经合组织（OECD）：双重劳动力市场的最低工资：来自2019年西班牙最低工资上调的例证

OECDSocial,EmploymentandMigrationWorkingPapersNo.298

Minimumwagesinaduallabourmarket:Evidencefromthe2019minimum-wagehikeinSpain

AlexanderHijzen,

MateoMontenegro,

AnaSofiaPessoa

/10.1787/7ff44848-en

》OECD

OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment

ForOfficialUse

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English-Or.English

12September2023

DIRECTORATEFOREMPLOYMENT,LABOURANDSOCIALAFFAIRS

EMPLOYMENT,LABOURANDSOCIALAFFAIRSCOMMITTEE

Minimumwagesinaduallabourmarket:Evidencefromthe2019minimum-wagehikeinSpain

JELClassifications:J3,J4,J8

AlexanderHijzen(OECDandIZA)

Alexander.HIJZEN@

MateoMontenegro(ToulouseSchoolofEconomics)

mateomontenegro@

AnaSofiaPessoa(UniversityofBonn)

sofiamendespessoa@

JT03525047

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Acknowledgements

TheauthorswouldliketothankStephaneCarcillo,AlbaCatalanPiera,AndreaGarneroandMarcelJanssenforhelpfulcommentsanddiscussions.TheviewsexpressedinthepaperarethoseoftheauthorsandshouldnotbeattributedtotheOECDortheirmemberstates.

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Abstract

Thispaperprovidesanassessmentofthe2019minimum-wagehikeinSpain,whichincreasedtheminimumwageby22%anddirectlyconcerned7%ofdependentemployees.Theassessmentisbasedonanindividual-levelanalysisthatfollowstheoutcomesofworkersthatwereemployedintheyearbeforethereformovertime.Amongdirectlyaffectedworkers,thehikeintheminimumwageincreasedfull-timeequivalentmonthlyearningsbyonaverage5.8%andreducedemploymentby-0.6%(about7400jobs),whichimpliesaverysmallown-wagelabourdemandelasticityof-0.1.Thewageeffectsarestrongerforworkersonopen-endedcontracts,whiletheemploymenteffectsarestrongerforworkersonfixed-termcontracts.Consequently,theown-wagelabourdemandelasticityismuchstrongerforworkersonfixed-termcontracts(-0.14vs-0.06).Insum,thehikeintheminimumwagesignificantlyincreasedthewagesoflow-wageworkers,butonlyresultedinverylimitedjoblossesamongdirectlyaffectedworkers.

Keywords:wage-setting,wage-shifting,labourmarketduality,fixed-termcontracts,employmentprotection

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Tableofcontents

OECDSocial,EmploymentandMigrationWorkingPapers2

Acknowledgements3

Abstract4

1Introduction7

2Institutionalandeconomiccontext10

2.1Minimumwage10

2.2Employmentprotection12

2.3Economiccontext12

3Theory13

4Data15

5Descriptiveevidence18

5.1Allworkers18

5.2Workersbytypeofcontract20

6Worker-levelanalysis22

6.1Methodology22

6.2Resultsonwages23

6.3Resultsonemployment,unemploymentandjobmobility25

6.4Robustnesstests31

7Conclusions32

AnnexA.33

References46

FIGURES

Figure1The2019minimum-wagehikeinSpaininOECDcontext11

Figure2Distributionofemploymentacrosswagebins19

Figure3Changeinthedistributionofemploymentacrosswagebinsbymarginofadjustment20

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Figure4.Netflowdecompositionofchangeinthedistributionofemploymentacrosswagebins21

Figure5.Individualwageeffects24

Figure6.Individualeffectsonemployment,unemployment,andjobmobility28

FigureA.1.Distributionofemploymentacrosswagebinsforpermanentandfixed-termworkers33

FigureA.2.Grossflowdecompositionofchangeinthedistributionofemploymentacrosswagebins34

