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PolicyResearchWorkingPaper10736

AssessingtheExtentofMonetaryPoverty

intheSyrianArabRepublicafteraDecade

ofConflict

SilviaRedaelli

MichelleInfanzon

LauraLilianaMorenoHerrera

WORLDBANKGROUP

PovertyandEquityGlobalPractice

March2024

PolicyResearchWorkingPaper10736

Abstract

ThedataforestimatingmonetarypovertyintheSyrianArabRepublicareoutdated.Inthecontextofdatascar-city,thispaperaimstoproposeamethodologicalapproachtoaddresstheknowledgegapregardingwelfareinSyriaoverthepastdecade.Inparticular,theanalysisprovides(i)updatedpre-conflictpovertybaselineestimatesbasedongroupeddatafromthe2009HouseholdIncomeandExpenditureSurvey;(ii)supportingevidenceontheviabil-ityofusingHumanitarianNeedsAssessmentProgrammeDemographicandWaterSupply,Sanitation,andHygiene2022surveydatafortheestimationofmonetarypovertyin2022;and(iii)supportingtheoreticalandempirical

evidencetoidentifygrowthinpercapitagrossdomesticproductincurrentpricesdeflatedbyConsumerPriceIndexasthebestmetrictoprojectpovertyusinganowcastingapproach.Basedonthisanalysis,thepaperproposestouse2022HumanitarianNeedsAssessmentProgramme–basedpovertyestimatestoanchorthemostrecentestimatestothebestavailableevidence,andtointerpolatethepovertyevolutionobtainedfromback-casting2022andnowcasting2009povertyestimatesover2009–22usingthegrowthrateofpercapitagrossdomesticproductincurrentprices,deflatedbytheConsumerPriceIndexwithapassthroughof0.7.

ThispaperisaproductofthePovertyandEquityGlobalPractice.ItispartofalargereffortbytheWorldBanktoprovideopenaccesstoitsresearchandmakeacontributiontodevelopmentpolicydiscussionsaroundtheworld.PolicyResearchWorkingPapersarealsopostedontheWebat

/prwp.Theauthorsmaybecontacted

atsredaelli@.

ThePolicyResearchWorkingPaperSeriesdisseminatesthefindingsofworkinprogresstoencouragetheexchangeofideasaboutdevelopmentissues.Anobjectiveoftheseriesistogetthefindingsoutquickly,evenifthepresentationsarelessthanfullypolished.Thepaperscarrythenamesoftheauthorsandshouldbecitedaccordingly.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthors.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/WorldBankanditsaffiliatedorganizations,orthoseoftheExecutiveDirectorsoftheWorldBankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent.

ProducedbytheResearchSupportTeam

AssessingtheExtentofMonetaryPoverty

intheSyrianArabRepublicafteraDecade

ofConflict

SilviaRedaelli

sredaelli@

MichelleInfanzon

minfanzonguadarr@

LauraLilianaMorenoHerrera

lmorenoherrera@

JELcodes:I32–MeasurementandAnalysisofPoverty

Keywords:povertymeasurement,povertynowcasting,fragilityandconflict,datadeprivation

Contents

Introduction 4

1Updatingpre-conflictpovertyestimates 6

2Post-conflictpovertyprojections:Reviewofexistingestimates 8

2.1Post-conflictestimatesbasedonnowcastingmethodologies 8

2.2Post-conflictestimatesbasedonHNAP2021DemographicandWASHsurvey 10

2.2.1MeasureofwelfareusedinHNAPanalysis 11

2.2.2PovertylineusedinHNAPanalysis 13

3PovertyestimationusingtheHNAP2022DemographicandWASHHouseholdSurvey 13

3.1Improvementstothesurvey’sexpendituremodule 14

3.2MonetarypovertyestimatesbasedontheHNAP2022DemographicandWASHsurvey 15

4NowcastingmonetarypovertyinSyria:Challengesandsensitivityanalysis 19

4.1Datachallenges 19

4.1.1Measuring“growth” 19

4.1.2Populationestimates 21

4.2Distributionneutralpovertyprojections:Sensitivityanalysis 22

5Triangulatingpovertyprojectionswithavailableevidence 26

6Proposedwayforward 28

References 29

Annex1:Post-ConflictPovertyEstimationStudiesinSyria 31

Annex2:TheHumanitarianNeedsAssessmentProgramme(HNAP) 33

Annex3:GeospatialpopulationestimatesforSyria 36

Annex4:DistributionneutralpovertyprojectionsusingprivatepercapitaconsumptionfromNA 38

