美国2026-2028展望：萧条还是繁荣？（英文版）-瑞银集团

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GlobalResearch11November2025

GlobalEconomicPerspectives

US2026-2028Outlook:BustorBoom?

Anewdaydawns:lookingaheadoverthenextthreeyears

Theeconomicexpansionlooksverynarrowlydriven.Thefundamentalsaremixedatbest.AdecentchunkoftheUSeconomyisinrecession.EssentiallytheUSoutlookrightnowlookslikeabigbetonAI.AI-drivenequitymarketwealthsupportstheconsumptionofupper-incomehouseholds,whileotherhouseholdsareunderincreasingpressure.Meanwhile,theonlyotherpartoftheeconomyobviouslygrowingisinvestmentinsoftware,computers,andperipheralequipment—againlikelyAI-driven.Thestrengthisnarrowandcouldbetenuous.

●Weexplainourassessmentofthenarrow-growthstartingpointinmoredetailinside.Weexpectthatthenarrowgrowthisausefulparadigmforunderstandingequitymarkets,thebroadereconomyandthelabormarket,andreconcilingallthree.

●Lookingoutto2026,theothertensionisthesupportfromtheOneBigBeautifulBillAct(OBBBA)fightingtheheadwindsofthetariffsthathavebeenputinplace.Weexpecttariff-relatedheadwindstomountoverthenextseveralmonthsbeforebumpertaxrefundsfuelbettergrowthinthesecondquarterofnextyear.

●Weexpecttariffstoshaveroughly0.8ppoffrealGDPgrowth,alittleoverhalfofthatduring2026.IncontrastweexpecttheOBBBAtoadd0.45pptogrowthin2025and2026.Overall,withtherestofgovernmentincluded,fiscalpolicyisexpectedtocontribute0.3ppin2026realGDPgrowth(Q4/Q4).Thetariffsversusfiscalpolicylookslikeacentraltensionof2026.

●Wedonotthinktheimpactfromtariffsisover.Weestimatea~1.4ppcumulativedirectimpactfromthetariffsonthelevelofthecorePCEpricedeflatorfrom2025to2028,buttheinertialprocessandrelatedsupplyimpactswouldpushtheoverallimpactupto~1.9pp.Nextyear,weestimatethetariffsadd0.8pptocorePCEinflation.WealsodiscusstheimplicationsoftheSupremeCourtcaseinside.

●ThatleavestheFOMCinatoughspot,butweexpectathird202525bpratecutandtwomorein2026,whichwouldleavethetargetrangeforthefederalfundsrateat3.00%to3.25%attheendofnextyear.

●Inside,wewriteessaysonAI'simpactonproductivity,anupcomingimprovementinstructurallaborsupply,theFOMCafterChairPowell,aplanBfortheTrumpadministrationiftheIEEPAtariffsarestruckdownbythecourt,andmore.

Wearebullishlongertermandestimatethatweareonthecuspofanaccelerationinstructuralgrowth.Keyquestion:canthetradewardamage,policyuncertaintyandvolatilitygetoutoftheway?

Economics

Global

JonathanPingle

Economist

jonathan.pingle@

+1-212-7132225

AlanDetmeister

Economist

alan.detmeister@

+1-212-7131222

PierreLafourcade

Economist

pierre.lafourcade@

+1-212-7134543

SoniaMeskin

Economist

sonia.meskin@

+1-212-7131424

AbigailWatt

Economist

abigail.watt@

+1-212-8826929

AmandaWilcox

Economist

amanda.wilcox@

+1-212-713-2000

JalenNichols

Economist

jalen.nichols@

+1-212-8826905

ThisreporthasbeenpreparedbyUBSSecuritiesLLC.ANALYSTCERTIFICATIONANDREQUIREDDISCLOSURES,includinginformationontheQuantitativeResearchReviewpublishedbyUBS,beginonpage41.

GlobalEconomicPerspectives11November2025ab2

Contents

Introduction:tension bustor

boom?.........................

.3

CallingthetroughinUSstructural

growth

5

Consumption:increasinglynarrowgrowth

7

Investment:thegreatA

Irotation

10

Theeconomicimpact

ofAI

12

Government:fiscalexpansion,forayear

14

IfnoIEEPAtariffs,whatisplan

B?

