IMF-跨境支付的货币用途（英）

Currency

Usage

forCross-Border

PaymentsHector

Perez-Saiz,Longmei

Zhang,

andRoshanIyerWP/23/72IMF

Working

Papers

describe

research

inprogress

by

the

author(s)

and

are

published

toelicit

comments

and

to

encourage

debate.Theviewsexpressed

inIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddo

notnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.2023MAR©2023InternationalMonetaryFundWP/23/72IMF

Working

PaperStrategy,Policy,andReview

DepartmentCurrency

Usage

for

Cross

Border

PaymentsPrepared

by

Hector

Perez-Saiz,

Longmei

Zhang,

and

Roshan

Iyer*AuthorizedfordistributionbyMartinČihákMarch2023IMF

Working

Papers

describe

research

in

progress

by

the

author(s)

and

are

published

to

elicitcomments

and

to

encourage

debate.

TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,

orIMFmanagement.ABSTRACT:

WhiletheglobalusageofcurrenciesotherthantheU.S.dollarandtheeuroforcross-borderpaymentsremainslimited,rapidtechnological(e.g.digitalmoney)orgeopoliticalchangescouldacceleratearegimeshiftintoamultipolar

ormorefragmentedinternationalmonetarysystem.Using

therichSwiftdatabaseofcross-borderpayments,weempiricallyestimatetheimportanceoflegaltenderstatus,geopoliticaldistance,andothervariablesvis-à-visthelargeinertiaeffectsforcurrencyusage,andperformseveralforecastingsimulationstobetterunderstandtheroleofthesevariablesinshapingthefuturepaymentslandscape.

Whileourresultssuggestasubstantiallymorefragmentedinternationalmonetarysystemwouldbeunlikelyintheshortandmediumterm,theimpactofnewtechnologiesremainshighlyuncertain,and

muchmorerapidgeopoliticaldevelopmentsthanexpectedcouldacceleratethetransformationoftheinternationalmonetarysystemtowardsmultipolarity.RECOMMENDED

CITATION:

Perez-Saiz,ZhangandIyer(2023)JELClassificationNumbers:Keywords:E42;F33Crossborderpayments;Swift;currencydominance;

legaltender;internationalmonetarysystem(IMS)Author’sE-MailAddresses:HPerez-Saiz@;LZhang2@;RIyer@*Datarelatingto

Swiftmessagingflowsispublishedwithpermissionof

S.W.I.F.T.SCRLSWIFT©2023undera‘BIPartnership’framework.Becausefinancialinstitutions

havemultiplemeanstoexchangeinformationabouttheirfinancialtransactions,Swiftstatisticsdonotrepresentcompletemarket

orindustrystatistics.Swift

disclaimsallliabilityfor

anydecisionbased,infullorinpart,

onSwiftstatistics,andfor

theirconsequences.WORKING

PAPERSCurrency

Usage

for

Cross-BorderPaymentsPreparedbyHectorPerez-Saiz,

LongmeiZhang,and

RoshanIyer11

Theauthors

wouldlike

to

thankJoseMarzluffor

outstandingresearchassistance,

andHelgeBerge,

MartinČihák,DongHe,AstridThorsen,FabiánValenciaandIMFdepartmentsfor

veryhelpfulcomments.IMF

WORKING

PAPERSCurrency

UsageforCross-BorderPaymentsContentsIntroduction

3Data

Sources

5SwiftData5Country-LevelData

7DatabyPairsofCountries

7Patterns

of

Currency

Usage9Empirical

Analysis

12Hypothetical

Simulations

18Conclusion21Annex

I.

