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January2024TheGlobalRisksReport2024Terms

ofuseanddisclaimerThisdocumentispublishedbytheWorldEconomicForumasacontributiontoaproject,insightareaorinteraction.Thefindings,interpretationsandconclusionsexpressedhereinarearesultofacollaborativeprocessfacilitatedandendorsedbytheWorldEconomicForumbutwhoseresultsdonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheWorldEconomicForum,northeentiretyofitsMembers,Partnersorotherstakeholders.WorldEconomicForum91-93routedelaCapiteCH-1223Cologny/GenevaSwitzerlandTel.:

+41(0)228691212Fax:+41(0)227862744E-mail:contact@Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,

storedina

retrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,orotherwisewithoutthepriorpermissionoftheWorldEconomicForum.ISBN:978-2-940631-64-3Thereportandaninteractivedataplatformareavailableat/publications/global-risks-report-2024/.Copyright©2024bytheWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksReport20242ContentsPreface45OverviewofmethodologyKeyfindings6Chapter1:GlobalRisks2024:Ataturningpoint1.1Theworldin202412121418222732333737404250576876778586878990929495991021121151211.2Thepathto20261.3Falseinformation1.4Riseinconflict1.5Economicuncertainty1.6LookingaheadEndnotesChapter2:GlobalRisks2034:Overthelimit2.1Theworldin20342.2Structuralforces2.3A3°Cworld2.4AIincharge2.5Theendofdevelopment?2.6Crimewave2.7PreparingforthedecadeaheadEndnotesChapter3:Respondingtoglobalrisks3.1Localizedstrategies3.2Breakthroughendeavors3.3Collectiveactions3.4Cross-bordercoordination3.5ConclusionEndnotesAppendixA:DefinitionsandGlobalRisksListAppendixB:GlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024AppendixC:ExecutiveOpinionSurvey:NationalRiskPerceptionsAppendixD:RiskgovernancePartnerInstitutesAcknowledgementsGlobalRisksReport20243PrefaceSaadiaZahidiManagingDirectorLastyear’s

GlobalRisksReportwarned

ofa

worldthatwouldnoteasilyrebound

fromcontinuedshocks.As2024begins,the19theditionofthereportissetagainsta

backdropofrapidlyacceleratingtechnologicalchangeandeconomicuncertainty,astheworldisplaguedbya

duoofdangerouscrises:climateandconflict.experimentaltechnologiespresentexistentialthreatstohumanity?Thesetransnationalriskswillbecomehardertohandleasglobalcooperationerodes.Inthisyear’sGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey,two-thirdsofrespondents

predictthata

multipolarorderwilldominateinthenext10years,asmiddleandgreatpowerssetandenforce–

butalsocontest-

currentrulesandnorms.Thereportconsiderstheimplicationsofthisfragmentedworld,wherepreparednessforglobalrisksisevermorecriticalbutishinderedbylackofconsensusandcooperation.Italsopresentsa

conceptualframeworkforaddressingglobalrisks,identifyingthescopefor“minimumviableeffort”foraction,dependingonthenatureoftherisk.Underlyinggeopoliticaltensionscombinedwiththeeruptionofactivehostilitiesinmultipleregionsiscontributing

to

an

unstable

global

order

characterizedbypolarizingnarratives,erodingtrustandinsecurity.Atthesametime,countriesaregrapplingwiththeimpactsofrecord-breaking

extreme

weather,asclimate-changeadaptationeffortsandresourcesfallshortofthetype,scaleandintensityofclimate-relatedeventsalreadytakingplace.Cost-of-livingpressurescontinuetobite,amidstpersistentlyelevatedinflationandinterestratesandcontinuedeconomicuncertaintyinmuchoftheworld.Despondentheadlinesare

borderless,

sharedregularlyandwidely,anda

senseoffrustrationatthestatusquoisincreasinglypalpable.Together,thisleavesampleroomforacceleratingrisks–

likemisinformationanddisinformation–

topropagateinsocietiesthathavealreadybeenpoliticallyandeconomicallyweakenedinrecentyears.Theinsightsinthisreport

areunderpinnedbynearlytwodecadesoforiginaldataonglobalriskperception.ThereporthighlightsthefindingsfromourannualGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey,whichbringstogetherthecollectiveintelligenceofnearly1,500globalleadersacrossacademia,business,government,

theinternational

communityandcivilsociety.Italsoleveragesinsightsfromover200thematicexperts,includingtheriskspecialiststhatformtheGlobalRisksReportAdvisoryBoard,GlobalFutureCouncilonComplexRisks,andtheChiefRiskOfficersCommunity.We

arealsodeeplygratefultoourlong-standingpartners,MarshMcLennanandZurichInsuranceGroup,fortheirinvaluablecontributionsinshapingthethemesandnarrativeofthereport.Finally,wewouldliketoexpressourgratitudetothecoreteamthatdevelopedthisreport–

