未来能源研究所：2025年企业尽职调查、汽车行业和电池供应链报告（英文版）

CorporateDueDiligence,AutoIndustry,andBatterySupplyChains

VaiosTriantafyllou,AnthonyCheng,andBeiaSpiller

Report25-15

September2025

AbouttheAuthors

VaiosTriantafyllouisaPhDcandidateinEconomicsatCornellUniversity.Hisareasof

focusineconomicsincludeenvironmentaleconomics,laboreconomics,andpolitical

economy.Triantafyllouisanengineerbytraining,holdingaBachelor’sinMechanical

EngineeringandAppliedMechanicsfromHarvardUniversityandaMaster’sin

MechanicalEngineeringfromtheUniversityofPennsylvania.

AnthonyChengisaPhDcandidateandNationalScienceFoundationGraduate

ResearchFellowshipProgramFellowintheEngineeringandPublicPolicyDepartment

atCarnegieMellonUniversity.ChenggraduatedfromtheMassachusettsInstituteof

Technologyin2020.Hisareaofinterestrevolvesaroundunderstandingmanufacturing

andcommercializationofcleantechnologiesneededintheenergytransition,

particularlyregardingelectricvehicles.

BeiaSpillerisafellowandthedirectorforResourcesfortheFuture’s(RFF’s)

TransportationProgram.PriortojoiningRFF,shewasLeadSeniorEconomistat

EnvironmentalDefenseFund(EDF),wheresheworkedforalmostadecade.Shewas

alsoaBoardmemberfortheAssociationofEnvironmentalandResourceEconomists

through2024.Spillerisanenergyeconomist,withexperienceworkingonelectricity

andtransportationissues.DuringhertimeatEDF,sheparticipatedinmanyelectric

utilityproceedingsinNewYorkandCalifornia,withagoalofusheringinacleaner,

moreefficientandequitableenergysystem.

Acknowledgments

WethankMilanElkerbout,AdityaRamji,FranziskaGruning,PierPaolo,VasileiosRizos

andJeffChristianfortheirthoughtsandinputtoourpaper.Anyerrorsareourown.

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AboutRFF

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TheviewsexpressedherearethoseoftheindividualauthorsandmaydifferfromthoseofotherRFFexperts,itsofficers,oritsdirectors.

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Abstract

WithintheEuropeanUnion,MultinationalEnterprisesandtheirglobalsupplychains

areincreasinglyunderscrutinyasconsumersandgovernmentsdemandhigher

environmentalandsocialstandards.Inparticular,asthegreentransitionaccelerates,

industriesthatrelyoncriticalmineralsfacegrowingpressuretoensurethattheir

operationsarebothsustainableandsociallyresponsible.Thisreportexaminesthe

implicationsoftheEuropeanUnion’sCorporateSustainabilityDueDiligenceDirective(CSDDD)fortheautomotiveandbatterysupplychains,withafocusonhowfirmsmayrespondtothenewrequirements.TheCSDDDisaEuropeanUnion-widelegislation,

aimingtoharmonizenational-levelduediligencelawsthatrequirefirmstomonitor,

report,andaddressadversehumanrightsandenvironmentalimpactsacrosstheir

supplychains.Weoutlinethevariousmarginsofadjustmentthatfirmshavetaken,

includinggreeninvestmentsandsuppliermonitoring,throughdigitaltoolsandphysicalaudits.However,westressthattheCSDDDdoesnotspecifysector-specificgoalsto

bemetbyaffectedfirms.Subsequently,weconcludethatthedirectivehaspotentialtotransformsupplychains,butrisksbeingproceduralifitsimplementationlacks

rigorous,measurabletargetstotrackbothfirmcomplianceandtheaggregateeffectsofthelegislation.

