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CEPRPOLICYINSIGHTNo.129
May2024
Howtode-risk:Europeaneconomicsecurityinaworldofinterdependence1
JeanPisani-Ferry,aceBeatriceWederdiMaurobdeand
JerominZettelmeyerae
aBruegel;bGenevaGraduateInstitute;cPIIE;dINSEAD;eCEPR
TheEUandotheradvancedeconomiesareattemptingto‘de-risk’theirexternal
economicrelationshipswithoutforegoingthebenefitsoftrade.Buthow?Drawing
onabodyofresearchpublishedinthejointCEPR/BruegelParisReport2,thisPolicy
Insightarguesthat(1)importde-riskingshouldfocusonafewproductcategorieswhere
thecostsofsupplyinterruptionsareunquestionablylarge;(2)riskexposuresthrough
exportsandfinancialchannelsrequiremoreattention;and(3)de-riskingmustbe
complementedbydeterrenceandbyraisingresiliencewithrespectalldisruptions,
wherevertheirorigin.ThelatterrequiresadeeperandbroaderEUSingleMarket.
1INTRODUCTION
Overaperiodofjust15years,Europehasbeenconfrontedwithafinancialshock
thatoriginatedintheUnitedStates,apandemicshockthatoriginatedinChinabut
couldhavecomefromanywhere,andanenergyshockprovokedbyRussia’sinvasion
ofUkraine.Theseeventshavepromptedare-examinationofefficiency/securitytrade-
offsthatariseasaresultofinternationalintegration,andparticularlyasaresultof
specialisationininternationaltradeandthevulnerabilitiesofglobalsupplychains.
Economistsandpolicymakershavelongworriedaboutsimilartrade-offs.Atthemost
fundamentallevel,suchtrade-offsarisefromthestandardtensionbetweengrowth
andeconomiccrises:highergrowthisoftenaccompaniedbygreaterinstability.
Forexample,regulationoffinancialandproductmarketsmaypreventormitigate
financialorenvironmentalhazardsatthecostofdampeningentryandgrowthof
firms.Similarly,inopeneconomies,tradeandfinancialintegrationmaybegoodfor
growth,butcanexposeeconomiestoimportedshocks.
Themostrecentsetofconcerns–asexemplified,forexample,byaseriesofEuropean
Commissionpapers(EuropeanCommission,2021,2022)andanassociatedlegislative
agenda(seeSection4andMcCaffreyandPoitiers,2024)–differsfromthesestandard
preoccupationsintworespects.
1ThisPolicyInsightisbasedonChapter1ofParisReport2(Pisani-Ferryetal.2024).WeareverygratefultoChad
Bown,JulianHinz,MorganKelly,ConorMcCaffrey,IsabelleMejean,KevinO’Rourke,NiclasPoitiers,PierreRousseaux
andMoritzSchularick,aswellastoShekarAiyar,AliciaGarciaHerrero,PetrosMavroidis,FrancescoPapadia,André
Sapir,FinoaScottMorton,NicolasVéron,LennardWelslauandGuntramWolffforhelpfuldiscussionsandcomments.
WeareparticularlygratefultoNiclasPoitiersforhiscontributionstothesurveyofEUeconomicsecurityinstruments
thatappearsinSection4ofthisPolicyInsight.