Annex5:DistributionneutralpovertyprojectionsusingGDPpercapita,andpovertylinesat2011PPP.41

Figure1:FCVPass-throughrateforSyria2009-2020 9

Figure2:Shareofpopulationinextremepoverty,bysubdistrict(HNAPextremepovertydefinition) 11

Figure3:Contributiontototalhouseholdmonetaryincome,bysource 12

Figure4:Averagehouseholdincomeandshareofhouseholdsreportingincomesufficiency,by

governorate 12

Figure5:Distributionofmonthlypercapitaexpenditure,nominalandspatiallyadjusted 17

Figure6:Distributionbygovernorateandquintilesofspatiallyadjustedandnominalmonthlypercapita

expenditure 17

Figure7:Governoratelevelpovertyestimatesbasedonnominalandspatiallyadjustedwelfare 18

Figure8:PovertyestimatesbasedonHNAP2022data,nominalaggregate 18

Figure9:GDPdeflatorandCPIgrowthindex(2003=100) 21

Figure10:PopulationestimatesforSyria 22

Figure11:SensitivityAnalysisofPovertyProjectionsatLICextremepovertyline($2.15,2017PPP) 23

Figure12:SensitivityAnalysisofPovertyatLMICinternationalpovertyline($3.65,2017PPP) 23

Figure13:PovertyProjectionsatLICextremepovertyline($2.15,2017PPP)andgrowthbasedonGDP

currentprices(CPIadjusted)and2009povertybaselineusingdifferentpassthroughrates 25

Figure14:PovertyProjectionsatLMICinternationalpovertyline($3.65,2017PPP)andgrowthbasedon

GDPcurrentprices(CPIadjusted)and2009povertybaselineusingdifferentpassthroughrates 25

Figure15:BenchmarkingofpovertyestimatesforSyria,2020 26

Figure16:Trendsinnight-timelightemissions 27

Figure17:Povertytrends2009-2022 28

Table1:Officialpovertyrateandnationalpovertylines 6

Table2:Povertyestimatesusingincomeclassinternationalpovertylines 7

Table3:ComparativeOverviewofPost-ConflictPovertyEstimationStudiesinSyria 9

Table4:Expendituremoduleofthe2021and(revised)2022DemographicandWASHsurvey 14

Table5:Analysisofrelationbetweenfoodshareandtotalhouseholdexpenditure 15

Table6:SpatialpricedeflatorbasedonWFPStandardFoodBasket(SFB) 16

Table7:Nationalpovertyestimatesbasedonnominalandspatiallyadjustedwelfare 17

Table8:RatioofsurveyhouseholdconsumptiontoPrivateConsumptionandGDP 19

Table9:Averageannualgrowthrate2003-2009 20

Table10:Comparisonbetweenbaselinepovertyestimatesandprojectionsin2009 24

Introduction

Morethanadecadeofconflicthashaddevastatingsocio-economicconsequencesfortheSyrianArabRepublic.In2011Syriawasafast-growingmiddle-incomecountry.Fastforward10years,Syriaisalow-incomecountrystillengulfedinviolenceandstrugglingwithadeepeconomiccrisis.Conflicthasclaimedthelivesofatleast350,209individuals

1

andmorethanhalfofSyria’spre-conflictpopulationremainsdisplaced,including6.6millionIDPsinSyriaand6.2millionSyrianrefugeesdisplacedabroad.Between2011and2019,theSyrianeconomyisestimatedtohavecontractedbymorethan50percentinrealterms.Overthesameperiod,extremepovertyisprojectedtohaveincreasedmanyfold,reflectingdeteriorationoflivelihoodopportunitiesandprogressivedepletionofhouseholdcopingcapacity.

