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NBERWORKINGPAPERSERIES

THEPERVASIVEINFLUENCEOFIDEOLOGYATTHEFEDERALCIRCUITCOURTS

AlmaCohen

WorkingPaper31509

/papers/w31509

NATIONALBUREAUOFECONOMICRESEARCH

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July2023

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ThePervasiveInfluenceofIdeologyattheFederalCircuitCourts

AlmaCohen

NBERWorkingPaperNo.31509

July2023

JELNo.D72,J15,J16,K0

ABSTRACT

Thispaperseekstocontributetothelong-standingdebateontheextenttowhichtheideologyoffederalcircuitcourtjudges,asproxiedbythepartyofthepresidentnominatingthem,canhelptopredictcaseoutcomes.Tothisend,Icombineandanalyzeanoveldatasetcontainingabout670,000circuitcourtcasesfrom1985to2020.Ishowthatthepoliticalaffiliationofjudgesisassociatedwithoutcomes,andthuscanhelptopredictthem,throughoutthevastuniverseofcircuitcourtcases–andnotonlyintheideologicallycontestedcasesonwhichpriorempiricalresearchhasfocused.

Inparticular,Ifindanassociationbetweenpoliticalaffiliationandoutcomesineachofsixcategoriesofcasesinwhichthetwolitigatingpartiescouldbeperceivedbyjudgestohaveunequalpower.Ineachofthesesixcasecategories,whichtogetheradduptomorethan550,000cases,themoreDemocraticjudgesapanelhas,thehighertheoddsofthepanelsidingwiththeseeminglyweakerparty.

Furthermore,Iidentifyevidenceofpolarizationovertimeincircuitcourtdecisions.Consistentwithsuchgrowingpolarization,intheimportantsubsetofpublishedcases,theidentifiedpatternsaremorepronouncedinthelasttwodecadesoftheexaminedperiodthanearlier.

Goingbeyondtheverylargesampleofcaseswithpartiesofseeminglyofunequalpower,Iidentifyhowpoliticalaffiliationcanhelptopredictoutcomesinmostofthecasesoutsidethissample.Inparticular,IshowthatpanelswithmoreDemocraticjudgesarelesslikelythanpanelswithlessDemocraticjudgestodefertothelower-courtdecisionincivilcasesbetweenprivatepartiesthatseemtobeofequalpower.Altogether,myanalysisshowsthatpoliticalaffiliationcanhelptopredictoutcomesinover90%ofcircuitcourtcases.

Overall,myresultshighlightthepervasivenesswithwhich–andthearrayofwaysthroughwhich–thepoliticalaffiliationofjudgescanhelptopredicttheoutcomeofcircuitcourtcases.

AlmaCohen

HarvardLawSchool

1525MassachusettsAvenue

Cambridge,MA02138

andNBER

alcohen@

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I.Introduction

Usingalargesampleofabout670,000circuitcourtcasesfromtheperiod1985–2020,thispaperinvestigatestheextenttowhichtheideologicalinclinationsofcircuitcourtjudges,asproxiedbythepartyoftheU.S.presidentnominatingthem,canhelptopredicttheoutcomesofcircuitcourtcases.Myanalysisshowsthatpoliticalappointmentcanhelptopredictoutcomesinavastlylargeruniverseofcasesthanhasbeensuggestedbypriorresearch.Also,consistentwithgrowingpolarization,myanalysisshowsastrengtheningoftheidentifiedpatternsovertime.

Thereisalargeempiricalliteratureoncircuitcourtdecisions,andmuchofithasexaminedwhetherjudgesappointedbyDemocraticandRepublicanpresidents(hereafter“Democraticjudges”and“Republicanjudges,”respectively)systematicallydifferintheirdecisions.