Statistics

for

Main

Variables

23References24FIGURES1.SwiftMessagesMT10362.SwiftMessagesMT70063.ShareofWorldCurrenciesOvertheYears(SwiftMessagesMT103andMT202)94.NumberofCurrenciesUsedforCross-BorderPayments95.DistributionoftheConcentrationofCurrencyUsageAcrossCountries(HHIIndex)116.CrossCountryDistribution

ofSwiftPayments

117.DynamicProjectionofMarketShareGrowthforRMB,ChangesinLegalTenderStatus

198.DynamicProjectionofMarketShareGrowthforOTHandRMB,ChangesinPoliticalProximity20TABLES1.MainVariablesandData

BasesUsed

inEmpiricalModel82.RegressionResults,CurrencybyCurrency,Transfer-relatedMessages(MT103andMT202)

133.RegressionResults,PooledPanelofCurrencies,Transfers(MessagesMT103andMT202)154.RegressionResults,CurrencybyCurrency,Trade-relatedMessages(MT400andMT700)

165.RegressionResults,PooledPanelofCurrencies,Trade-relatedMessages(MessagesMT400andMT700)17INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND2IMF

WORKING

PAPERSCurrency

UsageforCross-BorderPaymentsIntroductionCross-border

payments

are

at

the

heart

of

the

international

monetary

system

(IMS).Theyenabletheexchangeofgoodsandservicesbetweennations,the

settlementoffinancialcontractsbetweencorporationsacrossbordersandthechannelingofinternationalaid.Byfacilitatingcross-bordertransactions,theIMSis

thebackboneofglobalizationintradeandfinance.The

currency

configuration

for

cross-border

payments

is

dominated

by

the

U.S.

dollar

and

the

euro.Whiletherearemorethan150currenciesintheworldthataredeemedlegaltender,cross-borderpaymentsmainlyconcentrateinasmallnumberofcurrencies.Asof

end2021,theU.S.dollaraccountedforabout40percentofcross-borderSwiftflows,followed

closelyby

theeuro.Afewothercurrencies,theBritishpound,theJapaneseyen,theAustralian

dollar,theHongKongdollar,andtheCanadiandollar,alsohaveashareofmorethan1percent.TheChineserenminbi(RMB),theonlyreservecurrencyissuedbyanemergingmarket,1

hasalsogainedtraction

inrecent

yearswithitssharerisingto

about2.5percent.The

payment

landscape

is

closely

interrelated

with

other

facets

of

the

IMS.

Moneyperformsthreedistinctfunctions,as

amediumofexchange,aunitofaccount,andastoreofvalue.TheU.S.dollarusuallyplaysavehiclecurrencyroleintrade

invoicing,pricingoffinancialassets,and

centralbankreserves.Thisis

becauseacurrency’sroleas

aunitofaccountforinvoicingdecisionsis

complementarytoitsuse

asasafestoreofvalue,andthiscomplementaritycanleadtotheemergenceofasingledominantcurrencyin

tradeinvoicingandglobalbanking(GopinathandStein,2021).Thedominantcurrencyparadigmhasrecentlycometotheforefrontofpolicydebate,raisingquestionsonthebenefitsofexchangerateflexibilityforexternaladjustment(Gopinathetal,2020;Adleretal,2020).Historically

the

IMS

has

undergone

profound

but

slow

transformations.

Inthepasttwohundredyears,theIMShastransitionedfromthesterlingdominanceunderthegoldstandardinthepre-warperiod,tothecoequalstatusofthesterlingandtheU.S.dollarintheinter-waryears,tothefulldominanceoftheU.S.dollar,whichwasinstitutionalizedundertheBrettonWoodssystemandremaineddeeplyentrenchedaftertheBrettonWoodssystembrokedownin1973(Eichengreen,2008).

