GTA-G20贸易政策概况2023（英）

G20TradePolicyFactbook

2023Edition

TheindependentGlobalTradeAlertisapillaroftheSwiss-

based

St.GallenEndowmentforProsperityThroughTrade

September2023

Contents

ExecutiveSummary

3

WhybothertrackingthetradepoliciesofG20members?

4

RecentDevelopmentsinG20CommercialPolicy

Figure1:WhichG20membersadoptedtheworsttradepolicymixessincethe2022BaliSummit?Indonesia

implementedthemostdiscriminatorymix,Canadatheleast

5

Figure2:

TradereformsbyG20membersareup10%thisyear—tradedistortionsaredown2%.Butthelatterstilloutnumber

theformerbymorethan3-to-17

Figure3:

MarketAccessthreatstoG20economiesreverttothepre-COVIDpattern—subsidyawardstoimport-competing

firmsaccountforasmallerpercentagein2023thanin2020to20228

Figure4:SincetheBalisummit,fourtimesasmuchgoodstradewasatriskfromnewharmfulG20tradepolicies

thannewtradereforms

10

Figure5:Intra-G20commercialpolicydynamicssincetheBaliSummit:WhichG20membershaveharmedand

benefitedfellowG20membersthemostoftenandthemostintermsofgoodstrade?

11

Figure6:BeyondthenewEUsanctionsonRussiangoodsexports,

G20membersrarelysingleouteach

other’sexportsfortraderestrictions14

Figure7:DespiteGVCtradebeingafocusofIndia’sG20Presidency,sincetheBaliSummitlargesharesofintermediate

goodsimportsbytheG20werecoveredbynewmeasuresthatdiscouragedcross-bordersourcing

15

GeopoliticsandG20TradePolicymaking

Figure8:

Therevivalofindustrialpolicyfavouritism:Marketaccessatriskduetosubsidies,localisationandpublic

procurementmeasures17

Figure9:

Exportsatriskduetoexportcontrolsimposedsincethe2022BaliSummit18

Figure10:

HavefoodsecurityconcernsreallyinfluencedG20tradepolicydecisions?SincetheBaliSummit

whichG20membershavefacilitatedorimpededthecross-bordersourcingoffoodthemost?20

Figure11:

Commercialpolicyandthescrambleforcriticalminerals—theG20Presidentisthemostactive

liberaliseroftradepolicytowardscriticalminerals21

Figure12:Frenemies?SeveralG20memberstakecommercialpolicyactionsthatharmtheinterestsofsignatories

toregionaltradeagreements

22

Figure13:DodemocraciesorautocraciesposethegreaterthreattoG20exports?Doestheincidenceof

eachG20member’sharmfulcommercialpoliciesfallmoreondemocraciesoronautocracies?

23

TheContributionofG20TradePolicytoSustainableDevelopment

Figure14:

Environmentalgoodsmarketaccessatrisksincethe2022BaliSummit—theEUaccountsformostof

theincrease25

Figure15:

LowCarbonTechnologymarketaccessatrisksincethe2022BaliSummit—theEUaccountsfor

mostoftheincrease26

Figure16:IndiaprioritisedtradeandsustainabilityduringitsPresidency—ItturnsoutthatsincetheBaliSummit

lessthan40%ofG20trademeasureshadapositiveimpactontheSDGs

27

3

ExecutiveSummary

AnynotionthattheG20actsasaneffectiveforcetoalignitsmembers’tradeandindustrialpoliciescanbedis-carded.Onthebasisoftheirtrade,investment,industrial,andsubsidypolicychoicestakensincetheG20Lead-ers’SummitinBali,G20membershavelittleincommon.