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However,theliteraturehasgenerallyfocusedondocumentingsuchdifferencesinsmallsetsofpublishedcasesonsubjectsthatareideologicallycontestedorsalient.Forexample,oneearlyinfluentialstudydocumented“partyeffects”inasetofcasesinvolvingtheFirstAmendment,civilrights,laborrelations,andcriminalappeals(SongerandSue(1990)),andanotherinfluentialearlystudy(Revesz(1997))documentedsucheffectsinasetofcasesreviewingdecisionsbytheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency.Similarly,thesubsequentseminalworksofSunsteinetal.(2004,2006)identifiedsetsofcaseson“controversialissues”–suchasabortion,affirmativeaction,capitalpunishment,andsexdiscrimination–andcreatedadatasetof“ideologicalcases”thatmuchsubsequentliteratureused.Althoughmuchempiricalworkhasbeendoneintheinterveningyears,Iamunawareofanypriorstudythatidentifiedpervasivepartyeffectsthroughoutthevastuniverseofallcircuitcourtcases.

Explainingthefocusonthedomainsofideologicallycontestedcases,Sunsteinetal.(2004)explainedthat“outsideofsuchdomains[RepublicanandDemocraticjudges]arefarlesslikelytodiffer.”Indeed,Sunsteinetal.reasonedthattheabsenceofpartyeffectsthattheyfoundinseveralsetsofideologicallycontroversialcasestheystudiedemphasizes“thelimitednatureoftheseeffects”andthattheforcesof“professionaldisciplineandlegalconsensus”canprecludesuch

1See,e.g.,Sunsteinetal.(2004,2006),FarhangandWawro(2004),CoxandMiles(2008),ChewandKelley(2009),Boydetal.(2010),andHall(2010)).Forbroaddiscussionsofthesubjectandtheliterature,seeEpstein,Landes,andPosner(2013)andBonicaandSen(2021).

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effectsfromshowingupinmanyotherareas.Theauthorsremainedagnosticonwhether“ideologicalvoting”mightbepresentin“apparentlynon-ideologicalcasesinvolving,forexample,bankruptcy,torts,andcivilprocedure,”andviewedansweringthisquestionasanimportantchallengeforfuturework.

Inthisstudy,Iseektocontributetomeetingthischallenge.IshowthatsystematicdifferencesbetweenDemocraticandRepublicanjudgescanbefoundinaverybroaduniverseofcircuitcourtcases.Knowingthepoliticalcompositionofthecircuitcourtpanelcanhelptopredictoutcomesinthegreatmajorityofcircuitcourtcases.Thus,notwithstandingtheforcesof“professionaldisciplineandlegalconsensus,”howpartiesfareincasesdecidedbyacircuitcourtdependssignificantlyonthe“luckofthedraw”–thepoliticalcompositionofthepanelrandomlyassignedtohearthecase.

Muchofmystudyfocusesonanalyzinghowpoliticalaffiliationcanhelptopredictoutcomesinsixcategoriesofcasesinwhichoneofthepartieshascharacteristicsthatcouldleadtoitsbeingperceivedbyjudgestobeweaker.Thesesixcategoriesofcasesadduptomorethanhalfamillioncases,orover80%ofcircuitcourtcases.IhypothesizethatDemocraticjudgesandRepublicanjudgessystematicallydifferintheirtendencytosidewiththeseeminglyweakerparty.ConsistentwiththisPro-weakhypothesis,IfindthatpanelswithmoreDemocraticjudgesaremorelikelytosidewith:

(i)non-institutionalprivatepartiesincivillitigationagainstinstitutionalprivateparties;(ii)privatepartiesincivillitigationagainsttheU.S.government;

(iii)convictedoffendersincriminalappealslitigatedwiththeU.S.government;(iv)immigrantsinlitigationagainstimmigrationagencies;

(v)prisonersservingasentenceinlitigationwiththegovernmentandprisons;and(vi)petitionersinhabeascorpusandotherpetitionsagainstpublicofficialsforwhichthecircuit

courtshaveoriginaljurisdiction.