CorporateDueDiligence,AutoIndustry,andBatterySupplyChainsiv

Contents

1.Introduction1

2.CurrentStateoftheIndustryandRegulations2

2.1.TheCurrentEuropeanUnionBatterySupplyChainandRegulatoryLandscape2

2.2.ExistingNationalSupplyChainDueDiligenceLaws3

2.3.ImplicationsforAutomotiveandBatterySupplyChains6

3.TheEUCorporateSustainabilityDueDiligenceDirective6

3.1.MainObjectivesandHarmonizationofNationalRegulations7

3.2.TheOmnibusProposals7

4.EffectivenessofCorporateDueDiligenceLegislation8

4.1.MarginsofAdjustment8

4.1.1.CapitalExpenditures8

4.1.2.DueDiligenceActivities9

4.2.Monitoring,Verifiability,andDataCollection10

5.MitigatingCostIncreases11

6.Conclusion12

References13

CorporateDueDiligence,AutoIndustry,andBatterySupplyChains1

1.Introduction

Overthepastdecade,astheneedtoreducegreenhousegasemissionshasbecome

moresalient,publicopinioninEuropehasshiftedinfavorofmoresustainable

consumptionchoices.Between2011and2019,Europeansnotonlyshoweda

continuousincreaseinsupportformoresustainablepractices,butalsoreportedtakingmoreactionsto“helptackleclimatechange”(EuropeanCommission,2023a).Thisshiftinpublicopinionhasexertedsignificantpressureonpolicymakersandfirmstopush

forandadoptmoresustainablepractices,culminatingintheintroductionofnational-levelsupplychainduediligencelawsasearlyas2015.However,withthepromulgationofmultiplelawsacrossnationaljurisdictions,aclearneedarosetoharmonizethese

regulations.

Thus,in2024,theEuropeanUnionadoptedtheCorporateSustainabilityDue

DiligenceDirective(CSDDD),aspartofabroaderregulatoryeffortundertakenby

EUpolicymakerstoimprovethecoherenceofitssustainabilitypoliciesandaddress

humanrightsabusesinthesupplychainofEuropeanfirms.Thedirective,similar

tomanyoftheindividuallawsalreadyadoptedbycertainmemberstates,servesa

dualpurpose:(a)addressinghumanrightsviolationsstemmingfromtheactivitiesoflargemultinationalfirmsabroadand(b)limitingtheenvironmentalimpactsofthoseactivities(EuropeanCommission,2025b;White&Case,2025).Thedateinitiallysetformemberstatestoimplementitintonationallawwas2026.

AlthoughthedirectiveappliesbroadlytolargefirmsoperatingwithintheEuropean

Unioninvariousindustries,itsimplicationsareparticularlysignificantforsectors

reliantoncriticalminerals,especiallyundertheconcurrentpushforthegreen

transition.Criticalmineralssuchaslithiumandcobaltarekeytobatteryenergy

storagetechnologiesthatenablerenewableenergygenerationandtheadoptionof

electricvehicles(EVs).However,manycriticalmineralsareextractedandprocessedindevelopingcountries,oftenwithadversesocioeconomicimpactsonlocalcommunitiesandecosystems(InternationalEnergyAgency(IEA),2025;StimsonCenter,2023;WorldEconomicForum,2024).

Thoughseveralregulationsforbatteryandcriticalmaterialshavealreadybeen

introducedintheEuropeanUnion,wesuggestthat,despitetherecentOmnibus

proposallimitingitsscope,theCSDDDremainsausefulframeworkforharmonizingexistingnational-levelregulations.Weexploreexistingandpotentialmeasures

ofadjustmentbyaffectedcompanies,andtherequirementsforasuccessfulimplementationoftheregulation.

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2.CurrentStateoftheIndustryandRegulations

2.1.TheCurrentEuropeanUnionBatterySupplyChainandRegulatoryLandscape

Currently,verylittleofthebatterysupplychainliesinEurope,withthemostrelevantsegmentsconcentratedinbatterymanufacturing;verylittleextractionofbattery

criticalmineralsoccursintheEuropeanUnion,andlimitedrefiningandmanufacturingcapacityexists.TheKokkolaareaofFinlandaccountsformuchofthecurrent

Europeancapacity,mostlyinnickelandcobaltproductionandrefining(Chengetal.,2024;TorresdeMatosetal.,2020;BrunoandFiore,2023).

