【美国财政部】美国主要贸易伙伴宏观经济和外汇政策报告47831kb

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O CONGRES

SU.S.DEPARTMENTOFTHETREASURY•OFFICEOFINTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRSNovember

2023ContentsExecutive

Summary

..............................................................................................................................

1Section1:GlobalEconomicandExternalDevelopments........................................................5

U.S.ECONOMICTRENDS........................................................................................................................5

ECONOMICDEVELOPMENTSINSELECTEDMAJORTRADINGPARTNERS

............................18Section2:IntensifiedEvaluationofMajorTradingPartners

..............................................37KEYCRITERIA

........................................................................................................................................37SUMMARYOFFINDINGS.....................................................................................................................42

TRANSPARENCYOFFOREIGNEXCHANGEPOLICIESANDPRACTICES...................................43

GlossaryofKeyTermsinthe

Report............................................................................................45ThisReportreviewsdevelopmentsininternationaleconomicandexchangeratepoliciesandissubmittedpursuanttotheOmnibusTradeandCompetitivenessActof1988,

22U.S.C.§5305,andSection701oftheTradeFacilitationandTradeEnforcementActof2015,19U.S.C.§

4421.11TheTreasuryDepartmenthasconsultedwiththeBoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystemandInternationalMonetaryFundmanagementandstaffinpreparingthis

Report.1Executive

SummaryGlobaleconomicgrowthinboth2022andsofarin2023hasbeenstrongerthanexpected.TheIMFestimatesglobalgrowthwas2.2%in2022(measuredonaQ4/Q4basis),outperformingtheprojectionof1.7%itmadeinOctober2022.Itprojectsglobalgrowthtoincreaseto2.9%in2023andfurtherto3.2%in2024onthesameQ4/Q4basis.Pricesofcommoditieslikefoodandenergyhavebecomelessvolatile,supplychainpressurescontinuedtoease,andinsomecountriesdomesticdemandreceivedaboostfromexcesssavings.Despitemoreresilientnear-termperformance,theglobaleconomicoutlookcontinuestofaceelevateduncertaintyassociatedwithRussia’swaragainstUkraine,geopoliticalstressesintheMiddleEast,still-elevatedcoreinflation,andthepotentialforstressesinChina’spropertysectorto

deepen.Globalcurrentaccountimbalancesremainedelevatedin2022relativetopre-pandemiclevels,astradeandtourismpatternsremaineddisruptedandrisingcommoditypricestendedtostrengthenthecurrentaccountsofcommodityexportingcountriesandweakenthoseofcommodityimporters.Astheseimpulseswane,theIMFprojectsglobalimbalancestonarrowin2023buthighlightsrisksaroundthisforecast,includingadditionalshockstocommoditypricesortheriskofaseveretighteningoffinancial

conditions.AmongmajorU.S.tradingpartners,theverylargesurplusesofGermany,

Ireland,Switzerland,Taiwan,theNetherlands,andSingaporehaveeachremainedsignificantasashareofGDPoverthefourquartersthroughJune2023.China’ssurpluswashigherindollartermsat$389billion(2.2%ofGDP)overfourquartersthroughJune2023,comparedto$380billioninthefourquartersthroughJune2022(2.1%GDP).Meanwhile,theU.S.currentaccountdeficitnarrowedto3.3%ofGDPinthefourquartersthroughJune2023,downfrom4.0%ofGDPinthefourquartersthroughJune2022.Differinggrowthandinflationoutlookshaveledtoarangeofmonetarypolicyactionsacrosscountries,andfundamentalsincludinginterestratedifferentials,termsoftradeshocks,andgrowthexpectationshavehadlargeimpactsoncurrencies.In2022,thedollarstrengthenedagainstmostmajortradingpartners’currenciesthroughOctober2022,beforedepreciatingagainstmostmajortradingpartners’currenciesinthelastfewmonthsoftheyearasglobalfinancialconditionsbeganto

ease.Thenominalbroaddollarwasrelativelystableinthefirsthalfof2023,weakeningslightlybutstillatastronglevelrelativetohistoricalvalues.OverthecourseofAugustandSeptember,though,thedollarstrengthenednearly4%,leavingitup1.1%year-to-dateasofend-September.Notably,thedollarstrengthened13.4%againsttheyen,pushingtheyencloseto150yenperdollar.Thedollaris5.8%strongeragainsttheRMBasexpectationsforChinesegrowthhavecooled.Asofend-September,thebroaddollarhasstrengthened1.9%againstthebasketofadvancedeconomies’currenciesand0.4%againstthebasketofemergingmarketeconomies’

