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January2024TheGlobalRisksReport2024Terms
ofuseanddisclaimerThisdocumentispublishedbytheWorldEconomicForumasacontributiontoaproject,insightareaorinteraction.Thefindings,interpretationsandconclusionsexpressedhereinarearesultofacollaborativeprocessfacilitatedandendorsedbytheWorldEconomicForumbutwhoseresultsdonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheWorldEconomicForum,northeentiretyofitsMembers,Partnersorotherstakeholders.WorldEconomicForum91-93routedelaCapiteCH-1223Cologny/GenevaSwitzerlandTel.:
+41(0)228691212Fax:+41(0)227862744E-mail:contact@Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,
storedina
retrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,orotherwisewithoutthepriorpermissionoftheWorldEconomicForum.ISBN:978-2-940631-64-3Thereportandaninteractivedataplatformareavailableat/publications/global-risks-report-2024/.Copyright©2024bytheWorldEconomicForumGlobalRisksReport20242ContentsPreface45OverviewofmethodologyKeyfindings6Chapter1:GlobalRisks2024:Ataturningpoint1.1Theworldin202412121418222732333737404250576876778586878990929495991021121151211.2Thepathto20261.3Falseinformation1.4Riseinconflict1.5Economicuncertainty1.6LookingaheadEndnotesChapter2:GlobalRisks2034:Overthelimit2.1Theworldin20342.2Structuralforces2.3A3°Cworld2.4AIincharge2.5Theendofdevelopment?2.6Crimewave2.7PreparingforthedecadeaheadEndnotesChapter3:Respondingtoglobalrisks3.1Localizedstrategies3.2Breakthroughendeavors3.3Collectiveactions3.4Cross-bordercoordination3.5ConclusionEndnotesAppendixA:DefinitionsandGlobalRisksListAppendixB:GlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024AppendixC:ExecutiveOpinionSurvey:NationalRiskPerceptionsAppendixD:RiskgovernancePartnerInstitutesAcknowledgementsGlobalRisksReport20243PrefaceSaadiaZahidiManagingDirectorLastyear’s
GlobalRisksReportwarned
ofa
worldthatwouldnoteasilyrebound
fromcontinuedshocks.As2024begins,the19theditionofthereportissetagainsta
backdropofrapidlyacceleratingtechnologicalchangeandeconomicuncertainty,astheworldisplaguedbya
duoofdangerouscrises:climateandconflict.experimentaltechnologiespresentexistentialthreatstohumanity?Thesetransnationalriskswillbecomehardertohandleasglobalcooperationerodes.Inthisyear’sGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey,two-thirdsofrespondents
predictthata
multipolarorderwilldominateinthenext10years,asmiddleandgreatpowerssetandenforce–
butalsocontest-
currentrulesandnorms.Thereportconsiderstheimplicationsofthisfragmentedworld,wherepreparednessforglobalrisksisevermorecriticalbutishinderedbylackofconsensusandcooperation.Italsopresentsa
conceptualframeworkforaddressingglobalrisks,identifyingthescopefor“minimumviableeffort”foraction,dependingonthenatureoftherisk.Underlyinggeopoliticaltensionscombinedwiththeeruptionofactivehostilitiesinmultipleregionsiscontributing
to
an
unstable
global
order
characterizedbypolarizingnarratives,erodingtrustandinsecurity.Atthesametime,countriesaregrapplingwiththeimpactsofrecord-breaking
extreme
weather,asclimate-changeadaptationeffortsandresourcesfallshortofthetype,scaleandintensityofclimate-relatedeventsalreadytakingplace.Cost-of-livingpressurescontinuetobite,amidstpersistentlyelevatedinflationandinterestratesandcontinuedeconomicuncertaintyinmuchoftheworld.Despondentheadlinesare
