人工智能与大分流报告（英文）

ArtificialIntelligenceandthe

GreatDivergence

TheCouncilofEconomicAdvisers

January2026

CouncilofEconomicAdvisers1

1Introduction

Forcenturies,mostoftheworld'seconomiesgrewatasimilarlyslowrate.However,a“GreatDivergence”occurredwiththeIndustrialRevolution,causingindustrializingnationstoacceleratetheirgrowthrelativetotherestoftheworld.

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Artificialintelligence(AI)isapotentiallytransformativetechnologythatisoftencomparedtotheIndustrialRevolution.

However,wearewitnessingclearleadersinAIinvestment,performance,andadoptionmetricsacrossdifferentnations.TheTrumpadministrationislayingthegroundworkforAmericanAIdominancebyacceleratinginnovation,infrastructuredevelopment,andderegulationwhileestablishingglobaldominancethroughtechnologyexports.IftheAIrevolutionisastransformativeastheIndustrialRevolution,shouldweexpectthistoleadtoasecondGreatDivergence?Ofcourse,thefutureimpactofAIisuncertain,sointhispaperwefocusontheempiricaldatathatcanbeseenandmeasuredtoday.

WebeginbyreviewinganalysesofthepotentialforAI-ledeconomicgrowth(Section2)andthendiscussingestimatesofAIsimpactonbothGDPandthelaborforce.Recognizingthattheseimpactsareuncertainandthusneedconstantmonitoring,inSection3wehighlightmetricsfortrackingthebreakneckpaceofinvestment,performance,andadoptionofAI.Wethendiscusshowdifferentcountriesarefaringonthesemetrics(Section4).Theincrediblespeedofchangecannotbeoverstated;manyofthesemetricsaredoublingeveryfewmonthsandincreasingmanyfoldeachyear.ThismeansthattheAIofthefuturewilllikelybeverydifferentfromtheAIoftoday.WeconcludebyreviewingtheactionsPresidentTrumpistakingtoensurethatAmericacontinuestoleadonAI(Section5).AsthePresidentsaid:“AmericaisthecountrythatstartedtheAIrace.AndasPresidentoftheUnitedStates,I'mheretodaytodeclarethatAmericaisgoingtowinit.”

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2TheFutureOutlook

Thelast25yearshaveseenagreatconvergenceastheworldsrichestnationsgrewslowerthanmanydevelopingnations.However,theadventofgenerativeartificialintelligencebasedaroundlargelanguagemodels(LLMs)willinitiateanewwaveofprofoundeconomictransformationintheUnitedStates,promisingsignificantbooststoproductivityandgrowth.AsAItechnologiesbecomemoreintegratedintotheworkplace,economistsarere-evaluatinglong-termprojectionsforGrossDomesticProduct(GDP).

Yet,thisperiodofinnovationisnotwithoutitscomplexities.Inthisreport,wefocusonthelong-termanalysisofstructuraltrends,asofcoursenoteveryAI-relatedinvestmentwillbeprofitable,andtheshort-runalwayscontainsthepotentialforsubstantialvolatility.

1KennethPomeranz,TheGreatDivergence:China,Europe,andtheMakingoftheModernWorldEconomy(PrincetonUniversityPress,2000),

/stable/j.ctt7sv80

2“TrumpAdvancesUSLeadershipinAI,”Editorials,2025,

/a/trump-advances-us-leadership-in-ai/8050987.html

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2.1BackgroundonArtificialIntelligence

ThelastfewyearshaveseenarapidexplosioninbothAIcapabilitiesandjargon,sowebeginwithareviewofseveralkeytermsintheAIspace.

Artificialintelligencecanrefertoawidevarietyofdifferentcomputersystems,fromchess-playingcomputerslikeDeepBluetogenerativeAIlikeChatGPT.FormostofAI’shistory,AIwasonlycapableofmakingdecisionsamongarelativelysmallsetofoptions.TherecentsurgeinAIinteresthascoincidedwiththeriseof“generative”AI,socalledbecausetheyareableto“generate”text,images,orvideo.“Largelanguagemodels”aregenerativeAIthatcancreatetext.

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Theyare“large”becauseoftheirtrillionsofparameters,and“language”becausetheyaretrainedonlargeamountsoftextwritteninnaturallanguages.