17

Netexports:notmuchadjustment

underway

19

Investmentdeals:bignumberspledged

21

Labormarket:demandgrowth

nearstallspeed

22

Inflation:tariffskeepingthingselevated

25

Monetarypolicy:twosidestoevery

mandate

29

Fedindependenceandinflation

expectations

32

Risks:equitymarketbust?OBBBA

boom?

34

Conclusion:notoutofthew

oodsyet

37

Forecasttables

38

JonathanPingle

Economist

jonathan.pingle@

+1-212-7132225

AlanDetmeister

Economist

alan.detmeister@

+1-212-7131222

PierreLafourcade

Economist

pierre.lafourcade@

+1-212-7134543

SoniaMeskin

Economist

sonia.meskin@

+1-212-7131424

AbigailWatt

Economist

abigail.watt@

+1-212-8826929

AmandaWilcox

Economist

amanda.wilcox@

+1-212-713-2000

JalenNichols

Economist

jalen.nichols@

+1-212-8826905

GlobalEconomicPerspectivesUBSResearch

GlobalEconomicPerspectives11November2025ab3

Introduction:tension…bustorboom?

Theeconomicexpansionlooksverynarrowlydriven.Thestartingpointisprecarious.Thefundamentalsaremixedatbest.AdecentchunkoftheUSeconomyisinrecession.EssentiallytheUSoutlookisabigbetonAI,asequitymarketwealthsupportstheconsumptionofupper-incomehouseholdsandtheonlyotherpartoftheeconomyobviouslygrowingisinvestmentinsoftware,computersandperipheralequipment.Thatstrengthisnarrowandcouldbetenuous.

Realresidentialinvestmentisdecliningoutright.Realnonresidentialconstruction(structures)isdecliningoutright.Realgovernmentspendingandinvestmentisdecliningoutright.AdecentchunkoftheUSeconomyisinrecession.Outsideofsoftware,realintellectualpropertyinvestmentisflattodeclining.Realconsumerspendingrosejust1.5%annualizedinthefirsthalfof2025,afterrising3.2%annualizedovertherobustprecedingeightquarters.TheonlythingsgrowingintheUSeconomyareinvestmentinAI(computers,peripheralequipmentandsoftware)andupper-incomehouseholdwealth-supportedspending.Equitieshitanall-time-highshareofhouseholdwealthinQ2,andarealmostallofthegrowthinnetworthsincetheonsetofthepandemic.Ifthereisanequitybubble,anditbursts,fortherealeconomy,lookoutbelow.

Equitymarketsblewthroughtheyear'sevents,buttheeconomyandlabormarketappeartohaveslowed.Afterexpanding3.4%(Q4/Q4)in2023,and2.4%in2024,waningfiscalsupportledustopredict1.7%growthin2025atthistimelastyear.TheApril2peaktariffswerepartiallywalkedback,butevenso,wemarkeddownourprojectionstoroughly1%growththisyear.Exemptions,reductions,andslowerpricepass-throughhavesinceletourprojectionsdriftbackupalmosttowheretheystarted.

Figure1:Headwindsfightfiscalsupportandrisingpromise

Variable

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

ChangeinrealGDP

3.4

2.4

1.6

1.7

2.0

2.6

Unemploymentrate

3.8

4.2

4.4

4.5

4.4

4.3

PCEinflation

2.8

2.6

3.0

2.8

2.3

2.0

CorePCEinflation

3.3

3.0

3.0

2.9

2.4

2.0

Federalfundsrate

5.375

4.375

3.625

3.125

2.875

2.875

Note:Q4/Q4%basisexcepttheunemploymentratewhichisaQ4quarterlyaverage.Thefederalfundsratereflectsthemid-pointofthetargetrange.

