-backedshantytownrenovationprogram(SRP;Exhibit5).

11June20233

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GoldmanSachs

AsiaEconomicsAnalyst

Exhibit5:Acomparisonofmajorhousingeasingcyclessince2008GFC

Housingeasingmeasures

Easingrestrictionsonnewhome

purchases/resales*

Cuttingtaxesonhomepurchasesand

transaction

Demand

Loweringmortgagerates

Loweringdownpaymentratios

Easingrestrictionsontheuseofhousing

providentfunds

Facilitatingdeveloperfinancing

Launchingpublichousingconstruction

programs

Launchingcash-backedshantytown

renovationprogram

Therewasnorestrictiononnewhomepurchasesbefore2010(BeijingisthefirstChinesecitythatrolledoutsuchrestrictioninApril2010),andnorestrictiononnewhomeresalesbefore2017(XiameninMarch2017).

Since2022

Y,locally-basedforsomecities

Y,locally-basedforsomecities

Y

Y

Y

Y,mainlyviabankloanandonshorebond

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y,broad-based,

especially

offshorebonds

Y

Y,fundedbyPBOCPSL

Y,mainlyviashadowbanking

Y,broad-based

Dimension

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Supply

2008-09

2014-18

2011-13

Y

Y

Y

Source:Governmentwebsites,DatacompiledbyGoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

11June20234

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AsiaEconomicsAnalyst

GoldmanSachs

Box1:Thechallenginglong-termhousingdemandoutlook

Weupdateourprojectionfortotalurbanhousingdemandanditsbreakdown(bydemographic,replacementandinvestmentdemand),byincorporatingthelatestpopulationprojectionbyUnitedNations(UN),the7thCensusdataonChinesehouseholdsandothermacroindicatoroutturnsinrecentyears(seemoredetailsaboutouranalyticalframeworkinAsiaEconomicsAnalyst:CreditsupplyholdsthekeytoChinahousingoutlookin2022,11October2021).

nSpecifically,UNpopulationprojectionisupdatedwhichshowsmorepopulationdeclineinChinaoverthecomingdecades(totalpopulationin2050:1.3bn,vs.1.4bnpreviously).China’spopulationdeclinedforthefirsttimein60yearsin2022onfallingbirthrate,anditsdowntrendshouldremaininplaceforcomingdecades.

nThe7th(2020)CensussuggestsChinesehouseholdsaregettingsmallermuchfasterthanwepreviouslyprojected,andpropertydemolitionratesarelowerthanwepreviouslyassumed;

nTheunprecedentedpropertytighteningbetweenlate2020and2021ledtoabroad-basedcontractioninpropertyactivitysinceH22021andsubstantiallyreducedinvestmentdemandforhousing.

Ondemographicdemand,weusetheUNpopulationandurbanizationrateprojectionsandextrapolatetherecenttrendinaveragehouseholdsize.Attheaggregatelevel,weestimatehouseholdformationtodropfromaround9mnperyearinthe2010stoalittleunder3mnby2050(whenChina’surbanizationrateisexpectedtoreach80%),asthedragfromfallingpopulationandslowingurbanizationshouldmorethanoffsettheboostfromalikelydeclineinaveragehouseholdsize(Exhibit6).

Onreplacement(demolition)demand,weassumenon-modernhousingdepreciatesfasterthanmodernhousingbasedonindustryknowledge.Thistranslatesintoa0.9%overalldemolitionratein2022.Thedemolitionratedeclinesovertimeastheshareofmodernhousing(whichdepreciatesmoreslowlythannon-modernhousing)intotalhousingstockincreases.

Ourdefinitionof“investmentdemand”hereisspecifictodemandforpropertiesthatarenotintendedforyear-roundoccupation(differentfromdemographicandreplacementdemand).Incorporatinglatestdataavailable,weassumenewinvestmentdemandisnegligiblefrom2022onward,implyingnewinvestmentdemandmayhavebeenlargelymetbyexistinginvestmentproperties(e.g.,someonebuysavacationhomeinHainanfromsomeoneelsewhoboughtmultipleunitsinHainanpreviouslyonspeculation).Givenpolicymakers’“housingisforlivingin,notforspeculation”mantra,wethinkthisisareasonableassumption.

Basedonourestimates,China’sannualdemandfornewurbanhousingunitspeakedin2017-18,reflectingtheturningpointsfordemographicandreplacementdemand.Weexpecttotalhousingdemandtodeclineincomingdecades,fromaround15mnunitsin2020to5mnin2050,duetodecliningdemographicdemandandmuchlowerinvestmentdemand,althoughreplacementdemandshouldremainlargelystable(Exhibit7).2TheseforecastsaresomewhatlowerthanourpreviousprojectionsinOctober2021.3

2RecentPBOCsurveysalsosuggestastructurallylowershareofhouseholdsexpectingrisinghomeprices

11June20235

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AsiaEconomicsAnalyst

GoldmanSachs

Exhibit6:Fallingpopulationandslowingurbanizationshouldmorethanoffsetalikelydeclineinhouseholdsizetoweighondemographicdemandoverthelongterm