Morerecently,theadventof

theeuroandtheriseofChinahasspurreddiscussionsonapotentialmultipolarsystem,wheretheU.S.dollar,

euro,andtheRMBwouldsharetheroleofinternationalcurrencies(Eichengreen,2011,2017;Subramanian,2011;PrasadandYe,2012).Recent

technological

and

geopolitical

changes

may

bring

faster

changes

to

the

IMS.HistoricallythehighdegreeofinertiaoftheIMSlargelyreflectsthe

strongnetworkeffectsandswitchingcosts(Eichengreen,2008).Thesetwofactorscouldbesignificantlyalteredbythedigitalrevolutionandrecentgeo-politicaltensions.Digitalization

couldsubstantiallyreduce

switchingcosts,increasecurrencycompetition,andpromotetheinternationalizationofnewcurrencies(Brunnermeieretal,2019).Similarly,geo-politicaltensionsmaybreakdownexistingpaymentnetworksintoseparateblocs,weakentheincumbentadvantage,andfacilitate

systemchanges.1

Therenminbihasbeenincludedin

theSpecialDrawingRights

basketsince

2015,

alongwiththeU.S.dollar,

theeuro,theJapaneseyen,andtheBritishpound.INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND3IMF

WORKING

PAPERSCurrency

UsageforCross-BorderPaymentsDigital

money

and

payment

systems

will

be

at

the

forefront

of

the

potential

radicalchange

of

the

IMS(IMF,

2020

and

2022;

BIS,

2022).

Digitalpaymentshave

alreadystartedtoplayadominantroleinpartsoftheworld,suchasWechatandAlipayinChina,ormobilemoneyinAfrica(M-Pesaandothers).Theintroductionofcryptoassets(includingtheso-calledstablecoins)hasattractedincreasedattentionfrompolicymakers(IMF,2023).Also,centralbankdigitalcurrencies(CBDCs)could

affectboththecross-borderpaymentinfrastructureandcurrencyconfiguration(IMF,2020).Currently,

international

payments

are

mainly

conducted

via

financial

intermediaries,

such

as

banks,and

cross-border

financial

infrastructures.

TheSocietyforWorldwideInterbankFinancialTelecommunication(Swift)is

theleadingglobalmessagingplatformforcross-borderbankingtransactionsandhasamembershipofmorethan11,000institutionsinover200countriesandterritories.InadditiontoSwift,China,India,andRussiahavealsodevelopedtheirownfinancialinfrastructuresforcross-borderpayments,suchasCIPS,UPIandSPFS.AsofJanuary2023,thenumberofparticipatingbanksinthesealternativeplatformsremainslimited,andtheirmarketshareisverysmall.Withtheincreasinguse

ofcryptoassetsincross-bordertransactions,particularlyforremittances,alternativepaymentprovidersbuiltonblockchaintechnologyhaveemerged,althoughtherecentdeclinein

cryptoasset

valuationsorthefailureofvariousrelevantactorshaveintensifiedtheneedforeffectivepoliciestowardtheseassets(IMF,2023).This

paper

contributes

to

the

literature

by

studying

the

factors

that

determine

a

country’s

currencyusage

for

cross-border

payments.

Byaggregatingtransaction

leveldataprovidedbySwift,weexaminecurrencyusageforcross-bordertransactionsforeachcountrypairandinvestigatethedriversofcurrencyusageacrosscountriesand

overtime.GiventhewidecoverageofSwift,thetransactiondatausedinouranalysiscoversmostoftheuniverseofcross-borderpayments.Our

findings

show

that

inertia,

legal

tender

status,

and

political

proximity

play

a

major

role

indetermining

currency

usage.

Inlinewiththeliterature,wefindasignificantdegree

ofinertiaincurrencyusageforcross-borderpayments,reflectingthestrongnetworkeffectsandswitchingcosts.Notably,ourresultsshowthatpoliticalproximitycanalsoaffectthe

currencyusage,alongwithgeographicproximity,andotherculturalfactors.Finally,wefindarelativelylargepositive

effectofthelegaltenderstatus,whichcouldboostthecurrencyusagesignificantly.

Tradetiesorfinanciallinkagesdonotappeartohaveamajorimpactoncurrencychoices.Additionally,

we

perform

several

forecasting

simulations

to

better

understand

the

role

of

thesevariables

in

shaping

the

future

IMS.