FigureA.3.Wageandemploymenteffectsatthequarterlylevel35

TABLES

Table1.Characteristicsofworkersbywagebin17

Table2.Individualwageeffects25

Table3.Individualeffectsonemployment,unemploymentandjobmobility29

TableA.1.Newbaseline-Allcontracts36

TableA.2.Newbaseline-Temporarycontracts37

TableA.3.Newbaseline-Open-endedcontracts38

TableA.4.Newcontrolgroup-Allcontracts39

TableA.5.Newcontrolgroup-Temporarycontracts40

TableA.6.Newcontrolgroup-Open-endedcontracts41

TableA.7.Individualwageeffects-Full-timeworkers42

TableA.8.Individualeffectsonemployment-Full-timeworkers43

TableA.9.Individualeffectsonunemployment-Full-timeworkers44

TableA.10.Individualeffectsonjobmobility-Full-timeworkers45

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1Introduction

Whiletheminimumwagecontinuestobesurroundedwithcontroversy,itisgaininggrowingpoliticalsupportacrossadvancedeconomies.IntheEuropeanUnion,theCouncilandEuropeanParliamentadoptedanewEUDirectiveonadequateminimumwageson4October2022(EU,2022[1]).Ratherthansettingaone-sizefitsallminimumwage,itprovidesaframeworkforpromotingadequateminimumwages.Asanindicativereferencevalueforanadequateminimumwage,itmentions60%ofthemedianor50%oftheaveragewage.Similarly,intheUnitedStates,therehasbeenastrongpushforincreasingthefederalminimumwageto15$/hour,whichintermsof2019wages,correspondstoabout60%ofthemedian(BusinessInsider,2021[2]).Anumberofstatesalreadyhavestate-levelminimumwagesat15$/houroraboveorhavecommittedtoimplementtheseinthenearfuture.TheimplicationsoftheEUminimumwagedirectiveandtheprospectofhavingafederalminimumwageat15$/hourremainhoweveruncertainasthedesirabilityoftheminimumwage,itsoptimallevelanditseffectsonemploymentcontinuetobeintensivelydebated.

Tocontributetotheongoingdebateonthelabourmarketeffectsoftheminimumwage,thispaperfocusesonanunusuallylargeincreaseintheminimumwagethattookplaceinSpainin2019.Thisincreasedtheminimumwageby22%inasinglestepandaffected7%ofdependentemployees.Minimum-wageincreasesofthismagnitudearerareandprovideanidealsettingforanalysingthelabourmarketeffectsoftheminimumwage.ThecaseofSpainisfurtherofspecificinterest,sinceitisaprimeexampleofacountrywithaduallabourmarket.Atthetimeoftheminimumwagereform,itsincidenceoftemporaryworkwasthesecondhighestintheOECD(itdeclinedsignificantlyfollowingthe2021labourmarketreform).Thiscouldplayanimportantroleinshapingtheemploymenteffectsoftheminimumwageandhowtheyaredistributedacrossdifferentgroupsofworkers.Furthermore,newevidenceontheminimumwageforSpainisparticularlywelcomesinceuntilrecentlytherewereonlyfewlittlestudiesontheminimumwage.Thisreflectsthefactthattheminimumwagedoesnothaveanyvariationacrossregionsorgroupsofworkers(e.g.,age)andminimumwageincreasesinthepasttendedtobegradual,resultinginonlymodestchangesfromyeartoyear.

Themaininsightprovidedbythispaperisthatthe2019-minimumwagehikehadalargepositiveeffectonwages,butonlyaverysmallnegativeeffectonemployment.Theanalysisisbasedonanadministrativedatasetconstructedfromsocialsecurity,incometaxandcensusrecords(MuestraContinuadeVidasLaboralesorMCVL).Thewageandemploymenteffectsofthe2019minimumwagehikeareanalysedusinganindividual-levelapproachthatfollowsthewageandemploymentoutcomesofincumbentworkersovertimefollowingClemensandWither(2019[4])andDustmannetal.(2021[5]).Thefindingsindicatethat,

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amongdirectlyaffectedworkers,thehikeintheminimumwageincreasedfull-timeequivalentmonthlyearningsbyanaverageof5.8%andreducedemploymentby0.6%.Thisimpliesasmallown-wagelabourdemandelasticityof-0.1(0.6/5.8).Itcorrespondstoanemploymentelasticitywithrespecttotheminimumwageof-0.03(0.6/22),theconcepttypicallyusedinliteraturereviews[e.g.DeLindeetal.(2014[1])fortheUKandNeumarkandShirley(2021[2])fortheUS].Moreover,thenegativeemploymenteffectsarestrongerforworkersonfixed-termcontractsthanthoseonopen-endedcontracts.Thissuggeststhattheminimumwagereduceslabourmarketsegmentationbyincreasingtherelativeattractivenessofopen-endedcontractsforemployers.