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5

AgenticAIareasubsetofgenerativeAIthatgobeyondmerecontentcreationandcanexecuteactionsinordertoaccomplishgoals.

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OneframeworkforunderstandingtheintelligenceofanAIlooksatthatintelligenceontwodimensions:(1)itsabilitytoperformdifferenttasks:fromwritingessays,toidentifyingobjectsinpictures,towritingcomputercode,tosolvingmathproblemsand(2)howtheAI’scapabilitiesonthattaskcomparetohuman-levelintelligence.Today’sartificialintelligencesystemshave“specialized”(or“narrow”)intelligencebecause,althoughtheymaybesuperhumanataparticulartask(nohumancanmultiplyasfastasacalculatorcan),AIisnotabletoperformallthetasksahumancan.Humansarecapableofperformingawidevarietyofdifferenttasks.Thus,wesaythathumanshave“general”intelligencewhilecurrentAI(includingbothChatGPTandagenticAI)have“specialized”intelligence.

Artificialgeneralintelligence(AGI)wouldbeahypotheticalAIthatcanperformalltheintellectualtasksthathumanscan,

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buttheexactdefinitionofAGIishotlydebated,andsomedefinitionsonlyrequirethatAGIperform“manybutnotall”humantasks.Artificialsuperintelligence(ASI),sometimesjustcalled“superintelligence,”isAIwithintelligencethatsurpassesthatofhumans.

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TheboundarybetweenAGIandsuperintelligenceissimilarlycontentious,partlybecausethesetermsencompassdifferentaspectsofAI:"AGI"and"specializedAI"describethegeneralityoftasksanAIcanperform,while"superintelligence"describestheAI’scapabilitiesonthosetasks.However,a“mere”AGIisalreadysuperintelligentifitcanperformallhumantasks,butatcomputerspeeds.Butaccountingforsemanticdisagreements,itisworthnothingthatOpenAI,Anthropic,xAI,Meta,andGoogleallaimtocreateartificialgeneralintelligenceorsuperintelligence.

910111213

3“Whatisalargelanguagemodel(LLM)?”,Cloudflare,

/learning/ai/what-is-large-language-model/

4“Whatisalargelanguagemodel(LLM)?”,Cloudflare,

/learning/ai/what-is-large-language-model/

5“Whatarelargelanguagemodels(LLMs)?”,IBM,

/think/topics/large-language-models

6“WhatisagenticAI?”,GoogleCloud,

/discover/what-is-agentic-ai

7“Whatisartificialgeneralintelligence?”,GoogleCloud,

/discover/what-is-artificial-general-intelligence

8“Whatisartificialgeneralintelligence?”,GoogleCloud,

/discover/what-is-artificial-general-intelligence

9“PlanningforAGIandbeyond,”OpenAI,February24,2023,

/index/planning-for-agi-and-beyond/

10AlexHeath,“MarkZuckerberg’snewgoaliscreatingartificialgeneralintelligence,”TheVerge,January18,2024,

/2024/1/18/24042354/mark-zuckerberg-meta-agi-reorg-interview

11ElonMusk(@elonmusk),“Inowthink@xAIhasachanceofreachingAGIwith@Grok5.Neverthoughtthatbefore,”X,September17,2025,

/elonmusk/status/1968202372276163029

12SarahPerkel,“AnthropicCEOsaysAGIisamarketingtermandthenextAImilestonewillbelikea‘countryofgeniusesinadatacenter,’”BusinessInsider,January22,2025,

/anthropic-ceo-calls-agi-marketing-term-2025-1

13AncaDraganetal.,“TakingaresponsiblepathtoAGI,”GoogleDeepMind,April2,2025,

https://deepmind.google/discover/blog/taking-a-

responsible-path-to-agi/

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Thisbringsustoanimportantcaveattothisreport’sanalysis:limitationsofeconomicanalysisofartificialintelligence.AsnotedbyHanson(2001),artificialintelligencethatcouldperformallhumantaskswouldleadtoabsolutelyexplosivegrowthandtoaverydifferentworldthanthatseentoday.Thus,theimplicationsofAGI(botheconomicandotherwise)areanimportanttopicdeservingoffurtherstudy,butaregenerallyoutsidethescopeofourcurrentanalysis,whichfocuseson“narrow”or“specialized”AI.