currencies.MostinterventionsbyU.S.tradingpartnerscontinuetobeintheformofsellingdollars,actionsthatstrengthentheircurrencyandweakenthedollar.Thus,itisnotasurprisethatinthefourquartersthroughJune2023,notradingpartnerwasfoundtohave

manipulatedtherateofexchangebetweenitscurrencyandtheU.S.dollarforpurposesofpreventingeffectivebalanceofpaymentsadjustmentsorgainingunfaircompetitiveadvantageininternationaltrade.Anumberofmajortradingpartnershaveexcessivelylargecurrentaccountsurplusesasdiscussedabove,suggestingimbalancesindemandandsupplyacrossmajoreconomies,butcurrencymanipulationwasnotadrivingforceofthosesurplusesduringthisperiod.Itisworthnotingthattwotradingpartnersthatrancurrentaccountsurpluses(SingaporeandChina)didpurchaseforeigncurrencyonnetoverthesefourquarters,buttheytoodidnotmeetthestandardforpreventingeffectivebalanceofpaymentsadjustmentsorgainingunfaircompetitiveadvantageininternational

trade.TheBidenAdministrationbelievesthatamarketdeterminedexchangeratereflectingeconomicfundamentalsistheappropriatearrangementforthedollar.Whenmajoreconomiesfacedifferentstressesandaccordinglypursuedifferentpolicies,thiswilltypicallybereflectedincurrencymovements.Treasurymonitorscurrencymovementsandtheirimpactaroundtheworld,whilerecognizingthatarangeofapproachestomanageconsequencesbydevelopingandemergingeconomiesmaybewarrantedincertaincircumstances.Treasuryisalsovigilantinrespondingtostrainsthatthesemovementscanpresent,whetheritmeansaneedforhelpfrommultilaterals,debtrestructuring,orotherresponses.TheAdministrationstronglyopposesattemptsbytheUnitedStates’tradingpartnerstoartificiallymanipulatecurrencyvaluestogainunfairadvantageoverAmericanworkers.TreasurycontinuestopressothereconomiestoupholdtheexchangeratecommitmentstheyhavemadeintheG-20,theG-7,andattheIMF.AllG-7membershavecommittedtomarket-determinedexchangerates.AllG-20membershaveagreedthatstrongfundamentalsandsoundpoliciesareessentialtothestabilityoftheinternationalmonetarysystemandnottotargetourexchangeratesforcompetitivepurposes.2AllIMFmembersarerequiredtoavoidmanipulatingtheirexchangeratestogainanunfaircompetitiveadvantageoverother

members.Whilethepresentglobalmacroeconomiccircumstances—elevatedinflation,monetarytighteningtoslowdemand,andboutsofdollarappreciation—reducesomeconcernsaboutcurrentaccountsurpluses,itisimportanttomonitorcountries’externalbalancesandwhethertheirproductionanddomesticabsorptionarebroadly

aligned.TreasuryAnalysisunderthe1988and2015

LegislationThisReportassessesdevelopmentsininternationaleconomicandexchangeratepoliciesoverthefourquartersthroughJune2023.TheanalysisinthisReportisguidedbySections3001-3006oftheOmnibusTradeandCompetitivenessActof1988(1988Act)(codifiedat22U.S.C.§§5301-5306)andSections701and702oftheTradeFacilitationandTradeEnforcementActof2015(2015Act)(codifiedat19U.S.C.§§4421-4422),asdiscussedinSection2ofthis

Report.2Foralistoffurthercommitments,seetheApril2021ReportonMacroeconomicandExchangeRatePoliciesofMajorTradingPartners.Availableat:/system/files/206/April_2021_FX_Report_FINAL.pdf.2Underthe2015Act,TreasuryisrequiredtoassessthemacroeconomicandexchangeratepoliciesofmajortradingpartnersoftheUnitedStatesforthreespecificcriteria.Treasurysetsthebenchmarkandthresholdfordeterminingwhichcountriesaremajortradingpartners,aswellasthethresholdsforthethreespecificcriteriainthe2015