EllissaCavaciuti-Wishart,

SophieHeadingandKevinKohler–

andtoRickyLiandAttilioDiBattistafortheirsupport.Justasnaturalecosystemscanbepushedtothelimitandbecomesomethingfundamentallynew;suchsystemicshiftsarealsotakingplaceacrossotherspheres:geostrategic,demographicandtechnological.Thisyear,

weexploretheriseofglobalrisksagainstthebackdropofthese“structuralforces”aswellasthetectonicclashesbetweenthem.Thenextsetofglobalconditionsmaynotnecessarilybebetterorworsethanthelast,butthetransitionwillnotbeaneasyone.Thereport

explorestheglobalrisklandscapeinthisphaseoftransitionandgovernance

systemsbeingstretchedbeyondtheirlimit.Itanalysesthemostsevere

perceivedriskstoeconomiesandsocietiesovertwoand10years,inthecontextoftheseinfluentialforces.Couldwecatapulttoa

3°Cworldastheimpactsofclimatechangeintrinsicallyrewritetheplanet?Havewereachedthepeakofhumandevelopmentforlargepartsoftheglobalpopulation,givendeterioratingdebtandgeo-economicThefutureisnotfixed.A

multiplicityofdifferentfuturesisconceivableoverthenextdecade.Althoughthisdrivesuncertaintyintheshortterm,italsoallowsroomforhope.Alongsideglobalrisksandtheera-definingchangesunderwaylieuniqueopportunitiestorebuildtrust,optimismandresilienceinourinstitutionsandsocieties.Itisourhopethatthereportservesasa

vitalcalltoactionforopenandconstructivedialogueamongleadersofgovernment,businessandcivilsocietytotakeactiontominimizeglobalrisksandbuilduponlong-termopportunitiesandsolutions.conditions?Couldwefaceanexplosionofcriminalityandcorruptionthatfeedsonmorefragilestatesandmorevulnerablepopulations?Will

an“armsrace”inGlobalRisksReport20244OverviewofmethodologyTheGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey(GRPS)hasunderpinnedtheGlobalRisksReport

fornearlytwodecadesandistheWorldEconomicForum’spremiersourceoforiginalglobalrisksdata.Thisyear’s

GRPShasbroughttogetherleadinginsightsontheevolvingglobalriskslandscapefrom1,490expertsacrossacademia,business,government,theinternationalcommunityandcivilsociety.ResponsesfortheGRPS2023-2024werecollectedfrom4Septemberto9October2023.RefertoAppendixB:GlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024formoredetailonthemethodology.To

complementGRPSdataonglobalrisks,thereportalsodrawsontheWorldEconomicForum’sExecutiveOpinionSurvey(EOS)toidentifyrisksthatposethemostseverethreattoeachcountryoverthenexttwoyears,asidentifiedbyover11,000businessleadersin113economies.WhenconsideredincontextwiththeGRPS,thisdataprovidesinsightintolocalconcernsandprioritiesandpointstopotential“hotspots”andregionalmanifestationsofglobalrisks.RefertoAppendixC:ExecutiveOpinionSurvey:NationalRiskPerceptionsformoredetails.“Globalrisk”isdefinedasthepossibilityoftheoccurrenceofaneventorconditionwhich,ifitoccurs,wouldnegativelyimpactasignificantproportionofglobalGDP,

populationornaturalresources.Relevantdefinitionsforeachofthe34globalrisksareincludedinAppendixA:DefinitionsandGlobalRisksList.Finally,thereportintegratestheviewsofleadingexpertstogenerateforesightandtosupportanalysisofthesurveydata.Contributionswerecollectedfrom55colleaguesacrosstheWorldEconomicForum’s