CEPRPOLICYINSIGHTNo.129May2024
2
First,economicrisksrelateincreasinglynotjusttocrisesorshocks,buttodeliberateeconomiccoercionbyforeigngovernmentsorevennon-governmentalentities(suchascriminalgroups).Thisisprobablythereasonwhytheterm‘security’–asopposedto‘stability’or‘resilience’–hasbecomepopulartodescribethemitigationofeconomic,ratherthanjustnational,securitythreats(wediscussthedifferenceinSection2).OnereasontobeconcernedwitheconomiccoercionisthatChina,anincreasinglypowerfulandauthoritariancountry,hasbeenapplyingcoercionregularlyinresponsetopoliticalactionsbytradepartners(forexample,Australia’scallforinvestigationsintotheoriginoftheCOVID-19pandemicandLithuania’sdecisiontoletTaiwanopenarepresentativeofficeinVilnius).2ButtheconcernisnotjustaboutChina:thepoliciesofPresidentTrumpbetween2017and2020showedthatevenone’sclosestallycanbetemptedtoleverageitsmarketpoweranditscontrolofthetechnicalandfinancialinfrastructuresofglobalisation.ThepossibilityofasecondTrumptermisnowpromptingareflectionontheneedforEuropetoprepareforsucharisk(GonzalesLayaetal.2024).
Second,recentconcernshavefocusedmostlyontrade-relatedratherthanfinancialvulnerabilities.Thisreflectsthefactthattrade-relatedvulnerabilitieshavebecomemoreprominentasaresultofspecialisationandthevulnerabilityofglobalsupplychainsthatmaximiseefficiency,butatthecostofcreatinghiddenfragilities.Buttheprominenceoftradeconcernsmayalsoreflectarathermyopicreasoning,asthelasttwoorthreeexternalshocksthatEurope(and,toalesserextent,theUS)hassufferedhavebeentrade-related:supplychaindisruptionsrelatedtoCOVID-19andenergypriceshocksfollowingtheRussianinvasionofUkraine.
Inlinewiththisconcern,wefocusmostlyontrade-relatedexternaleconomicsecurity.ThisshouldnotbetakentoimplythatEuropedoesnotneedtoworryaboutfinancialsecurity.Butunliketrade-relatedsecurity,financialriskscontinuetobemostlyofthefinancial-stabilityvariety,linkedtoshocksandfinancialvulnerabilitiesratherthancoercion.Totheextentthatfinancialcoercionisaseriousconcern,itislinkedtoonemainpotentialsource:theUnitedStatesifPresidentTrumpreturns(seeSection2).Incontrast,trade-relatedexternalsecurityrisksareubiquitous.
InthisPolicyInsight,weseektoanswertwocriticalquestions.First,howshouldtrade-relatedvulnerabilitiesbeidentified,andwhattraderelationshipsmakeEuropeparticularlyvulnerabletoshocksandcoercion?Second,howcanthesevulnerabilitiesbereducedwhileminimisingthecostsof‘de-risking’andreducingthechancesofunintendedconsequences?Foursuchpotentialcostscometomind:
•Foregoingsomeofthegainsfromtradespecialisationandtradeopenness.ThiscouldweighonEuropeangrowthandcompetitiveness,whichdependonexportspecialisationandonimportingrawmaterialsandintermediateinputsmorecheaplythantheycouldbeproducedathome(ifatall).Itcouldalsomakeithardertoattainemissionreductionobjectives,byraisingthecostofthetransitiontorenewableenergysources.Inturn,thiscouldexacerbatesocialandpoliticaldivisionsrelatedtoclimateaction.
•Becomingmorevulnerabletodomesticshocksincludingnaturaldisasters,epidemicsandhome-grownfinancialcrises–andmoregenerally,toanyshockwhoseconsequenceswouldbemitigatedbyinternationaltradeand/orcapitalflows.
•Damaginginternationalcooperation.ThiscouldincludeEUcooperationwithChinaonvitalmattersofcommoninterest,suchasclimate-changemitigation,aswellasrespectfortherulesofthemultilateraltradingsystem.NotwithstandingthedamagethattheWTOhassufferedoverthelastdecade,theserulescontinuetobelargelyrespected(MavroidisandSapir,
2See,forexample,“
ChinapunishesAustraliaforpromotinganinquiryintocovid-19
”,TheEconomist,21May2020;and
“Lithuaniacomplainsoftrade‘sanctions’byChinaafterTaiwandispute
”,FinancialTimes,3December2021.
