主观幸福感外文翻译及高考语文冲刺秘籍应用写作文体的主旨

PAGE1-Subjectivewell-beingIntroductionSubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingaremeasuresofwell-beingbasedonquestionssuchas:“Takingthingsalltogether,howwouldyousaythingsarethesedays–wouldyousayyou’reveryhappy,prettyhappy,ornottoohappythesedays?”(Gurin,Veroff,&Feld,1960,p.411,italicsinoriginal).1Subjectsmaybepromptedtogiveanumberbetween1and7,where1represents“Ingeneral,Iconsidermyselfnotaveryhappyperson”and7“Ingeneral,Iconsidermyselfaveryhappyperson”(Lyubomirsky&Lepper,1999,p.151).Inthepast,theywereaskedwhethertheysatisfieddescriptionssuchas:“Cheerful,gayspiritsmostofthetime.Occasionallybotheredbysomethingbutcanusuallylaughitoff,”“Upsanddowns,nowhappyaboutthings,nowdepressedaboutbalancedinthelongrun,”and“Lifeoftenseemssoworthlessthatthereislittletokeeponegoing.Nothingmattersverymuch,therehasbeensomuchofhurtthatlaughterwouldbeemptymockery”(Watson,1930,p.81).Answerstosuchquestionsareusedtoconstructnumericalmeasuresofbothindividualwell-being(thewell-beingofpersons)andsocialwellbeing(thewell-beingofgroups).Subjectivemeasuresofwell-beinghavebecomethesubjectofheateddiscussionintheacademyandbeyond.Onereasonisthattheyarefrequentlypresentedassubstitutesfor,orcomplementsto,traditionalincome-basedeconomicwelfaremeasuresandtoindicatorsinspiredbythecapabilityapproach(Kesebir&Diener,2008).Indeed,toencouragetheuseofsubjectivemeasuresforpublicpolicypurposes,proponentshaveadvocatedNationalWell-BeingAccounts(NWBAs),whichtrackpopulation-levelscoresonsubjectivemeasuresovertime(Diener&Seligman,2004;Diener,2006;Kahneman,Krueger,Schkade,Schwarz,&Stone,2004).Whileitishardtopredicttheextenttowhichsubjectivemeasureswillassumetheroletraditionallyplayedbyothermeasures,subjectivemeasuresseemtobegainingground.Forinstance,theirusewasrecentlyendorsedbyFrenchPresidentNicholasSarkozy’sCommissionontheMeasurementofEconomicPerformanceandSocialProgress.TheCommission,whichwasheadedbyNobelMemorialPrizelaureatesJosephE.StiglitzandAmartyaSen,hadbeenchargedwiththetaskofexploringalternativestoGrossDomesticProduct(GDP)asameasureofeconomicperformanceandsocialprogress(Stiglitz,Sen,&Fitoussi,2009).Subjectivemeasuresofwell-beingarefrequentlyreferredtoasmeasuresofsubjectivewell-being(Andrews&Robinson,1991).Thus,forexample,Stiglitzandcoauthorswrite:“Recommendation1:Measuresofsubjectivewell-beingprovidekeyinformationaboutpeople’squalityoflife.Statisticalofficesshouldincorporatequestionstocapturepeople’slifeevaluations,hedonicexperiencesandprioritiesintheirownsurveys”(Stiglitzetal.,2009,p.58,italicsinoriginal).Theterm“subjectivewell-being”(Diener,1984)–denotingthatwhichsubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingaredesignedtorepresent–hasitsownencyclopediaentries(e.g.,Diener,2001)andhandbookarticles(e.g.,Diener,Lucas,&Oishi,2005).Bynow,anestablishedbodyofliteratureemployssubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingtoshedlightonthecausesandcorrelatesofsubjectivewell-being.Thoughissuesaboutthereliabilityandvalidityofsuchmeasuresremain,scientificandvalidityandmoreonexaminingsubstantiveempiricalrelationships.Nevertheless,considerableconfusionremainswhenitcomestowhatsubjectivewell-beingisandhowitrelatestowhatIwillcallwell-beingsimpliciter:“whatwehave，whenourlivesaregoingwellforus,whenwearelivinglivesthatarenotnecessarilymorallygood,butgoodforus”(Tiberius,2006,p.493,italicsinoriginal).Ithasbeenpointedoutthatsubjectivemeasuresdifferfromeconomicandcapability-basedmeasureswithrespecttotheunderlyingaccountofwelfareorwell-being(Adler&Posner,2008;Angner,2008,2009a).2Ithasalsobeennotedthatproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresdifferamongthemselves(Bruni,2008,pp.117–120;Tiberius,2006,pp.494–495).Yet,whenitcomestothenatureofsubjectivewell-beinganditsrelationtowell-beingsimpliciter,existingliteraturefailstocapturethedegreeofdiversity,anddisagreement,amongproponentsofsubjectivemeasures.Theresultisafalseimpressionofhomogeneityandanobstacletofruitfulcommunicationandcooperationwithinandacrossdisciplinaryboundaries.Thispaperexaminesthenotionof“subjectivewell-being”asthetermisusedinliteratureonsubjectivemeasuresofwell-being.Inordertoexaminewhatsubjectivewell-beingisandhowitrelatestowell-beingsimpliciter,Ibeginbyexploringtheaccountsofwellbeingimplicitintheliteratureonsubjectivemeasures–aswellastherolethatsubjectivewell-beingplaysinthoseaccounts–andproceedtoexaminewhatsubjectivewell-beingisthoughttobe.Myaimistoestablishthatproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresdifferatleastsuperficiallyonatleasttwopoints.First,theydisagreeabouttherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwellbeingsimpliciter:aboutwhethersubjectivewell-beingconstituteswell-beingsimpliciterormerelyisacomponentofit.Second,theydisagreeaboutthenatureofsubjectivewell-being:aboutwhetheritisconstitutedbyacognitive,hedonic,emotional,ormoodstate,orsomecombination,andaboutwhethertocallthatstate“happiness,”“satisfaction,”orsomethingelseentirely.Inanefforttoreconcilethesedifferences,Iproposeaninterpretationaccordingtowhichsubjectivemeasurespresupposepreferencehedonism:anaccountaccordingtowhichwell-beingisamatterofdesiredmentalstates.Thisreadinghasnot(tomyknowledge)beenexplicitlyendorsedbyproponentsofsubjectivemeasures.Yet,itsucceedsinreconcilingmuchthathasbeenwrittenaboutsubjectivemeasuresandithastheadditionaladvantageofattributingtoproponentsofsubjectivemeasureanaccountofwell-beingthathasclearaxiologicalfoundationsandisrelativelyplausible.Aproperappreciationofthenatureofsubjectivewell-beinganditsrelationtowell-beingsimpliciterisimportantforavarietyofreasons.Amongotherthings,suchanappreciationcanhelpbothproponentsandcriticsofsubjectivemeasurestodevelopclearerandmoreeffectivearguments.Proponentsofsubjectivemeasures–likethosewhoargueforthedevelopmentofNWBAs–willwanttoidentifythemostplausibleinterpretationofthesemeasures,soastopermitthedevelopmentofasstrongacaseaspossibleintheirfavor.Critics–likethosewhoargueforthesuperiorityoftraditionaleconomicorcapability-basedmeasures–willwanttozeroinonthemostplausibleinterpretationofsubjectivemeasuressoastoavoidthechargethattheyareattackingastrawman.Myhopeisthatintheend,aclearerappreciationforthefoundationsofsubjectivemeasurescanhelpremoveobstaclestoscientificcommunication,collaboration,andprogress.Subjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciterInthissection,Iexploretherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciterinthewritingsonsubjectivemeasures.Iwillarguethatproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingdisagreeabouttherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciter:aboutwhethersubjectivewell-beingconstituteswell-beingsimpliciterormerelyisacomponentofit.Asmystartingpoint,Itaketheconceptofwell-being,thatis,whatIhavesofarcalledwell-beingsimpliciter:“whatwehavewhenourlivesaregoingwellforus,whenwearelivinglivesthatarenotnecessarilymorallygood,butgoodforus”(Tiberius,2006,p.493,italicsinoriginal).Letuscallthisthe“core”conceptofwell-being.Therearemanyothertermsthatareusedinthesamesense,including“aperson’sgood,benefit,advantage,interest,prudentialvalue,welfare,happiness,flourishing,eudaimonia,andutility”(Moore&Crisp,1996,p.599).Becausetheconceptofwell-beingisintendedtocapturewhatisultimately–andnotjustinstrumentally–goodfortheindividual,itisalsosupposedtocapturethatwhichwehavereasontopromote–asanendandnotjustasameans–bothinourownlivesandinthelivesofothers.AsThomasScanlonputsit:Itiscommonlysupposedthatthereisasimplenotionofindividualwell-beingthatplaysthefollowingthreeroles.First,itservesasanimportantbasisforthedecisionsofasinglerationalindividual,atleastforthosedecisionsinwhichheorshealoneisconcerned(thatistosay,inwhichmoralobligationsandconcernsforotherscanbeleftaside).Second,itiswhataconcernedbenefactor,suchasafriendorparent,hasreasontopromote.Third,itisthebasisonwhichanindividual’sinterestsaretakenintoaccountinmoralargument(Scanlon,1998,p.93).3Inparticular,itisfrequentlyassumedthatwell-beingisoneconsiderationorassomepeoplewouldargue,theonlyconsiderationthatshouldserveasanend,andnotjustameansforpublicpolicy.HereIwilltakeitforgrantedthatwhenproponentsofsubjectivemeasurestalkaboutsuchmeasuresasrepresentingwell-being,theyusetheterminthecoresense(Angner,2009a,inpress).First,asindicatedabove,subjectivemeasuresareoftenpresentedasalternativestoothermeasuresofwelfareorwell-being;thiswouldmakelittlesenseif,infact,subjectivemeasureswerenotintendedtorepresentthatwhichtheothermeasuresweredesignedtorepresentviz.welfareorwell-being.Second,theproponents’conceptofwell-beingplaystheverysameroleasthatplayedbythecoreconcept:thosewhodefendtheuseofsubjectivemeasuresofwellbeingoftenemphasizethattheythinkofwell-beingasthatwhichisultimatelygoodfortheindividual,asthatwhichisworthpromotinginthelifeofothers,andasacentral(sometimestheonly)ultimategoalforpublicpolicy(cf.Diener&Seligman,2004,quotedabove).Third,anumberofproponentsexplicitlyciteclassicalphilosophicalliteratureinenthusiasticagreementwhilesignalingthattheyuse“well-being”and/or“happiness”inthesamesenseasphilosophersdo(Kahneman,Wakker,&Sarin,1997;Layard,2005;Watson,1930).Overtheyears,philosophershavetriedtoshedlightontheconceptofwell-beingbydevelopinganddefendingvariousaccounts,orconceptionsofwell-being.Here,IfollowParfit(1984,pp.493–502)individingsuchaccountsintothreemainclasses:mentalstateaccounts,preference-satisfactionordesire-fulfillmentaccounts,andobjective-listaccounts.4Accordingtomental-stateaccounts,well-beingisa“mentalstate”ora“stateofmind.”Becausetheseaccountsallseewelfare“ashavingtoenterourexperience,”theyaresaidtosatisfytheexperiencerequirement(Griffin,1986,p.13).Scanlonwrites:“Experientialtheoriesholdthatthequalityoflife‘forthepersonwholivesit’iscompletelydeterminedbyitsexperientialquality,”where“experientialquality”refersto“whatitwouldbeliketoliveit”(Scanlon,1998,pp.97,99).Onthisview,then,subjectivelyfeltexperienceisbothnecessaryandsufficientforaperson’swell-being.Accordingtodesire-fulfillmentorpreference-satisfactionaccounts,bycontrast,apersoniswellofftotheextentthatherdesiresarefulfilledand/orherpreferencesaresatisfied.Scanlonputsitthisway:Desiretheoriesrejecttheexperiencerequirementandallowthataperson’slifecanbemadebetterandworsenotonlybychangesinthatperson’sstatesofconsciousnessbutalsobychangeselsewhereintheworldwhichfulfillthatperson’spreferences(Scanlon,1993,p.186).Suchaccountsdonotrequirethatapersonwhoiswelloffexperienceanyfeelingsofhappinessorsatisfaction.Whattheydorequireisthatherdesiresarefulfilled(orthatherpreferencesaresatisfied),whichdoesnotcomedowntothesamething.Thetwokindsofaccountdescribedsofararefrequentlyreferredtoassubjectiveaccounts,becausetheydescribeaperson’swell-beingas(atleastpartly)afunctionofhisorherfeelings,experiences,desires,andsoon.Accordingtoso-calledobjectiveaccounts,bycontrast,aperson’swell-beingdoesnotdependonsuchsubjectivefactors.Onsuchaccounts,“certainthingsaregoodorbadforbeings,independentlyinatleastsomecasesofwhethertheyaredesiredorwhethertheygiverisetopleasurableexperiences”(Chappell&Crisp,1998,p.553).Identifyingthelistofthingsthataregoodforpeopleregardlessofwhattheywantisnotoriouslydifficult,butoneprovisionallistofsuchthingsincludes“moralgoodness,rationalactivity,thedevelopmentofone’sabilities,havingchildrenandbeingagoodparent,knowledge,andtheawarenessoftruebeauty”(Parfit,1984,p.499).Obviously,therearemanyversionsofaccountsofeachkind.Thetri-partitedivisionpermitsustocaptureamajordifferencebetweensubjectivemeasuresofwell-being,traditionaleconomicwelfaremeasures,andwelfareindicatorsinspiredbythecapabilityapproach.Ithasbeennotedelsewherethattraditionaleconomicwelfaremeasuresarebasedonpreference-satisfactionaccountsofwell-being(Angner,2009a,b,inpress;Harsanyi,1982;Hausman&McPherson,2006).Thisisevident,amongotherthings,fromthefactthatwelfareeconomiststraditionallyhavedefendedtheirmeasuresbyshowingthattheyareutilityfunctions,thatis,thattheyareindicesofpreferencesatisfaction.Ithasalsobeennotedthatmeasuresinspiredbythecapabilityapproacharebasedonobjective-listaccountsofwell-being(Nussbaum,2008;Sen,1987).Thisisclear,amongotherthings,fromtheassumptionthatcertainthings–inparticular,havingalargecapabilityset–arethoughttobegoodforapersonregardlessofwhetherthosethingswouldmakethepersonhappier,andofwhetherthepersondesiresthem.5Meanwhile,itisfairlyobviousthatmanyproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresthinkofwell-beingasamentalstate.Thereisabundantevidence,foronething,thattheyadheretotheexperiencerequirement.Intheliteratureonsubjectivemeasures,well-beingisoftendescribedasamatterexclusivelyofindividualsubjective,hedonic,oraffectiveexperience.Forexample,DavidG.MyersquotesMadamedelaFayetteassaying:“Ifonethinksthatoneishappy,thatisenoughtobehappy,”andaddsthat“likeMadamedeLaFayette,socialscientistsviewwell-beingasastateofmind.Well-being,sometimescalled‘subjectivewell-being’toemphasizethepoint,isapervasivesensethatlifeisgood”(Myers,1992,pp.23,27).Myersevidentlytakeswell-beingtobesomethingthoroughlysubjective;note,inparticular,theuseoftheterm“subjectivewell-being”assynonymouswith“well-being.”Theexplicitreferencetostatesofmindstronglysuggeststhatwhathehasinmindissometypeofmental-stateaccount.Similarly,EdDienerwrites:“Theareaofsubjectivewell-beingissubjective.[It]resideswithintheexperienceoftheindividual”(Diener,1984,p.543).DienerandEunkookSuhreinforcethepoint:Subjectivewell-beingresearchisconcernedwithindividuals’subjectiveexperiencesoftheirlives.Theunderlyingassumptionisthatwell-beingcanbedefinedbypeople’sconsciousexperiences—intermsofhedonicfeelingsorcognitivesatisfactions.Thefieldisbuiltonthepresumptionthattounderstandtheindividuals’experientialqualityofwell-being,itisappropriatetodirectlyexaminehowapersonfeelsaboutlifeinthecontextofhisorherownstandards(Diener&Suh,1997,p.191).DienerandSuh,likeMyersandtheauthorstowhomherefers,apparentlyusetheterm“well-being”interchangeablywith“subjectivewell-being.”ThefactthatDienerandSuharguethatwell-beingisnotonlyconcernedwiththeindividual’ssubjectiveexperiences,butdefinedbythem,stronglysuggeststhattheyadheretotheexperiencerequirement.Severalauthorsemphasizethesubjectivecharacterofwell-being,astheyusetheterm,bycontrastingsubjectivemeasureswith“objective”ones,includingsocialandeconomicindicators.Dienermakesthispointinthefollowingway:NotablyabsentfromdefinitionsofSWB[subjectivewell-being]arenecessaryobjectiveconditionssuchashealth,comfort,virtue,orwealth.AlthoughsuchconditionsareseenaspotentialinfluencesonSWB,theyarenotseenasaninherentandnecessarypartofit(Diener,1984,p.543).6Thisquoteconfirmsthat,inDiener’swork,anindividual’swell-beingisdefinednotbytheobjectivecircumstancesinwhichshefindsherself,butbyhersubjectiveexperiences,thoughheallowstheformertobecausallyresponsibleforthelatter.DanielKahneman,whoidentifieswell-beingwithhappiness,addsthathappiness“isnottobeconfusedwithgoodfortune,whichisanassessmentofthecircumstancesofsomeone’slife”(Kahneman,1999,p.5).InKahneman’sview,itispossibletoenjoygoodfortune–presumablyincome,health,andsoon–withoutbeinghappy.AngusCampbell(1976),quotedinDiener