Inconsequence,theEuropeanUnionreliesheavilyonexternalsourcesforthecriticalrawmaterialsessentialtoitsautomotiveandbatterysupplychains.Keyminerals

suchaslithium,cobalt,nickel,naturalgraphite,andrareearthelementsareimportedprimarilyfromasmallnumberofcountries.Forinstance,Chilesuppliesapproximately79percentoftheEuropeanUnion’srefinedlithium,whiletheDemocraticRepublicof

Congoprovidesaround68percentofitscobalt,muchofwhichisprocessedinChina,whichdominatesglobalrefiningcapacity.Lastly,alargeshareofrefinednickelisstillcomingfromRussia(EuropeanCommission,2023b;Eurostat,2023;JointResearch

Centre,2023).Asseeninthe2024AnnualBatteryReport,anindustryreportpublishedbytheVoltaFoundation,theEuropeanUnionisfallingfarshortofthe2030goalsfor

domesticproductionstatedintheEuropeanCriticalRawMaterialsAct(CRMA)(Fig.1).

Figure1.EUProgressTowardsDomesticMineralProduction

Source:2024BatteryReport(Volta).

CorporateDueDiligence,AutoIndustry,andBatterySupplyChains3

TheseimportdependenciescreatesignificantvulnerabilitiesfortheEuropeanUnion’sindustrialstrategy,especiallyasdemandforEVsandbatterymaterialsaccelerates.

WhiletheCRMAaimstoincreaseself-sufficiency—settingtargetslike40percent

domesticprocessingand10percentextractionby2030—thereisnodedicatedfundingtoachievethesegoals(EuropeanCourtofAuditors,2023).Asaresult,theEuropean

Unionispursuingnewtradepartnershipsandisattemptingtodiversifysupply

throughagreementswithcountriesincludingChile,Argentina,andIndonesia,whilesimultaneouslyinvestinginrecyclingtechnologies.

SeveralregulationsforbatteriesandcriticalmaterialshavealreadybeenintroducedintheEuropeanUnion.TheBatteryDirective(Directive2006/66/EC)from2006aimedtoreducetheamountofhazardousmaterialsinbatteriesandincreasebatteryrecyclingrates.Thiswasreplacedin2023bytheNewBatteriesRegulation(Regulation(EU)

2023/1542),undertheauspicesofthebroaderEuropeanGreenDealpoliticalstrategy(EuropeanCommission,2025a).Thisregulationaimedtominimizetheenvironmentalimpactofbatteriesthroughouttheirentirelifecycle,fromrawmaterialextraction

todisposal,includingcarbonfootprintrequirementsandminimumrecycledcontentrequirements(byweight)forcobalt,lead,lithium,andnickel.Thisregulationalso

implementeda“batterypassport”toensurecomplianceandbettertransparencyandtrackingofthosebatterycontents.

Furthermore,theEUConflictMineralsRegulation(Regulation(EU)2017/821)was

promulgatedin2021,aimingtostemtradeintin,tantalum,tungsten,andgold,salesofwhichhavehistoricallybeenusedinparttofinancearmedconflicts.Lastly,theEUDeforestation-FreeProductsRegulation(Regulation(EU)2023/1115),adoptedin2023,asksfirmstoprovethatcommodities,includingcriticalminerals,arenotsourcedfromdeforestedland.

Thus,directivesliketheCSDDDworktoensurethatmaterialssourcedforproductssoldintheEuropeanUnionachievethestandardsdesiredbyconsumersintheregion,therebysupportingthefocusonsustainablesourcingofimportedcriticalminerals.

2.2.ExistingNationalSupplyChainDueDiligenceLaws

BeforetheCSDDDwasintroduced,anumberofEuropeancountrieshadalready

introducednational-levellawsaimedatensuringproperduediligenceandbestpracticeswithinsupplychainsthatunderliethegoodssoldintheircountries.Table1presents

anoverviewofthemainnationallawsinplace,includingtheirscope—whetherthey

coverenvironmentalissues,humanrightsconcerns,orboth—alongwiththethresholdsbeyondwhichcompaniesareliable,theyearofintroduction,andthespecifiedfines.Anumberofothercountries,suchasIreland,Denmark,Finland,andBelgium(InitiativeforSustainableandResponsibleBusinessConduct,2025),havesignaledstrongsupport

forsupplychainduediligencelegislationandarepreparingforimplementationoftheCSDDDaspromulgatedin2024,buthavenotyetintroducedbindingnationallaws.Wediscusseachcountrywithanexistinglawinfurtherdetail.