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2Tothebestofmyknowledge,priorresearchhasnotexaminedwhetherpoliticalaffiliationcanhelptopredictoutcomesinfiveofmysixcategoriesofcases.Withrespecttothesixthcategoryofcriminalappeals,Sunsteinetal.(2004,2006)andHall(2010),usedasampleofabout1,000suchappealstoexaminewhetherDemocraticandRepublicanjudgessystematicallydifferintheirdecisionsinsuchcases.Sunsteinetal.(2004,2006)reportthattheydonot,butHall(2010)suggestedthattheydo.

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Ineachoftheabovesixcategoriesofcases,havingmoreDemocraticjudgesonthepanelisassociatedwithhigheroddsofaPro-weakoutcometoanextentthatisbothstatisticallysignificantandmeaningfulinsize.Moreover,thisPro-weaktendencyisshownnottobedrivenbythemeretendencyofDemocraticjudgestoreverselower-courtdecisions.Incaseswithaseeminglyweakparty,Democraticjudgesaremorelikelytoreversethelower-courtdecisionwhentheweakerpartyappealsthelower-courtdecision,andlesslikelytoreversethelower-courtdecisionwhenthestrongerpartyappealsthesedecisions.

Theidentifiedassociationisnotmerelystatisticallysignificantbutalsomeaningfulinmagnitude.Toillustrate,fortheapproximately550,000casesinthesixcategoriesofcasesasawhole,switchingfromanall-Republicanpaneltoanall-Democraticpanelisassociatedwithanincreaseof55%inthebaselineoddsofaPro-weakoutcome.Thus,theoddsofaPro-weakoutcomewouldverymuchdependonthepoliticalaffiliationsofthejudgesrandomlyassignedtothecase,andthusonthe“luckofthedraw.”

Ifindthatmyresultsregardingthisassociationarenotlimitedtocasesontopicsthatareideologicallycontested;infact,theyarepresentinthelargemajorityofcasesthatarenotonsuchtopics.Theseresultsindicatethatseemingly“non-ideological”cases–casesontopicsthatarenotideologicallycontestedorsalient–arecommonlystillideologicalinthesensethattheyinvolvedimensionsoraspectsthatjudgesofdifferentpoliticalaffiliationsaresystematicallylikelytoapproachorreacttodifferently.Inparticular,theresultsindicatethatDemocraticandRepublicanjudgeshavedifferentinclinationstowardperceivedinequalitiesofpowerbetweenlitigants–aspectsthatarepresentinavastnumberofcasesthatarenotaboutideologicallycontestedissues.Forthisreason,theideologicalleaningsofcircuitcourtjudgesareassociatedwithoutcomes,andcanhelptopredictthem,inalmostallcircuitcourtcases.

Ialsoexaminewhethertheidentifiedassociationandpredictivepowerarelimitedtopublishedcasesonwhichpriorresearchhastendedtofocus.Ifindthatthesepatternsaresignificantlypresentintheunpublishedcasesthatrepresentamajorityofcircuitcourtcases.Similarly,partitioningcasesbycircuitorbydecade,andpartitioningthelargesetofcriminalappealsbythetypeofoffense,Idonotfindanysignificantsetofcasesforwhichideologycannothelptopredictoutcomes.

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Inaddition,IaddressempiricallyachallengeputforwardbyHarryEdwards,theseniorchiefjudgeoftheD.C.CircuitCourtofAppeals,totheviewthatjudicialideologieshaveanon-negligiblepredictivepowerforcircuitcourtdecisions(seeEdwards1985,1998,andEdwardsandLivermore2009).Edwardspresentedevidencethatthevastmajorityofcircuitcourtcasesendupwithunanimousdecisionsandarguedthatthegenerallackofadissentingopinioninthisvastmajorityofcasesimpliesthattheypresentquestionsonwhichallcircuitcourtjudgesagree.Focusingexclusivelyoncaseswithunanimousdecisions,however,Ifindthatthepanelcompositioninthesecasesstillhelpspredictwhatdecisionisunanimouslyreached.Toillustrate,comparingthevastnumberofcasesinwhichall-Republicanandall-Democraticpanelsreachunanimousdecisions,therearesystematicdifferencesbetweenthedecisionsofthetwogroupsofpanels.Similarly,comparingthevastnumberofcasesinwhichmixed-partypanelsreachunanimousdecisions,therearesystematicdifferencesbetweentheunanimousdecisionsmadebymajority-Republicanpanelsandthosemadebymajority-Democraticpanels.