Exhibit7:Urbanhousingdemandhaspeakedandmaytrenddowninthelongrunonfallingdemographicdemandandmuchlowerinvestmentdemand

Million

Million

Million

Million

14

12

10

14

20

20

Totaldemandforurbanhousing

Demographicdemandforurbanhousing

12

DemographicReplacementInvestmentTotal

16

16

10

8

8

6

4

2

0

Population

Urbanizationrate

Householdsize

Demographic

12

12

6

4

8

8

2

4

4

0

-2

-4

-2

0

0

-4

2015

2010

2050

20252030203520402045

2010

2015

2020

2050

202020252030203520402045

Source:HaverAnalytics,Wind,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearchSource:HaverAnalytics,Wind,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Moretargetedhousingeasinglikelyforcomingquarters

Willthegovernmentstimulatethepropertysector?Ouranswerisyes(fortargetedeasing)andno(forbroad-basedmassivestimulus).Webelievethepolicypriorityistomanagethemulti-yearslowdownratherthantoengineeranupcycle,anddonotexpectarepeatofthe2015-18cash-backedSRP,asitscost(e.g.,worseninghousingaffordability,increasinglong-termfinancialrisksandevenspoilingpartofpolicymakers’earliereffortsincontainingthepropertysector)appeartooverweighitsbenefits(e.g.,boostinghousingdemand/supplymainlyinlower-tiercities).

However,tocounteractstill-stronggrowthheadwindsandlingeringfinancialrisks,wedoexpectadditionalhousingeasingmeasuresincomingquarters,onthefollowingfrontsandprimarilyatthecity-level:

nFurthereasingincreditconditionsfornewhomebuyersandupgraders,additionalreductionineffectivemortgageratesandmortgagedown-paymentratios,andmoreflexibilityfortheuseofhousingprovidentfund.Largecitieswithsolidfiscalconditionsmayalsoconsiderprovidingsomefiscalsubsidiesandtax/feereductionsforhomepurchases,likeQingdao’spractice.Wealsoseeapossibilityofasmallcutto5yrloanprimerate(LPR;onemajorpricinganchorformortgageloans).

nAdditionalrelaxationinhomepurchaserestrictionsandresales,especiallyinlargecitiesandcityclusterswithnetpopulationinflows.

nFurtherpolicysupportforurbanization(e.g.,easingpreconditionsforHukouregistrationsandHukou-relatedrestrictionsforhomepurchases).

nAdditionalfinancingsupporttosecurethedeliveryofpre-soldhomes,andimprovethecashflowconditionsforqualitydevelopers(e.g,furtherextendingthedebt

thanpre-pandemicyears.

3Wepreviouslyprojectedthattotalhousingdemandwoulddeclinefrom16.5mnunitsin2020to6mnin2050.

11June20236

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AsiaEconomicsAnalyst

GoldmanSachs

maturity,optimizingpresalesdepositcontrol,andencouragingacquisitionactivitiesbySOEs,asourChinapropertyanalystsexpected).

nMorepolicypushforpublichousing.Notepolicymakerssetthenationwidetargetforpublichousingconstructionat8.7mnunitsinthe14thFive-YearPlan(2021-25).Excludingthe3.3mnunitsbuiltin2021-22,therearestill5.4mnunitstobefulfiledduring2023-25.

Wealsonoticethatsomemeasuresmaybetiedwiththenation’slong-termstrategies,suchasattractingtalentandencouragingchildbirth,likewhatsomecitiesdidin2022.Latestmediareports(yettobeconfirmedbyofficialsources)hintthatpolicymakersappeartobeworkingonadditionalhousingeasingmeasures.4

Whyit’ssodifficulttoturnthepropertysectoraroundinthenearterm?

Despitecontinuedhousingeasing,weseepersistentweaknessesinthepropertysectormainlyrelatedtolower-tiercitiesandprivatedeveloperfinancing.Thereappearsnoquickfixforthemandweexpectnorepeatofthe2015-18cash-backedshantytownrenovationprogram(SRP).

#1:Lower-tiercities

Lower-tiercitieshavetakenthelion’sshareinnationwidepropertysector,althoughtheyreceiveddisproportionallylowmarketattention.Basedonourpropertyteam’stracking,lower-tiercities(Tier-3/4)contributed66%,65%,60%and59%,respectivelytonationwidenewhomesalesvolume,starts,underconstructionandcompletionsin2020(allinrealterms;latestdataavailable;Exhibit8).Consideringrelativelylowhousingpricesvs.largecities,theshareoflower-tiercitiesinnewhomesalesvalueandpropertyinvestment–bothinnominalterms–wassomewhatsmaller,bothataround50%.Thesharpdeclineinnewhomesalesbetweenmid-2021and2022wasbroadlybased,butparticularlylargeinlower-tiercities(Exhibit9).

4Webelieveifthereisanymajorpropertyeasingmeasureahead,itshouldrequirejointeffortsfrommultipleministriesandgovernmentbodies,suchasPBOC,MinistryofFinance(MOF),MinistryofHousingandUrban-RuralDevelopment(MoHURD),NationalDevelopmentandReformCommission(NDRC),policybanksandlocalgovernments.