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Table1.OverviewofCorporateDueDiligenceLawsbyCountry

Country

Environmental

HumanRights

Threshold

Year

Fine

France

Yes

Yes

5,000domestic/

10,000employees

2017

Civilliability(lawsuits);noadministrativefines

Germany

Yes

Yes

3,000employees(2023),1,000

employees(2024onward)

2023

Upto2percentof

globalturnover;

exclusionfromtenders

Netherlands

Partial

Yes

20millioneuros/

40millioneurosand

250employees

2019(not

inforce)

Potentialcriminalcharges

Norway

No

Yes

Greaterthan70millionkrone

2021

Fines

UnitedKingdom

No

Yes

Greaterthan36

millionpounds

2015

Switzerland

No

Yes

Greaterthan43.5milionswissfranc

2022

Fineof100,000swissfrancforcompany

directors

TheUnitedKingdomwasthefirstcountrytopromulgatesuchalaw,withtheModernSlaveryActineffectsince2015.Thiswasthefirstlawtomandatethatlargebusinessesdisclosetheireffortsinaddressingmodernslaverywithintheirsupplychains.Theactrequirescompaniestopublishannualstatementsontheiractions.Whilethereareno

criminalpenaltiesfornoncompliance,thegovernmentcanseekinjunctionstoenforcereportingrequirements.ThoughtheUnitedKingdomvotedtoleavetheEuropean

Unionin2016,fullyexitingin2020,thislawhelpedspurmomentumforsupplychainduediligenceinthegreaterregion(UKParliament,2015).

Since2017,France’sDutyofVigilanceLawhasrequiredlargecompaniestodevelop

duediligenceplansthatidentifyandassesssocialandenvironmentalrisksintheir

operationsandsupplychains.Theseplansmustincluderiskmitigationstrategies,andcompaniescanbeheldlegallyaccountablefordamagesresultingfrominsufficient

implementation,facingpotentialcivilpenalties(Latham&WatkinsLLP,2024).

TheNetherlands’ChildLaborDueDiligenceAct,adoptedin2019,requirescompaniestoinvestigatechildlaborrisksintheirsupplychainsandtodeclarethatthey

haveexercisedduediligenceinaddressingthem.Noncompliancecanresultin

CorporateDueDiligence,AutoIndustry,andBatterySupplyChains5

administrativefines,andrepeatviolationsmayleadtocriminalsanctionsforcompanydirectors,includingimprisonment(LittenbergandBinder,2019).However,thelawisnotyetinfulleffect.

Norway’sTransparencyandHumanRightsAct,enactedin2021,requireslarge

enterprisestocarryoutduediligenceinlinewiththeOECDGuidelinesandreportpubliclyontheseefforts.Thelawalsograntsindividualstherighttorequest

informationonhowcompaniesmanagehumanrightsrisks.CompaniesthatfailtocomplymayfaceenforcementordersandcoercivefinesimposedbytheNorwegianConsumerAuthority(DNV,2025).

Switzerland’ssupplychainduediligenceregulation,enactedin2022,requires

companiestoimplementmeasurestoensureresponsiblesourcing.Firmsmust

evaluatetheirsupplychainsforcompliancewithhumanrightsstandardsrelatedtoconflictmineralsandchildlaborrisks(EYSwitzerland,2025).

Germany’sSupplyChainAct(Lieferkettensorgfaltspflichtengesetz,orLkSG),whichtookeffectinJanuary2023,mandatesthatcompanieswithatleast3,000employees(startingin2024,atleast1,000)establishsupplierriskmanagementsystems.Thesesystemsmustaddressconcernssuchaschildlabor,unsafeworkingconditions,andenvironmentalharm.Companiesthatfailtocomplymayfacefinesofupto2percentoftheirannualrevenueandbebarredfrompublictendersforuptothreeyears.