2

Overthelastfouryears,thenegativewelfareimpactofconflicthasbeenfurtherexacerbatedbyregionalandglobalshocks.TheconflictinSyriahasexacerbatedthecountry’svulnerabilitytoexternalshocks.TheintensificationofUSsanctionsontheIslamicRepublicofIranafterthecollapseoftheNuclearTreatyinNovember2018impactedSyrianimportsofIranianfuel,leadingtopetrolandgasshortageswhichsparkedsharppriceincreasesforbothfoodandnon-fooditemsinearly2019.Moreover,thefinancialcrisisinLebanonbyend2019hadrippleeffectsontheSyrianeconomy,furthercontributingtosoaringprices.

3

TheCOVID-19crisisanddroughtconditionsintheNortheasternregion,Syria’straditionalbreadbasketwhichisstillheavilyaffectedbyconflictandnewwavesofpopulationdisplacement,furthercontributedtothefoodsecuritychallengeoftheSyrianpopulation.AsofFebruary2022,beforethewarinUkraine,WFPestimatesthat12millionpeople,about55percentoftheSyrianpopulation,werefacingacutefoodinsecurity,up51percentcomparedto2019.

HouseholdwelfareanalysisinSyriaisseverelyconstrainedbydataavailability.Similartootherconflict-affectedcountries,estimatesofthelivingstandardsoftheSyrianpopulationareoutdatedduetothelackofofficialandcomparablehouseholdbudgetsurveysaftertheonsetofwar.ThelatestofficialhouseholdbudgetsurveydataavailableontheWorldBank’sPovertyandInequalityPlatform(PIP)

4

datesbackto2003,despitetheexistenceoftwomorerecentbudgetsurveysconductedbySyria’sStatisticalOfficein2007and2009.

5

Assuch,theWorldBankhasnotbeenpublishingpovertyestimatesforSyriapost2003.

1EstimatesofthetotaldeathtolloftheSyrianwarvarydependingonthemethodologyandreportingagency.In2021,theUN’shumanrightsoffice(OHCHR)releasedatallyof

350,200deaths

includingbothciviliansandcombatants.Thecountisbasedonastrictmethodologyrequiringthedeceased’sfullname,dateofdeathandlocationofthebodyandshouldthereforebeinterpretedasanunder-estimationoftheactualnumberofwar-relateddeaths.TheSyrianObservatoryforHumanRights(SOHR)estimatesanoveralldeathtollof

610,000people

over11yearsofconflict,ofwhich160,681arerepresentedbycivilians(120,158men,15,237womenand25,286children).

2ESCWA(2020)“Syriaatwar:eightyearson”,UnitedNationsEconomicandSocialCommissionforWesternAsia,Beirut,2020.

3Syrians,especiallytraders,havebeendependingonbanksinLebanonforaccessingforeigncurrency(dollars).However,duetothefinancialcrisisinLebanonandwithLebanesebankslimitingthereleaseoffunds,manySyrianshavelostaccesstotheirsavings.TheheavilyreducedreleaseofcashfromLebanesebankshasmeantthatdollarshavebecomescarceinSyria,pushing-uptheinformalmarketexchangerate.Asaresult,pricesoffoodandnon-fooditemshaverisenacrossSyria.

4ThePovertyandInequalityPlatform(PIP)isapubliclyavailabledatasetofWorldBank’sofficialcountry-level,regional,andglobalestimatesofpoverty.MostofthedatainPIPcomesfromtheGlobalMonitoringDatabase,whichistheWorldBank’srepositoryofharmonizedmultitopicincomeandexpenditurehouseholdsurveysusedtomonitorglobalpoverty.PIPcontainsmorethan2,000surveysfrom168countriescovering98%oftheworld’spopulation.ThedataavailableinPIParestandardizedasfaraspossiblebutdifferencesexistwithregardstothemethodofdatacollection,andwhetherthewelfareaggregateisbasedonincomeorconsumption.