Source:FederalReserve,BEA,BLS,Haver,UBSprojections2025onward

Weexpecttariff-relatedheadwindstomountinthenexttwoquartersbeforebumpertaxrefundsfuelbettergrowth.Weexpecttariffstoshaveroughly0.8ppoffrealGDPgrowth,alittleoverhalfofthatduring2026.IncontrastweexpecttheOneBigBeautifulBillAct(OBBBA)toadd0.45pptogrowthin2025and2026.Overallfiscalpolicyisexpectedtocontribute0.32ppin2026realGDPgrowth(Q4/Q4).Tariffsversusfiscalpolicylookslikethecentraltensionof2026.Wedonotthinkthetariffsareover.Weestimatea~1.4ppcumulativedirectimpactofthetariffsonthelevelofthecorePCEpricedeflatorfrom2025to2028,buttheinertialprocessandrelatedsupplyimpactswouldpushtheoverallimpactupto~1.9pp.Nextyear,weestimatethetariffsadd0.8pptocorePCEinflation.

Liketheequitymarket,theeconomicandthelabormarketexpansionsarenarrowlydriven.Jobgainsaveraged27KpermonthoverthefourmonthsendinginAugust.Excludinghealthcareandsocialassistance,jobshavebeendecliningby-36Kpermonth.Evenconsideringthematerialslowinginnetinternationalmigration,awiderangeofdatasuggestslabordemandhasslowedbymorethanlaborsupply.Thatslowdownindemandhasweighedonhouseholdassessmentsofjobavailabilityandrisksspillingintoassessmentsofincomesecurityandconsumerspending.Allthatsaid,wecannotgettoobearishwhenfiscalpolicyisabouttoturnpositiveandweexpecttobeonthecuspofanaccelerationinstructuralGDPgrowth.Narrowisathemeandarisk.

TheFOMCisinatoughspot.Thefundsrateisnotwellsuitedtostoptariffcost-pushinflation.However,restrictivemonetarypolicycouldmakeaweaklabormarketevenweaker,riskingtheexpansionitself.Withmostassessmentsofneutralpolicyatroughly3.00%to3.25%,policyhasroomtogetoutoftheway.Thoseratecutsareunderway.

We'renotsurethestartingpointisquiteasstrongasthenarrative

suggests.Thesourcesofeconomicgrowthlookrelativelynarrow.

Severallargesectorswere

contractinginH1andprobablycontinuedtocontractinH2.

Weexpecttariff-relatedpricepass-

throughtoweighonrealincomes

andraisebusinesscosts,asOBBBA

supportemergesovertime.We

expectinflationremainsnear3%

throughtheendofnextyear,puttingtheFOMCinatoughspot.

Oneriskwediscussbelowisthe

potentialfortheSupremeCourttoruleagainsttheadministrationinitsuseofIEEPAtoimposetariffs.We

describehowthetariffregimecouldbelargelyrebuiltthroughother

executivebranchauthorities.

TheFOMCisinatoughspot.

Figure2:RealGDPgrowthsteppeddownFigure3:Tariffsrenewinginflationarypressure

GlobalEconomicPerspectives11November2025ab4

RealGDP&RealPCE(%,saar)

5

Q/Q,saar

4

3.39

%Q4/Q4

3

2.40

H1,saar

2

1

1.57

0

2023-Q12023-Q42024-Q32025-Q2Realpersonalconsumptionexpenditures

-1

RealGDP

Source:BEA,Haver,UBS

CPI:commoditiesex-(food,energy,usedvehicles)(%)

15

10

5

0

-5

y/y%q/q%,saar

-10

2015-Jan2017-Feb2019-Mar2021-Apr2023-May2025-Jun

Source:BLS,Haver,UBS

Weexpectthatattheendofnextyearthetargetrangewillbeat3.00%to3.25%.Oncethetargetrangeforthefederalfundsrategetsdownto3.25%to3.50%,thecutsgetharder.Weexpectbytheendof2026thefundsratewillbesittingat3.00%to3.25%,butsotoodotheforwards.Why?Becausewithinflationexpectedtostillbeelevated(inourforecastsduetotariffpass-through)canonicalmonetarypolicywouldnotgolower.Indeed,withfiscalpolicyexpanding,theset-upwouldbesimilartothelate1960s,whentheMartinFOMCbeganraisinginterestrates.Weexpectthatdiscussionofratehikeswillmountinthesecondhalfofnextyear.