Firmsarerequiredtoconductriskassessments,implementmitigationmeasures,setupcomplaintmechanisms,andpublishannualreportsontheirduediligenceefforts(FederalMinistryofLabourandSocialAffairs,2023).

Collectively,theselawsreflectashifttowardincreasingcorporateaccountability

forhumanrights,laborconditions,andenvironmentalsustainabilitywithinsupply

chains.However,itisimportanttonotethatnoneoftheselawshavespecifictargetsordeliverables,otherthanpublishingannualplansoutliningthestepstakenby

firmstomonitortheirsupplychains.Hence,theprimarychannelsthroughwhichthe

lawsoperateare(a)increasingthesalienceofthistopicinpublicdiscourseand(b)

providinginterestedgroupsandnongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs)legalgroundstogoafternoncompliantfirms.

TheEuropeanCommissionsurveyedbusinessexecutives,industryorganizations,andcivilsociety,todocumenttheperceivedmotivationforconductingsupply-chaindue

diligenceaftertheintroductionoftheselaws.Interestingly,businessexecutivesrankedreputationalconcerns,investorrelations,andconsumerpreferencesthehighest,

whilenotplacingalargeweightonsanctionsandfinesorjudicialoversightstemmingfromthoseregulations.Ontheotherhand,civilsocietyandNGOgroupsseemtobeoverlyoptimisticaboutthelegislativepoweroftheselaws,despitethelackofspecificthresholdsandguidelines(EuropeanCommission,2020).

Yet,whilereputationalconcernsseemtobeenoughofanincentiveforbusinessestorespondtosuchlegislation,multinationalcompaniesinparticulargrapplewithdifferingrequirementsandrestrictionsacrossdifferentcountries.Thisisaprimaryconcern

intheEuropeanUnionmoregenerallyandhasledtotheintroductionoflawsthat

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attempttoharmonizedisparatenationalapproachesinordertolowerthebarrierstotradewithinthelargerinternalmarket.CohesiveduediligencelegislationacrosstheunioncouldbesimilarlyhelpfulforlargeEuropeanfirms.

2.3.ImplicationsforAutomotiveandBatterySupplyChains

Mostofthenationallawsreferencedintheprevioussectionapplybroadlytolarge

companiesacrossvarioussectorsbutdonotspecificallymentionautomotivesupplychains.However,giventhesignificanceoftheautomotiveindustryinGermany,the

LkSGhasdirectimplicationsforautomotivemanufacturersandsuppliers.Companiesarerequiredtoassessandaddressrisksrelatedtochildlaborandforcedlaborintheextractionofrawmaterials,suchascobaltandlithium,essentialforEVbatteries.Theyarealsorequiredtoaddressissuesofenvironmentaldegradation,includingpollutionanddeforestation,associatedwithminingandproductionprocesses.Lastly,they

needtoaddressoccupationalhealthandsafetyviolationsinmanufacturingfacilities(FederalMinistryofLabourandSocialAffairs(BMAS),2023).

Switzerland’sOrdinanceonConflictMineralsandChildLaboralsodirectlyaffectssupplychainsintheautomotivesector.Itrequirescompaniestoestablishasupplychaintraceabilitysystem,withspecificobligationsforeachcategory.Firmsmustdocumentproductdetails,tradenames,andinformationaboutsuppliersand

productionsiteswhenthereisreasonablesuspicionthatchildlaborwasemployed.

Asforconflictminerals,companiesdealingwith3TG(tin,tantalum,tungsten,and

gold)sourcedfromhigh-riskareasmustrecorddetailssuchasmineraldescriptions,

supplierinformation,countryoforigin,and,formetals,dataonsmeltersandrefiners.Ifrisksareidentified,additionalinformation—includingmineoforigin,processing

locations,andtaxpayments—mustbedocumented.By-productsaretraceableonlyuptothepointwheretheyareinitiallyseparatedfromprimarymineralsormetals(SwissConfederation,2022).