Thepapermakesanumberofcontributionstotheexistingliterature.

•Thereisalargeliteratureontheemploymenteffectsofminimumwages.Eversincethepath-breakingstudyoftheminimumwagebyCardandKrueger(1994[1]),whichshowedthattheminimumwagehadpositiveratherthannegativeemploymenteffects,thishasbeenanissueofintensedebate.Thischallengedtheconventionalwisdombasedthepresenceofcompetitivelabourmarketsthatminimumwagestendtopricelowskilledworkersoutofthemarket.Smallpositiveemploymenteffectsarehoweverconsistentwithimperfectlycompetitivelabourmarketswherewagesaresetbymonopsonicemployersorthroughwagebargaining.ThestudybyCardandKrueger(1994[1])gaverisetoaflurryofnewstudies,sometimescalledthe“newminimumwageresearch”,whichhasconstantlysoughttoimproveondata,researchdesignsandmechanismsthatcanexplaintheabsenceofsizeableemploymenteffects(Cengizetal.,2019[3];Dustmannetal.,2021[4];HarasztosiandLindner,2019[5]).Differentreadingsoftheliteratureyielddifferentconclusions,withsomereviewsconcludingtherearenosignificantemploymenteffects(Manning,2021[2])andothersthatthereare(Neumark,SalasandWascher,2014[3];Neumarketal.,2021[4]).Meta-analyses,which,bydefinition,arelesssubjecttojudgement,typicallyfindsmallbutnegativeemploymenteffects(DeLinde-Leonard,StanleyandDoucouliagos,2014[1]).ThepresentpapercontributestothislargeandgrowingliteraturebyprovidingnewevidencebasedonanexceptionallylargeincreaseintheminimumwagethattookplaceinSpain,acountrywithastronglysegmentedlabourmarket.Thissuggeststhatminimumwagesignificantlyincreasedthewagesofdirectlyaffectedworkersbutonlyhadasmallnegativeeffectonemployment.

•Therearefewpapersthathavespecificallylookedattheeffectsofminimumwagesinaduallabourmarket.Whilethereisampleevidencethattheemploymenteffectsofadversetemporarylabourdemandshockstendtobeconcentratedonworkerswithfixed-termcontractsinduallabourmarkets(Bentolila,DoladoandJimeno,2012[6]),thisislessobviousinthecaseofpermanentadverselabourdemandshocks,includingminimumwageincreases.Basedonanintuitivemodel,wearguethatwhatmattersinsuchacontextisthedifferenceinexpecteddismissalcosts(e.g.expectedseverancepayment)andthescopeforwage-shifting(e.g.bargainingpower).Minimumwagescruciallyconstraintheextenttowhichexpecteddismissalcostsareshiftedtoworkersthroughlowerwages.Expecteddismissalcostsinourmodeldependontheriskofdismissaland

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severancepaymentsupondismissal.Byconstrainingthescopeforwage-shifting,theemploymenteffectsofanincreaseintheminimumwagetendtobelargerforworkerswithhigherexpecteddismissalcosts.Theemploymenteffectsbytypeofcontractarethereforeanempiricalquestion.1Thefindingsinthispapersuggestthattheown-wagelabourdemandelasticityforworkersonfixed-termcontractsissignificantlystrongerthanthatforworkersonopen-endedcontracts(-0.14versus-0.06).Thissuggeststhattheminimumwagereducedlabourmarketsegmentationbyincreasingtherelativeattractivenessofopen-endedcontractsforemployers.

•Agrowingnumberofstudiesanalysethe2019minimumwagehikeinSpain.Publiclyavailablestudiesalsofindnegativeemploymenteffectsbutestimatesoftheirsizevaryconsiderably,withBarceloetal(2021[4])findinglargenegativeeffectsandGorjonetal.(2022[7])moremodestones.Thesepapersdonotanalysehowtheeffectsdifferbytypeofcontract.Anumberofearlierstudieshaveattemptedtopredictitsimpactonemploymentexante.Forexample,theBankofSpain(2017[1])estimatedthattheincreaseintheminimumwagebetween2018-2020couldleadtoalossoftotalemploymentof1.4%and11.3%amongaffectedworkers.Joblosseswereexpectedtobeconcentratedamongyoungworkersaswellasolderworkersabove45.TheseestimatesrelyonapreviousstudybyGalánandPuente(2015[9])forSpainthatfocusedontheincreaseintheminimumwagebetweenin2004and2010.Thepresentfindingscontributetotheongoingpolicydebateonthedesirabilityofincreasingtheminimumwageto60%ofthenetaveragewageasintendedbythecurrentgovernment.