2.2ImpactofAIonGDP

Economistsoftenthinkoftheproductivepowerofaneconomyascomingfromthreefactors:thequantityoflabor,thequantityofcapital,andtotalfactorproductivity(TFP).TFPisameasureofaneconomy'sefficiencyandtechnologicalprogress.ArisingTFPindicatesthataneconomyisproducingmoregoodsandservicesfromthesameamountoflaborandcapital,orthesameoutputwithfewerinputs.

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Thisimprovementinefficiencyisakeydriveroflong-runeconomicgrowthandhigherlivingstandards.

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ForrichcountriesliketheUnitedStateswhosecapitalstocksarealreadyveryhigh,economicgrowthmainlycomesfromincreasingtotalfactorproductivity.

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TheproductivitygainsfromTFPareeventuallytranslatedintohigheroveralleconomicoutput,orGDP.However,theeffectofanewtechnologyoccurswithatimelag,asbusinessesmustfirstsuccessfullyadoptthenewtechnologyandadapttheiroperations.

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Muchoftheproductivitygainsinthe1990semergedfromtechnologicalinvestmentsthatoccurredinthe1970sand1980s.

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SimilartechnologicalinvestmentsthatoccurredduringtheGreatDepressionborefruitduringthe1950sand1960s.

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Asaresult,whileTFPisanimportantindicator,itisnotaleadingindicatorofAI’simpactontheU.S.economy.Instead,R&DspendingonAIandtheoutputofAIfirmsserveasearlyindicatorsoftechnologicalprogress.

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Forexample,AI-relatedR&Doccurswellbeforetheresultinginnovationsarewidelyadoptedandhaveamacroeconomiceffect.

AvarietyofrecentstudieshaveattemptedtoquantifytheimpactsofAIonGDPlevels.Thesestudiesproducedabroadrangeofestimates:AIcouldincreaseGDPby1percentuptomorethan45percent.ThewiderangereflectsthehighdegreeofuncertaintysurroundingtheeconomiccharacteristicsofAI.However,

14RobertZymek,“TotalFactorProductivity,”IMF,September2024,

/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2024/09/back-to-basics-

total-factor-productivity-robert-zymek

15RobertZymek,“TotalFactorProductivity,”IMF,September2024,

/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2024/09/back-to-basics-

total-factor-productivity-robert-zymek

16RobertShackleton,“TotalFactorProductivityGrowthinHistoricalPerspective,”CongressionalBudgetOffice,March2013,

/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/workingpaper/44002_TFP_Growth_03-18-2013_1.pdf

17EdwardC.Prescott,“Needed:ATheoryofTotalFactorProductivity,”InternationalEconomicReview,August1998,

/stable/2527389

18ScottA.Wolla,“WhatArethe‘Ingredients’forEconomicGrowth?”,FederalReserveBankofSt.Louis,September1,2013,

/publications/one-economics/2013/09/01/what-are-the-ingredients-for-economic-growth

19WenjieTang,TongWang,andWenxinXu,“SoonerorLater?TheRoleofAdoptionTiminginNewTechnologyIntroduction.”Productionand

OperationsManagement,April2022,

/doi/epdf/10.1111/poms.13637?msockid=28439e724fd560f012f588f14e1861b7

20RogerW.FergusonJr.andWilliamL.Wascher,“DistinguishedLectureonEconomicsinGovernment:LessonsfromPastProductivityBooms,”JournalofEconomicPerspectives,2004,

/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040707/attachment.pdf

21RogerW.FergusonJr.andWilliamL.Wascher,“DistinguishedLectureonEconomicsinGovernment:LessonsfromPastProductivityBooms,”JournalofEconomicPerspectives,2004,

/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040707/attachment.pdf

22LuisaR.Blanco,JiGu,andJamesE.Prieger.“TheImpactofResearchandDevelopmentonEconomicGrowthandProductivityintheU.S.States,”SouthernEconomicJournal,January2016,

/doi/abs/10.1002/soej.12107

23Yen-ChunChou,HowardHao-ChunChuang,andBenjaminB.M.Shao.“TheImpactsofInformationTechnologyonTotalFactorProductivity:ALookatExternalitiesandInnovations,”InternationalJournalofProductionEconomics,December2014,