Act.InthisReport,Treasuryhasreviewedthe20largestU.S.tradingpartners3againstthethresholdsTreasuryhasestablishedforthethreecriteriainthe2015

Act:AsignificantbilateraltradesurpluswiththeUnitedStatesisagoodsandservicestradesurplusthatisatleast$15

billion.Amaterialcurrentaccountsurplusisonethatisatleast3%ofGDP,orasurplusforwhichTreasuryestimatesthereisamaterialcurrentaccount“gap”using

Treasury’sGlobalExchangeRateAssessmentFramework

(GERAF).Persistent,one-sidedinterventionoccurswhennetpurchasesofforeigncurrencyareconductedrepeatedly,inatleast8outof12months,andthesenetpurchasestotalatleast2%ofaneconomy’sGDPovera12-month

period.4InthisReport,inaccordancewiththe1988Act,TreasuryhasalsoevaluatedwhethertradingpartnershavemanipulatedtherateofexchangebetweentheircurrencyandtheUnitedStatesdollarforpurposesofpreventingeffectivebalanceofpaymentsadjustmentsorgainingunfaircompetitiveadvantageininternational

trade.Becausethestandardsinthe1988Actandthe2015Actaredistinct,atradingpartnercouldbefoundtomeetthestandardsidentifiedinoneofthestatuteswithoutnecessarilybeingfoundtomeetthestandardsidentifiedintheother.Section2providesfurtherdiscussionofthedistinctionsbetweenthe1988Actandthe2015

Act.TreasuryConclusionsRelatedtothe2015ActInthisReport,Treasuryfindsthatnomajortradingpartnermetallthreecriteriaunderthe2015ActduringthefourquartersendingJune2023,suchthatnomajortradingpartnerrequiresenhanced

analysis.SwitzerlandwasremovedfromtheMonitoringList,havingmetonlyoneofthethreecriteriaoverthefourquartersthroughJune2023,asithadintheJune2023ReportforthefourquartersthroughDecember2022.Switzerlandhadpreviouslyexceededthethresholdsforallthreecriteria,asnotedinpreviousReports,ineachofwhichTreasuryconductedenhancedanalysisofSwitzerland.Inearly2021,TreasurycommencedenhancedbilateralengagementwithSwitzerlandinaccordancewiththe2015ActanddiscussedwiththeSwissauthoritiesthepolicyoptionstoaddresstheunderlyingcausesofSwitzerland’sexternalimbalances.Treasurycontinuestoengagecloselywith

Switzerland,3Basedontotalbilateraltradeingoodsandservices(i.e.,importsplus

exports).4Thesequantitativethresholdsforthescaleandpersistenceofinterventionareconsideredsufficientontheirowntomeetthecriterion.Otherpatternsofintervention,withlesseramountsorlessfrequentinterventions,mightalsomeetthecriteriondependingonthecircumstancesofthe

intervention.34andalsocontinuesaseparatebutrelatedStandingMacroeconomicandFinancialDialoguetodiscussmacroeconomic

issues.TreasuryAssessmentsofOtherMajorTrading

PartnersTreasuryhasalsoestablishedaMonitoringListofmajortradingpartners,whosecurrencypracticesandmacroeconomicpoliciesmeritcloseattention.Whenamajortradingpartnermeetstwoofthethreecriteriainthe2015Act,thattradingpartnerisplacedontheMonitoringList.OnceontheMonitoringList,aneconomywillremainthereforatleasttwoconsecutiveReportstohelpensurethatanyimprovementintheirperformance,suchthattheynolongermeettwoofthethreecriteriaforenhancedanalysis,isdurable,ratherthanbeingduetotemporaryfactors.Asafurthermeasure,TreasurywilladdandretainontheMonitoringListanymajorU.S.tradingpartnerthataccountsforalargeanddisproportionateshareoftheoverallU.S.tradedeficit,evenifthateconomyhasnotmettwoofthethreecriteriafromthe2015Act.InthisReport,theMonitoringListcomprisesChina,Germany,Malaysia,Singapore,Taiwan,and

Vietnam.InadditiontoSwitzerland,KoreawasremovedfromtheMonitoringListinthisReport,havingmetonlyoneoutofthreecriteriainthe2015ActfortwoconsecutiveReports.Germany,Malaysia,Singapore,Taiwan,andVietnamareontheMonitoringList,havingtriggeredtwocriteriainthe2015