borderless,
sharedregularlyandwidely,anda
senseoffrustrationatthestatusquoisincreasinglypalpable.Together,thisleavesampleroomforacceleratingrisks–
likemisinformationanddisinformation–
topropagateinsocietiesthathavealreadybeenpoliticallyandeconomicallyweakenedinrecentyears.Theinsightsinthisreport
areunderpinnedbynearlytwodecadesoforiginaldataonglobalriskperception.ThereporthighlightsthefindingsfromourannualGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey,whichbringstogetherthecollectiveintelligenceofnearly1,500globalleadersacrossacademia,business,government,
theinternational
communityandcivilsociety.Italsoleveragesinsightsfromover200thematicexperts,includingtheriskspecialiststhatformtheGlobalRisksReportAdvisoryBoard,GlobalFutureCouncilonComplexRisks,andtheChiefRiskOfficersCommunity.We
arealsodeeplygratefultoourlong-standingpartners,MarshMcLennanandZurichInsuranceGroup,fortheirinvaluablecontributionsinshapingthethemesandnarrativeofthereport.Finally,wewouldliketoexpressourgratitudetothecoreteamthatdevelopedthisreport–
EllissaCavaciuti-Wishart,
SophieHeadingandKevinKohler–
andtoRickyLiandAttilioDiBattistafortheirsupport.Justasnaturalecosystemscanbepushedtothelimitandbecomesomethingfundamentallynew;suchsystemicshiftsarealsotakingplaceacrossotherspheres:geostrategic,demographicandtechnological.Thisyear,
weexploretheriseofglobalrisksagainstthebackdropofthese“structuralforces”aswellasthetectonicclashesbetweenthem.Thenextsetofglobalconditionsmaynotnecessarilybebetterorworsethanthelast,butthetransitionwillnotbeaneasyone.Thereport
explorestheglobalrisklandscapeinthisphaseoftransitionandgovernance
systemsbeingstretchedbeyondtheirlimit.Itanalysesthemostsevere
perceivedriskstoeconomiesandsocietiesovertwoand10years,inthecontextoftheseinfluentialforces.Couldwecatapulttoa
3°Cworldastheimpactsofclimatechangeintrinsicallyrewritetheplanet?Havewereachedthepeakofhumandevelopmentforlargepartsoftheglobalpopulation,givendeterioratingdebtandgeo-economicThefutureisnotfixed.A
multiplicityofdifferentfuturesisconceivableoverthenextdecade.Althoughthisdrivesuncertaintyintheshortterm,italsoallowsroomforhope.Alongsideglobalrisksandtheera-definingchangesunderwaylieuniqueopportunitiestorebuildtrust,optimismandresilienceinourinstitutionsandsocieties.Itisourhopethatthereportservesasa
vitalcalltoactionforopenandconstructivedialogueamongleadersofgovernment,businessandcivilsocietytotakeactiontominimizeglobalrisksandbuilduponlong-termopportunitiesandsolutions.conditions?Couldwefaceanexplosionofcriminalityandcorruptionthatfeedsonmorefragilestatesandmorevulnerablepopulations?Will
an“armsrace”inGlobalRisksReport20244OverviewofmethodologyTheGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey(GRPS)hasunderpinnedtheGlobalRisksReport
fornearlytwodecadesandistheWorldEconomicForum’spremiersourceoforiginalglobalrisksdata.Thisyear’s
GRPShasbroughttogetherleadinginsightsontheevolvingglobalriskslandscapefrom1,490expertsacrossacademia,business,government,theinternationalcommunityandcivilsociety.ResponsesfortheGRPS2023-2024werecollectedfrom4Septemberto9October2023.RefertoAppendixB:GlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey2023-2024formoredetailonthemethodology.To