Usingatwenty-yearhorizonforecast,wefindthatrelativelyminorbutsustainedchangesinpoliticaldistanceorlegaltenderstatusovertheyearscouldelevatetheshareofalternativecurrenciesinselectedcountries.However,theaggregateeffectontheglobalcurrencylandscapedoesnotappeartobesubstantialasthemajorityofpaymentvolumesarechanneled

throughlargeeconomies,mostlyadvanced,whicharenotlikelytobeaffectedby

changesinlegaltenderstatusandothervariables.Our

paper

provides

preliminary

insights

on

possible

future

evolution

of

the

IMS.

Theseresultssuggestthatdespiterecenttechnologicalandgeo-politicaltrends,

asubstantiallymorefragmentedinternationalmonetarysystemwouldbeunlikelyinthenearterm.Thesubstantialinertiaofthesystemdrivenbylargenetworkeffectsorhighswitchingcosts,ortherelativelyslow-movinggeo-politicaland

regulatorychangeswouldnotcontributetoadrasticchangeintheglobalpaymentslandscape.INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND4IMF

WORKING

PAPERSCurrency

UsageforCross-BorderPaymentsNevertheless,

the

impact

of

new

technologies

remains

highly

uncertain,

and

a

much

more

rapid

geo-political

evolution

than

expected

could

accelerate

the

transformation

of

the

IMS.

Abroaderintroductionofcrypto-assetsas

legaltendercouldweakentheroleoffiatmoneyandsignificantlyimpacttheIMS.Atthesametime,adecisiveeffortbycentralbankstodigitalize

publicmoney,orintroduceCBDCs,couldalsofacilitaterapidcurrencyconfigurationchangesbyreducingswitching

costsandthedegreeofinertiainthesystem,thoughtheimpactremainshighlyuncertain.More

abruptgeo-politicalchangescouldalsoacceleratethefragmentationofthepaymentsystemandgiveriseto

newcurrencyblocs.Data

SourcesSwift

DataSwift

was

founded

in

1973

to

provide

secure

financial

messaging

services

for

cross-border

payments.Today,Swiftisusedbyover

11,000institutionsinmorethan200countriesandterritoriesaroundtheworld.Swiftrepresentstheprimarycommunicationchannelforcorporates,financialinstitutions,andmarketinfrastructurestosettle

internationalfinancialpayments,securities,foreignexchangetransactions,

treasuryoperations,andtradeflows.Swift

messages

are

categorized

by

standardized

codes

to

dispel

any

ambiguity

about

the

nature

offinancial

transactions

between

institutions.

Thereare

ninecategoriessuchascustomerpaymentsandchecks,financialinstitutiontransfers,treasurymarkets,anddocumentarycreditsand

guarantees.Eachofthesecategoriescontainsseveraltypesofmessages.

A

Swiftmessage

startswithan

identifier(MT)andisfollowedbya3-digitnumber

thatrepresentscategory,group,andtype.2The

Swift

Watch

solution

provides

access

to

monthly

data

going

back

to

2010.Thedataisaggregatedatcountrylevelwithcompleteanonymityof

individualserviceusers.EachobservationcontainstheSwiftmessagecode,ordering/sendingandbeneficiary/receivingcountries,thecurrencyofthetransaction,anditscorrespondentU.S.dollarvalue.This

paper

constructs

two

sets

of

Swift

datasets,

the

transfer

dataset

and

the

trade

dataset.ThetransferdatasetincludesSwiftmessageswiththecodesMT1033

andMT202whicharedefinedrespectivelyas“singlecustomercredittransfers”and“generalfinancialinstitutionstransfer”.4

Ingeneral,theseSwifttransactionsfortransfersmayinvolveuptofourfinancialinstitutions:a)thebankoftheoriginalorderingentity,which

isorderingthetransferpayment;b)theintermediarybank,whichmayhandlethe

actualcross-bordertransferofthefunds;c)thereceiving

intermediarybank,whichmayreceivethefundsonbehalfof

thebeneficiarybank;andd)thebeneficiarybank,

whichholdstheaccountoftheultimaterecipientofthetransferpayment.