(1984,p.543),expandsonthispoint.Campbellmaintains:“Thegrossnationalproduct,importantasitundoubtedlyis,isclearlynottheultimatetouchstoneagainstwhichthequantumofhappinessinthiscountrycanbeassessed”(Campbell,1976,p.117).Hecontinues:Ifweareprimarilyconcernedwithdescribingthequalityoflifeexperienceofthepopulation,wewillneedmeasuresdifferentfromthosethatareusedtodescribetheobjectivecircumstancesinwhichpeoplelive.Wewillhavetodevelopmeasuresthatgodirectlytotheexperienceitself.Thesesubjectivemeasureswillsurelynothavetheprecisionofindicatorsthatareexpressedinnumberofdollars,unitsoftime,ornumbersofsquarefeet,buttheywillhavethegreatadvantageofdealingdirectlywithwhatitiswewanttoknow,theindividual’ssenseofwell-being(Campbell,1976,p.118,italicsinoriginal).6Qualityoflife,onCampbell’sview,isafunctionofindividuals’senseofwell-being.Ifwewanttostudythequalityoflife,then,weneedtostudytheindividuals’experienceoftheirlives,nottheobjectivecharacteristicsoftheirexistence.Thesewritingsclearlygiveprideofplacetosubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstates.Indeed,theevidencesuggeststhattheseauthorsadopttheexperiencerequirementandthinkofwell-beingasconstitutedbysomesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate.Theyarebestunderstoodasusingtheterm“subjectivewell-being”todenotethesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate,sothatwell-beingcanbesaidtobeconstitutedbysubjectivewell-being.Thenotionthatwell-beingisconstitutedbysubjectivewell-being,bytheway,explainstheidentificationof“subjectivemeasuresofwell-being”and“measuresofsubjectivewell-being.”Others,however,appeartoresisttheviewthatwell-beingisconstitutedbysubjectivewell-beingalone(cf.Angner,inpress).Increasinglyfrequently,itissuggestedthatsubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstatesconstitutebutonecomponentofwell-being.Forexample,Kahnemanwrites:Objectivehappinessisnotproposedasacomprehensiveconceptofhumanwell-being,butonlyasasignificantconstituentofit.Maximizingthetimespentontherightsideoftheaffectgridisnotthemostsignificantvalueinlife,andadoptingthiscriterionasaguidetolifemaybemorallywrongandperhapsself-defeatingaswell.However,thepropositionthattherightsideofthegridisamoredesirableplacetobeisnotparticularlycontroversial.Objectivehappinessisacommonelementofmanyconceptionsofwell-being(Kahneman,2000,p.691).Thepointisclearenough:well-beinghasmultiplecomponents,ofwhich“objectivehappiness”isonlyone(albeitanimportantone).AsimilarpositionisdefendedbyDiener,JeffreyJ.Sapyta,andSuh,whousetheterm“subjectivewell-being”todenotethesubjectivelyexperiencedcomponentofwell-beingandwhoarguethatalthoughsubjectivewell-beingisnotsufficient,itis“essentialtowell-being”(Diener,Sapyta,&Suh,1998,p.33;cf.Kesebir&Diener,2008,p.69).Seligmantoocanbeattributedthisview:Iusehappinessandwell-beinginterchangeablyembracingbothpositivefeelings(suchasecstasyandcomfort)andpositiveactivitiesthathavenofeelingcomponentatall(suchasabsorptionandengagement).Itisimportanttorecognizethat“happiness”and“well-being