complementGRPSdataonglobalrisks,thereportalsodrawsontheWorldEconomicForum’sExecutiveOpinionSurvey(EOS)toidentifyrisksthatposethemostseverethreattoeachcountryoverthenexttwoyears,asidentifiedbyover11,000businessleadersin113economies.WhenconsideredincontextwiththeGRPS,thisdataprovidesinsightintolocalconcernsandprioritiesandpointstopotential“hotspots”andregionalmanifestationsofglobalrisks.RefertoAppendixC:ExecutiveOpinionSurvey:NationalRiskPerceptionsformoredetails.“Globalrisk”isdefinedasthepossibilityoftheoccurrenceofaneventorconditionwhich,ifitoccurs,wouldnegativelyimpactasignificantproportionofglobalGDP,
populationornaturalresources.Relevantdefinitionsforeachofthe34globalrisksareincludedinAppendixA:DefinitionsandGlobalRisksList.Finally,thereportintegratestheviewsofleadingexpertstogenerateforesightandtosupportanalysisofthesurveydata.Contributionswerecollectedfrom55colleaguesacrosstheWorldEconomicForum’s
platforms.Thereportalsoharnessesqualitativeinsightsfromover160expertsfromacrossacademia,business,government,theinternationalcommunityandcivilsocietythroughcommunitymeetings,privateinterviewsandthematicworkshopsconductedfromMaytoOctober2023.TheseincludetheGlobalRisksAdvisoryBoard,GlobalFutureCouncilonComplexRisksandtheChiefRisksOfficersCommunity.RefertoAcknowledgementsformoredetail.TheGRPS2023-2024includedthefollowingcomponents:–Risklandscapeinvitedrespondentstoassessthelikelyimpact(severity)ofglobalrisksoveraone-,two-and10-yearhorizontoillustratethepotentialdevelopmentofindividualglobalrisksovertimeandidentifyareasofkeyconcern.–––Consequencesaskedrespondentstoconsidertherangeofpotentialimpactsofariskarising,tohighlightrelationshipsbetweenglobalrisksandthepotentialforcompoundingcrises.Riskgovernanceinvitedrespondentstoreflectonwhichapproacheshavethemostpotentialfordrivingactiononglobalriskreductionandpreparedness.Outlookaskedrespondentstopredicttheevolutionofkeyaspectsunderpinningtheglobalriskslandscape.GlobalRisksReport20245KeyfindingsTheGlobalRisksReport2024presentsthefindingsoftheGlobalRisksPerceptionSurvey(GRPS),whichcapturesinsightsfromnearly1,500globalexperts.Thereportanalysesglobalrisksthroughthreetimeframestosupportdecision-makersinbalancingcurrentcrisesandlonger-termpriorities.Chapter1exploresthemostseverecurrentrisks,andthoserankedhighestbysurveyrespondents,overatwo-yearperiod,analysingindepththethreerisksthathaverapidlyacceleratedintothetop10rankingsoverthetwo-yearhorizon.Chapter2focusesonthetoprisksemergingoverthenextdecadeagainstabackdropofgeostrategic,climate,technologicalanddemographicshifts,divingdeeperintofourspecificriskoutlooks.Thereportconcludesbyconsideringapproachesforaddressingcomplexandnon-linearaspectsofglobalrisksduringthisperiodofglobalfragmentation.Belowarethekeyfindingsofthereport.Althoughgloballydestabilizingconsequences–suchasthoseseenattheinitialoutbreakoftheRussia-UkrainewarortheCOVID-19pandemic–werelargelyavoided,thelonger-termoutlookforthesedevelopmentscouldbringfurtherglobalshocks.Asweenter2024,2023-2024GRPSresultshighlightapredominantlynegativeoutlookfortheworldoverthenexttwoyearsthatisexpectedtoworsenoverthenextdecade(FigureA).SurveyedinSeptember2023,themajorityofrespondents(54%)anticipatesomeinstabilityandamoderateriskofglobalcatastrophes,whileanother30%expectevenmoreturbulentconditions.Theoutlookismarkedlymorenegativeoverthe10-yeartimehorizon,withnearlytwo-thirdsofrespondentsexpectingastormyorturbulentoutlook.Inthisyear’s