Myanalysisalsoseekstocontributetothelargeliteratureonpoliticalpolarizationovertimeand,inparticular,tothesmallerliteratureonwhetherpolarizationhasgrownovertimeinfederalcourtdecisions.Hazen(2019)discussesthegrowingpoliticizationovertimeoftheprocessforselectingfederaljudges,andEpsteinetal.(2015)andBonicaandSen(2021)documentgrowingpolarizationovertimeinSupremeCourtdecisions.Tothebestofmyknowledge,however,mystudyisthefirsttoempiricallyinvestigatethepresenceofpolarizationovertimeincircuitcourtdecisions.IshowthatthesystematicdifferencesthatIidentifybetweenthedecisionsofDemocraticandRepublicancircuitcourtjudgesbecamestrongerinthepasttwodecadesthanintheprecedingperiod.

Myanalysisconcludesbyshowingthepresenceofanassociationbetweenpoliticalaffiliationandoutcomesincasesbeyondthoseinwhichoneofthelitigatingpartiesisseeminglyweakerthantheother.Ishowthatpoliticalaffiliationcanhelptopredictoutcomesinasampleofabout80,000civilappealsforwhichIwasunabletoidentifycasedimensionsthatmakeonepartyseeminglyweakerthantheother.Thissampleconsistsofcivillitigationbetweentwoinstitutionalprivatepartiesandcivilcasesbetweentwonon-institutionalprivateparties.Forcaseswithoutanapparentinequalityinpowerbetweentheparties,IhypothesizethatthemoreDemocraticjudgesthepanelhas,thehighertheoddsofthepanelnotdeferringtothedistrictcourtdecisionandbeingopentoreversingit.

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ThisLess-deferencehypothesisisduetothepossibilitythatDemocraticandRepublicanjudgesmightattachdifferentweightstothecostsandbenefitsoflessdeferencetolower-courtdecisions.RelativetoRepublicanjudges,Democraticjudgesmightattachgreaterweighttothe“costs”ofleavinginplace“mistakes”inindividuallower-courtdecisions,ortheymightattachlowerweighttotheresource-savingefficiencygainsfromdeferencetodistrictcourtdecisions.TestingtheLess-deferencehypothesis,Ifindthattheoutcomesinthelargesampleofcaseswithpartiesofseeminglyequalpowerareconsistentwiththishypothesis.

Overall,myanalysisfindsthatpoliticalaffiliationsareassociatedwithoutcomesandcanthushelptopredictoutcomesinover95%ofcircuitcourtdecisions.Theseresultshighlighttheimportanceofideologicalleaningsasproxiedbypoliticalaffiliationforpredictingcircuitoutcomes,aswellasthearrayofwaysinwhichsuchideologicalleaningsmightaffectoutcomes.Theassociationbetweenpoliticalaffiliationandoutcomesisfarmorepervasive,Ishow,thanhasbeendocumentedbypriorresearch.

MyabilitytocontributetotheliteratureinthewaysdiscussedaboveisfacilitatedbythelargedatasetthatIcompiledforthisstudy.Mostpriorempiricalstudiesoncircuitcourtshaveusedsmallsamplesofpublishedcases,

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withasignificantnumberofstudiesusingthesampleofabout5,000publishedcasescompiledbySunsteinetal.(2006),

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andasignificantnumberofotherstudiesusingthesampleofabout22,000casescompiledbytheSongerProject(Songer(2008),KuerstenandHaire(2011)).