However,personnelispolicy.ChairPowell'stermasChairendsinMay.Wenotethefrontrunnersbelow.Forhisreplacement,weexpectaFedChairwhowantsto"seethrough"tariff-relatedinflation.WethinkthenextChairwillmakeacaseforrisinglonger-runGDPgrowth,givingtheeconomyroomtorunwithoutcreatingadditionalinflationarypressures.Intheorythatwouldimplyhigherneutralratesofinterestthanotherwise,butweexpectacasewillbeincreasinglymadethatlowerinterestratesshouldaccommodateinvestmentinwhatcouldbedisinflationarystructuralforces:higherproductivityanddownwardpressureonunitlaborcosts.ParallelstotheGreenspanexperiencewillbedrawn,whenproductivitygrowthsteppedupintoanewregime,theeconomydisinflatedamidstronggrowthandcoreinflationbrieflydippedbelow1%in1998.

Overall,despitesixyearsofnothittingthetarget,wedonotseeanextFOMCraisingratesin2026,or2027,tofinishthejob.

Adiscussionaboutresumingraisingratesmightmountnextyear.

However,weexpectthereactionoftheFOMCwilltendtowardfavoringeasingratherthanreactingtoa

longertailoftariffrelated-inflationthanexpected.

Figure4:Economystilldigestinglargetariffhike

%

30

USeffectivetariffrate1900-2025Fordney-

McCumber

Underwood-Simmons

25

Smoot-Hawley

GATT

20

CurrentWAT,14.9

WithChina

Fentanylat10pp,

13.6

15

ImpliedEffectiveRate,12.6

10

5

0

190019141928194219561970198419982012

Source:Haver,UBSestimates

Figure5:Recessionprobabilitymodeloddsstillhigh

USrecessionprobabilitymodel

NBERrecessionsHarddataCreditYieldcurveAggregate

100%

0.92

90%

80%

70%

60%

0.50

0.36

0.22

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

62677175798387929600040812172125

Source:NBER,Haver,UBSestimates

GlobalEconomicPerspectives11November2025ab5

CallingthetroughinUSstructuralgrowth

Thepopulationgrowthslowdown,immigration,andtheill-defined"break-even"rateofemploymentdominatedsupply-sidediscussionsin2025.Thatmaskedtwoimportantjunctures,inourview.One,thedragonstructuralUSGDPgrowthfrompopulationaginghastroughed.Weestimatethatweightwilldiminishinthecomingyears.Two,evidenceisaccumulatingthatanimprovementinstructuralproductivitydawns.

Weappeartobeonthecuspofanimprovementinstructuralgrowththatwouldbepositiveforhouseholds,thenation'sfiscalposition,andbeneficiariesofhigherinflation-freegrowth.Theslowdowninimmigrationhasbeenanegativestructuralgrowthshock,inourview,butthatslowdownweexpectisunlikelytobeslowerinthefuturethanin2025and2026.Theestimatedslowdowninimmigrationcomesontopofaslowinginpopulationgrowthfromthenative-bornpopulation.Thedemographicsarenotlikethe1990s,whenthebabyboomersenteredtheirmostproductiveandpeakearningsagesandthestructuraltrendinfemalelaborforceparticipationwasstillrising.However,despiteslowerpopulationgrowthandnotasfavourabledemographics,weestimatethatwillbemorethanoffsetbylessdragfrompopulationagingintheyearsaheadandrisingstructuralproductivitygrowthfromaninvestmentwavewethinkhasjustbeguntogetunderway.

Thefinalcohortsofthebabyboomareenteringretirement.Thosebornin1960,whenbirthrateshadalreadycomeofftheboil,turn65thisyear,andbegintoqualifyforfullsocialsecuritybenefitsalittleoverayearfromnow.Thatshiftinthenation'sagedistributionhasputdownwardpressureonlaborforceparticipationsince2003,asthebigbulgemovedfromhighworkyearsintoretirement.Thenationisstillaging,buttheimpactonstructuralgrowthislessening.In2025,weestimatepopulationagingtoreducestructuralGDPgrowthintheUSbyroughly0.4pp.Nextyear,andtheyearafter,thatdraggraduallydiminishes,asshowninthechartbelow.Populationagingimpliesthetrendintheparticipationratewillstillbenegativeintothe2030s,butthesteepestpartsofthedeclinearebecominglesssteep.Thesecondderivativeisturningpositive.That'sdifferentfromsayingdemographicslooksgreat.Fertilityratesremainlow,anddeathsaretrendinghigher.Tobesure,thedemographicsarestillconsistentwithaging,buttheshiftisslowingandtheweightonstructuralgrowtheasingintheyearsahead.