3.TheEUCorporateSustainabilityDueDiligenceDirective

BusinessownersandexecutiveshaveexpressedsignificantconcernsabouthavingtocomplywithapatchworkoflawsandstandardsacrossdifferentEuropeancountries(EuropeanCommission,2020).Asaresponse,theEuropeanUnionhasmadean

efforttointroducelegislationthatwillhomogenizenational-levellawsoncorporateduediligence.Hence,theCorporateSustainabilityDueDiligenceDirective(CSDDD)wasintroduced,requiringlargecompaniesto“identifyandaddressadversehumanrightsandenvironmentalimpacts,[...](1)integratingduediligenceintopolicies

andmanagementsystems;(2)identifyingandassessingadversehumanrightsandenvironmentalimpacts;(3)preventing,ceasingorminimisingactualandpotentialadversehumanrightsandenvironmentalimpacts;(4)monitoringandassessing

theeffectivenessofmeasures;(5)communicatingand(6)providingremediation”

(EuropeanCommission,2022).

CorporateDueDiligence,AutoIndustry,andBatterySupplyChains7

3.1.MainObjectivesandHarmonizationofNationalRegulations

ThemainpurposeoftheCSDDDistostandardizetherequirementstocomply

withtheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD)’s“Due

DiligenceGuidanceforResponsibleBusinessConduct,”ideallyhelpingmultinationalcompaniestohomogenizetheirreportingandsustainabilityrequirementsacrosstheEuropeanUnion.Moreover,theCSDDDrequiresEuropeanfirmstoputforthclimatetransitionplansthatalignwiththeobjectivesoftheParisAgreement.Lastly,itaimstohomogenizetheindividuallawsthatEuropeancountriesadoptedatdifferenttimes(KPMGinFinland,2024).

Specifically,whilethedirectiveenteredintoforceonJuly25,2024,requiredcompliancewasdelayedduetonegotiations.Companieswithaglobalturnoverofmorethan€1.5billionandmorethan5,000employeesintheEUmustcomplywithinthreeyears,by

2027.Thosewithaturnoverexceeding€900millionandmorethan3,000employeeshavefouryears,until2028,andcompanieswithaturnoverabove€450millionand

morethan1,000employeesaregrantedfiveyears,withcompliancerequiredby2029(EuropeanCommission,2025c).However,theproposalhasbeencriticizedas“onerousandinneedofsimplification,”giventheextensivereportingrequiredacrossthesupplychain(Runyon,2025).

3.2.TheOmnibusProposals

ThecriticismsleveledagainsttheCSDDDledtointensivelobbyingeffortsthatresultedintheintroductioninFebruary2025ofwhatcametobeknownastheOmnibus

proposals.Theproposalswereasetofamendmentsaimingtosimplifyandstreamlinesustainabilityreportingandduediligencerequirements.Whiletheseproposalswere

intendedtoreduceadministrativeburdensandenhancecompetitiveness,concerns

havebeenraisedthattheycoulddilutebothexistingnationalregulationsandtheinitialCSDDDproposal(KPMGInternational,2025).

Therearefivemainwaysinwhichexistingnationalregulationsmightbediluted.

First,theOmnibusproposalssuggestthatCSDDDwouldnowapplyonlytoTier1

(i.e.,direct)businesspartnersandnottheentiresupplychain.Secondly,therequiredreportingwouldbecarriedoutonlyeveryfiveyears,asopposedtoannually,asisthecaseinmuchcurrentnationallegislation.Third,currentlegislationrequiresthatfirmsterminaterelationshipswithbusinesspartnersforwhichriskshavebeenidentified;theproposalsuggestsremovingthisrequirement.Additionally,theproposalwouldexcludefinancialinstitutions,suchthattheywouldnolongerberequiredtodecideinvestmentsbasedonsimilarguidelines.Lastly,theproposalincludesaone-yearpostponementoftheeffectivedateofthelaw(July2028)(Ropes&GrayLLP,2024;PwCUnitedStates,2024).

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