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RecentexceptionstothisuseofsmallsamplesarestudiesbyCarlsonetal.(2020),Battaglinietal.(2022),andAshetal.(2023),

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buteachofthesestudiesfocusesondifferentquestionsfromtheonesexploredinthispaper.

3Studiesusingsuchsmallsamplesinclude,forexample,Boyd,Epstein,andMartin(2010),Epstein,Landes,andPosner(2011),Kastellec(2013),GlynnandSen(2015),Sen(2015),Szmer,Songer,andBowie

(2016),andSchorppandReidd(2017).

4ThesampleofSunsteinetal.(2006)isbasedonpublishedcasesthatsalientlyinvolveideologicalissues.

5TheSongerprojectisnamedforDonaldSonger,whoinitiallydirectedtheconstructionofthedatabase.Thedatabase,whichwassubsequentlyexpandedbyKuerstenandHaire,includesasampleofabout22,000publishedcasesduringthelongperiodof1925–2002,withcasesrandomlyselectedfromallthecircuitcourts./data.html.

6Carlsonetal.(2020)usestheCourtListenerportaltoconstructadatasetofabout150,000publishedcasesfromtheperiodof1970–2010.Battaglinietal.(2022)usesLtoconstructadatasetofabout50,000publishedcasesfromtheperiodof2004–2017.Ashetal.(2023)usesBloombergLawtocompilea

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Beforeproceeding,IwouldliketostressthatalthoughIfindsystematicdifferencesbetweenthedecisionsofDemocraticandRepublicanjudges,myanalysisdoesnottakeaviewonwhetheroneoftheapproachesisinsomewaybetter.Forexample,whileIfindthatDemocraticjudgesaremorelikelytosidewiththeweakpartyinlitigation,thedatadonottellus,andItakenoviewon,whetherDemocraticjudgesaretooprotective,orRepublicanjudgesareinsufficientlyprotective,ofsuchweakparties.Mycontributionismerelytoshowthatthetwotypesofjudgessystematicallydifferintheirdecisionsinlitigationbetweenpartiesthatcouldbeperceivedtobeunequalinpower,andthatpoliticalpartyeffectscanhelptopredicttheoutcomeinsuchcases.

Itisalsoworthstressingthatmyresultsdonotimplythatpoliticalaffiliationsfullydetermineoutcomes.Decisionsareundoubtedlylikelytobeinfluencedsubstantiallybylegaldimensions,suchasrelevantlegalrulesandprecedents,andonthefactualconclusionsreachedbythelowercourt.Politicalaffiliationsareshownbymyanalysisnottodetermineoutcomesbuttoinfluencethem.Thus,whereasknowingthepoliticalcompositiondoesnotenableustopredictwithcertaintythepanel’sdecisions,knowingthispoliticalcompositioncanhelptoassesstheoddsofparticularoutcomes.

Furthermore,whereasmyanalysisidentifieswaysinwhichpoliticalaffiliationcanhelptopredictoutcomes,therearegoodreasonstoexpectthatfutureworkmightbeabletoimproveonthispredictiveability.Myanalysisusesthepoliticalpartyofthenominatingpresidentasthe(noisy)measureofthepoliticalaffiliationofajudge,andfutureworkmightseektoemploymoreaccuratemeasuresforpoliticalleanings.Similarly,myanalysisusesverysimple,coarse,andeasilyobservablecharacteristicsofcasestoidentifypartiesthatcouldbeperceivedasweak,andfutureworkmightemployforitspredictivemodelricherandmoreaccuratemeasuresoftheimbalanceofpowerbetweenpartiesandadditionalaspectsofcases.Thecontributionofmypaperistoshowthatevenwhenusingasimpleandnoisymeasureofideologicalleaningsandusingsimpleandnoisymeasuresoftherelativepowerofpartiestolitigation,ideologicalleaningscannonethelesshelptopredictoutcomesinavastnumberofcasesbelongingtothesecategories.