ComparingthetradepolicymixesofG20membersintheIndonesianandIndianG20Presidenciessupportsthisconclusionandrevealsbigshiftsinpolicymix.AsFigure1shows,perhapsbecauseitwasunderscrutinyasG20Presidentlastyearandnotthisyear,Indonesiamovesfrombestinclasstoworstinclass.DuringtheIndianG20Presidency,ChinahadthefifthmostdiscriminatorytradepolicymixwhereasundertheIndonesianPresidencyitwasranked15th.Incontrast,duringthecurrentG20PresidencyCanada’stradepolicymixwasthemostliberalising.

ThisyeartheG20implemented10%moretradereforms,byfarthelargestproportionofwhichweretariffcuts(seeFigures2and3).G20tradedistortionsaredown2%thisyearandthepre-COVIDpatternofbeggar-thy-neigh-bourpolicieshasreturned—thatis,onemadeupofalargedoseofsubsidiestoimport-competingfirmscom-plementedbylimitsonforeignbiddingforstatecontractsandimporttariffincreases.SincetheBaliSummit,thetradepolicyreformstakenbytheG20coveredimportsworthUSD420billion—whereastheG20tradedistor-tionsthreatenedmorethanfourtimesasmuchgoodstrade,specifically,USD1850billion(seeFigure4).

SincetheBaliSummit,apartsanctionsagainstRussia,fewG20trademeasuressingleoutotherG20members.Havingsaidthat,UStrademeasuresthatharmonlyCanadacovered10%ofthelatter’sbilateralexportstotheUSA—morethantreblethecomparablepercentageforChina(3%).Meanwhile,EUpolicystepsthatharmonlyIndiaaffected5%oftheformer’simportsfromthelatterandEUmeasuresaffectingonlytheUKaffected4%ofbilateralexportsfromBritaintotheEU(seeFigure6).

InadditiontoanoverviewofG20tradepolicyactionssincetheBaliSummit,thisFactbookreportsoncertaingeopoliticalaspectsofG20tradepoliciesaswellasthedegreetowhichG20tradepolicychoicesarecontribut-ingtoSustainableDevelopment.Foreignmarketaccessatriskfromindustrialpolicymeasuresthatfavourlo-calfirmsispervasiveinChina,Russia,andtheUnitedStates(seeFigure7).Industrialpolicymeasuresthreatenforeignmarketaccessmostinmarketsforadvancedtechnologyproducts,dualusetechnologies,andlowcar-bontechnologiesinG20economies.

TheUnitedStatesstandsoutinitsresorttoexportcontrolsinsensitivesectors(seeFigure9).Japan,SouthKorea,andRussiaemployexportcontrolsinanumberofsuchsectorsbuttoalesserdegree.Meanwhile,nearly70%ofChineseexportsoflowcarbontechnologiesarecoveredbyBeijing’sexportcontrols.

Asfarasfoodinsecurityisconcerned,Brazil,IndiaandSouthKoreaaretheonlyG20memberswheretheirtradereformssincetheBaliSummitcovermoreoftheirfoodimportsthanmeasuresthatcrimpimports(seeFigure10).SinceG20Leaderslastmet,Argentina,Indonesia,andtheEuropeanUnionhavetakencommercialpolicystepsthatthreatenmorethanthree-quartersofthemarketaccesstotheiragriculturalmarkets.Suchstepsareinconsistentwithimprovingfoodsecurityfortheirpopulations.

Reducingtradebarriersfacilitatescross-bordersalesanddisseminationofenvironmentaltechnologiesandlowcarbontechnologies.SincethelastG20Leaders’Summit,onlythreeG20members(Australia,BrazilandTurkey)openedupmoretradeintheseproductsthanimpededforeignmarketaccess(seeFigures14and15).

