毕业论文外文资料翻译

Fundamentalsoffinancial，2004，(8):23-25DividendpolicyEugeneF.Brigham.JoelF.HoustonAbstractDividendpolicyplaysanimportantroleinbusinessdecision-makinginthestockisthecompany'scorefinancialissues.Thusthedividenddistributionpolicyhasbeenthecompany'sstakeholderssharesarecloselywatched.Onthebasisofthetextoftheintroductionanddividendpolicybasictypesoftraditionalandmoderntheoriesofdividendpolicyelaborateon,focusingonthestatusofthedividenddistributionpolicyoflistedcompanies,thedividendpolicychoiceshouldconsiderfactorswereanalyzed,anddealwiththeproblemsraisedcorrespondingconstructivecomments.Keywords:Dividendtheory;dividenddistribution;policyrecommendationsIntroductionProfitablecompaniesregularlyfacethreeimportantquestions:(1)Howmuchofitsfreecashflowshoulditpassontoshareholders?(2)Shoulditprovidethiscashtoshareholdersbyraisingthedividendorbyrepurchasingstock?(3)Shoulditmaintainastable,consistentpaymentpolicy,orshoulditletthepaymentsvaryasconditionschange?Whendecidinghowmuchcashtodistributetoshareholders,financemanagermustkeepinmindthatthefirm'sobjectiveistomaximizeshareholdervalue.Consequently,thetargetpayrateratio—defineasthepercentageofnetincometobepaidoutascashdividends—shouldbebasedinlargepartoninvestors'preferencefordividendsversuscapitalgains:doinvestorsprefer(1)tohavethefirmdistributeincomeascashdividendsor(2)tohaveiteitherrepurchasestockorelseplowtheearningsbackintothebusiness,bothofwhichshouldresultincapitalgains?ThispreferencecanbeconsideredpDintermsoftheconstantgrowthstockvaluationmodel:厂， 1—K—gSIfthecompanyincreasesthepayoutration,theraisesD.Thisincrease1inthenumerator,takenalone,wouldcausethestockpricetorise.However,ifDisraised,thenlessmoneywillbeavailableforreinvestment,thatwill1causetheexpectedgrowthratetodecline,andthatwilltendtolowerthestock'sprice.Thus,anychangeinpayoutpolicywillhavetwoopposingeffects.Therefore,thefirm'soptimaldividendpolicymuststrikeabalancebetweencurrentdividendsandfuturegrowthsotomaximizethestockprice.Inthissection,weexaminethreetheoriesofinvestorpreference:(1)thedividendirrelevancetheory,(2)the"bird-in-the-hand"theory,and(3)thetaxpreferencetheory.dividendtheoryDIVIDENDIRRELEVANCETHEORYIthasbeenarguedthatdividendpolicyhasnoeffectoneitherthepriceofafirm'sstockoritscostofcapital.Ifdividendpolicyhasnosignificanteffects,thenitwouldbeirrelevance.TheprincipalproponentsofdividendirrelevancetheoryareMertonMillerandFrancoModigliani(MM).Theyarguedthatthefirm'sisdeterminedonlybyitsbasicearningpoweranditsbusinessrisk.Inotherwords,MMarguedthatthevalueoffirmdependsonlyontheincomeproducedbyitsassets,notonhowthisincomeissplitbetweendividendsandretainedearnings.TounderstandMM'sargumentthatdividendpolicyisirrelevance,recognizethatanyshareholdercanintheoryconstructhisorherowndividendpolicy.Ifinvestorscouldbuyandsellsharesandthuscreatetheirowndividendpolicywithoutincurringcosts,thenthefirm'sdividendpolicywouldtrulybeirrelevant.Note,though,thatinvestorswhowantadditionaldividendsmustincurbrokeragecosttosellshares,andinvestorswhodonotwantdividendsmustfirstpaytaxesontheunwanteddividendsandthenincurbrokeragecosttopurchaseshareswiththeafter-taxdividends.Sincetaxesandbrokeragecostscertainlyexist,dividendpolicymaywellberelevant.Indevelopingtheirdividendtheory,MMmadeanumberofassumptionsespeciallytheabsenceoftaxesandbrokeragecosts.Obviously,taxandbrokeragecostsdoexist,sotheMMirrelevancetheorymaynotbetrue.However,MMarguedthatalleconomictheoriesarebasedonsimplifyingassumptions,andthatthevalidityofatheorymustbejudgedbyempiricaltest,notbytherealismofitsassumptions.BIRD-IN-THE-HANDTHEORYTheprincipalconclusionsofMM'sdividendirrelevancetheoryisthatdividendpolicydoesnotaffecttherequiredrateofreturnonequity,Ks.Thisconclusionhasbeenhotlydebatedintheacademiccircles.Inparticular,MyronGordonandJohnLintnerarguedthatKsdecreasesasthedividendpayoutisincreasebecauseinvestorarelesscertainofreceivingthecapitalgainswhicharesupposedtoresultfromretainingearningsthantheyareofreceivingdividendpaymentsMMdisagreed.TheyarguedthatKsindependentofdividendpolicy,whichimpliesthatinvestorsareindifferentbetweenD1/P0andgand,hence,betweendividendsandcapitalgains.MMcalledtheGordon-Lintnerargumentthebird-in-the-handfallacybecause,inMM'sview,mostinvestorsplantoreinvesttheirdividendsinthestockofthesameorsimilarfirms,and,inanyevent,theriskinessofthefirm'scashflowstoinvestorsinthelongrunisdeterminedbytheriskinessofoperatingcashflows,notbydividendpayoutpolicy.TAXPREFERENCETHEORYTherearethreetax-relatedreasonsforthinkingthatinvestorsmightpreferalowdividendpayouttoahighpayout:(1)RecallfromChapterIIthatlong-termcapitalgainsaretaxedatarateof20percent,whereasdividendincomeistaxedateffectiverateswhichgoupto39.6percent.Therefore,wealthyinvestorsmightprefertohavecompaniesretainandplowearningsbackintothebusiness.Earningsgrowthwouldpresumablyleadtostockpricesincreases,andthuslow-taxedcapitalgainswouldbesubstitutedforhigher-taxeddividends.(2)Taxesarenotpaidonthegainsuntilastockissold.Duetotimevalueeffects,adollaroftaxespaidinthefuturehasalowereffectivecostthanadollarpaidtoday.(3)Ifastockisheldbysomeoneuntilheorshedies,nocapitalgainstaxisdueatall-thebeneficiarieswhoreceivethestockcanusethestock'svalueonthedeathdayastheircostbasisandthuscompletelyescapethecapitalgainstax.Becauseofthesetaxadvantages,investorsmayprefertohavecompaniesretainmostoftheirearnings.IFso,investorswouldbewillingtopaymoreforlow-payoutcompaniesthanforotherwisesimilarhigh-payoutcompanies.Therethreetheoriesoffercontradictoryadvicetocorporatemanagers,sowhich,ifany,shouldwebelieve?