CEPRPOLICYINSIGHTNo.129May2024
3
2024).Anaggressive‘de-risking’ofEuropeantraderelationshipsthroughtradepolicytoolsandsubsidiescouldtriggerprotectionistreactionsfromtradingpartners,particularlyifmeasuresviolateWTOrules.ItcouldalsobecomeanexcuseforprotectionistsintheEU,whomightuseeconomic-securityargumentstofurtherspecialinterests.
•DamagingcohesionwithintheEU.EUcountriesdifferintheirtradestructuresandtheirdependenceonspecificexportandimportmarkets.Asaresult,attemptstode-risktrademayhavenetbenefitsforsomeandnetcostsforothers.Ifde-riskingbecomesasourceofdivision,itmaybecounterproductive,asinternaldivisionsintheEUarepartlywhatanadversary–whetherChina,RussiaorPresidentTrump–mighttrytoexploit(andindeed,divisionsarewhatthesethreepowershavetriedtoexploitinthepast).
TheremainderofthisPolicyInsightsummarisesasbestwecantheanswerstothesequestions,drawingonasetofpaperscommissionedbyBruegelandCEPR(Pisani-Ferryetal.,2024).Section2defineswhatwemeanbyeconomicsecurity,andwhatrisksweshouldbeworryingabout.Section3discusseshowtheserisksshouldbeaddressedinprinciple.Whattraderelationshipsrequirede-risking?Section4discussestheinstruments.Howcanprotectionbebuiltthatpreservesthebenefitsoftrade?Aconcludingsectionsummarisesthemainlessons.
2DEFININGRISKSTOECONOMICSECURITY
AsnotedbyBown(2024),economicsecurityremainsanemergingconcept.Atitsmostabstractlevel,itcanbedefinedasbothpreventingbadeconomicoutcomesandmakingsurethatshouldrisksmaterialise,thedamagetheycauseisminimised.Societiescarebothaboutraisingexpectedwelfareandaboutreducingitsvolatility.Economicsecurityisconcernedwiththelatter.
Definedinthisbroadway,economicsecurityhasbeenastandardconcernofpolicymakersforcenturies–andnotjustofeconomicpolicymakers,sinceeconomicharmcanbeinflictedby‘non-economic’shocks,includingpoliticaldisruptionandwars.Theuseofstateinterventiontoaddresstheseconcerns,includingindustrialpolicyandtradepolicy,issimilarlynothingnew(KellyandO’Rourke,2024).Thequestion,then,ishowtheconceptof‘economicsecurity’differsfromthoseof‘economiccrisisprevention’or‘nationalsecurity’.Totheextentthattheperceivednatureoftheriskandriskpropagationhaschanged,itisimportanttounderstandhowithaschanged,toavoidduplication,andtopreventoverreactiontoperceivednewriskswhentheoldrisksandriskpropagationchannelsmightstillbethere.
Economistsconcernedwithcrisispreventionandmitigationtypicallyfocusonrisksandvulnerabilitiesrelatedtothefinancialsystemorthestructureofproduction.Forexample,creditcyclescanexposecountriestofinancialcrises,whicharepropagatedinternationally.Dependenceoncommodityexportsorimportsexposeseconomiestoswingsininternationalpricesandtodisruptiontodomesticproductionthatreliesoncommodityimports.
Militaryandsecurityexpertsworryaboutadifferenttypeofthreat:harmthatisinflictedpurposelybyoutsideactors,normallynationstates,butalsoterroristorcriminalorganisations.MurphyandTopel(2013)widenedthedefinitionofnationalsecuritytoincludeall“substantialthreats”tothesafetyandwelfareofanation’scitizens,forexampleincludingnationalcatastrophesandpublichealththreats.Definedthisbroadly,nationalsecuritywouldincludepreparednessandmitigationagainstanyharmfulactsconductedbyforeigngovernmentsornon-governmentalorganisationswithmilitaryornon-militarymeans,includingeconomicsanctions,andthreatsrelatedtophysicalandinformationinfrastructure.