TheIndianG20presidencylaidconsiderablestoreonpromotingSustainableDevelopment.Drawingonourpreviousworklinkingtrade,industrial,andsubsidypolicydevelopmentstosevenSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs),wecalculatedtheshareofeachG20member’smeasurestakensincetheBaliSummitthatim-provedandimpairedSDGtargets.TheincoherencebetweenG20tradeanddevelopmentpolicyislaidbareinFigure16.Lessthan40%ofeachG20member’scommercialpolicyinterventionsimprovedSDGtargets,suchasenhancingtheirpopulation’saccesstofoodandmedicines.Morethan30%ofthemeasurestakenbyArgen-tina,Australia,Japan,andTurkeyshiftedmarketforcesinwaysthatmakeithardertoattainSDGtargets.Incontrast,39.1%ofthepolicymeasurestakenbyChinasincetheBaliSummitarelikelytohaveenhancedtheirperformanceontheSDGs.Thisisfurtherevidencethattradepolicymakersintheworld’slargesteconomieshaveyettotakefullyonboardtheAgenda2030goalsagreedattheUnitedNations.

4

WhybothertrackingthetradepoliciesofG20members?

TherationalefortheG20TradePolicyFactbook

2023Edition

AnotherG20Summitbeckons,thistimewithIndiaasPresident.Asaninstitutionalgrouping,theG20ishavingabadyear.Recently,someofitsmembersdecidedtoexpandacompetingforum(theexpandedBRICS).Earlierintheyear,manyoftheprinciplesforbankrescuescreatedinG20-inspiredforaaftertheGlobalFinancialCrisishavebeendiscardedindealingwithbankingcrisesonbothsidesoftheAtlantic.Mostrecently,theChinesegovernmenthasconfirmedthatforthefirsttimeitwillnotberepresentedbyitsHeadofStateattheG20Lead-ers’Summit.TotradepolicyhandstheG20longlostitsholdovercommercialpolicymaking.ResentedinGen-evabynon-G20membersforfailedattemptstosteertheworldtradingsystem,theG20’scredibilityontradepolicywasunderminedbyafailuretoadheretoitsownselectivecommitmenttoeschewprotectionismand,whenthatprovedtoomuch,theabandonmentofthatpledge.SowhybothertrackingthetradepoliciesofG20members?

TogetherG20membersrepresent86%ofglobalGDP,73%ofinternationaltrade,andtwo-thirdsoftheworld’spopulation.Theapproachesthesenationstakeinaddressingthegrandchallengesfacinghumankindmatter,evenwhenexecutedunilaterallyratherthaninacoordinatedmanner.TheG20countriesareresponsiblefor84.5%ofallthecommercialpolicyinterventiondocumentedbytheGlobalTradeAlertteam.Almostall(99%)oftheinformationwehavecollectedonG20tradepoliciescomesfromthewebsitesofgovernmentsandinter-nationalorganisations—orwheretruthfuldisclosurebyfirmsismandatedbylaw.

Inthiscontext,thesecondeditionofourG20TradePolicyFactbookrepresentstheGlobalTradeAlert‘scommit-menttoprovidecomprehensiveandevidence-basedinformationonsomeofthecurrentglobaltradetrends.Wecontinuetoidentifynewwaystonotonlydocumentpolicyinterventionsthataffectcross-bordercommerce,butalsotoconveythisinformationinanaccessiblemanner,therebyempoweringinterestedstakeholderswithinsightsofthemostrelevanttradepolicytrends.Wearecommittedtodemocratisingaccesstotradepolicyin-formationsothatmoreeffectivepoliciesareidentifiedthroughanalysis,ultimatelystrengtheningtheroleofinternationaltradeasanengineforhumandevelopmentinthedecadestocome.