Themostlogicalwaytoproceedistotestthetheoriesempirically.Manysuchtestshavebeenconducted,buttheirresultshavebeenunclear.Therearetworeasonsforthis(1)Foravalidstatisticaltest,thingsotherthandividendpolicymustbeheldconstant;thatis,thesamplecompaniesmustdifferonlyintheirdividendpolicies,and(2)wemustbeabletomeasurewithahighdegreeofaccuracyeachfirm'scostofequity.Neitherofthesetwoconditionsholds:Wecannotfindasetofpubliclyownedfirmsthatdifferonlyintheirdividendpolicies,norcanweobtainpreciseestimatesofthecostofequity.Therefore,noonecanestablishaclearrelationshipbetweendividendpolicyandthecostofequity.Investorsintheaggregatecannotbeseentouniformlyprefereitherhigherorlowerdividends.Nevertheless,individualinvestorsdohavestrongpreferences.Somepreferhighdividends,whileotherspreferallcapitalgains.Thesedifferencesamongindividendshelpexplainwhyitisdifficulttoreachanydefinitiveconclusionsregardingtheoptimaldividendpayout.Evenso,bothevidenceandlogicsuggestthatinvestorspreferfirmsthatfollowastable,predictabledividendpolicy.therelevantrecommendationsBecausewediscusshowdividendpolicyissetinpractice,wemustexaminetwoothertheoreticalissuesthatcouldaffectourviewtowarddividendpolicy:(1)theinformationcontent,orsignaling,hypothesisand(2)Theclienteleeffects.MMarguedthatinvestors'reactionstochangeindividendpolicydonotnecessarilyshowthatinvestorspreferdividendstoretainedearnings.Rather,theyarguedthatpricechangefollowingdividendactionssimplyindicatethatthereisanimportantinformation,orsignaling,contentindividendannouncements.Theclienteleeffectstotheextentthatstockholderscanswitch,afirmcanchangefromonedividendpayoutpolicytoanotherandthenletstockholderswhodonotlikethenewpolicyselltootherinvestorswhodo.However,frequentswitchingwouldbeinefficientbecauseof(1)brokeragecosts,(2)thelikelihoodthatstockholderswhoaresellingwillhavetopaycapitalgainstaxes,and(3)apossibleshortageofinvestorswholikethefirm'snewlyadopteddividendpolicy.Thus,managementshouldbehesitanttochangeitsdividendpolicy,becauseachangemightcausecurrentstockholderstoselltheirstock,forcingthestockpricedown.Suchapricedeclinemightbetemporary,butitmightalsobepermanentiffewnewinvestorsareattractedbythenewdividendpolicy,thenthestockpricewouldremaindepressed.Ofcourse,thenewpolicymightattractanevenlargerclientelethanthefirmhadbefore,inwhichcasethestockpricewouldrise.Inmanyways,ourdiscussionofdividendpolicyparallelsourdiscussionofcapitalstructure:wepresentedtherelevanttheoriesandissues,andwelistedsomeadditionalfactorsthatinfluencedividendpolicy,butwedidnotcomeupwithanyhard-and-fastguidelinesthatmanagercanfollow.Itshouldbeapparentfromourdiscussionthatdividendpolicydecisionsareexercisesininformedjudgment,notdecisionsthatcanbebasedonprecisemathematicalmodel.Inpractice,dividendpolicyisnotanindependentdecision-thedividenddecisionsismadejointlywithcapitalstructureandcapitalbudgetingdecisions.Theunderlyingreasonforthisjointdecisionsprocessisasymmetricinformation,whichinfluencesmanagerialactionsintwoways:Ingeneral,managersdonotwanttoissuenewcommonstock.First,newcommonstockinvolvesissuancecost---commissions,fees,andsoon-andthosecostscanbeavoidedbyusingretainedearningstofinancethefirm'sequityneeds.Also,asymmetricinformationcausesinvestorstoviewcommonstockissuesasnegativesignalsandthuslowersexpectationsregardingthefirm'sfutureprospects.Theendresultisthattheannouncementofanewstockissueusuallyleadstoadecreaseinthestockprices.Consideringthetotalcostsinvolved,includingbothissuanceandasymmetricinformationcosts,managersstronglyprefertouseretainedearningsastheirprimarysourceofnewequity.Dividendchangesprovidesignalaboutmanagers'beliefsastotheirfirms'futureprospects,Thus,dividendreductions,Orworseyet,omissions,generallyhaveasignificantnegativeeffectonafirm'sstockprice.Sincemanagersrecognizethis,theytrytosetdollardividendslowenoughsothatthereisonlyaremotechancethatthedividendwillhavetobereduceinthefuture.Ofcourse,unexpectedlylargedividendincreasescanbeusedtoprovidepositivesignals.theactualpayoutratioinany.Thedividenddecisionismadeduringtheplanningprocess,sothereisuncertaintyaboutfutureinvestmentopportunitiesandoperatingcashflows.Thus,theactualpayoutratioinanyyearwillprobablybeaboveorbelowthefirm'slong-rangetarget.However,thedollardividendshouldbemaintained,orincreaseasplannedpolicysimplycannotbemaintained.Asteadyorincreasingsteamofdividendsoverthelongrunsignalsthatthefirm'sfinancialconditionisundercontrol.Further,investorsuncertainisdecreasedbystabledividend,soasteadydividendstreamreducesthenegativeeffectofastockissue,shouldonebecomeabsolutelynecessary.Ingeneral,firmswithsuperiorinvestmentopportunitiesshouldsetlowerpayouts,henceretainmoreearnings,thanfirmswithpoorinvestmentopportunities.Thedegreeofuncertaintyalsoinfluencesthedecision.Ifthereisagreatdealofuncertaintyintheforecastsoffreecashflows,whicharedefinedhereasthefirm'soperatingcashflowsminusmandatoryequityinvestments,thenitisbesttobeconservativeandtosetalowercurrentdollardividend.Also,firmswithpostponableinvestmentopportunitiescanaffordtosetahigherdollardividend,becauseintimesofstressinvestmentscanbepostponedforayearortwo,thusincreasingthecashavailablefordividends.Finally,firmswhosecostofcapitalislargelyunaffectedbychangeinthedebtratiocanalsoaffordtosetahigherpayoutratio,becausetheycan,intimesofstress,moreeasilyissueadditionaldebttomaintainthecapitalbudgetingprogramwithouthavingtocutdividendsorissuestock.Firmshaveonlyoneopportunitytosettheopportunitypaymentfromscratch.Therefore,today'sdividenddecisionsareconstrainedbypoliciesthatweresetinthepast,hencesettingapolicyforthenextfiveyearsnecessarilybeginswithareviewofthecurrentsituation.Althoughwehaveoutlinedarationalprocessformanagerstousewhensettingtheirfirms'dividendpolicies,dividendpolicystillremainsoneofthemostjudgmentaldecisionsthatfirmsmustmake.Forthisreason,dividendpolicyisalwayssetbytheboardofdirectorsthefinancialstaffanalyzesthesituationandmakesarecommendation,buttheboardmakesthefinaldecision.Fundamentalsoffinancial，2004，（8）:23-25.股利政策EugeneF.Brigham.JoelF.Houston,摘要：股利政策在股份制企业经营决策中占有重要地位，是企业的核心财务问题。因而股利分配政策一直为股份公司的利益相关者所密切关注。全文在对传统及现代股利政策理论的介绍和股利政策基本类型进行阐述的基础上，重点对上市公司的股利分配政策现状、选择股利政策应该考虑的因素进行了分析，并且针对存在的问题提出了相应的建设性意见。关键词：股利理论；股利分配；政策建议一、引言盈利的公司常常面临三个重要问题：（1）自由现金流量有多少应该分配给股东？（2）怎么样吧这些现金分配给股东，是通过增发股利还是回购本公司股票？（3）需要保持一个不变的股利支付政策，还是让股利支付随着各年度的情况不同而不同？当财务经理决定应该付多少现金给股东时，他一定要记住，公司的目标是股东价值最大化，目标支付率作为现金股利支付的净收益占总收益的百分比，应该是根据投资者更偏好的股利还是资本利得来决定。投资者是偏好（1）以现金股利形式分配收益；还是偏好（2）回购股票或者吧收益重新投资到公司？这两者都会导致资本利得。这方面的偏好可以通个稳定增产的股票价值评估模型来考虑：P二一D—K—gS如果公司增加了股利支付率就增加D,单独分子可能会导致股票价格上升。然而,1如果D提高了，就会减少钱用在再投资，会引起预期增长率下降，那就有可能降低股1票的价格。因此，股利政策有任何改变将有两个相反的结果。所以，公司最优股利政策是必须在现在行使的股利和未来增长之间取得一个平衡，使股票价格达到最高。在这一部分文献中，我们将分析评价了投资者偏好的三个理论：（1）股利无关理论；（2）“一鸟在手”理论；（3）税收偏好理论。二、股利理论1、股利无关理论有很多人认为，股利分配政策对公司股票价值和资本成本都是没有任何影响。如果股利政策没有显著的影响，那这个股利政策就是不相关。股利无关理论的主要提出的人是默顿•H・米勒和佛朗哥•莫迪哥莱尼。公司价值只是由于基本盈利能力和经营风险所决定。换一句话说，MM理论作者认为，公司价值只是由其资产所创造的收益来决定的，而不是由于股利和留存收益之间是如何分割来决定的。要如何理解MM理论关于股利政策无关的观点，我们需要认识到，一个股东在理论上都是能构建自己的股利政策。但是如果投资者能够随意的购买或者卖出股票，他就能够实现他所期望的鼓励政策，而不用支付额外的费用。因此，鼓励政策是不相关的。要注意的是，那些想要得到额外股东在卖掉股票是必须支付一定的费用；而那些不想要额外股利的股东不想为那部分鼓励交税而且用税后股利购买额外的股份还得支付交易费用。既然税收和交易费用的存在是必然的，那么鼓励政策也很可能是相关的。在建立股利理论时，MM理论作了一系列的假设，尤其是关于不存在税收和交易费用的假设。显然，税收和交易费用是确实存在的，因此MM股利无关理论可能是不正确的。但是MM理论提出，所有的理论都是基于简化了的假设，理论的正确与否必须经过实践的检验，而不是其假设的真实性。2、 “一鸟在手”理论MM股利无关理论的主要结论是：鼓励政策不影响要求的权益收益率Ks。该观点在学术界引起广泛争论。迈伦•林特纳就认为，随着股利支付的增加，Ks会下降，因为虽然可以假定留存收益会带来相应的资本利得，但是与得到支付的股利相比，投资者获得收益的确定性要小。MM理论对这有反对意见。他们认为，Ks与股利政策是没有关系的，这就说投资者对于D"和资本利得是没有偏好。MM理论认为，高顿和林特纳为“一鸟在手”理论的假象所迷惑，因为在MM理论看来，大部分投资者都打算将其股利所得再投资于同一家或类似的企业。而且在任何情况下，对于投资者来说，从长远来看，公司现金流量的风险是由该公司的经营现金流量风险来决定的，却不是由股利政策决定的。3、 税收偏好理论从所得税方面来考虑，投资者可能会偏好较低的股利支付率，这样说的理由有三个。（1）第二章说到长期资本利得要缴纳20%的所得税，而股利收益的税率却高达39.6%。所以，有钱的投资者可能会更加偏好于公司留存收益而且将其投资于公司业务，而不是将收益用于发放股利。股利收益增长会导致股价上涨，从而较低税负的资本利得会替代较高税负的股利。（2）资本利得直到股票被卖掉以后才需要支付所得税。由于资金时间价值的作用，未来所支付的一美元的所得税比现在支付的一美元的所得税的价值更加低。（3）如果某人持有股票直到死亡，那就根本不会有资本利得税。接受股票受益人可以把股票原持有人去世那天的股票价值作为其成本基础，从而可以完全避免资本利得所要交的赋税。由于这种税收优势，投资者会愿意保留公司其绝大部分收益。如果是这样，那么相对于其他方面类似而支付率高的公司而言，投资者将更加愿意支付率低的公司的股票付更加高的价钱。这三个理论为公司经理人提供了有矛盾的建议,因此，如果理论可信的话，我们应该相信哪种理论?最合理的方法是利用经验来检测这3个理论。这方面的研究已经展开,但他们的结果还不太清楚。有两个原因（1）为一个有效的统计来说,除了股利政策，其他事情必须保持不变;也就是说,样本公司必须只是股利政策方面有所差异。（2）我们必须能够准确地测量每个公司的资本成本。这两种情况没有一个能够成立:我们不能发现一家上市公司只在股利政策方面有差异,也无法得到准确的公司资本成本的估计。因此,没有人能建立了一个股利政策和资本成本间清晰的关系。投资者作为一个整体，不能看出统一的选更高或更低的股利偏好。然而,个人投资者就有较强的喜好。一般投资者喜欢高额股利,而另一些则喜欢所有的收益都是资本利得。这些差异有助于解