Theremainderofthispaperisstructuredasfollows.Section2providesanoverviewoftheinstitutionalandeconomiccontextinwhichtheminimumwagehiketookplace.Section3presentsanintuitivemodelthatanalyseshowtheminimumwagemayaffectemploymentofworkersonfixed-termandopen-endedcontracts.Section4presentsthedata,whileSection5providesdescriptivestatistics.Section6introducestheworker-levelapproachtoassessthewageandemploymenteffectsoftheminimumwagehike,presentsthebaselineresultsanddiscussestheirrobustness.Section7concludes.

1Ahigherminimumwagemayalsochangeincentivesforlong-termcontractingasworkersneedsomedegreeofexperiencetobecomesufficientlyproductiveandhenceincreasetheincentivesforconversion(RebitzerandTaylor,1995[3]).Focusingonthe2016increaseintheminimumwageinIreland,McGuinnessandRedmond(2019[4])findnoevidencethatitincreasedtheprobabilityofbecomingjoblessforworkersonfixed-termcontracts.However,theyfindthatitleadstoareductioninworkingtimeandthatthiseffectisstrongeramongtemporaryworkers.

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2Institutionalandeconomiccontext

2.1Minimumwage

ThestatutoryminimumwagewasintroducedinSpainin1964.Initially,thisallowedforregionalsub-differencesandsub-minimaforteenagers.Since1998,therehasbeenauniquenationalminimumwageforallworkers,irrespectiveofthecharacteristicsofworkers,theirtypeofcontract,economicactivityandtheregionwheretheywork.TheminimumwageinSpainisdefinedintermsofamonthlywageforfull-timeworkerswhoworktheentiremonthwhichisrescaledinproportiontothehoursanddaysactuallyworked.Yearlycompensationattheminimumwageiscalculatedfor14months,withthe13thandthe14thassupplementspaidinJuneorDecember.

TheminimumwageisseteachyearbytheSpanishGovernmentbyRoyalDecree,usuallyinDecember,withchangesbecomingbindingfromthebeginningofthenextyear.Decisionsaremadeonadiscretionarybasisinconsultationwithemployerandworkerrepresentatives,takingintoaccountpastandpredictedinflationandgeneraleconomicconditions.TheSpanishgovernmentstatesintheRoyalDecreethattheriseintheminimumwagewasexpectedtobringaboutaprogressivereductioninin-workpovertyandwageinequalityandpromotesustainedjobcreationandeconomicgrowth.SinceJanuary2021,thereisanindependentcommissionofexperts.ItsmaintaskwastodefineapathtowardsreachingaMWat60%ofaveragenetwageby2023basedonasetofindicatorsestablishedinArt.27oftheConstitution.

Theminimumwagehikein2019followedalongperiodduringwhichtheminimum-to-medianwage(Kaitz)ratiohadbeenbroadlystableatalmost40%(Figure1).ThiswasverylowbyOECDstandardsandconsistentlybelowthefirstdecileofthedistributionoftheKaitzratioacrossOECDcountrieswithaminimumwage.The2019hikeintheminimumwageincreasedtheKaitzratioto50%.ThiscorrespondstoamonthlyminimumwageofEUR900,orEUR1,050ifthemandatory13and14thmonthsaredistributedover12months,consistentwiththewayearningsarerecordedinourdata.In2020,theminimumwagewasfurtherincreased,to52%ofthemedian,slightlyabovethemedianlevelintheOECD.