platforms.Thereportalsoharnessesqualitativeinsightsfromover160expertsfromacrossacademia,business,government,theinternationalcommunityandcivilsocietythroughcommunitymeetings,privateinterviewsandthematicworkshopsconductedfromMaytoOctober2023.TheseincludetheGlobalRisksAdvisoryBoard,GlobalFutureCouncilonComplexRisksandtheChiefRisksOfficersCommunity.RefertoAcknowledgementsformoredetail.TheGRPS2023-2024includedthefollowingcomponents:–Risklandscapeinvitedrespondentstoassessthelikelyimpact(severity)ofglobalrisksoveraone-,two-and10-yearhorizontoillustratethepotentialdevelopmentofindividualglobalrisksovertimeandidentifyareasofkeyconcern.–––Consequencesaskedrespondentstoconsidertherangeofpotentialimpactsofariskarising,tohighlightrelationshipsbetweenglobalrisksandthepotentialforcompoundingcrises.Riskgovernanceinvitedrespondentstoreflectonwhichapproacheshavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononglobalriskreductionandpreparedness.Outlookaskedrespondentstopredicttheevolutionofkeyaspectsunderpinningtheglobalriskslandscape.GlobalRisksReport20245KeyfindingsTheGlobalRisksReport2024presentsthefindingsoftheGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey(GRPS),whichcapturesinsightsfromnearly1,500globalexperts.Thereportanalysesglobalrisksthroughthreetimeframestosupportdecision-makersinbalancingcurrentcrisesandlonger-termpriorities.Chapter1exploresthemostseverecurrentrisks,andthoserankedhighestbysurveyrespondents,overatwo-yearperiod,analysingindepththethreerisksthathaverapidlyacceleratedintothetop10rankingsoverthetwo-yearhorizon.Chapter2focusesonthetoprisksemergingoverthenextdecadeagainstabackdropofgeostrategic,climate,technologicalanddemographicshifts,divingdeeperintofourspecificriskoutlooks.Thereportconcludesbyconsideringapproachesforaddressingcomplexandnon-linearaspectsofglobalrisksduringthisperiodofglobalfragmentation.Belowarethekeyfindingsofthereport.Althoughgloballydestabilizingconsequences–suchasthoseseenattheinitialoutbreakoftheRussia-UkrainewarortheCOVID-19pandemic–werelargelyavoided,thelonger-termoutlookforthesedevelopmentscouldbringfurtherglobalshocks.Asweenter2024,2023-2024GRPSresultshighlightapredominantlynegativeoutlookfortheworldoverthenexttwoyearsthatisexpectedtoworsenoverthenextdecade(FigureA).SurveyedinSeptember2023,themajorityofrespondents(54%)anticipatesomeinstabilityandamoderateriskofglobalcatastrophes,whileanother30%expectevenmoreturbulentconditions.Theoutlookismarkedlymorenegativeoverthe10-yeartimehorizon,withnearlytwo-thirdsofrespondentsexpectingastormyorturbulentoutlook.Inthisyear’s

report,wecontextualizeouranalysisthroughfourstructuralforcesthatwillshapethematerializationandmanagementofglobalrisksoverthenextdecade.Thesearelonger-termshiftsinthearrangementofandrelationshipbetweenfoursystemicelementsofthegloballandscape:AdeterioratingglobaloutlookLookingbackattheeventsof2023,plentyofdevelopmentscapturedtheattentionofpeoplearoundtheworld–whileothersreceivedminimalscrutiny.Vulnerablepopulationsgrappledwithlethalconflicts,fromSudantoGazaandIsrael,alongsiderecord-breakingheatconditions,drought,wildfiresandflooding.Societaldiscontentwaspalpableinmanycountries,withnewscyclesdominatedbypolarization,violentprotests,riotsandstrikes.–TrajectoriesrelatingtoglobalwarmingandrelatedconsequencestoEarthsystems(Climatechange).–Changesinthesize,growthandstructureofpopulationsaroundtheworld(Demographicbifurcation).FIGUREAShort

and

long-term

global

outlook"Whichofthefollowingbestcharacterizesyouroutlookfortheworldoverthefollowingtimeperiods?"3%1%Shortterm(2years)Longterm(10years)27%54%15%17%46%29%8%1%Stormy:

Global

catastrophic

risks

loomingTurbulent:

Upheavals

and

elevated

risk

of

global

catastrophesUnsettled:

Some

instability,

moderate

risk

of

global

catastrophesStable:

Isolated

disruptions,

low

risk

of

global

catastrophesCalm:

Negligible

risk

of

global

catastrophesSourceNoteWorld

Economic

Forum

Global

RisksPerception

Survey

2023-2024.The

percentages

in

the

graph

may

not

add

up

to100%

because

figures

have

been

roundedup/down.GlobalRisksReport20246impliessub-optimalalignmentanddecision-making,heighteningtheriskofmissingkeymomentsofintervention,whichwouldresultinlong-termchangestoplanetarysystems.––Developmentalpathwaysforfrontiertechnologies(Technologicalacceleration).Materialevolutionintheconcentrationandsourcesofgeopoliticalpower(Geostrategicshifts).Chapter2.3:A3°Cworldexplorestheconsequencesofpassingatleastone“climatetippingpoint”withinthenextdecade.Recentresearchsuggeststhatthethresholdfortriggeringlong-term,potentiallyirreversibleandself-Anewsetofglobalconditionsistakingshapeacrosseachofthesedomainsandthesetransitionswillbecharacterizedbyuncertaintyandvolatility.Associetiesseektoadapttothesechangingforces,theircapacitytoprepareforandrespondtoglobalriskswillbeaffected.perpetuatingchangestoselectplanetarysystemsislikelytobepassedatorbefore1.5°Cofglobalwarming,whichiscurrentlyanticipatedtobereachedbytheearly2030s.Manyeconomieswillremainlargelyunpreparedfor“non-linear”impacts:thepotentialtriggeringofanexusofseveralrelatedsocioenvironmentalriskshasthepotentialtospeedupclimatechange,throughthereleaseofcarbonemissions,andamplifyrelatedimpacts,threateningclimate-vulnerablepopulations.Thecollectiveabilityofsocietiestoadaptcouldbeoverwhelmed,consideringthesheerscaleofpotentialimpactsandinfrastructureinvestmentrequirements,leavingsomecommunitiesandcountriesunabletoabsorbboththeacuteandchroniceffectsofrapidclimatechange.EnvironmentalriskscouldhitthepointofnoreturnEnvironmentalriskscontinuetodominatetheriskslandscapeoverallthreetimeframes.Two-thirds

ofGRPSrespondentsrankExtremeweatherasthetopriskmostlikelytopresentamaterialcrisisonaglobalscalein2024(FigureB),withthewarmingphaseoftheElNiño-SouthernOscillation(ENSO)cycleprojectedtointensifyandpersistuntilMaythisyear.

Itisalsoseenasthesecond-mostsevereriskoverthetwo-yeartimeframeandsimilartolastyear’s

rankings,nearlyallenvironmentalrisksfeatureamongthetop10overthelongerterm(FigureC).Aspolarizationgrowsandtechnologicalrisksremainunchecked,‘truth’willcomeunderpressureHowever,

GRPSrespondentsdisagreeabouttheurgencyofenvironmentalrisks,inparticularBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapseandCriticalchangetoEarthsystems.Youngerrespondentstendtoranktheserisksfarmorehighlyoverthetwo-yearperiodcomparedtoolderagegroups,withbothrisksfeaturingintheirtop10rankingsintheshortterm.Theprivatesectorhighlightstheserisksastopconcernsoverthelongerterm,incontrasttorespondentsfromcivilsocietyorgovernmentwhoprioritizetheserisksovershortertimeframes.Thisdissonanceinperceptionsofurgencyamongkeydecision-makersSocietalpolarizationfeaturesamongthetopthreerisksoverboththecurrentandtwo-yeartimehorizons,ranking#9overthelongerterm.Inaddition,SocietalpolarizationandEconomicdownturnareseenasthemostinterconnected–andthereforeinfluential–risksintheglobalrisksnetwork(FigureD),asdriversandpossibleconsequencesofnumerousrisks.FIGUREBCurrent

risklandscape"Pleaseselectuptofiverisksthatyoubelievearemostlikelytopresentamaterialcrisisonaglobalscalein2024."Risk

categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietal66%53%46%42%39%Technological1st2nd3rd4th5thExtreme

weatherAI-generatedmisinformationSocietal

and/orpolitical

polarizationCost-of-living

crisisCyberattacksand

disinformationSourceWorld

Economic

Forum

Global

RisksPerception

Survey

2023-2024.GlobalRisksReport20247FIGURECGlobalrisksrankedbyseverityovertheshortandlongterm"Pleaseestimatethelikelyimpact(severity)ofthefollowingrisksovera2-yearand10-yearperiod."Risk

categories2years10

yearsEconomic123456stMisinformationanddisinformationExtremeweathereventsSocietalpolarizationCyberinsecurity123456stExtremeweathereventsCriticalchangetoEarthsystemsBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapseNaturalresourceshortagesMisinformationanddisinformationAdverseoutcomesofAItechnologiesInvoluntarymigrationEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalndrdthththndrdthththTechnologicalInterstatearmedconflictLackofeconomicopportunityInflation7th7th8thInvoluntarymigrationEconomicdownturnPollution8thCyberinsecurity9th9thSocietalpolarization10th10thPollutionSourceWorld