”sometimesrefertofeelings,butsometimesrefertoactivitiesinwhichnothingatallisfelt(Seligman,2002,p.261).Insum,thesepassagesallseemtoexpressthenotionthatwell-beinghasmultiplecomponentsandthatsomesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstateconstitutesoneofthesecomponents.Itisunfortunatethattheseauthorsdonotsaymoreaboutthenumberandnatureoftheremainingcomponents,butitisquiteclearthattheyneednotbesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstates.Theideathatwell-beinghasmultiplecomponents,thoughitdoesnotfitneatlyintoParfit’staxonomy,hasbeendefendedbyseveralmodernphilosophers.Bytheendofhisdiscussion,Parfithimselfindicatesthatitmightbepossibletoformamoreplausibleaccountofwell-beingbytakingeachofthethreekindsofaccountasdescribinganecessary(butnotindividuallysufficient)conditionforwell-being(Parfit,1984,p.501;cf.Haybron,2008,p.18).Parfit’ssuggestionappearstohavebeenpickedupbySimonKeller(2004),whowritesthatwelfare–likephysicalfitness–ismulti-dimensional.Hebelievesthatyoucanbebetteroff(orfitter)simpliciterthanIamwithoutscoringhigheralongalltherelevantdimensions;yet,therearecasesinwhichwecannotsaythateitheroneofusisbetteroff(fitter)becausethereisnofactofthematter.InKeller’sview,onecomponentofwell-beingistheachievementofone’sgoals,nomatterwhatthosegoalsare(Keller,2004,p.36).Onmyreading,authorslikeKahnemancanbeunderstoodasagreeingwithKelleraboutthemulti-dimensionalityofwell-being,althoughhemaynotbeproposingthesamecomponents.Notice,however,thatthetwoproposalsarenotincompatible.Inanycase,theseproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresstillgiveprideofplacetosubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstates.Theauthorsdonot,however,treatwell-beingasconstitutedbyasubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstatealone.Instead,theytreatsomesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstateasconstitutingamerecomponent–albeitanimportantone–ofwell-being.Thesewritersarebestunderstoodasusingtheterm“subjectivewell-being”todenotethatsubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate,sothatsubjectivewell-beingcanbesaidtoconstitute,notwell-being,butacomponentofwell-being.Thediscussioninthissectionhasshownthatproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingappeartodisagreeabouttherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciter.Somethinkofwell-beingasconstitutedbysomesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate;theyarebestunderstoodasusingtheterm“subjectivewell-being”todenotethesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate,sothatwell-beingcanbesaidtobeconstitutedbysubjectivewell-being.Othersthinkofsomesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstateasconstitutingamerecomponent–albeitanimportantone–ofwell-being;theyarebestunderstoodasusingtheterm“subjectivewell-being”todenotethatsubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate,sothatsubjectivewell-beingcanbesaidtoconstituteacomponentofwell-being.Hence,proponentsofsubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingarenotahomogeneousgroup:theydisagreewitheachotherabouttherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciter.主观幸福感1.引言幸福的主观测量是基于一些问题的幸福感的测量，如：“在一起，你觉得这些天过得怎么样呢——你会说你这些日子很高兴，挺快乐的，或者不太高兴吗？格瑞，威戎夫＆费尔德，960年，第411，斜体原件）。被试可能会给予数字1到7之间的提示，其中1代表“总的来说，我认为我不是一个很快乐的人”和7代表“总的来说，我认为自己一个非常幸福的人”（柳博米尔斯基及莱佩尔，1999年，第151页）。在过去，他们会被问及对这样的描述是否满意，如：“性格开朗，大部分时间是同性恋心境。有时为一些事烦恼，但通常可以一笑而过，”“跌宕起伏，时而为事情感到高兴，时而为长期的均衡感到惆怅，”和“生活通常似乎都是这么没有意义以至于没什么值得一个人去继续向前的。没什么重要的事情，已经有这么多的伤害，笑声全成了无意义的嘲弄”（华生，1930年，第81页）。这些问题的答案是用来创建个体幸福（个人的幸福）和社会幸福（团体的幸福）的诸多方法。主观幸福感的测量已成为了在学术界及以后热烈讨论的对象。其中一个原因是，他们经常被作为对传统的以收入为基础的经济福利措施，和对通过能力的方法得到启发的指标的替代品，或补充（凯士比与迪纳，2008）。事实上，为了鼓励使用主观措施来达到公共政策的目的，支持者都提倡国家幸福报告，它是通过追踪一段时间的人口水平分数的主观措施（迪纳与塞利格曼，2004;迪纳，2006；卡内曼，克鲁格，施卡德，施瓦茨，斯特尼，2004）。虽然现在很难预测在何种程度上的主观措施将承担传统上由其他措施所发挥的作用，但是主观措施似乎正在提高它的地位。例如，最近法国总统萨科齐的委员会也赞同将它们用在经济绩效和社会进步的测量上。该委员会是由诺贝尔纪念奖获得者约瑟夫斯蒂格利茨和阿马蒂亚森领导的，已经承担负责了探索国内生产总值的替代品的任务，是用来作为经济绩效和社会进步的措施的（斯蒂格利茨，森与罗菲图西，2009）。幸福的主观测量通常也指主观幸福感的测量（安德鲁斯＆罗宾逊，1991）。因此，例如，斯蒂格利茨和同事写道：“建议1：主观幸福感的测量能提供有关人们对生活质量的关键信息。统计局应将记录人们的生活评价，享乐经验和优先事项的问题纳入到他们自己的调查中”（斯蒂格利茨等，2009年，第58页，原斜体）。所谓“主观幸福感”（迪纳，1984）—是指幸福的主观测量的目的是代表—有自己的百科全书的条目（例如，迪纳，2001）和手册制品（例如，迪纳，卢卡斯，＆欧石，2005）。到现在，既定的文学使用幸福的主观测量来阐明主观幸福感的影响因素和相关。虽然对这些措施的信度和效度的问题依然存在，但是科学和效度以及在实证研究的实质性关系更多。尽管如此，当涉及到什么是主观幸福感以及它与我称其为绝对幸福的有何联系时仍然相当的困惑。“我们拥有什么，我们的生活什么时候会变得好，什么时候我们的生活不是一定道义上的好，但是有利于我们”（提比略，2006，第493，原斜体）。据指出，主观措施不同于有关于潜在的福利或幸福报告的经济和以能力为基础的措施（阿德勒和波斯纳，2008；安格纳，2008，2009）。也有人指出，主观测量的支持者彼此不同（布鲁尼，2008年，第117-120；厄斯，2006年，第494-495）。然而，当涉及到主观幸福感的本质及其与绝对幸福的关系时，现有文献未能找到多样性程度和主观测量的支持者之间的不同意见。其结果会是一种同质性的假象和对富有成效的沟通的障碍以及学科间和跨学科之间的合作。本文探讨了“主观幸福感”的概念，将其作为使用在文学上的幸福主观测量的术语。为了研究什么是主观幸福感，以及它如何关乎绝对幸福，我开始通过探索隐含在文学里的有关主观测量的幸福报告，以及主观幸福感在这些报告中所起的作用，并着手研究主观幸福感被认为是什么。我的目标是建立主观措施的支持者的差异至少在表面上至少有两点。首先，他们对主观幸福感和绝对幸福之间的关系持不同意见：主观幸福感是否构成绝对幸福或仅仅是它的一个组成部分。第二，他们在主观幸福感本质上的意见不同：它是否是由认知，享乐，情绪或情绪状态，或它们的组合构成，以及有关该国是否能完全被称作“幸福”，“满足”或别的其他。为了努力协调这些分歧，我提出了一个根据主观测量预先假定偏好享乐主义的解释：根据幸福是一个理想的精神状态问题的报告。这个解释还没有（据我所知）被主观测量的支持者明确表示赞同。然而，它成功地协调着许多关于主观测量的写作，而且它具有归因于主观测量支持者的额外优势，一个幸福报告具有明确的价值论基础，是相对合理的。给主观幸福感的本质及其与绝对幸福之间的关系一个适当的评价对于许多原因来说是重要的。除其他事情，这样的一个评价可以同时帮助主观测量的支持者和批判者去进行更清晰，更有效的辩论。主观测量的支持者，就像那些为国家幸福报告的发展争论的人一样，想要确认这些测量的最合理的解释，以允许尽可能强有利于他们的发展的情况。批判者，就如同为传统经济或以能力为基础的经济的优越性辩论的人一样，想要清空关于主观测量的最合理的解释，以避免受到他们是在攻击一个稻草人的指控。在最后，我的希望是一个对主观测量的基础的更明确的评价可以帮助消除学术交流，合作和进步的障碍。2．主观幸福感和绝对幸福在这个部分，我将就著作中的主观测量来探讨主观幸福感和绝对幸福之间的关系。我会争辩说，主观幸福感的测量的支持者在主观幸福感和绝对幸福之间的关系上持不同意见：主观幸福感是否构成绝对幸福或仅仅是它的一个组成部分。如同我一开始的观点一样，我认为幸福的概念，也就是所谓的迄今我都成为绝对幸福：“我们拥有什么，我们的生活什么时候会变得好，什么时候我们的生活不是一定道义上的好，但是有利于我们”（提比略，2006年，第493，原斜体）。让我们称其为幸福的核心概念吧。还有许多其他的名词，在同一意义上使用，包括“一个人的好，利益，优点，兴趣，审慎的价值，福利，幸福，繁荣，幸福和实用”（摩尔＆酥，1996年，第599）。因为幸福是为了追求最终的，而不仅仅是帮助性地有利于个人，幸福也应该是我们有理由鼓励追求的，是作为目的，而不仅仅是作为一种手段，无论是在我们自己的生命里以及他人的生命里。正如托马斯斯坎伦指出：大家普遍认为个体幸福有一个简单的含义，它起着以下三个作用。首先，它作为一个单个人的理性决策的重要依据，至少对那些在他或她独自关注时（也就是说，在这种道义上的义务和对他人的关切上能够予以搁置）的决定。第二，它关注恩人如朋友或父母，有理由推广。第三，它是以将其个人的利益考虑到道德观点里为基础的（斯坎伦，1998年，第93页）。特别是，人们经常认为幸福是一个因素，或者像有些人会认为，唯一的因素应作为结果，而不仅仅是为公共政策的一个手段。当主观测量支持者谈到用这种测量代表幸福感时我会认为这是理所当然的，他们在核心概念上使用这个术语（安格纳，200