5ThesesurveyswereusedbyUNDPandESCWAtoestimatenationalpovertyestimates(seeAbu-Ismail,Abdel-GhadirandEl-Laithy(2011)“PovertyandInequalityinSyria1997-2007”,ArabDevelopmentChallengesReport,Backgroundpaper2011/05).

Still,lineupestimatesofpovertyinSyriabasedonadistributionneutralnowcastingapproachusinggrowthinHouseholdFinalConsumptionExpenditure(HFCE–constantprices,unit-passthrough)havesofarbeenusedfortheproductionofglobalandregionalpovertyestimates.

Inthecontextofdatascarcity,thispaperaimstoproposeamethodologicalapproachtoaddresstheknowledgegapregardingwelfareinSyriaoverthelastdecade.Inparticular,theobjectiveofthispaperisto(i)filltheknowledgegapontheextentofmonetarypovertypre-conflictusinginternationalpovertylinesfor2007and2009;(ii)assessthestrengthsandweaknessesofpovertyestimatesbasedonhouseholdsurveydatacollectedin2021and2022undertheHumanitarianNeedsAssessmentProgramme(HNAP);(iii)conductasensitivityanalysisofdistributionneutralnowcastingapproaches,identifyingthemostcredibleapproachgivenNAdatalimitations;(iv)triangulateestimatesobtainedthroughvariousapproacheswithindirectevidenceoneconomicactivitybasedongeoreferenceddata;andlastly(v)proposeamethodologicalapproachtoassesstheevolutionofmonetarypovertyinSyriaduringtheconflictperiod.

1Updatingpre-conflictpovertyestimates

OfficialpovertyestimatesforSyriaareavailablefor1997,2003and2007andproducedwithUNDPtechnicalassistance.PovertymeasurementbuildsonnationallyrepresentativehouseholdbudgetsurveydatafromtheHouseholdIncomeandExpenditureSurveys(HIES)conductedbytheCentralBureauforStatistics(CBS–theofficialstatisticalagencyinSyria).

6

CBSconductedanotherroundoftheHIESin2009-10,butnopovertyestimateswerereleased.Sincetheconflicteruptedin2011,nonewroundsofHIESwereconducted.

ThemethodologyadoptedbyUNDPtocomputeofficialpovertyestimatesbuildsontheconstructionof“household-specificpovertylines”,reflectingcaloricrequirementswhichvarybyhouseholdcompositionandregionalvariationinthecostpercaloryandnon-foodallowance.

7

Twodifferentpovertythresholdsareconsidered,onereflectingbasicneeds(referredtoasthe“extreme”or“lower”povertyline–henceforthLPL)andamoregenerousonereflectinga“reasonable”levelofbasicneeds(referredtoasthe“moderate”or“upper”povertyline–henceforthHPL).TheLPL–onceexpressedinUSDusingthe2011PPPconversionfactor–isclosetotheinternationalpovertylineforlower-middle-incomecountries($3.65at2011PPP),whiletheUPLisclosetotheoneforupper-middle-incomecountries.

Table1

belowsummarizestheavailablepovertyestimates.

Table1:Officialpovertyrateandnationalpovertylines

LowerPovertyline(LPL)UpperPovertyline(UPL)

LowerPovertyline(LPL)

UpperPovertyline(UPL)

199720032007

Povertyrate(%)

14.2611.3912.3

33.2230.1333.6

Nationalaverageofhouseholdspecificpovertylines-SYPpermonth

NA14582183

($3.6daily,2011PPP)($3.9daily,2017PPP)

($4.2daily,2011PPP)($4.6daily,2017PPP)

NA

2052

($5.1daily,2011PPP)($5.5daily,2017PPP)

3037

($5.8daily,2011PPP)($6.4daily,2017PPP)

Source:Abu-Ismailetal.(2011);ElLaithy,Abu-Ismail(2005).WorldBankstaffestimatesfor2011PPPconversion.