TheGlobalTradeAlertisanindependenttradepolicymonitoringinitiativelocatedintheSt.GallenEndowmentforProsperitythroughTrade,anon-profitfoundationestablishedunderSwisslawandaspin-offfromtheUni-versityofSt.Gallen.Aftermakingoveradecadeofinvestmentsintradepolicyexpertiseanddigitaltools,theSt.GallenEndowmentforProsperityThroughTrade(SGEPT,hereafter)isinauniquepositiontoprovideinsightsonthesematters.Bycombiningpolicyexpertisewithevermorenovelwaystoacquire,enrich,andanalysein-formation,SGEPThasbecomeanimpartialandtrustworthysourceformanywhoseektoknowhowgovern-mentsacttoinfluenceglobalcommerce.Bynurturingapioneeringteamcapableofadaptingquicklytoourun-settledworld,weengagewithindividualsandorganisationsthatrespectourindependenceandshareourcoreobjectivesandvalues,whichincludeensuringthatthemillennium-oldhumanimperativetotraderemainsaforceforgoodassocietiestacklethepressingchallengesofthe21stcentury.

Acknowledgments

ThepreparationofthisFactbookinvolvedcontributionsfromeveryoperationalteamattheGlobalTradeAlert(Research,Monitoring,Outreach,andTechnology).FernandoMartín,AndréBrottoandSvenGlinzproposedandcreatedthechartsinthisFactbook.LawrenceReddywasinchargeofproducingtheFactbook.Prof.SimonJ.Evenett,aFounderoftheSt.GallenEndowmentforProsperityThroughTrade,providedideasandfeedbackduringtheexecutionofthisproject.

5

Figure1.WhichG20membersadoptedtheworsttradepolicymixes

sincethe2022BaliSummit?Indonesiaimplementedthemost

discriminatorymix,Canadatheleast

Rank

2023

Changeinrankcomparedtolast

G20Summit

+

+

+

+

-

-

+

+

-

+

+

-

-

-

-

+

7

-

0%20%40%60%80%100%

Percentageoftotaltradecoveredbyharmfulandliberalisingmeasures

Liberalisinginterventions

Harmfulinterventions

UnitedStates

SaudiArabia

SouthKorea

SouthAfrica

Argentina

Indonesia

Australia

Turkey

Canada

Japan

Mexico

Russia

EU-27

China

Brazil

India

47%

48%

47%

45%

23%

63%

55%

91%

90%

55%

53%

53%

52%

50%

50%

99%

99%

98%

98%

98%

96%

10%

17%

13

13

16

16

10

15

15

12

17

11

14

UK

%

%

%

%

%

4%

9%

3%

5%

7%

7%

4

2

2

2

2

6

6

6

6

8

3

3

3

3

9

9

5

5

5

7

1

1

1

4

2

2

2

8

3

1

1

RecentDevelopmentsinG20CommercialPolicy

6

HowwasFigure1prepared?

BetweentheBaliandNewDelhiG20Leaders’Summits,G20membersimplementedatotalof2,219unilat-eralpolicyinterventionsthataffectedcross-borderaccesstotheirnationalgoodsmarkets.Thisinventoryoftrade-relatedpolicyinterventionwasusedtoprepareFigure1.

ForeachG20member,weextractedinformationfromtheGTAdatabaseonthepolicyinterventionsaffect-inggoodstradethatwereimplementedsincethe2022BaliSummit.Wecalculatedthetotaldollarvalueofgoodstradeaffectedbytrade-distortingmeasures(denotethis$H)andbytradereforms(denotethis$L).Thenumberofdaysameasurewasinforceisusedtoweighteachmeasure’stradecoverage.Withthesedurationadjustedtradecoveragecalculations,foreachG20memberwethencalculatedthepercentage100H/(L+H).Thispercentagewasusedtoproducethecurrent(2023)rankingandrevealsthedegreetowhichcommercialpolicychangestowardsgoodstradesincetheBaliSummitwereskewedtowardspolicymeasuresthatharmthecommercialinterestsoftradingpartners.

Thatrankingwascomparedtoa2022rankingproducedinanidenticalmannerforthegoods-relatedpolicyinterventionscomingintoforcebetweentheRomeandBaliSummits.Byandlarge,the2023and2022rank-ingsofG20membersarequitestable.However,Canada,China,andIndonesiawitnesssignificantchangesintheirranking.