Figure1showsthefourfinancialinstitutionsthatcouldbe

involved

inaSwifttransactionwithcodeMT

103,althoughmosttransactionsareeitherdirectorinclude

justoneintermediary.2

TheMTmessagingformatwillbeprogressivelyreplacedby

theMXformatthatiscompliantwiththeISO20022standard,

whichisalsobeingadoptedinotherPayment

MarketInfrastructures(PMIs).

Thereisalsoaplannedtransitionin

Swiftto

theCross-borderPaymentsandReportingPlus

(CBPR+)specification.3

TheseincludeMT

103,MT

103+,

andMT103R4

SwiftStandards

MT

Guide2023INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND5IMF

WORKING

PAPERSCurrency

UsageforCross-BorderPaymentsFigure

1.

Swift

Messages

MT

103The

trade

dataset

also

includes

Swift

messages

with

codes

MT

400

and

MT

700.

Thesearetrade-relatedmessagesdefinedas“documentarycollections”and“standbylettersofcredit”,respectively.AccordingtotheUniformCustomsandPracticeforDocumentaryCreditsrulesestablishedby

theInternationalChamberofCommerce(ICC),importersusuallyobtainaletterofcreditfromabanktoimportmerchandisegoodsagainstafixedtransactionfeeandinterest.Aftertheletterofcreditis

obtained,theissuingbanksendsanMT700messagetothebankoftheexportertoindicatethetermsoftheletterofcredit.Against

thisguarantee,theexporterthenshipsthemerchandisegoodstotheimporterandproducesthenecessaryshippingdocumentationrepresentingthetitletothegoods.Theissuingbankthencheckstheshippingdocumentationagainsttherequirementsundertheletterofcreditbefore

makingthepaymenttotheexporter’sbank.TheMT400messagerepresentsalesscommonformoftradefinancingwheretheshipping/ownershipdocumentsaretransferredtotheimporter’sbank,whichreleasesthemto

theimporteronlyoncetheimporterhaspaidtheexporterfortheimportedgoods.AccordingtoNiepmannandSchmidt-Eisenlohr(2017),documentarycollections(MT400messages)financed1.8percentofworldtradein2013,comparedwith13percentoflettersofcredit(MT700messages).Figure2showsthetypicalflowsandinstitutionstypicallyinvolvedinaSwifttransactionwithcodeMT700.Figure

2.

Swift

Messages

MT

700Source:Cartonet

al,

2020INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND6IMF

WORKING

PAPERSCurrency

UsageforCross-BorderPaymentsCountry-Level

DataWe

use

several

country-level

databases

in

our

empirical

analysis

(see

Table

1).

Grossdomesticproduct,inflationandmonetaryaggregatesareobtainedfromtheIMF’sWorldEconomicOutlook(WEO)database.TheBaselAML

indexis

producedbytheBaselInstituteofGovernance.5

Itaimstoassesstheriskofmoneylaunderingorterroristfinancingandaimstoactasaproxyindicatorofthequalityoffinancialsectorlegislationincountries,withtheassumptionthatcountrieswithbetter

regulationhavehigherlevelsoftradeandtransactions.6

TheFinancialDevelopmentIndexis

producedbytheIMF7

toassessthe

depth,efficiency,andaccessoffinancialsystemsofcountries,withtheexpectationthathigherlevelsoffinancialdevelopmentincreasetheleveloftradeandtransactions.TheAnnualReportonExchangeArrangementsandExchangeRestrictions(AREAER)databasebytheIMF8

providesacontrolforthetypesofcurrency,legaltenderstatus,andexchangerateregimesofcountries.9We

also

include

default

probabilities

at

the

country

level.TheprobabilityofdefaultfromtheNationalUniversityof

SingaporeCreditResearchInitiative10

providesanindicatorofcreditworthinessofacountry’sfirmswiththeexpectationthatcountrieswithlowerprobabilitiesofdefaulthavehigherlevelsoftradeandtransactions.Thisis

similarto

thesovereignratingsvariablefromS&PGlobalRatingswithafocusongovernmentcreditworthiness.Data

by

Pairs

of

CountriesVariables

specified

by

pairs

of

countries

are

detailed

inTable

1.