Notes:SYPvalueofthepovertylinesisexpressedincurrentprices.Daily2011PPPvalueofthePLprovidedinparenthesisforreference.

Atpresent,theWorldBankPovertyandInequalityPlatform(PIP)onlyincludespovertyestimatesatinternationalpovertylinesfor2003,theonlyyearforwhichmicrodataareavailableintheGlobalPovertyMonitoringDatabase.However,buildingontabulationsavailableinAbu-Ismailetal.(2011)andontheCBSwebsite,itispossibletogatherallrelevantinformationtocomputegrouped-datapovertyestimatesatinternationalpovertylinesfor2007andfor2009,hencetoupdatetheavailablepre-conflictbaselinepovertyseries

(Box1)

.

6InformationfromtheHIES1997wascollectedbetweenOctober1996andSeptember1997;fortheHIES2003informationwascollectedbetweenJuly2003andJune2004;fortheHIES2007,informationwascollectedbetweenNovember2006andOctober2007.

7ElLaithy,Abu-Ismail(2005).

Box1:Groupeddatapovertyestimates

Groupeddataareconsumptionexpenditureorincomeorganizedinintervalsorbins,suchasdecilesorpercentiles.ThesebinsareusedtoderiveacontinuousLorenzcurve,whichplotsthecumulativewelfareshare(onthey-axis)againstthecumulativepopulationshare(onthex-axis).Togetherwithinformationaboutmeanwelfare,theLorenzcurvecanbeusedtoconstructafulldistribution.TwoapproachesareusedtoderiveaLorenzfunction,thegeneralquadratic(GQ)LorenzfunctionandtheBetaLorenzfunction(Datt1998).Bothfunctionsareparameterizedandestimated.Thefunctionthatprovidesthebestfitisselectedforpovertyanddistributionalstatistics,conditionalonpassingnormalityandvaliditytests.TheGQLorenzfunctionisestimatedusingthefollowingspecification:

L(1−L)=a(p2−L)+bL(p−1)+c(p−L),

wherepisthecumulativeproportionofthepopulation,Listhecumulativeproportionofconsumptionexpenditureorincome,anda,b,careparameterestimates.Povertyandinequalitymeasuresarebasedontheparameterestimates.

TheBetaLorenzfunctionisestimatedusingthefollowingspecification:

L(p)=p−θpγ(1−p)δ,

whereθ,γ,andδareparameterestimates.

Themethodologytoestimatepovertystartingfromgroupeddataisappliedongroupeddatainformationonperhouseholdconsumptionbydecileofthewelfaredistributionin2007andin2009HIESavailablefromtheCBSwebsite.Informationonaveragehouseholdsizebydecile,whichisneededtoconverthouseholdexpenditureinpercapitaterms,wasobtainedfromProf.HebaEl-Laithy,oneoftheauthorsoftheAbu-Ismailetal.(2011)studywhowasinpossessionof2007HIESmicrodata.Throughthisconsultancy,groupeddatapovertyestimatesfor2007werecomparedandvalidatedwithestimatesbasedonthefulldistribution.Lackinginformationonaveragehouseholdsizebydecilefor2009,percapitaexpenditurebydecilein2009isobtainedusing2007estimates.

Source:

PovertyandInequalityPlatformMethodologyHandbook

Table2

belowreportsgroupeddataestimatesofpovertyincidenceatdifferentvaluesofinternationalpovertylinesfor2007andfor2009.Basedongrouped-dataestimationapproach,in2009,thelatestyearforwhichdataareavailablebeforeconflictstarted,Syria’spovertyatLMICwas14.50percentusing2011PPPand16.02percentusing2017PPP,whereascorrespondingestimatesbasedontheUMICpovertylinewere40.29percent(2011PPP)and47.52percent(2017PPP).Whencomparingto2007group-basedestimates,evidencesuggeststhatpovertyhadstagnated,possiblyreflectingtheimpactofthedroughtthataffectedthecountryovertheperiod.