report,wecontextualizeouranalysisthroughfourstructuralforcesthatwillshapethematerializationandmanagementofglobalrisksoverthenextdecade.Thesearelonger-termshiftsinthearrangementofandrelationshipbetweenfoursystemicelementsofthegloballandscape:AdeterioratingglobaloutlookLookingbackattheeventsof2023,plentyofdevelopmentscapturedtheattentionofpeoplearoundtheworld–whileothersreceivedminimalscrutiny.Vulnerablepopulationsgrappledwithlethalconflicts,fromSudantoGazaandIsrael,alongsiderecord-breakingheatconditions,drought,wildfiresandflooding.Societaldiscontentwaspalpableinmanycountries,withnewscyclesdominatedbypolarization,violentprotests,riotsandstrikes.–TrajectoriesrelatingtoglobalwarmingandrelatedconsequencestoEarthsystems(Climatechange).–Changesinthesize,growthandstructureofpopulationsaroundtheworld(Demographicbifurcation).FIGUREAShort
and
long-term
global
outlook"Whichofthefollowingbestcharacterizesyouroutlookfortheworldoverthefollowingtimeperiods?"3%1%Shortterm(2years)Longterm(10years)27%54%15%17%46%29%8%1%Stormy:
Global
catastrophic
risks
loomingTurbulent:
Upheavals
and
elevated
risk
of
global
catastrophesUnsettled:
Some
instability,
moderate
risk
of
global
catastrophesStable:
Isolated
disruptions,
low
risk
of
global
catastrophesCalm:
Negligible
risk
of
global
catastrophesSourceNoteWorld
Economic
Forum
Global
RisksPerception
Survey
2023-2024.The
percentages
in
the
graph
may
not
add
up
to100%
because
figures
have
been
roundedup/down.GlobalRisksReport20246impliessub-optimalalignmentanddecision-making,heighteningtheriskofmissingkeymomentsofintervention,whichwouldresultinlong-termchangestoplanetarysystems.––Developmentalpathwaysforfrontiertechnologies(Technologicalacceleration).Materialevolutionintheconcentrationandsourcesofgeopoliticalpower(Geostrategicshifts).Chapter2.3:A3°Cworldexplorestheconsequencesofpassingatleastone“climatetippingpoint”withinthenextdecade.Recentresearchsuggeststhatthethresholdfortriggeringlong-term,potentiallyirreversibleandself-Anewsetofglobalconditionsistakingshapeacrosseachofthesedomainsandthesetransitionswillbecharacterizedbyuncertaintyandvolatility.Associetiesseektoadapttothesechangingforces,theircapacitytoprepareforandrespondtoglobalriskswillbeaffected.perpetuatingchangestoselectplanetarysystemsislikelytobepassedatorbefore1.5°Cofglobalwarming,whichiscurrentlyanticipatedtobereachedbytheearly2030s.Manyeconomieswillremainlargelyunpreparedfor“non-linear”impacts:thepotentialtriggeringofanexusofseveralrelatedsocioenvironmentalriskshasthepotentialtospeedupclimatechange,throughthereleaseofcarbonemissions,andamplifyrelatedimpacts,threateningclimate-vulnerablepopulations.Thecollectiveabilityofsocietiestoadaptcouldbeoverwhelmed,consideringthesheerscaleofpotentialimpactsandinfrastructureinvestmentrequirements,leavingsomecommunitiesandcountriesunabletoabsorbboththeacuteandchroniceffectsofrapidclimatechange.EnvironmentalriskscouldhitthepointofnoreturnEnvironmentalriskscontinuetodominatetheriskslandscapeoverallthreetimeframes.Two-thirds
ofGRPSrespondentsrankExtremeweatherasthetopriskmostlikelytopresentamaterialcrisisonaglobalscalein2024(FigureB),withthewarmingphaseoftheElNiño-SouthernOscillation(ENSO)cycleprojectedtointensifyandpersistuntilMaythisyear.