11June20237

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AsiaEconomicsAnalyst

20%

0%

201720182019202020212022

2015

2016

2023

GoldmanSachs

Exhibit8:Lower-tiercitiesaccountforthelion’sshareofthenationwidepropertysector

Exhibit9:Thesharpdeclineinnewhomesalesbetweenmid-2021and2022wasbroadlybased,butparticularlylargeinlower-tiercities

mnsqm

TheshareofeachcitytierinnationwidehousingmarketTier-1Tier-2Lower-tier

mnsqm

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

90

100%

100%

80%

Grossfloorareasoldbreakdownbycitytier(12mma)

80

70

60

Tier2

Tier1

Total

Tier-3/4

80%

49.549.4

65.965.160.158.7

60%

40%

20%

0%

60%

50

40

30

20

10

0

40%

31.2

3.0

GFAsold(volume)

30.1

4.9

GFAstarted(volume)

34.4

5.5

GFAunder

construction

(volume)

34.3

7.1

GFA

completed

(volume)

39.7

10.8

Sales(value)

39.7

10.9

Property

investment

(value)

Ourcity-tierbreakdownisbasedon2020data,duetoconstraintsfromdataavailability.

Source:NBS,CREIS,GoldmanSachsGaoHuaSecuritiesResearch,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Source:CREIS,GoldmanSachsGaoHuaSecuritiesResearch,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

#2:Norepeatofcash-backedSRP

Housinginventory(asmeasuredbytheratioofhousinginventorydividedbymonthlynewhomesales)hasrisenrapidlysinceH22021andremainedhigherthantheirpreviouspeaksin2015,especiallyforlower-tiercites(Exhibit10).Duringthe2014-18housingcycle,onegamechangerwasthecash-backedSRPin2015-18,throughwhichthePBOCinjectedRMB3.4tnpledgedsupplementarylending(PSL)liquidityintothepropertymarketinlower-tiercities(Exhibit11).Thisstronglyboostedhousingdemandandinturnstimulatedsupply,andsawhomepricesmorethandoublinginmanycities.Asweexpectnorepeatofcash-backedSRP,thehousingdestockinginlower-tiercitiescouldbemuchslowerandmorepainfulthanbefore.

Exhibit10:Housinginventoryinlower-tiercitieshasbeenmuchhigherthanlargecitiessince2022

Exhibit11:Cash-backedshantytownrenovationwasamajordriverofthe2014-18propertycycle

Months

30

Months

30

Inventorymonthsbreakdownbycitytier

Tier1

Tier3

25

25

Tier2

20

20

15

15

10

10

5

5

0

0

15

17

16

18

21

22

23

1920

Source:CREIS,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

mnunit

RMBbn

8

1200

Shantytownrenovationvs.PSL

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

2013

Actualshantytownrenovation

NetPSLissuance(RHS)

2014201520162017

20182019202020212022

900

600

300

0

-300

-600

NetPSLissuanceusedtobeamajorfundingsourcefor2015-18cash-backedshantytownrenovation,butin2022itwasusedforsupportinginfrastructureinvestmentviapolicybanks.

Source:PBOC,Governmentwebsites,DatacompiledbyGoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

#3:Still-significantfinancialstressamongstprivatedevelopers

Privatedevelopersstillfacetightfundingconditions,asbanksappearreluctantin

11June20238

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GoldmanSachs

AsiaEconomicsAnalyst

extendingcredittothem,theirfinancingthroughshadowbankingandoffshoredollarbondchannelscontinuetocontract(Exhibit12),5andhouseholdsarecautiousinpurchasingpre-soldunbuilthomesfromprivatedevelopersaftertheirheighteneddefaultsoverthepasttwoyears.Asoneofmajorfundingchannelsfordevelopers,presalesalsoexperiencedsharpupsanddownsinrecentyears.Presalesratio(shareofpresalesintotalnewhomesalesinvalueterms)rosedrasticallyfromlessthan30%beforethe2008GFCtoitspeakof93%in2021,followedbyameaningfuldeclineto83%in2022.Privatedevelopershavebornethebruntamidthedowncycle:Ourcreditstrategyteam’strackingsuggeststhatalthoughpresalesbySOEshavebeengraduallyimprovingsinceearly2022,presalesbyprivatedevelopersremain60%belowtheirlevelsbeforethepropertydownturn(Exhibit13).

Exhibit12:Developerfinancingthroughbankloansandonshorebondsappearsbottomingout,whileshadowbankingandoffshorebondsremainsubdued

%yoy

%yoy

200

200

Majorchannelsforpropertydeveloperfinancing

150

150

Bankloan

Onshorebond

Offshorebond

Trustproduct

100

100

Exhibit13:Presalesbyprivatedevelopers(especiallythosewithdefaulthistory)remainsubdueddespiteadditionalhousingpolicyeasing

Percent

140

120

100

80

PresalesofpropertydeveloperswithUSDbondsoutstanding,

breakdownbydevelopertype(as%ofJune2021sales)

SOE

POEwithoutdefaultedorexchangedbondsPOEwithdefaultedorexchangedbonds

Percent

140

120

100

80

5050

0