Act.China’sfailuretopublishforeignexchange(FX)interventionandbroaderlackoftransparencyaroundkeyfeaturesofitsexchangeratemechanismcontinuestomakeitanoutlieramongmajoreconomiesandwarrantsTreasury’sclosemonitoring.ItremainsontheMonitoringListforthisreasonaswellasduetoitsoutsizedtradeimbalancewiththeUnitedStates.TreasuryConclusionsRelatedtothe1988ActThe1988ActrequiresTreasurytoconsiderwhetheranyeconomymanipulatestherateofexchangebetweenitscurrencyandtheU.S.dollarforpurposesofpreventingeffectivebalanceofpaymentsadjustmentsorgainingunfaircompetitiveadvantageininternationaltrade.InthisReport,TreasuryconcludesthatnomajortradingpartneroftheUnitedStatesengagedinconductofthekinddescribedinSection3004ofthe1988Actduringtherelevantperiod.Thisdeterminationhastakenaccountofabroadrangeoffactors,includingnotonlytradeandcurrentaccountimbalancesandforeignexchangeintervention(the2015Actcriteria),butalsocurrencydevelopments,exchangeratepractices,foreignexchangereservecoverage,capitalcontrols,andmonetary

policy.Treasurycontinuestocarefullytracktheforeignexchangeandmacroeconomicpolicies

ofU.S.tradingpartnersundertherequirementsofboththe1988Actandthe2015Act,andtoreviewtheappropriatemetricsforassessinghowpoliciescontributetocurrencymisalignmentsandglobalimbalances.TheAdministrationhasstronglyadvocatedforourmajortradingpartnerstocarefullycalibratepolicytoolstosupportastrongandsustainableglobalrecovery.Treasuryalsocontinuestostresshowimportantitisfor

alleconomiestopublishdatarelatedtoexternalbalances,foreignexchangereserves,andinterventioninatimelyandtransparent

fashion.Section1:GlobalEconomicandExternal

DevelopmentsThisReportcoverseconomic,trade,andexchangeratedevelopmentsintheUnitedStates,theglobaleconomy,andthe20largesttradingpartnersoftheUnitedStatesforthefourquartersthroughJune2023and,wherequarterlyand/ormonthlydataareavailable,throughend-September2023.TotalgoodsandservicestradeoftheeconomiescoveredwiththeUnitedStatesamountedtomorethan$5.3trillioninthefourquartersthroughJune2023,about78%ofallU.S.tradeduringthat

period.U.S.Economic

TrendsEconomicPerformancein2023H1Theeconomygrewsolidlyduringthefirsthalfof2023—thoughataslowerpacethaninthelatterhalfof2022.RealGDPgrew2.0%atanannualizedpaceinthefirsthalfofthisyear,followinga2.9%advanceinlastyear’ssecondhalf.Significantly,growthofprivatedomesticfinalpurchases(PDFP)—thatis,personalconsumptionexpenditures(PCE),businessfixedinvestment,andresidentialinvestment—acceleratedinthefirsthalfof2023,andcontributed2.7

percentagepointstototalGDPgrowth–amorethanfive-foldincreaseoverthe0.5percentagepointcontributioninthelatterhalfof2022.Themuchlargercontributioninthefirsthalfofthisyearreflectedfasterprivateconsumptionand,especially,amuchsmallerdeclineinresidentialinvestment,whichwasdrivenbysignificantimprovementsinsingle-familyhomeconstructionaswellassalesofexistinghomes.RealPCEcontinuedtoreflectarotationfromgoodstoservices,eventhoughconsumptionofservicessloweda

bit.Meanwhile,thecontributionfrombusinessfixedinvestmentdeclinedmodestlyinthe

firsthalfof2023.Businessspendingonstructuresremainedstrong,mainlyreflectingheavyinvestmentinmanufacturingfactories,butalsoother

structures.-2.00.02.04.02021 2022 2022 2023H2 H1 H2 H1Percentagepoints,seasonally

adjusted,annual

ratesPDFPContributiontoGDP

GrowthPCE

GoodsPCE

Services

BFI

StructuresBFI

OtherResidentialPFDP5Source:BureauofEconomic

Analysis.AmongtheremainingthreedriversofrealGDP,totalgovernmentconsumptionandinvestmentaddeda