Economic

Forum

Global

RisksPerception

Survey

2023-2024.Emergingasthemostsevereglobalriskanticipatedoverthenexttwoyears,foreignanddomesticactorsalikewillleverageMisinformationanddisinformationtofurtherwidensocietalandpoliticaldivides(Chapter1.3:Falseinformation).Asclosetothreebillionpeopleareexpectedtohead

to

the

electoral

polls

acrossseveral

economies–includingBangladesh,India,Indonesia,Mexico,Pakistan,theUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStates–overthenexttwoyears,thewidespreaduseofmisinformationanddisinformation,andtoolstodisseminateit,mayunderminethelegitimacyofnewlyelectedgovernments.Resultingunrestcouldrangefromviolentprotestsandhatecrimestocivilconfrontationandterrorism.riskrankingsoverthetwo-yearperiod(FigureC).Althougha“softerlanding”appearstobeprevailingfornow,

thenear-termoutlookremainshighlyuncertain.Therearemultiplesourcesofcontinuedsupply-sidepricepressuresloomingoverthenexttwoyears,fromElNiñoconditionstothepotentialescalationofliveconflicts.Andifinterestratesremainrelativelyhighforlonger,

small-andmedium-sizedenterprisesandheavilyindebtedcountrieswillbeparticularlyexposedtodebtdistress(Chapter1.5:Economicuncertainty).Economicuncertaintywillweighheavilyacrossmostmarkets,butcapitalwillbethecostliestforthemostvulnerablecountries.Climate-vulnerableorconflict-pronecountriesstandtobeincreasinglylockedoutofmuch-neededdigitalandphysicalinfrastructure,tradeandgreeninvestmentsandrelatedeconomicopportunities.Astheadaptivecapacitiesofthesefragilestateserodesfurther,

relatedsocietalandenvironmentalimpactsareamplified.Beyondelections,perceptionsofrealityarelikelytoalsobecomemorepolarized,infiltratingthepublicdiscourseonissuesrangingfrompublichealthtosocialjustice.However,

astruthisundermined,theriskofdomesticpropagandaandcensorshipwillalsoriseinturn.Inresponsetomis-anddisinformation,governmentscouldbeincreasinglyempoweredtocontrolinformationbasedonwhattheydeterminetobe“true”.Freedomsrelatingtotheinternet,pressandaccesstowidersourcesofinformationthatarealreadyindeclineriskdescendingintobroaderrepressionofinformationflowsacrossawidersetofcountries.Similarly,theconvergenceoftechnologicaladvancesandgeopoliticaldynamicswilllikelycreateanewsetofwinnersandlosersacrossadvancedanddevelopingeconomiesalike(Chapter2.4:AIincharge).Ifcommercialincentivesandgeopoliticalimperatives,ratherthanpublicinterest,remaintheprimarydriversofthedevelopmentofartificialintelligence(AI)andotherfrontiertechnologies,thedigitalgapbetweenhigh-andlow-incomecountrieswilldriveastarkdisparityinthedistributionofrelatedbenefits–andrisks.Vulnerablecountriesandcommunitieswouldbeleftfurtherbehind,digitallyisolatedfromturbochargedAIbreakthroughsimpactingeconomicproductivity,finance,climate,educationandhealthcare,aswellasrelatedjobcreation.Economicstrainsonlow-andmiddle-incomepeople–andcountries–are

settogrowTheCost-of-livingcrisisremainsamajorconcernintheoutlookfor2024(FigureB).TheeconomicrisksofInflation(#7)andEconomicdownturn(#9)arealsonotablenewentrantstothetop10GlobalRisksReport20248FIGUREDGlobalriskslandscape:aninterconnectionsmapIntrastateviolenceCensorshipandsurveillanceNaturalresourceshortagesErosionofhumanrightsMisinformationanddisinformationCriticalchangetoEarthsystemsTerrorist

attacksInvoluntarymigrationAdverseoutcomesoffrontiertechnologiesBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapseTechnologicalpowerconcentrationCyberinsecurityInterstatearmedconflictPollutionExtremeweathereventsAdverseoutcomesofAItechnologiesSocietalpolarizationNon-weatherrelatednaturaldisastersDisruptionstoChronichealthconditionscriticalinfrastructureInfectiousdiseasesBiological,chemicalornuclearhazardsInsufficientinfrastructureandservicesLackofeconomicopportunityDisruptionstoasystemicallyimportantsupplychainLabourshortagesConcentrationofstrategicresourcesGeoeconomicconfrontationInflationEconomicdownturnIlliciteconomicactivityDebtUnemploymentNodesEdgesAssetbubbleburstsRisk