Theremainderofthepaperisorganizedasfollows:SectionIIdiscussestheinstitutionalbackground.SectionIIIdiscussesmydatasourcesandcodingprotocolsandprovidessummary

datasetofabout380,000publishedcasesfromtheperiodof1890–2013.Thesampleofcircuitcourtcasesusedinmystudyseemstobesignificantlylargerthananythathasbeenusedbypriorstudies.

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statistics.SectionsIV–VIIpresentmyempiricalanalysis,andSectionVIIIconcludes.Finally,inadditiontothetablesincorporatedinthetextofthispaper,theAppendixincludesanumberofsupplementaltables.

II.InstitutionalBackground

A.TheFederalCourtsofAppeals

TheU.S.federalcourtssystemhasthreemainlevels.Thefirstlevelconsistsofthefederaldistrictcourts.Asoftheendof2020,therewere620activedistrictcourtjudgesand479seniordistrictcourtjudges,whoheldtrialsinninety-fourdistrictsandmadedecisionsinabout420,000casesduring2020.Casesbroughttothedistrictcourtsareheardbyasinglejudge,andtheymayormaynothaveajury.Eachfinalrulingbyadistrictcourtcanbeappealedtothecourtofappealsinthefederaljudicialcircuitinwhichthedistrictcourtislocated.

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Thesecondlevelisthatofthecircuitcourts,whicharethefederalcourtsofappeals.Theninety-fourdistrictcourtsareorganizedintotwelveregionalcircuitcourtsofappeals.Inaddition,theCourtofAppealsfortheFederalCircuithasnationwidejurisdictiontohearappealsincertaintypesofcases.Asoftheendof2020,180activeand120seniorcircuitcourtjudgesservedinthecircuitcourts,andthesejudgesmadedecisionsinabout50,000casesduring2020.Thegreatmajorityofcasesheardbycircuitcourtsareappealsofdistrictcourtdecisions.Inaddition,circuitcourtshearsomecasesthatrepresentappealsofdecisionsbyspecialfederaltrialcourts,suchastheTaxCourt,immigrationcourts,patentcourts,orbankruptcycourts,aswellasarelativelysmallnumberofcasesforwhichthecircuitcourtshaveoriginaljurisdiction,suchashabeascorpuscases.InthelargedatasetofcircuitcourtcasesIcompiled,appealsofdistrictcourtdecisionsincivilandcriminalcasesrepresentabout55%and31%ofthecases,respectively,appealsoverdecisionsbyfederaladministrativecourtsandfederalbankruptcycourtsrepresentabout11%and2%ofthecases,respectively,andoriginaljurisdictioncasesrepresentabout2%.

ThethirdlevelisthatoftheU.S.SupremeCourt,thehighestcourtoftheland.AmajorityofcasesintheSupremeCourtareappealsofdecisionsbythecircuitcourtsthattheSupremeCourt

7Inrarecases,theappealmaybebroughtdirectlytotheU.S.SupremeCourt.

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electstoreview.TheSupremeCourtconsidersonlyatinynumberofcaseseachyear,andthusonlyaminusculefractionofcasesconsideredbythecircuitcourtsreachtheU.S.SupremeCourt;in2020,forexample,theSupremeCourtissueddecisionsinaboutseventycases.AccordingtoBonicaandSen(2021),becausetheSupremeCourtmakesdecisionsinonlyaminusculefractionoffederalcases,circuitcourtanddistrictcourtdecisionscanbeviewedasthe“breadandbutter”ofthefederalcourtssystem.

B.FederalJudges

AllfederaljudgesareselectedbytheU.S.presidentandconfirmedbytheSenate.Thisisthecasebothforjudgesofthecircuitcourtsofappealsandforthejudgesofthefederaldistrictcourts.Federaljudgesarenominatedforlifeandarerarelyremovedbyimpeachment.Federaljudgesthusgenerallyserveuntiltheyresign,retire,orpassaway.