CEPRPOLICYINSIGHTNo.129May2024
4
Therecentusageoftheterm‘economicsecurity’isattheintersectionofnon-financial
economiccrisesandnationalsecurityinthebroadsensedefinedbyMurphyandTopel.3Specifically,itfocusesonharminflictedthroughinternationaleconomicrelationships–andparticularlytraderelationships–whetherthesereflectexogenousshocks(suchasCOVID-relatedtradedisruption)ordeliberateactionsbyforeigngovernmentsornon-governmentalorganisations(Bown,2024;McCaffreyandPoitiers,2024;EuropeanCommission,2021,2022).TheserisksareparticularlyrelevanttodaybecauseofthecombinationofeconomicintegrationthroughtradeandFDI,specialisation,longsupplychainsandactorswillingtoengageincoercionthroughthesechannels.
Itisinthissensethattheterm‘economicsecurity’willbeusedintheremainderofthisPolicyInsight.Inthisdefinition,achievingeconomicsecurityinvolvesthepreventionandmitigationof:
•disruptiontocriticalimports,whetheraccidentalordeliberate;
•economiccoercionthroughrestrictionsorboycottsonspecificexports,alongthelinesofactionstakenbyChinaagainstAustralia,orthroughpressuresonforeigncompaniesevenwhentheyproducelocally(forexample,threatsofdeprivingthemfromaccesstothedomesticmarket,restrictionsonprofitrepatriation,orexpropriation);
•abroaddisruptionofglobaltradeatascalewithmacroeconomicimpact,forexample,asaresultofgeopoliticalconflictleadingtoeconomicsanctionsoraprotractedtariffwarwithamajortradingpartner.EventsthatcouldtriggersuchscenariosincludeaChineseattackonTaiwan,orthere-electionofPresidentTrumptriggeringasharpdeteriorationofthepoliticalrelationshipbetweentheUSandtheEU.
Itisimportanttoemphasisethatthisanarrow–perhapsinappropriatelynarrow–definitionofeconomicsecurity,fortworeasons.
First,itdisregardsthepossibilityofeconomicdisruptionsasaresultofdomesticshocks,whichhistoricallyhavebeenamajorsourceofeconomiccrises(Table1).Hence,abettertermforthetypeofeconomic-securityriskswediscusswouldbe‘externaleconomicsecurity’.Thisterminologyremindsusthattherecouldbetrade-offsnotjustbetweeneconomicsecurityandeconomicgrowth,butalsobetweenexternaleconomicsecurityandsecurityfromdomesticshocks.Internationalintegrationmayincreaseexposuretotheformer,butoffersprotectionagainstthelatter.
Table1Varietiesofwelfarethreatsandpropagationmechanisms
Origin
Domesticshock
Externalshock
Deliberateaction
Propagation
Tradeandinvestment
Financial
Disease
Military
Other
Economic
Externaleconomic
crises
securityrisks
National
Epidemics/pandemics
securityrisks
Source:Authors’illustration.
Note.ThecolumnsinTable1definetheoriginofabadevent–anexogenousshockoriginatingathomeorabroad(productiondisruption,naturalcatastrophe,transportationorinfrastructuredisruption,confidenceshock);oradeliberateactionbyaforeigngovernmentoranon-governmentalentity.Therowsdefinethe
propagationchannel:economicactivityrelatedtotradeorfinance,disease,militaryaction,orother(forexample,throughITinfrastructure).
3TheEuropeanCommission(2023)usesadefinitionwhichalsoincludes“risksrelatedtophysicalandcybersecurityofcriticalinfrastructure”and“risksrelatedtotechnologysecurityandtechnologyleakage”.Wewouldclassifythisaspartofnationalsecurity(withinthe‘other’categoryinTable1)ratherthaneconomicsecurity.