substantial,0.7percentagepointstogrowthinthefirsthalfof2023,afterreboundinginlastyear’ssecondhalftomakeanidenticalcontribution.However,impetusfromnetinternationaldemandwasfarmoremodestinthefirsthalfof2023,fallingto0.2percentagepoints,afraction

oftheleadingcontributionthiscomponentmadeinthesecondhalfof2022.Exportsofgoodsandservicesdeclined1.9%atanannualrateinthefirsthalfof2023,reflectingslowingglobaldemandforU.S.products,whileimportsfellmore,down-2.6%.Consequently,thetradedeficitdeclinedby$26.4billion,afteramoresubstantialnarrowingof$192billioninthesecondhalfoflastyear.Meanwhile,thecontributionfromprivateinventoriesinthesecondquarterof2022wasmorethanreversedinthethirdquarter.Thechangeinprivateinventoriesposeda1.1percentagepointdragongrowthinthisyear’sfirsthalf,afteradding0.5percentagepointsinthesecondhalfof2022.Thedragininventorieswaslargelysourcedinthewholesale

sector.Labormarketsremainedstronginthefirsthalfof2023,but

signsofrealignmentinsupplyanddemandcontinuedtobuild.Thehistoricallyrapidpaceofpayrolljobcreationin2021easedthroughout2022andintothefirsthalfof2023.Theeconomycreatedanaverage354,000payrolljobspermonthduringthelatterhalfof2022,whichsteppeddowntoa

monthlyaverageof257,000jobsin

thisyear’sfirsthalf.Evenso,thepaceisstillconsistentwiththatneededtomaintainastableunemploymentrate.Theunemploymentrate(U-3),meanwhile,edgedupby0.1percentagepointto3.6%fromDecember2022toJune2023,althoughduringthefirsthalfof2023,thisratefellto3.4%inJanuaryandApril,thelowestratesinceMay1969,asagrowinglaborsupplymatchedthepaceofjob

creation.8.06.04.02.00.0-2.0-4.0Percentagepoints,

seasonallyadjusted,annual

ratesContributiontoRealGDP

GrowthPrivS61.061.461.862.262.663.076543210Jun-21Sep-21Dec-21Mar-22Jun-22Sep-22Dec-22Mar-23Jun-23Percentoflabor

forceUnemployment&Labor

ParticipationU-3

(LHS) LFPR

(RHS)6Source:BureauofLabor

Statistics.Inflationinthefirsthalfof2023continuedtoslowduetoongoingimprovementsinseveraldrivers,includingfoodandenergy,aswellasinunderlyingconditions,suchasresolvingsupplychainsandpricepressuresstemmingfromRussia’sillegalinvasionofUkrainewerecontained.Onemajorcomponent,shelter,showedverylittleimprovementfromanelevatedpace.Afterslowingsteadilyinthefinalsixmonthsof2022,energypriceinflationhasdeclinedoutrightinthefirsthalfofthisyear.Foodpriceinflationremainedatadouble-digitpacethroughmostof2022,butfinallymovedlowerduringthefirsthalfofthisyear.Asaresultofallthesefactors,twelve-monthCPIinflationhasdeclinedfromapeakrateof9.1%inJune2022,to6.5%

inDecember2022,andto3.0%

inJune2023,i.e.a

two-thirdsreductionfromtheyear-earlierpeak.TheimprovementincoreCPIinflation(whichexcludesfoodandenergy)hasbeenmoremodest,owingtopersistentlyelevatedreadingsforshelterpricesandashiftbacktoconsumptionofservices.OvertheyearthroughJune2022,thecoreCPIroseby5.9%,theneasedto5.7%overthe12monthsthroughDecember2022.OvertheyearthroughJune2023,however,12-monthcoreinflationeasedmorenoticeablyto4.8%.Evenafterslowingnoticeablyduringthelatterhalfof2022,coregoodsinflationdeceleratedfurtherduringthefirsthalfofthisyear,toa12-monthpaceof1.3%throughJune2023.Coreservicesinflationremainselevated,owingtorisingdemandinvariousservicesectors,especiallythoseadverselyaffectedbythepandemic,aswellaspersistentlyrapidinflationinhousing(rentofprimaryresidenceandowners’equivalentrent).EconomicDevelopmentsSinceJune