Table2:Povertyestimatesusingincomeclassinternationalpovertylines

PovertyRate(%)

PPP

PLvalue

Estimatesbasedonmicrodata

Estimatesbasedongrouped-data

2003

20072009

LIC

2011

1.9

0.79

2.43

2.08

2017

2.15

0.93

2.83

2.44

LMIC

2011

3.2

9.48

14.90

14.50

2017

3.65

10.89

16.36

16.02

UMIC

2011

5.5

38.37

39.47

40.29

2017

6.85

47.26

46.43

47.52

Source:WorldBankstaffestimates

2Post-conflictpovertyprojections:Reviewofexistingestimates

2.1Post-conflictestimatesbasedonnowcastingmethodologies

Nowcastingmethodologiesaretypicallyusedtofilldatagapsincountriesthatlackup-to-datesurvey-basedpovertyestimates.Nowcastingapproachesvaryintermsofbothmethodologicalassumptionsaswellasintermsofdatasourcesusedintheanalysis.

Thesimplestnowcastingapproach–whichisusedbytheWorldBankintheproductionofglobalpovertyestimates–reliesoninformationfromnationalaccounts(percapitaGDPorhouseholdfinalconsumptionexpenditure)topredictpoverty.Morespecifically,thisnowcastingmethodologyassumesthatgrowth(orshrinkage)inGDPpercapitaregisteredsincethecountry’slastpovertyestimateisfullypassedthroughtotheconsumptionvectorthatismeasuredinhouseholdsurveys(Prydzetal.2019).Povertyisthenestimatedusingthispredictedconsumptionvectorundera“distributionneutral”assumptioni.e.,assumingthatinequalitydoesnotchangeatthateachindividualisequallyaffectedbythegrowth/contractioninwelfare.Whiletheimpactofgrowthonpovertyreductioniswell-known(Kraay,2006;FerreiraandRavallion,2009),concernshaveemergedrelatedtopossibleun-reliabilityofGDPmeasuresindevelopingcountries(Angrist,2022),aswellastheextenttowhichgrowthispassedthroughtowelfareinfragileandconflictaffectedcountries

(Box2)

.

Box2:Growthratepass-throughinFCSEconomies

Theassumptionoffullpass-throughworksfairlywellineconomiesthatarenotinFragileandConflict-AffectedSituations(FCS).However,availableevidencesuggeststhatafullpassthroughassumptionislikelyinappropriateincaseofconflict.

Inordertoestimateanydifferenceinpass-throughinFCSsettings,Corraletal.(2020)fittedaregressionmodelonasampleincludingallcountriesforwhichsurveyconsumptionestimatesareavailableinPIPovertheperiod2000to2019.Inparticular,theannualizedgrowthrateinthesurveypercapitaconsumptionisregressedonannualizedgrowthinGDPpercapita,togetherwithaninteractionofannualizedgrowthinGDPpercapitaandtheshareoftime(ifany)thateachcountryspentasFCSbetween2000and2019.

GTowthsuTveymean=0.964*GTowthGDppeTcapita−0.530*GTowthGDppeTcapita*ShaTeFCS

Accordingtothismodel,foreconomiesthathaveneverbeenFCS,96percentofGDPgrowthispassedthroughtowelfare.However,foreconomiesthathavebeeninFCSthroughouttheentireperiod,only43percent(0.64-0.30)ispassedthrough.

Thereducedpass-throughrateindicatesthatineconomiesexperiencingconflict,violence,orfragility,changesinnationalaccountsarelargerthanchangesinwelfare.Inparticular,foreconomiesinFCSwhereGDPpercapitadeclined,thisimpliesthatthepovertyratesestimatedusingthisadjustedpass-throughwouldbelowercomparedtothoseestimatedunderafullpass-throughassumption.