CEPRPOLICYINSIGHTNo.129May2024
5
Second,thenarrowdefinitionlargelyignoresexternaleconomicsecurityrisksthroughfinancialchannels.However,internationalfinance–includingtheinternationalpaymentssystemandtheconfiscationoffinancialassetslocatedinforeignjurisdictions–isanobviousinstrumentofeconomiccoercionandeconomicsanctions,asshownbyG7sanctionsagainstRussiasinceitsfull-scaleinvasionofUkraine.ThemainreasonwhyfinancialrisksdonotfeatureprominentlyintherecentliteratureonEuropeaneconomicsecurityisthatEuropeismuchlesslikelytobeonthereceivingendofsuchsanctions,giventhecontrolexertedbytheUSanditsalliesoverinternationalfinance.ButthiscouldrapidlychangeifPresidentTrumpisre-electedanddecidestousefinancialcoercionagainstEuropeforwhateverreason(forexample,toforceEuropetoalignitsforeignorcommercialpolicieswiththoseoftheUS,aswasthecasewhentheUSthreatenedEUfirmswith‘secondarysanctions’forviolatingUS-imposedsanctionsonIran).
AbroaderanalysisofEuropeaneconomicsecurityshouldtakeintoaccountsuchfinancialeconomicrisksandhowtomitigatethem.Fornow,theremainderofthisPolicyInsightfocusesontradeandinvestment-relatedrisks.TheseareparticularlyrelevantfortherelationshipwithChina,butcouldalsobecomerelevantintheeventofareturnofPresidentTrumpandarevivalofUStariffsagainstEurope,whetherimposedformercantilistorpoliticalreasons.
3WHATTODE-RISK
Firmshaveincentivestoavoidbecomingdependentononeorasmallnumberofsuppliersorcustomers,particularlywhenthosesuppliersorcustomersarevulnerabletohighrisksoutsidetheircontrol,includingpoliticallymotivatedinterference.Yet,asMejeanandRousseaux(2024)pointout,firms’privateinterestinsecuritymaynotbeenoughtotakecareofthecollectiveEUsecurityinterest.Firmsoftenfailtorealisetheextenttowhichsuppliersorcustomersarethemselvessubjecttorisks,simplybecausetheydonotknowtheentirevaluechain.Firmsalsodonotinternalisethepotentialcostsofsupplierorcustomerdependencyontheentirevaluechain,andultimatelythewelfareofcitizens.Ifasupplierrelationshiprepresentsacriticallinkinthatchain,thesocialcostsofthatlinkfailingmayfarexceedtheprivatecoststothefirm.Thisargument,whichisbroadlyconsistentwiththeevidencepresentedbyBown(2024),canjustifypolicy-ledde-risking.
Butwhatareasoftraderequirede-risking?Howcanpolicymakerstellwhentradedependenciesareexcessive,inthesensethattheeconomicsecurityrisksoftradeoutweighitsbenefits,bothforefficiencyandgrowthandasprotectionagainstdomesticdisruption?Theidealwaytoanswerthisquestionwouldbethroughafirm-levelmodeloftradeandsupplyrelationships,bothacrossbordersandwithintheEU.Themodelwould‘know’whotradeswithwhom,howspecificinputsentereachstageofproduction,andtowhomfirmssell.Itwouldalsohaveinformationabouttheeaseofswitchingsuppliersifasupplierfailsorsharplyraisesitsprices.SuchamodelcouldbeusedtostresstestEuropeaneconomiesinrelationtospecificsupplychainorcustomerrisks.Wherelargeeffectsarefound,itwouldbeusedtoidentifytradingrelationshipsworthde-risking.Unfortunately,suchamodeldoesnotexistandmayneverexistbecauseofdatalimitations.Wearethereforeconstrainedbytheavailableinformationandshouldmakethebestofit.