ThenumberintherightmostcolumninFigure1revealsthechangeinaG20member’srankingfrom2022to2023.Thatis,fromtherankingoftradepolicystancetakenbetweentheRomeandBaliG20Leaders’Sum-mitsandfromtherankingbasedonactionstakenbetweentheBalitotheNewDelhiG20Leaders’Summits.

Agreennumberindicatesamovetowardsarelativelymoreliberalisingcommercialpolicystancecomparedtopeers.Canadafell16ranksthisyeargoingfromtoptobottomoftheranking.Incontrast,ChinaandIndo-nesiamovedsharplyuptherankings,revealingmoretradedistortivepolicymixeswereadoptedbetweentheBaliandtheNewDelhiG20summits.ArgentinaandMexico’stradepoliciesbecamemarkedlymorere-strictiverelativetoG20peers.Incontrast,Australia,Japan,SouthKorea,andtheUKimplementedcommer-cialpolicymixesthatwererelativelymoreliberalisingsincetheBaliSummit.Suchfindingsindicateasignifi-cantdivergenceinunilateralpolicymakingacrosstheG20.Evidenceofpolicyalignmentthisisnot.

AnotherexplanationforsomeobservednationalrankingsisthatthespotlightontheG20Presidentmaycurbthetemptationtodiscriminateagainstforeignsuppliers—andthatrestraintisliftedoncetheG20Presi-dencypassestoanothercountry.Indonesia’sbigshiftintherankingsfrom2022to2023canbeseeninthislight.India’spositioninthe13thrankforthisyearmightbeseeninthislightaswell.

LikeallofthefiguresinthisFactbook,thisrankingwasproducedusingthefinestgraineddataoncross-bor-dergoodstradeavailable(fromtheUNCOMTRADEdatabaseatthesix-digitlevelofdisaggregation.)Un-fortunately,nosuchgranulardataoncross-borderservicesectortradeiscollectedbytheinternationalor-ganisations.Therefore,therankingpresentedinFigure1isbestthoughtofasacomparisonofchangesinpolicytreatmentofgoodstrade,whichisstillaverylargepartofobservedcross-bordercommerce.ThisrankingisbestthoughtofasacomparisonofthetradecoveredbythepolicymixofG20membersratherthanasameasureofthequantumofcommerceaffectedbypoliciesthatfavournationalfirms.

RecentDevelopmentsinG20CommercialPolicy

7

Figure2.TradereformsbyG20membersareup10%thisyear—tradedistortionsaredown2%.Butthelatterstilloutnumberthe formerbymorethan3-to-1

TotalnumberofG20interventionsimplementedeachyear

3028

27

33

15

42

12

12

52

26

6

83

1068

3

1

4

63

2

49

32

3

00

3

35

675

12

2018-20192020-2021202220232018-20192020-202120222023

Totalnumberofinterventionsrecordedby31Augusteachyear

HarmfulinterventionsLiberalisinginterventions

HowwasFigure2prepared?

Foreachyearfrom2018to2022thetotalnumberofpolicyinterventionsimplementedbyG20membersthatliberalisedanyformofcross-bordercommercewasextractedfromtheGTAdatabase.Likewise,thetotalnumberofpolicyinterventionsbyG20membersthatimpairedthecompetitivepositionoffirmslocatedabroad(referredtointheFigureas“harmful”interventions).

TheannualtotalscurrentlyrecordedintheGTAdatabasefromJanuarytoAugust2023arereportedtogeth-erwithtotalsrecordedby31Augustfromotherrecentyears.Asbenchmarks,averagesareprovidedfor2018and2019(pre-pandemic)andfor2020-2021(pandemic).Asmorepolicyinterventionarerecordedovertime,the31Augusttotals(indicatedbytheorangetriangle)arelessthanthetotalnumberofmeasureseverrecorded(indicatedbytheheightoftherespectivebar).Sincethisreportwascompiledusingdataavail-ableattheendofAugust2023,thedifferencebetweentheAugust312023totalandthoseatthestartofSeptember2023aretrivialandsothetriangleisnotreportedfor2023.