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Figure1The2019minimum-wagehikeinSpaininOECDcontext

MinimumwageasashareofthemedianwageinSpainincomparisonofthebottomdecile,topdecileandmedianofitsdistributionacrossOECDcountrieswithaminimumwage

Source:OECDMinimumWagedatabase

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2.2Employmentprotection

EmploymentprotectionrelativelystrictinSpain.AccordingtotheOECDemploymentprotectionindexofthestringencyofindividualdismissalsofworkersonopen-endedcontracts,itisaboveaverageinSpain.ThisreflectsamongstothersthefactthatseverancepayforpermanentworkersinthecaseofeconomicdismissalisrelativelyhighinSpaincomparedwithotherOECDcountries.Severancepayis20daysofpayperyearserviceuptoamaximumof18years.2Similarly,accordingtotheOECDemploymentprotectionindexonthestringencyofregulationsontheuseoftemporarycontracts,Spainwasamongthetopfifthofcountrieswiththestrictestrules,evenbeforethe2021labourmarketreformthatfurtherrestrictedtheiruse.Theregulationoffixed-termcontractsrelatestothecircumstanceswheretheycanbeused,thenumberoftimestheycanberenewedandtheircumulativeduration.

Strictemploymentprotectioncoincideswithahighincidenceoftemporarywork.In2018,theincidencefixed-termcontractsindependentemploymentemployeespeakedat27%inSpainanddeclinedslightlyto25%in2021comparedto12%intheOECDasawhole.Followingthe2021labourmarketreform,itsincidencedroppedmarkedlyto21%.TemporaryworkersarealsoentitledtoseverancepayinSpainiftheircontractisnotrenewedorconvertedintoapermanentone.However,theamountislowerthanforworkersonopen-ended-termcontracts.Severancepayfortemporaryworkersamountsto12daysofpayperyearofserviceinsteadof20forpermanentworkers.Inmostothercountries,terminatingatemporarycontractatitsenddatedoesnotrequirepayingseverancepay.

2.3Economiccontext

Ourempiricalfindingshavetobeinterpretedintheparticularmacroeconomiccontextinwhichtheminimumwagewasincreased.TheSpanisheconomywascharacterizedbysteadyeconomicgrowthintheyearsprecedingtheimplementationofthereform.Between2015and2018,nominalGDPgrewover15%,employmentincreasedby7%andtheunemploymentratefellbymorethan6percentagepoints,despiteremainingabove15%in2018.

2Inpractice,firmsoftenpaymoretoavoidthetakingtheriskthatthedismissalischallengedincourtforbeingunfair.Ifalayoffisdeclaredunfairbyacourt,theworkerreceivesatotalcompensationof33daysofpayperyearofservice.Reinstatementcannotbeimposedontheemployer,exceptinthecaseofprohibitedgrounds,suchasdiscrimination.Atthesametime,probationperiodsarerelativelyshortandnotificationrequirementslimited.

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3Theory

Aminimumwagehikecanaffectfixed-termandopen-endedcontractsdifferentlybecauseofdifferencesintheexpecteddismissalcosts,eitherintheformofalayofftax(redtape)orprivatetransferfromthefirmtotheworker(severancepay).Toillustratethis,wepresentasimpletwo-periodmodelbelow.

Workersareidenticalinallaspectsexceptfortheirtypeofcontract,whichmaybefixed-term(F)oropen-ended(O).Workerscanstayinthejobforuptotwoperiods.Ineachperiodinwhichaworkerisemployed,heorsheproducesoutput(y)andreceivesawage(w).Open-endedcontractworkersarefiredwithaprobabilityλoattheendofthefirstperiodorkeeptheirjobwithprobability1−λo.Fixed-termcontractworkersarefiredwithprobabilityλFafteroneperiodorhavetheircontractconvertedintoanopen-endedcontractwithprobability1−λF.Thecostofdismissaldependsonthetypeofcontract,Ci,i∈{F,0},whichisspecifiedbylabourregulations.Specifically,CF<Co,sinceinpracticeitismorecostlytofireworkerson

open-endedcontracts.

Westartbyconsideringthecaseofdismissalcostsintheformoflayofftaxes(asopposedtoseverancepaywhichrepresentsamandatoryprivatetransferbetweenthefirmandtheworkers).Inthiscase,thevalueofagivenjobforanemployer(V)withcontract(F,O)canberepresentedastheexpectedvalueofproductionnetoflabouranddismissalcostsasfollows:

(1a)Vo=y−w−λoCo+(1−λo)(y−w−λoCo)=(2−λo)(y−w−λoCo)

(1b)VF=y−w−λFCF+(1−λF)(y−w−λoCo)=(2−