Itisalsoseenasthesecond-mostsevereriskoverthetwo-yeartimeframeandsimilartolastyear’s
rankings,nearlyallenvironmentalrisksfeatureamongthetop10overthelongerterm(FigureC).Aspolarizationgrowsandtechnologicalrisksremainunchecked,‘truth’willcomeunderpressureHowever,
GRPSrespondentsdisagreeabouttheurgencyofenvironmentalrisks,inparticularBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapseandCriticalchangetoEarthsystems.Youngerrespondentstendtoranktheserisksfarmorehighlyoverthetwo-yearperiodcomparedtoolderagegroups,withbothrisksfeaturingintheirtop10rankingsintheshortterm.Theprivatesectorhighlightstheserisksastopconcernsoverthelongerterm,incontrasttorespondentsfromcivilsocietyorgovernmentwhoprioritizetheserisksovershortertimeframes.Thisdissonanceinperceptionsofurgencyamongkeydecision-makersSocietalpolarizationfeaturesamongthetopthreerisksoverboththecurrentandtwo-yeartimehorizons,ranking#9overthelongerterm.Inaddition,SocietalpolarizationandEconomicdownturnareseenasthemostinterconnected–andthereforeinfluential–risksintheglobalrisksnetwork(FigureD),asdriversandpossibleconsequencesofnumerousrisks.FIGUREBCurrent
risklandscape"Pleaseselectuptofiverisksthatyoubelievearemostlikelytopresentamaterialcrisisonaglobalscalein2024."Risk
categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietal66%53%46%42%39%Technological1st2nd3rd4th5thExtreme
weatherAI-generatedmisinformationSocietal
and/orpolitical
polarizationCost-of-living
crisisCyberattacksand
disinformationSourceWorld
Economic
Forum
Global
RisksPerception
Survey
2023-2024.GlobalRisksReport20247FIGURECGlobalrisksrankedbyseverityovertheshortandlongterm"Pleaseestimatethelikelyimpact(severity)ofthefollowingrisksovera2-yearand10-yearperiod."Risk
categories2years10
yearsEconomic123456stMisinformationanddisinformationExtremeweathereventsSocietalpolarizationCyberinsecurity123456stExtremeweathereventsCriticalchangetoEarthsystemsBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapseNaturalresourceshortagesMisinformationanddisinformationAdverseoutcomesofAItechnologiesInvoluntarymigrationEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalndrdthththndrdthththTechnologicalInterstatearmedconflictLackofeconomicopportunityInflation7th7th8thInvoluntarymigrationEconomicdownturnPollution8thCyberinsecurity9th9thSocietalpolarization10th10thPollutionSourceWorld
Economic
Forum
Global
RisksPerception
Survey
2023-2024.Emergingasthemostsevereglobalriskanticipatedoverthenexttwoyears,foreignanddomesticactorsalikewillleverageMisinformationanddisinformationtofurtherwidensocietalandpoliticaldivides(Chapter1.3:Falseinformation).Asclosetothreebillionpeopleareexpectedtohead
to
the
electoral
polls
acrossseveral
economies–includingBangladesh,India,Indonesia,Mexico,Pakistan,theUnitedKingdomandtheUnitedStates–overthenexttwoyears,thewidespreaduseofmisinformationanddisinformation,andtoolstodisseminateit,mayunderminethelegitimacyofnewlyelectedgovernments.Resultingunrestcouldrangefromviolentprotestsandhatecrimestocivilconfrontationandterrorism.riskrankingsoverthetwo-yearperiod(FigureC).Althougha“softerlanding”appearstobeprevailingfornow,
thenear-termoutlookremainshighlyuncertain.Therearemultiplesourcesofcontinuedsupply-sidepricepressuresloomingoverthenexttwoyears,fromElNiñoconditionstothepotentialescalationofliveconflicts.Andifinterestratesremainrelativelyhighforlonger,