3.1Criticalgoodsandtheriskofimportdisruption
Supposeweweremainlyinterestedinrisksrelatedtoimportdisruption.Thiswouldbethecaseifexportsareeitherwelldiversifiedorgomainlytocountriesthatonewouldnotconsidertobemajorsourcesofshocks.Inthatcase,thefollowingapproachmightbeaclosesubstitutefortheperfectmodel.Usingthemostdisaggregateddatapossible,oneshouldidentifyproductsforwhich:
CEPRPOLICYINSIGHTNo.129May2024
6
1.alargeshareofEUconsumptionreliesonimportedinputs;
2.foreignsupplyofthesegoodsishighlyconcentrated;
3.findingalternativesuppliersintheeventofadisruptionisdifficult;and
4.disruptiontosupplywouldhavehigheconomiccosts.Unlikecriterion3,thiscriterionreflectsthesubstitutabilityofproductsineitherconsumptionor
production,asopposedtothesubstitutabilityofsupplierrelationships.
Productsthatmeetallfourcriteriawouldbeprimecandidatesforde-risking.
Thisapproach,whichbuildsonworkundertakenbytheEuropeanCommission(2021),approximatelydescribestheapproachtakeninMejeanandRousseaux(2024).TheirmaininnovationrelativetotheworkoftheCommissionandotherauthorsisstep3,whichtheyimplementbyeliminatingproductsforwhich‘relationshipstickiness’–thetypicaldurationoffirm-supplierrelationships–dropsbelowaspecificthreshold.Forexample,ifthestickinessthresholdissetatthesamplemedian,thenumberofproductsforwhichtheEUshouldconsideritselfimport-dependentdropsfrom378tojust105,andtojust49ifthe75%leastrelationship-stickyproductsareeliminated(Figure1).Focusingonlyonupstreamintermediateproducts–forwhichanexportbanwouldaffectmanysupplychainsandhencehavehigheconomiccosts–wouldreducethelistfurther,tojust21products.For12ofthese,themainsupplierisChina.
Figure1NumberofproductsforwhichtheEUisimportdependent
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
(100)
5381
(7.9)
306
(8.6)
378
(7.3)
228
(0.5)49
Imported
(CEPII-BACI
data)
BasedontheECmethodology
MatchedwithProdcomdata
BasedontheECBasedonEC
methodology+absorption criterion
methodology,
theabsorption
criterionand
thestickiness
criterion
Note:ThefigureshowsthenumbersofproductsforwhichtheEUisimport-dependentaccordingtovariousmethodologies,startingwiththatoftheEuropeanCommission(2021)(secondbluebar)andaddingthecriteriaproposedbyMejeanandRousseaux,basedontheratioofimportsoverdomesticabsorption(redbar)andthedegreeofproductstickiness(greenbar).NumbersinbracketsrefertopercentageofvalueofEUimports.
Source:MejeanandRousseaux(2024).
Tothese,MejeanandRousseaux(2024)suggestedaddingasmallnumberof“criticalgoods”that,ifinsufficientlysupplied,“canresultinhumanlossesandotherseverenon-economicconsequences”.Thesewouldincludebetweentwoand19pharmaceuticalproducts,dependingonwherethesubstitutabilitycut-offisset,aswellasinputstothegreentransition.Interestingly,mostoftheseinputs–includingmostcriticalrawmaterials,whichhavebeenamongthemainjustificationsforthedrivetode-riskimports,particularlyfromChina–currentlyfailoneormoreofMejean’sandRousseaux’sdependencytests.Whilehighlyrelationship-sticky,batteriesandtheircomponents,hydrogentechnologies,rareearthmetalsandsolarpanelsfailthe
CEPRPOLICYINSIGHTNo.129May2024
7
concentrationtest,andmostcomponentsofsolarpanelsfailboththeconcentrationtestandtherelationship-stickinesstest.Yet,MejeanandRousseauxurgedcautionwithrespecttotheseproducts,onthegroundsthatdemandforthemisdevelopingsofastthatthestructureofEUimportsduring2015-2019,onwhichconcentrationindicesandimportneedsarebased,maybeapoorproxyfortradedependenciesinthefuture.