Theyessentiallyaccountforvariousfactorsthatimpactthe

level

oftransactionsandtradebetweenpairsofcountriesand

havebeenoftenusedinstandardgravitymodelsinthetradeliterature.Thebilateralshareofthestockofforeign

directinvestmentandportfolioinvestmentisobtainedfromtheIMF’sCoordinatedDirectInvestmentSurvey11

(CDIS),andtheCoordinatedPortfolioInvestmentSurvey12

(CPIS),respectively.Theseprovidetheannuallevelofassetsandliabilitiesbetweenall

countrypairsandareusedtocontrolfortheleveloffinancialtransactionsbetweencountrypairs,withtheexpectationthatcountrieswithhigherlevelsofdirectinvestmentandportfolioinvestmentsharesalsohavehigherlevelsoftradeandtransactions.The

political

proximity

indicator

is

based

on

the

United

Nations

voting

patterns

data

from

the

HarvardDataverse.13

Itprovidesthedegreeofcorrelationbetween

countries’votingpatternsin

theUnitedNations,5

/basel-aml-index6

TheBaselAMLIndexisnotendorsedby

theIMFExecutiveBoard,

and

it

does

not

assesscountriesfortechnicalcomplianceandeffectiveness

againstagloballyendorsedstandardandassessment

methodology.

Thecurrentroundofassessmentsofcountries’AML/CFTframeworkis

stillongoing,andcompletedatacoveringallcountriesisnotyet

available.7

/fdindex8

/Pages/Home.aspx9

About5%ofthecountry-yearobservationshavetwoormorecurrenciesthat

arelegaltender.Somecountries

alsohaveadoptedacurrencyfromathirdcountryas

legal

tender,

withoutbeingpartof

a

currencyunion(e.g.EcuadororEl

SalvadorwiththeU.S.dollar).10

/en/11

/cdis12

/cpis13

Voeten,Erik;Strezhnev,Anton;Bailey,Michael,

2009,"UnitedNations

GeneralAssemblyVotingData",

HarvardDataverse,V29,/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/LEJUQZINTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND7IMF

WORKING

PAPERSCurrency

UsageforCross-BorderPaymentsanditisusedtoprovideaproxyindicatorofpoliticalproximity,withtheexpectationthatpoliticallyclosercountrieshavehigherlevelsoftradeandtransactions.Thisis

anindicatorthathasbeenusedfordecadesbypoliticalscientistsandeconomiststomeasureforeignpolicypreferences(Ball,1951;Lijphart,1963;DreherandJensen,2007;AlesinaandDollar,2000;Baileyetal,2017).TradedataarefromtheIMF

DirectionofTradeStatistics,14

whichmeasurebilateralgoodstradebetweencountriesatbothquarterlyandannualfrequency.Exportsaremeasuredasthevalueofgoodsfreeonboard.Importsincludethecostof

insurance.Thevalueofexportsandimportsis

denominatedinU.S.dollarsusing

prevailingmarketexchange

rates.Lastly,

we

use

geographic

and

cultural

indicators

by

pairs

of

countries.

GeographicandhistoricindicatorsareobtainedfromtheGeoDistdatabaseoftheCentred'ÉtudesProspectivesetd'InformationsInternationales(CEPII)15

andprovidefurthercontrolswiththeexpectationthatcountrieswhichhavecloserculturalorgeographicrelationshipsexperiencehighertradeandtransaction

levels.Thesevariableshavealsobeenoftenusedinstandardgravitymodelsinthetradeliterature.Intheannex,wehaveincludedsomekeystatisticalinformationonthesedatabases.Table

1.