ThesignificanceoftheAugust31totalsisthattheyreporttheamountofG20policyinterventionthatwasrecordedoverthesametimeframeeachyear(thatis,duringthefirst8monthsofeachyear).Asaresult,theAugust31totalsprovideafairwaytocompareresorttoharmfulandliberalisingpoliciesbytheG20overthefiveyears,2018to2022.Inalltencolumns,onlyEUpolicyinterventionthataffectedextra-EUcommercewasincluded.

RecentDevelopmentsinG20CommercialPolicy

8

Figure3.MarketAccessthreatstoG20economiesreverttothepre-COVIDpattern—subsidyawardstoimport-competingfirmsaccountforasmallerpercentagein2023thanin2020to2022

MarketaccessimpairmentsimplementedbyG20members,2018-2023

Percent

100%

7.3%

75%

102%

8.6%

50%

797%

664%

25%

0%

2020-2021

Classof

Corporatesubsidies

GovernmentProcurement

Tariffincreases

Localisationmeasures

Importlicenses,quotasetc.Contingentmeasures

Others

Internaltaxesonimports

2022

intervention

74%

77%

4.4%4.8%

2018-2019

policy

644%

712%

82%

2023

RecentDevelopmentsinG20CommercialPolicy

9

HowwasFigure3prepared?

Fortheupperpanel,dataextractedfromtheGTAdatabaseonthenumberofeachtypeofmarketaccess-re-ducingpolicyinterventionimplementedbyG20membersfrom2018to2023.Theclassesofpolicyinterven-tionmostfrequentlyusedbyG20memberswereidentifiedanda100%stackedbarchartcreatedtorevealthemixofharmfulpolicyinterventionintroducedbyG20membersduringeachyearorpairofyears.Thepercentagesofharmfulinterventionassociatedwiththethreemostusedclassesofcommercialpolicy(awardofcorporatesubsidiestolocalfirms,governmentprocurementmeasures,andimporttariffmeas-ures)werereportedtofacilitatecomparisonsacrosstheyears.

Theextensiveresorttocorporatesubsidiesduringthefirstyearofthepandemicisevident.Governmentsandcompaniesreportsubsidyawardswithalag–sometimesasignificantlag–andthiswillhavecontribut-edtothelowerpercentageofcorporatesubsidiesrecordedsofarin2023.Still,eventhisyearmorethanhalfofG20policyinterventionthatthreatensmarketaccessisrelatedtocorporatesubsidiesawardedtoim-port-competingfirms.SincetheCOVID-pandemic,thereisanincreasingtrendinthenumberprotectionistmeasuresusinggovernmentprocurement,tariffincreasesandimportlicensesandquotas.

Weusethetermcorporatesubsidiesasnon-commercialsubsidies,suchastransfersbetweenlevelsofgov-ernment,welfarestatepaymentstoindividuals,andinternationalaidpayments,areexcludedfromtheGTAdatabaseanddonotcounttowardsanyofthetotalsreportedinthisFactbook.

ThelowerpanelisconstructedusingGTAdataontheaveragenumberofeachclassofmarketaccess-improv-ingmeasuresimplementedbytheG20during2018-2019and2020-2021andthetotalnumberofeachclassofaccess-improvingpolicyinterventionimplementedbyG20membersin2022and2023.Whatisnote-worthyinthelowerpanelistheliberalisingpolicymixisskewedmoreandmoretowardsimporttariffcuts.Clearly,forsomeG20governments,globalisationhasnotgonetoofar.