Weshowourestimatesofthestructuraltrendonthelevelofproductivityinthechartbelow.From2004to2019,thetrendroseatanannualrateof1.56%,aslowregime.Sincethen,productivitygrowthhasrisen1.83%annualized.Thatsmoothsthroughtheupsanddownsofthepandemicandpost-pandemicperiod.That'snotenoughofaboosttothinktheregimehasshifted,whichhasleftussellersofsomeofthebullishrhetoric.Theregimeshiftsarehuge:ahighproductivitygrowthregimeimpliesrateslike2-3/4%or3%.However,lookingahead,investmenthasbecomemorefavorable.Incomingdataandevidencepointstosomethingafoot.Asweshowinthebottomtwochartsofthenextpage,productivitymovesinregimes,andthoseregimescanstartslow,andwithnoise.

WediscusstheimpactofAIinanotheressay,butinadditiontodemographicsbecominglessnegativeandpointingtoaccelerationinstructuralgrowth,weexpectstructuralproductivitygrowthtoaccelerateoverourforecasthorizontoo.Wedotheadding-upexerciseinthegrowthaccountingframeworkbelow.WeestimatestructuralUSGDPgrowthinsteadofpre-Covidestimatesbelow2%,ortheFOMCestimateof1.8%,isheadedtomorelike2-1/2%inthecomingthreetofiveyears.

Figure6:GrowthaccountingbreakdownofstructuralUSGDPgrowth

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

PotentialGDPgrowth

1.9

1.8

1.5

1.8

2.1

2.5

2.3

1.7

1.8

2.1

2.6

Population

0.8

0.8

0.5

0.7

1.2

1.4

1.3

0.4

0.3

0.4

0.4

LFPR

-0.3

-0.4

-0.4

-0.4

-0.5

-0.2

-0.4

-0.4

-0.3

-0.2

-0.2

Employmentrate/AWH

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

NFBProductivity

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.8

1.9

2.1

2.5

GDP/NFB/CES/AWH

-0.1

-0.1

-0.1

-0.1

-0.1

-0.1

-0.1

-0.1

-0.1

-0.1

-0.1

Source:BEA,BLS,Haver,UBSestimatesandprojections

Everyonehasbeensofocusedon

whatisdraggingdownpotential

growth,theyaremissingthecomingimprovement.

Immigrationisunlikelytobeslowerin2026thanin2025.

Theweightofpopulationagingisstillnegativebutthesecond

derivativeisturningpositive.The

weightlessensintheyearstocome.

Notonlyisstructurallaborsupplypoisedtoaccelerate,wethink

productivitygrowthistoo.

Figure7:PopulationagingpushedlaborsupplylowerFigure8:Buttherateofchangeisimprovingnoticeably

GlobalEconomicPerspectives11November2025ab6

LaborForceParticipationRate(%CNIP)

68

67

66

65

64

63

62

61

USLaborForceParticipationRateImpactofPopulationAging

60

1988M061995M032001M122008M092015M062022M032028M12

Source:BLS,Census,Haver,UBScalculationsandprojections

Figure9:Decliningfertilityloweringpopulationgrowth

Livebirths&deaths(12monthsums)

4,500,000

4,000,000

3,500,000

3,000,000

2,500,000

2,000,000

Deaths(running12monthsum)

Livebirths(running12monthsum)

2000-Jan2006-Feb2012-Mar2018-Apr2024-May

Source:NCHS,Haver,UBS

Figure11:Productivitygrowth(fortheUS)hasbeenlow

Productivitygrowth(%)

8

NFBproductivitygrowth(y/y,%)

6

4-yearaverage(annualized,%)

4

2

1.5

1.0

0

-2

2013-Q42016-Q12018-Q22020-Q32022-Q42025-Q1

Source:BLS,Haver,UBS

PopulationagingdragonUSGDPgrowth

0.000

-0.100

-0.200

-0.300

PPreductioniny/ypotentialrealGDP

-0.400

-0.365

-0.5002012M022015M122019M102023M082027M062031M04

Source:BLS,Census,Haver,UBScalculationsandprojections

Figure10:Population/immigrationsurgecollapsing

HHSurveypopulationgrowth

(break-adjustedforpopulationupdates)