influenceRelative

influenceHighHighMediumLowMediumLowRisk

categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceWorld

Economic

Forum

Global

RisksPerception

Survey

2023-2024.SimmeringgeopoliticaltensionscombinedwithtechnologywilldrivenewsecurityrisksOverthelongerterm,developmental

progress

andliving

standards

are

at

risk.

Economic,environmentalandtechnologicaltrends

are

likelyto

entrench

existingchallenges

aroundlabour

and

social

mobility,

blockingindividualsfrom

incomeand

skillingopportunities,and

therefore

the

abilityto

improve

economic

status(Chapter

2.5:Endof

development?).

Lackofeconomicopportunity

is

a

top

10

riskoverthetwo-yearperiod,

butisseeminglyless

of

a

concernforglobaldecision-makers

over

the

longer-termhorizon,dropping

to

#11

(Figure

E).

Highrates

of

jobchurn

–

bothjob

creation

anddestruction–

havethepotentialto

result

indeeply

bifurcated

labour

marketsbetween

andwithin

developedanddevelopingeconomies.

While

the

productivity

benefitsof

theseeconomic

transitions

should

not

be

underestimated,manufacturing-

orservices-ledexport

growth

mightnolonger

offer

traditionalpathwaysto

greaterprosperity

for

developingcountries.Asbotha

product

anddriverofstatefragility,Interstatearmedconflictisa

newentrantintothetopriskrankingsoverthetwo-yearhorizon(FigureC).Asthefocusofmajorpowersbecomesstretchedacross

multiplefronts,

conflictcontagionisa

keyconcern

(Chapter1.4:Riseinconflict).There

areseveral

frozenconflicts

at

risk

of

heating

up

in

the

nearterm,duetospilloverthreats

orgrowing

statefragility.Thisbecomesanevenmoreworryingriskinthecontextofrecenttechnologicaladvances.Intheabsenceofconcertedcollaboration,agloballyfragmentedapproachtoregulatingfrontiertechnologiesisunlikelytopreventthespreadofitsmostdangerouscapabilitiesand,infact,mayencourageproliferation(Chapter2.4:AIincharge).Overthelonger-term,technologicaladvances,includingingenerativeAI,willenablearangeofnon-stateandstateactorstoaccessasuperhumanbreadthofknowledgetoconceptualizeanddevelopnewtoolsofdisruptionandconflict,frommalwaretobiologicalweapons.Thenarrowingofindividualpathwaystostablelivelihoodswouldalsoimpactmetricsofhumandevelopment–

frompovertytoaccesstoeducationandhealthcare.Markedchangesinthesocialcontractasintergenerationalmobilitydeclineswouldradicallyreshapesocietalandpoliticaldynamicsinbothadvancedanddevelopingeconomies.GlobalRisksReport20249Inthisenvironment,thelinesbetweenthestate,organizedcrime,privatemilitiaandterroristgroupswouldblurfurther.

Abroadsetofnon-stateactorswillcapitalizeonweakenedsystems,cementingthecyclebetweenconflict,fragility,corruptionandcrime.Illiciteconomicactivity(#31)isoneofthelowest-rankedrisksoverthe10-yearperiodbutisseentobetriggeredbyanumberofthetop-rankedrisksoverthetwo-and10-yearhorizons(FigureD).Economichardship–combinedwithtechnologicaladvances,resourcestressandconflict–islikelytopushmorepeopletowardscrime,militarizationorradicalizationandcontributetotheglobalizationoforganizedcrimeintargetsandoperations(Chapter2.6:Crimewave).includingimplicationsforhigh-stakeshotspots:theRussia-Ukrainewar,

theMiddleEastconflictandtensionsoverTaiwan

(Chapter1.4:Riseinconflict).Coordinated

effortstoisolate“rogue”statesarelikelytobeincreasinglyfutile,whileinternationalgovernance

andpeacekeepingeffortsshowntobeineffectiveat“policing”conflictcouldbesidelined.Theshiftingbalanceofinfluenceinglobalaffairsisparticularlyevidentintheinternationalizationofconflicts–wherepivotalpowerswillincreasinglylendsupportandresourcestogarnerpolit

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