/science/article/abs/pii/S0925527314002618

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itisworthnotingthatinthefirsthalfof2025alone,AI-relatedinvestmentincreasedGDPbyanannualizedrateof1.3percent,harkeningbacktothescaleofrailroadinvestmentduringtheIndustrialRevolution

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andseeminglyrulingoutthelowestfewestimates.Mid-rangeestimatesfortheeffectsofAIonGDPincludethosefromavarietyofcompaniessuchasOxfordEconomics(1.8to4percentincreaseafter8years),McKinsey(2.4to4.1percentincreaseinthelongrun)andGoldmanSachs(7percentincreaseafter10years).HighestimatesincludethosebyPricewaterhouseCoopers(8to15percentafter10years)andaBISAcademicWorkingPaperbyAldasoroetal.(20to45percentafter10yearsfortheirapproachesthatassumeallsectorsoftheeconomywillbeatleastsomewhatimpactedbyAI).Alonsoetal.haveawiderangeofestimates(4.7to19.5percent),reflectinguncertaintyoverwhetherAIwillsubstitutemoreforskilledorunskilledlabor(thelatterofwhichwouldyieldthedivergenceandthereforethehigh-endgrowthestimatefortheU.S.).Forcomparison,a2010ITIFstudyindicatedthattheITrevolutionboostedU.S.GDPbyabout14percent.

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TheseestimatesallassumethatAIcanpartiallybutnotcompletelysubstituteforhumanlabor:inthecasewhereAIcoulddoallhumantasks,capitalbecomesasubstituteforlaborandeconomicgrowthincreasesto45percentperyear(seeHanson,2001).

24Page5ofRuiM.Pereriaetal.,“RailroadsandEconomicGrowthintheAntebellumUnitedStates,”CollegeofWilliamandMaryDepartmentofEconomics,December2014,

/wp/cwm_wp153.pdf

25Notethatthis1.3percentvalueforAIistheimpactofAIinvestmentonthelevelofGDP,evenbeforeanyproductivitygainsfromthatinvestmentarereaped.CEAstaffcouldnotlocatethisexactstatisticforrailroadsduringtheIndustrialRevolution,butU.S.investmentinrailroadsroadsgrewfrom0.2percentofGDPin1830,to0.9percentin1839,toamaximumof2.6percentofGDPin1854(Pereriaetal.,2024).

26RobertD.Atkinsonetal.,“TheInternetEconomy25YearsAfter.Com,”TheInformationTechnologyandInnovationFoundation,March2010,

/2010-25-years.pdf

27ITIFindicates$2trillion.Thereportwaspublishedinearly2010.2009U.S.GDPwas$14.5trillion,see“GrossDomesticProduct,”FRED,December

23,2025,

/graph/?g=1Pw1E

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Table1:EstimatesofAIImpactsonGDPLevel

Study

ImpactonGDP

Level

TimeHorizon

Region

Acemoglu(2024)

28

0.9to1.6%

10Years

U.S.

PennWhartonBudgetModel(2025)

29

1.5%

10Years

U.S.

OxfordEconomics(2024)

30

1.8to4%

8Years

U.S.

McKinsey(2023)

31

2.4to4.1%

LongRun

Global

Alonsoetal.(2022)

32

4.7to19.5%

LongRun

U.S.

GoldmanSachs(2023)

33

7%

10Years

Global

PricewaterhouseCoopers(2025)

34

1to15%

10Years

Global

Aldasoroetal.(2024)

35

20to45%

10Years

U.S.

Hanson(2001)

36

≥45%

SeeNotes

Global

Notes:ExceptforHanson(2001),thesearetheimpactsofAIonGDPlevels,notGDPgrowthrates.

2.3InternationalEconomicGrowthPriortoAI

EvenbeforeAI,differentcountriesmaybeondifferentgrowthpaths,withtheUnitedStatesexhibitingacceleratinggrowthinpotentialGDPwhilegrowthinEuropeandChinaisslowing.

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ForEuropeversustheUnitedStates,thisislargelyduetostructuralfactorssuchasstrongerU.S.productivitygrowth(especiallyintech)andAmerica’sbetterbusinessenvironment.