small-andmedium-sizedenterprisesandheavilyindebtedcountrieswillbeparticularlyexposedtodebtdistress(Chapter1.5:Economicuncertainty).Economicuncertaintywillweighheavilyacrossmostmarkets,butcapitalwillbethecostliestforthemostvulnerablecountries.Climate-vulnerableorconflict-pronecountriesstandtobeincreasinglylockedoutofmuch-neededdigitalandphysicalinfrastructure,tradeandgreeninvestmentsandrelatedeconomicopportunities.Astheadaptivecapacitiesofthesefragilestateserodesfurther,
relatedsocietalandenvironmentalimpactsareamplified.Beyondelections,perceptionsofrealityarelikelytoalsobecomemorepolarized,infiltratingthepublicdiscourseonissuesrangingfrompublichealthtosocialjustice.However,
astruthisundermined,theriskofdomesticpropagandaandcensorshipwillalsoriseinturn.Inresponsetomis-anddisinformation,governmentscouldbeincreasinglyempoweredtocontrolinformationbasedonwhattheydeterminetobe“true”.Freedomsrelatingtotheinternet,pressandaccesstowidersourcesofinformationthatarealreadyindeclineriskdescendingintobroaderrepressionofinformationflowsacrossawidersetofcountries.Similarly,theconvergenceoftechnologicaladvancesandgeopoliticaldynamicswilllikelycreateanewsetofwinnersandlosersacrossadvancedanddevelopingeconomiesalike(Chapter2.4:AIincharge).Ifcommercialincentivesandgeopoliticalimperatives,ratherthanpublicinterest,remaintheprimarydriversofthedevelopmentofartificialintelligence(AI)andotherfrontiertechnologies,thedigitalgapbetweenhigh-andlow-incomecountrieswilldriveastarkdisparityinthedistributionofrelatedbenefits–andrisks.Vulnerablecountriesandcommunitieswouldbeleftfurtherbehind,digitallyisolatedfromturbochargedAIbreakthroughsimpactingeconomicproductivity,finance,climate,educationandhealthcare,aswellasrelatedjobcreation.Economicstrainsonlow-andmiddle-incomepeople–andcountries–are
settogrowTheCost-of-livingcrisisremainsamajorconcernintheoutlookfor2024(FigureB).TheeconomicrisksofInflation(#7)andEconomicdownturn(#9)arealsonotablenewentrantstothetop10GlobalRisksReport20248FIGUREDGlobalriskslandscape:aninterconnectionsmapIntrastateviolenceCensorshipandsurveillanceNaturalresourceshortagesErosionofhumanrightsMisinformationanddisinformationCriticalchangetoEarthsystemsTerrorist
attacksInvoluntarymigrationAdverseoutcomesoffrontiertechnologiesBiodiversitylossandecosystemcollapseTechnologicalpowerconcentrationCyberinsecurityInterstatearmedconflictPollutionExtremeweathereventsAdverseoutcomesofAItechnologiesSocietalpolarizationNon-weatherrelatednaturaldisastersDisruptionstoChronichealthconditionscriticalinfrastructureInfectiousdiseasesBiological,chemicalornuclearhazardsInsufficientinfrastructureandservicesLackofeconomicopportunityDisruptionstoasystemicallyimportantsupplychainLabourshortagesConcentrationofstrategicresourcesGeoeconomicconfrontationInflationEconomicdownturnIlliciteconomicactivityDebtUnemploymentNodesEdgesAssetbubbleburstsRisk
influenceRelative
influenceHighHighMediumLowMediumLowRisk
categoriesEconomicEnvironmentalGeopoliticalSocietalTechnologicalSourceWorld
Economic
Forum
Global
RisksPerception
Survey
2023-2024.SimmeringgeopoliticaltensionscombinedwithtechnologywilldrivenewsecurityrisksOverthelongerterm,developmental
progress
andliving
standards
are
at
risk.