2023Intheadvanceestimateforrealeconomicactivityinthethirdquarterof2023,realGDProse4.9%atanannualrate,morethandoubletherateinthefirsthalfof2023andthefastestpaceofgrowthsincethefirstquarterof2021.PDFPaccountedfor2.8percentagepointsofGDPgrowthashouseholdconsumptionstrengthenedandresidentialinvestmentposteditsfirstcontributiontoGDPgrowthsincethefirstquarterof2021.ForthecomponentsofrealGDPotherthanPDFP,thechangeinprivateinventoriesboosted

real0.02.04.06.08.02021-Jun2021-Dec2022-Jun2022-Dec2023-JunPercentagepointcontribution

to12-monthcore

inflationCoreCPIInflation

DecompositionGoodsRentor

HousingServices

ex.HousingCoreCPI

Inflation7Source:BureauofLabor

Statistics.economicactivityby1.3percentagepoints,andgovernmentpurchasesandinvestmentadded0.8percentagepoints.However,netexportssubtracted0.1percentagepointsfromgrowthasimportgrowthoutweighedtheincreasein

exports.Stronglabormarketspersistedduringthethirdquarterof2023withrobustpayrolljobgrowthandlowunemploymentrates.FromJunetoSeptember,employersaddedanaverageof266,000jobs,upfrom201,000inthesecondquarterwhiletheunemploymentrateincreasedby0.2percentagepointsto3.8%inSeptember.Meanwhile,thelaborforceparticipationratecontinuedtoimproveslowly,averaging62.8%throughoutthethirdquarter,apost-pandemichigh.Demandforlaborhasslowlyeased:theaveragevacancyratioinJulyandAugust(lastavailabledata)tickeddownby0.1to1.5jobopeningsperunemployedpersonsfromthesecondquarter,stillsomewhatabovethepre-pandemiclevelofjustover1butwellbelowrecenthighs.Thequitsratealsosoftened,decreasing

by0.2percentagepointsto2.3%inthethirdquarter.Theseimprovementshaveeased

labormarketpressuresbutthevacancyratioandquitsratesstillarehighrelativetohistoricalstandards,signalingthattheimbalancebetweensupplyanddemand

persists.Inflationtrendedabithigherduringthethirdquarter,boostedbyhigherenergyprices,but12-monthratescontinuedtoslowrelativetoyear-earlierreadings.Onayear-over-yearbasis,CPIinflationwas3.7%inSeptember2023,upfrom3.0%inJune2023.Year-over-yearenergypriceinflationremainsnegative—buttoasmallerdegreeduetorecentincreaseinenergyprices.Meanwhile,twelve-monthcoreinflationcontinuedtotrendlower;overtheyearthroughSeptember,coreinflationwas4.1%,lessthantwo-thirdsoftheyear-earlierreadingandtheslowestpaceintwoyears.Rentofhousinginflationcontinuestosetahighflooroncoreprice

growth.TheFederalOpenMarketsCommittee(FOMC)tightenedmonetarypolicyfurtherduringthethirdquarter.TheFOMCvotedtoraiseitsshort-termpolicyratetarget(thefederalfundsrate)by25basispointsto5.25–5.50%attheJuly25-26meetingbutleftthetargetunchangedattheSeptember19-20meeting.ThetargetrangeremainsatthehighestlevelsinceFebruary

2001.FederalFinancesinFiscalYear2023FederalfinanceshaveimprovedsignificantlysinceFiscalYear(FY)2020.InFY2020,

thefederaldeficitpeakedat14.7%ofGDPduetothepandemicandrelatedaidmeasurestohelphouseholdsandbusinessesweathertheeconomicshock.ByFY2022,thedeficithaddecreasedto5.4%ofGDP,reflectingthephasingoutofpandemic-relatedaid

and

FY

'10 FY

'12 FY'14 FY

'16 FY

'18 FY'20 FY

'223020100-10-20-30-40PercentofGDP,fiscal

yearsReceiptsFederal

FinancesOutlays Surplus(+)/Deficit

(-)8Sources:U.S.Treasury;BureauofEconomic

Analysis.recoveryintheeconomymorebroadly.ForFY2023,thedeficitincreased$320billion

to$1.70trillion,equalto6.3%ofGDP,aslowerreceiptsoutweigheddecreased

spending.Individualincometaxesdropped$457billion,reflectinglowercapitalgainsrealizationsandlowerdepositsofFederalReserveearningscoincidingwithhigherinterestratesandthe