Main

Variables

and

Data

Bases

Used

in

Empirical

ModelStartVariableSourceFrequency

NotesDirection

of

valuesdateCross

borderpaymentsthroughSwiftSwift2010

Annual2001

Annual2001

AnnualInflowsandoutflows,by

pairsofcountriesBilateralsharesof

Foreign

CoordinatedDirectInvestmentDirect

Investmentstock

SurveyBilateralsharesofPortfolio

CoordinatedPortfolioInvestmentBilaterallevelsof

assetsandPairwisevariablePairwisevariableliabilities/Total

levelof

assetsandliabilitiesBilaterallevelsof

assetsandInvestmentstockSurveyliabilities/Total

levelof

assetsandliabilitiesAssessestherisk

ofmoneylaunderingand

Highervalue

indicatesalowerBaselAMLIndexBaselInstituteon

Governance2012

Annualterroristfinancing(ML/TF)aroundtheworldriskof

moneylaunderingandterroristfinancingRates

countriesbasedon

depth,access,andefficiencyof

theirfinancialinstitutionsandfinancialmarketsFinancialDevelopmentIndexAnnual1980Highervalue

indicatesabetterdevelopedfinancialsystemIMF(2year

lag)LegalTenderStatusandexchangerateregimesAREAER(IMF)1950

AnnualTrackstheexchangerateandtraderegimes

of

allcountriesIndicatorvariablesVoeten,Erik;Strezhnev,Anton;Bailey,Michael,2009,"UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyVotingData"Votingsimilarityindex:no.of

voteswhere

HighervaluesindicatescloserPoliticalProximity1946

Annualbothcountriesagree/Totalno.ofvotespoliticalproximityHighervalue

isworse

as

thereisahigherprob.of

defaultProbof

DefaultNUS-CRI1993

DailyHighervalue

indicatesaworsesovereignratingSovereignRatingS&PGlobalRatings1981

AnnualCentred'ÉtudesProspectivesetDistancebetweenCapitals

d'InformationsInternationales(CEPII)CEPIIFixed

FixedExpressedinkilometersIndicatorvariableBorderContiguityFixed

FixedFixed

FixedIndicatorvariableIndicatorvariableIndicatorvariableCommonOfficial

Language

CEPIIFormerColonialCEPIIFixed

FixedFixed

FixedRelationshipFormerCommonCountry

CEPIIIndicatorvariable14

/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B8515

Mayer

and

Zignago,

2011,INTERNATIONALMONETARYFUND8IMF

WORKING

PAPERSCurrency

UsageforCross-BorderPaymentsPatterns

of

Currency

UsageThere

are

more

than

150

different

currencies

in

the

world,

but

their

usage

greatly

varies

acrosscountries.

Figure3showstheevolutionglobalactivitysharesforcross-borderpayments(SwiftmessagesMT103andMT202)ofseveralmajorcurrenciesovertheyears.TheU.S.dollarandtheeurohavebeenconsistentlythetwodominantcurrenciesovertheyears,

withactivitysharescloseto

orabove40percent.TheRMBhassignificantlyincreaseditsactivityshareincross-borderpaymentsoverthelastdecade,butitsusageisstillverylow,andsimilarin

orderofmagnitudetotheBritishpound,Japaneseyenandothermajorcurrencies.Economically

larger

countries

or

countries

that

are

more

active

in

cross-border

payments

tend

to

usemore

currencies.

Figure4showsarepositive

correlation

betweenGDPorcross-borderpaymentsandthenumberofcurrenciesusedby

countries.However,sincetheusageofthegreatmajorityofcurrenciesisverylimited,mostcountries’usageisconcentratedonfewcurrencies.Figure5showsthedistributionofconcentrationratiosofcurrencyusageacrosscountriesusingtheHerfindahl–Hirschman(HHI)index.Themodeofthedistributionis

approximatelyequalto5,000,

whichwouldbeequivalentto