1.00

0.80

0.60

0.40

0.20

0.00

Shareoftimesince2009asFCSPass-throughRate

Figure1:FCVPass-throughrateforSyria2009-2020

Source:Corraletal.(2020)

Analternativenowcastingapproach,whichbypassesthedistributionneutralassumption,reliesongrowthelasticitiesofpoverty(GEP).Growthelasticitiesofpovertyrevealthepercentagechangeinpovertyassociatedtoa1percentgrowthinGDPpercapita.Implicitly,theelasticitytakesintoaccountboththeimpactofgrowthonaveragewelfareaswellaschangesinthedistributionofwelfare(Shorrocks,2013;DattandRavallion,1992).Still,thisapproachreliesonthestrongassumptionthattherelationbetweengrowthandpovertydoesnotchangeovertime.

Insomecases,povertynowcastingbuildsonmorearticulatedmicrosimulationmodels.Morecomplexexamplesofmicrosimulationmodelsarebasedoncomputablegeneralequilibrium(CGE)orgeneralequilibriummacroeconomicmodelsthatrelyonsocialaccountingmatricesortimeseriesmacroeconomicdatatocreate“linkageaggregatevariables”(LAVs)thatarefedintomicrosimulationmodelsthatbuildonhouseholdsurveydata.However,thehighinformationdemandsofthesemodelsmakesthemhardtoapplyindatadeprivedcontexts.Alessdatademandingapproachtomicrosimulationreliesonbuildingbehavioralmodelsonhouseholdsurveys(typicallylinkinglabormarketoutcomesandremittancestoindividualandhouseholds’incomesandconsumption)whicharethenlinkedtoaggregateandsectorlevelmacro-economicprojections.

8

Table3

belowprovidesasummaryoftheresultsandmethodologiesemployedinthelimitednumberofstudiesthathaveattemptedtoestimatepovertyinSyriaduringthepost-conflictperiod.Despitetheirnotablelimitations,allthesestudiesconsistentlyindicatesubstantialincreasesinpoverty.

9

Table3:Comparati

Author

veOverviewofPost-ConflictPov

Povertyline

ertyEstimationStudiesinSyria

Estimates

Methodologicalapproach

WorldBank(2017)

LowernationalPL(LPL)

2007:12.3%

2016:54.5–66.5%

Extrapolationusingagrowthelasticityofpoverty

estimatedovertheperiod2003-2007.

ESCWA(2016)

LowernationalPL(LPL)

UppernationalPL(UPL)

2010:14%;2015:50%

2010:28%;2015:83.4%

NA

ESCWA

(2020b)

$1.90(2011PPP)intlPL

$3.50(2011PPP)intlPL

2010:<1%;2019:40%

2010:19%;2019:77%

Distributionneutral

projectionsbasedonthe

growthofprivatehousehold

8Olivierietal.(2014).

9ForadetaileddescriptionofeachstudyseeAnnex1.

consumptionpercapita

fromNA;unitpass-through

Hamati(2018)

LowernationalPL(LPL)

UppernationalPL(UPL)

2009:14.9%;2015:85.8-75.9%

2009:29.4%;2015:93.1%-87.5%

Dynamicmicrosimulationmodelprojectionsthat

introduceprice,

demographic,labormarket,andincomeshocks.

2.2Post-conflictestimatesbasedonHNAP2021DemographicandWASHsurvey

ThescaleofSyria’shumanitariancrisisandthenecessitytoinformoperationsonthegroundhaspromptedUNagenciestodevelopanarticulatedsystemofwelfaremonitoring:theHumanitarianNeedsAssessmentProgramme(HNAP).TheHNAPisajointUNprogramestablishedinApril2018withtheobjectiveoftrackingdisplacementandreturnmovements,conductingmulti-sectoralassessments,andmonitoringhumanitarianneedsinsidethecountry.

10

Inadditiontocollectingdataatthecommunitylevelthroughkeyinformantinterviews,theHNAPalsoimplementedsample-basedhouseholdsurveyswhoseframereliesoncommunitylevelpopulationdata.

11

TheHNAPDemographicandWASHsurveyisalarge-scalesurveyaimedatprovidingnationalandsub-national-levelestimatesofdemographicandbasicsocio-economicconditionsofthepopulationlivinginsideSyria(resident,IDPsandreturnees).Thesurveyisprimarilyusedtoinformtheprog