Economic,environmentalandtechnologicaltrends
are
likelyto
entrench
existingchallenges
aroundlabour
and
social
mobility,
blockingindividualsfrom
incomeand
skillingopportunities,and
therefore
the
abilityto
improve
economic
status(Chapter
2.5:Endof
development?).
Lackofeconomicopportunity
is
a
top
10
riskoverthetwo-yearperiod,
butisseeminglyless
of
a
concernforglobaldecision-makers
over
the
longer-termhorizon,dropping
to
#11
(Figure
E).
Highrates
of
jobchurn
–
bothjob
creation
anddestruction–
havethepotentialto
result
indeeply
bifurcated
labour
marketsbetween
andwithin
developedanddevelopingeconomies.
While
the
productivity
benefitsof
theseeconomic
transitions
should
not
be
underestimated,manufacturing-
orservices-ledexport
growth
mightnolonger
offer
traditionalpathwaysto
greaterprosperity
for
developingcountries.Asbotha
product
anddriverofstatefragility,Interstatearmedconflictisa
newentrantintothetopriskrankingsoverthetwo-yearhorizon(FigureC).Asthefocusofmajorpowersbecomesstretchedacross
multiplefronts,
conflictcontagionisa
keyconcern
(Chapter1.4:Riseinconflict).There
areseveral
frozenconflicts
at
risk
of
heating
up
in
the
nearterm,duetospilloverthreats
orgrowing
statefragility.Thisbecomesanevenmoreworryingriskinthecontextofrecenttechnologicaladvances.Intheabsenceofconcertedcollaboration,agloballyfragmentedapproachtoregulatingfrontiertechnologiesisunlikelytopreventthespreadofitsmostdangerouscapabilitiesand,infact,mayencourageproliferation(Chapter2.4:AIincharge).Overthelonger-term,technologicaladvances,includingingenerativeAI,willenablearangeofnon-stateandstateactorstoaccessasuperhumanbreadthofknowledgetoconceptualizeanddevelopnewtoolsofdisruptionandconflict,frommalwaretobiologicalweapons.Thenarrowingofindividualpathwaystostablelivelihoodswouldalsoimpactmetricsofhumandevelopment–
frompovertytoaccesstoeducationandhealthcare.Markedchangesinthesocialcontractasintergenerationalmobilitydeclineswouldradicallyreshapesocietalandpoliticaldynamicsinbothadvancedanddevelopingeconomies.GlobalRisksReport20249Inthisenvironment,thelinesbetweenthestate,organizedcrime,privatemilitiaandterroristgroupswouldblurfurther.
Abroadsetofnon-stateactorswillcapitalizeonweakenedsystems,cementingthecyclebetweenconflict,fragility,corruptionandcrime.Illiciteconomicactivity(#31)isoneofthelowest-rankedrisksoverthe10-yearperiodbutisseentobetriggeredbyanumberofthetop-rankedrisksoverthetwo-and10-yearhorizons(FigureD).Economichardship–combinedwithtechnologicaladvances,resourcestressandconflict–islikelytopushmorepeopletowardscrime,militarizationorradicalizationandcontributetotheglobalizationoforganizedcrimeintargetsandoperations(Chapter2.6:Crimewave).includingimplicationsforhigh-stakeshotspots:theRussia-Ukrainewar,
theMiddleEastconflictandtensionsoverTaiwan
(Chapter1.4:Riseinconflict).Coordinated
effortstoisolate“rogue”statesarelikelytobeincreasinglyfutile,whileinternationalgovernance
andpeacekeepingeffortsshowntobeineffectiveat“policing”conflictcouldbesidelined.Theshiftingbalanceofinfluenceinglobalaffairsisparticularlyevidentintheinternationalizationofconflicts–wherepivotalpowerswillincreasinglylendsupportandresourcestogarnerpolit
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