1.6

1.35

Year-over-year%change

1.4

1.2

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.72

BLS:Civilianage16-plusnon-institutionalizedpopulation

Withestimatednetinternationalimmigration

0.40

0.2ProjectedwithUBSnetinternational

migrationassumptions

0.02001-Dec2007-Nov2013-Oct2019-Sep2025-Aug

Source:BLS,Census,Haver,UBScalculationsandestimates

Figure12:...butwethinkaregimeshifthigherisnearing

Productivityregimes(%,annualized)

8.0

6.0

4.0

2.0

0.0

-2.0

Nonfarmbusinesssectorproductivitygrowth(y/y%inrealoutput

2.71.52.91.6

perhour)

Regime

-4.0

1948-Q11963-Q21978-Q31993-Q42009-Q12024-Q2

Source:BLS,Haver,UBSestimates

GlobalEconomicPerspectives11November2025ab7

Consumption:increasinglynarrowgrowth

BettingagainsttheUSconsumerhasnotbeenagoodbet.However,spendingappearstohaveslowedthisyearandthetariffpass-throughtopricesshouldintensifyasweheadinto2026.Averagehourlyearningsgrowthhasslowedto3½%annualizedoverthepastsixmonths,andaggregatepayrollincomehasbeenrunning~3¼%overthelastfourtofivemonthsannualized.WeexpectquarterlyannualizedPCEinflationtorun3%to4%thenexttwoquarters,wipingoutthoseincomegains.Inflationalreadyremainsnear3%.Asthechartbelowonexpectationsshows,householdsacrossallincomegroupsexpecttobemoresensitivetofutureinflationnowthanin2022.

Atthesametime,householdsarelessabletoweatherinflation.Householdsbelowthetop20%oftheincomedistributionhavehistoricallylowliquidassets.Asweshowbelow,onlytheupper20%oftheincomedistributionremainsawashincash,wealthandliquidassets.Thelabormarketslowinghasalsodiminishedtheperceptionsofmosthouseholdsabouttheirfutureprospects.Plus,whileequitymarketwealthhasbeenrising,nationwidehousepriceshavebeendecliningyear-to-date,animportantsourceofwealthformiddle-incomehouseholds.Singlefamilypermitspointtoweakening,andrentalvacancyrateshavebeenrising.Completed,unsoldnewlybuilthomessitatthehighestlevelssinceJuly2009.AccordingtotheNationalAssociationofRealtors,themedianageofhomepurchasersincreasedtoarecordedhighof59yearsoldoverthepastyear.Themedianfirst-timebuyerageincreasedto40yearsold.Price-to-incomeratioslingernearpre-GFCbubblepeaks.Danger.

Ratecutsarenotmuchreliefeither.Creditcardrateshaveonlycomedown34bpsto21.4%after150bpsofFedratecuts.Creditcarddelinquencyratescontinuetorise.TheFRBofStLouis,seehere,estimatetheaggregate30+daysdelinquencyrateoncreditcardshasneardoubledfrom8.5%inQ3of2022to14%inQ3of2025,encroachingontheseriespeakof15.6%inQ12010.Theirresearchalsoshowsthatdelinquencyratesaren'tjustrisingforthepoorest10%ofZIPcodeswherethe30+daysdelinquentratewas22.7%;inQ32025,theratefortherichest10%ofZIPcodeshasrisento8.2%,alevellastseenin2012.

Thedelayedreturnofcreditreportingforstudentloandelinquencieshaspushedflowsintoseriousdelinquencyfrom~0.7%in2024Q4to~12.9%in2025Q2.DailydepositsintotheDepartmentofEducation'saccountattheFederalReservearerunningaround$234millionperday,oranannualized~$60billion,another0.3%ofdisposableincomethatsomeseemtobestrugglingtoreallocate.ALibertyStreetEconomicspost,seethelinkhere,foundthatwhileabouthalfofnewlydelinquentborrowersalreadyhadsubprimecreditscores,~2.4millionhadscoresabove620,andmanywouldhavequalifiedfornewauto,mortgageandcreditcardsbeforethedelinquencieswerereported.Intotal,morethan2.2millionstudentloanborrowersw