RecentDevelopmentsinG20CommercialPolicy

10

Figure4.SincetheBalisummit,fourtimesasmuchgoodstrade

wasatriskfromnewharmfulG20tradepoliciesthannewtradereforms

SinceBaliSummittradereformsbyG20memberscoveredUSD0.42trillionbuttradedistortionscoveredmuchmore,USD1.85trillion.

Exposuretotradedistortions&tradereformsin2023

(inbillionUSD)

1200

800

400

0

licensing,quotas

etc.

measures,including

1226

429

175

184

52

154

148

3

57

3021

07

4

Non-automatic

Importtariffs

Price-control

Trade-related

Governmentprocurement

Contingentmeasures

investmentmeasures

Subsidies(excl.

exportsubsidies)

taxes

HarmfulLiberalising

HowwasFigure4prepared?

WeextractedalltheinformationonG20commercialpolicyinterventionaffectingimportsofgoodsthatwereimplementedfromthe2022BaliSummittothe2023NewDelhiSummit.Wedistinguishedbetweenmeasuresthatreducemarketaccess(“harmfulinterventions”)fromthosethatimprovemarketaccess(“lib-eralisinginterventions”).Associatedwitheachofthesegoodstradeinterventionsarethesix-digitproduct(HS2012)codesimplicated.Adoptingstandardapproachesthatcorrectforthedurationthatameasureisinforce,wecalculatedthevalueoftheG20goodsimportsthatwillbecoveredbyeachclassofpolicyinter-ventionin2023.InthisfigureweorderedtheclassesofpolicyinterventionintermsofthedescendingtotalvalueofG20importsexposedtoharmfulintervention.G20measuresthataffectexports–suchasexporttaxes,quotas,bans,andsubsidies–donotcounttowardsthetotalsreportedhere.Dataon2019tradeflowsfromUNCOMTRADEwereusedinthisFigure--aswellasineveryotherfigureinthisFactbookwheretheval-uesoftradeflowscoveredarereported--toavoidthattheCOVID-19pandemicandsubsequentdisruptionofcross-bordersupplychainsfromskewingtheresults.

RecentDevelopmentsinG20CommercialPolicy

11

Figure5.Intra-G20commercialpolicydynamicssincetheBali

Summit:WhichG20membershaveharmedandbenefitedfellow

G20membersthemostoftenandthemostintermsofgoodstrade?

NumberofG20-on-G20harmfulcommercialpolicyinterventions

ImplementingJurisdiction

172

155

120

85

146

159

154

185

126

146

113

126

133

180

142

129

UnitedStates

UK

Turkey

SouthKorea

SouthAfrica

SaudiArabia

Russia

Mexico

Japan

Indonesia

India

EU-27

China

Canada

Brazil

Australia

Argentina

23

11

8

11

2

9

13

12

20

6

13

21

14

4

1

5

50

19

6

23

3

12

8

36

10

27

31

20

26

2

8

5

18

18

19

23

18

18

24

21

10

20

2

22

20

11

8

22

6

1

2

4

3

8

2

3

3

4

3

0

1

7

5

5

6

3

3

3

1

1

3

3

6

2

5

5

5

7

5

5

12

40

13

18

58

14

36

14

9

23

51

51

44

29

34

60

3

8

2

8

13

3

3

3

2

1

3

3

3

5

7

5

16

16

24

14

12

14

6

21

13

16

8

20

9

21

7

5

11

6

3

8

25

21

8

2

21

4

3

9

27

27

5

5

49

68

69

59

53

49

83

33

50

64

46

47

43

86

77

75

216

136

126

95

94

218

206

166

150

88

42

146

123

132

100

141

13

11

11

13

14

11

9

12

10

14

12

11

14

5

7

7

9

2

37

15

6

16

4

3

16

17

17

8

13

24

25

7

32

16

58

34

27

35

19

1

15

32

38

29

33

25

51

52

13

33

31

19

31

20

2

4

27

32

26

26

2

36

28

35

11

1

1

3

2

3

3

1

2

3

8

3

17

1

2

5