Inbothcircuitcourtsanddistrictcourts,activejudgesrefertojudgeswhoareservingonafull-timebasis.Whenjudgesretire,incertaincircumstances,theymayandoftenchoosetotakeonaseniorstatusandcontinuetohearcasesonapart-timebasis.

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Seniorjudgeshavethesameresponsibilitiesasactivejudges,exceptthattheyhaveareducedcaseloadandsomeflexibilityinmanagingtheirworkload.Whenajudgetakesaseniorstatus,thiscreatesavacancyonthecourtthatcanbefilled.Afterthenumberofactivecircuitcourtjudgesstoppedexpandingaround1990,federalcourtssoughttoencouragelong-servingjudgestotakeonaseniorstatusinordertoincreasethenumberofjudgeswhocanhearcases.Amongotherthings,judgesassumingthisseniorstatusareeligibletomaintaintheirchambersandstaffandenjoyconsiderablefinancialbenefitsaslongastheymaintainaworkloadofatleast25%ofanactivejudge’sworkload.

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Manystudiesintheliterature(see,e.g.,Nagal(1961),Ashenfelteretal.(1995),ChewandKelley(2008),CoxandMiles(2008),CohenandYang(2019),Huangetal.(2019),andLie(2020))assume,forthepurposesofanalysis,thatallfederaljudgesare“affiliated”withthe

8Ajudgemayleaveregularactiveserviceandbecomeaseniorjudgeifthejudgesatisfiestwoconditions:

(i)thejudgeissixty-fiveorolderand(ii)thejudge’sageplusthejudge’syearsofserviceonthebenchexceedeighty.Regardlessofage,thejudgemusthaveservedatleasttenyearstoqualifyforseniorstatus.

9SeeLevy(2021)foradiscussionofthebenefitsofferedtojudgestakingonseniorstatus.

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politicalpartyofthepresidentwhonominatedthem.Thisassumptionisbasedonthebeliefthatthepresidentsprefertonominatecandidateswhoseviews,connections,andaffiliationsalignatleastsomewhatwithmembersofthepresident’sparty.BonicaandSen(2021)attributethewideuseofthepartyofthenominatingpresidenttothesimplicityofthismeasure,aswellastotheevidence(SegalandSpaeth(2002))thatthismeasureprovidesastrongpredictorofthedecisionsofSupremeCourtjusticesacrossavarietyofsubjectmatters.Followingthisapproachoftheliterature,Iusetheterm“Republicanjudges”torefertojudgesnominatedbyaRepublicanpresident,and“Democraticjudges”torefertojudgesnominatedbyaDemocraticpresident.Duringthestudyperiod,servingcircuitcourtanddistrictcourtjudgesinthedatawerenominatedbyoneofthethirteenpresidentsfromFranklinD.RooseveltthroughDonaldJ.Trump.

Althoughthismethodofclassifyingthepoliticalideologyoffederaljudgesseemstobethemostcommon,alternativemeasuresforjudicialideologyhavebeenputforwardbysomestudiesintheliterature,

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andfutureworkcouldusesuchmeasurestofurtherexaminethequestionsIconsider.

C.CircuitCourtPanels

Unlikeinthedistrictcourts,wheremostcasesareheardbyonedistrictcourtjudge,mostcircuitcourtcasesareheardbyapanelofthreejudges.Inaverysmallnumberofcases,whichareexcludedfrommyanalysis,casesareheardenbanc–i.e.,reviewedbyallactivejudgesinthespecificcircuit.Three-memberpanelsconsistofactiveandseniorjudges.Inasmallnumberofcases,thepanelalsoincludesavisitingjudgefromanothercircuitorfromanotherdistrictcourt,whoisassignedtemporarilytoaspecificcaseorforaspecificperiodoftime.

Theworkingpremiseoftheempiricalliteratureoncircuitcourtsisthatjudgesarerandomlyassignedtopanelsandthatcasesarealsorandomlyassignedtopanels.Examplesofthemanystudiesthatarebasedo