MejeanandRousseaux’sworkrepresentsthemostexhaustiveanalysissofartoidentifydependenciesonthebasisofrankingcriticalimportswithrespecttoconcentrationandrelationshipsubstitutability,anddecidingonthresholdsaboveorbelowwhichconcentrationisdeemedtoohighorsubstitutabilitytoolow.Preciselybecauseitismorethoroughandcomprehensivethanpreviousattemptsinthisliterature,MejeanandRousseaux(2024)illustratestheintrinsiclimitationsofthisapproach.
•Wehavesofarnosystematicwayoftellingwhichimportsaregenuinely
critical.Focusingonupstreamproductsandpharmaceuticalsmaymiss
otherproducts(suchascomputerchips),theaccidentalscarcityofwhich
wouldcauselargeeconomicornon-economiclosses.Meanwhile,some
upstreamproductsandpharmaceuticalsmightnotbecriticaliftheycanbe
substitutedbyotherproducts.TheEuropeanCommission’s(2021)approach
ofdesignatingwhole"ecosystems"(sectors,suchashealth,energy,digital,
electronicsandaerospace)ascriticalseemsevenmoreproblematic,both
becausemanyproductsinthesesectorsarenotinfactcriticalandbecause
productsoutsidethesesectorsthatmaywellbecriticalcouldbemissed(for
example,mostofMejeanandRousseaux’supstreamproducts).
•AsbothMejeanandRousseaux(2024)andBown(2024)emphasise,datalimitationsimplythatimportdependencemeasuresdonotreflectindirectexposure.IftheEUhasanimportexposuretoacountrythatisitselfimportdependentonChinaforthisproduct(oranimportantintermediateinput),thendirectimportdependenceonChinamightsignificantlyunderstatetotalimportdependence.
•Thefinallistscanbeverysensitivetohowthecut-offsareset,whichissomewhatarbitrary.Forexample,whetherrelationshipsubstitutabilitythresholdsaresetatthe25th,50thor75thpercentileaddsorsubtractslargesharesofproductsfromthesample.
•Supplierrelationshipsinnormaltimestendtoberelativelylong(25and19months,respectively,forthe75thand50thpercentilesinMejeanandRousseaux’ssample).Thisimpliesthatunlessreplacementdurationissignificantlyshorterinacrisis,animportinterruptioncouldbeverydamagingevenforproductsthatarerelativelynon-relationship-stickyinnormaltimes.Buttheimpactofaforcedinterruptiononthereplacementperiodcouldgobothways.Firmsseekingtoreplacesuppliersunderduresswouldhaveincentivestodosomuchfasterthaninnormaltimes.However,findingnewsupplierswhenmanyotherfirmsaretryingtodosocouldtakelongerand/orresultinpricejumpsforscarcesupplies,whichcouldbeverydamaging.
3.2Riskfromexportdisruptionsandfromdecoupling
Anotherproblemisthatanapproachfocusedonreducingdependenceoncriticalimportsdoesnotconsiderdisruptionstoexports,whichcouldequallyhaveamacroeconomicimpactiftheywerehighlyconcentratedinanyonedestinationcountry.Forexample,20%ofEUexportsgototheUS,13%totheUKand9%toChina;while41%ofUKexportsgototheEU,21%totheUSand5%toChina.Furthermore,justasimportdependencynumbersignoreindirectexposures,sodoexportshares.Forexample,directUKexportdependencyonChinaisonly5%,buttheUK’sindirectexposureviatheEUalonecouldbelargerifUKproductsarepartofthevaluechainsofgoodsultimatelydestinedfortheChinesemarket.
CEPRPOLICYINSIGHTNo.129May2024
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Whiledemandshocksviaexportsareastandardriskoftradeintegration,geopoliticalc
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