38

ForChina,afterdecadesofrapidgrowth,growthisnowslowingtobemorelikethatofemergingmarkets.

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AI-ledgrowthmaybeespeciallyimportanttoChina,astheironce-rapidgrowthhasslowedinrecentyearstoalevelmuchmorecomparabletothatofotheremergingmarkets.SimilartoChina,AI-ledgrowthmaybeespeciallyimportantforEurope.AlthoughtheriseofChinaisoneoft-repeatedgeopoliticalstoryofthe21st

28DaronAcemoglu,“TheSimpleMacroeconomicsofAI,”NationalBureauofEconomicResearch,May2024,

/system/files/working_papers/w32487/w32487.pdf

29“TheProjectedImpactofGenerativeAIonFutureProductivityGrowth,”PennWharton,September8,2025,

/issues/2025/9/8/projected-impact-of-generative-ai-on-future-productivity-growth

30“HowGenAIwillchangetheworldeconomy,”OxfordEconomics,May8,2024,

/resource/how-genai-will-

change-the-world-economy/#:~:text=Generative%20AI%20has%20the%20potential,demand%2C%20adding%20to%20cost%20pressures

31“TheeconomicpotentialofgenerativeAI:Thenextproductivityfrontier,”McKinsey,June14,2023,

/capabilities/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/the-economic-potential-of-generative-ai-the-next-productivity-frontier

32CristianAlonsoetal.,“WilltheAIrevolutioncauseagreatdivergence?”,JournalofMonetaryEconomics,April2022,

/science/article/abs/pii/S0304393222000162

33“GenerativeAIcouldraiseglobalGDPby7%,”GoldmanSachs,April5,2023,

/insights/articles/generative-ai-

could-raise-global-gdp-by-7-percent

34“Valueinmotion,”PWC,April29,2025,

/bm/en/press-releases/value-in-motion.html

35IñakiAldasoroetal.,“TheImpactofartificialintelligenceonoutputandinflation,”BankforInternationalSettlements,April2024,

/publ/work1179.pdf

36RobinHanson,“EconomicGrowthGivenMachineIntelligence,”GeorgeMasonUniversity,2001,

/~rhanson/aigrow.pdf

37Pierre-OlivierGourinchas,“AsOneCycleEnds,AnotherBeginsAmidGrowingDivergence,”IMF,January17,2025,

/en/Blogs/Articles/2025/01/17/as-one-cycle-ends-another-begins-amid-growing-divergence

38Pierre-OlivierGourinchas,“AsOneCycleEnds,AnotherBeginsAmidGrowingDivergence,”IMF,January17,2025,

/en/Blogs/Articles/2025/01/17/as-one-cycle-ends-another-begins-amid-growing-divergence

39Pierre-OlivierGourinchas,“AsOneCycleEnds,AnotherBeginsAmidGrowingDivergence,”IMF,January17,2025,

/en/Blogs/Articles/2025/01/17/as-one-cycle-ends-another-begins-amid-growing-divergence

CouncilofEconomicAdvisers6

century,anotherlessdiscussed,althoughperhapsnolessimportantone,isthedeclineofEurope.TheEUhasfallenfrom27percentofworldGDPin1980tojust14percentin2025.

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Thisisnotjustbecauseofhighgrowthratesinemergingmarkets,butalsobecauseGermanyandmanyotherEUcountrieshaveagrowthratelowerthanotheradvancedeconomies.ThistrendcontinuesinAI,wheretheEUlagsbehindtheU.S.andChinaonvariousAImetrics.Forexample,cumulativeprivateAIinvestmentintheU.S.exceeded$470billionbetween2013and2024,comparedtoroughly$50billionacrossallEUcountriescombined.

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RecognizingthecriticalroleAIcanplayforfuturegrowth,theUnitedStatesandmanyofourallieshavebandedtogetherthrough“PaxSilica,”America’sinternationalpartnershiponAIsupplychains.

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PaxSilicamembersrangefrommajorupstreamsemiconductorequipmentmanufacturerslikeJapan,todownstreamdatacenterinvestorslikeQatar.

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Thisvariedgroupisunitedbyaforward-lookingviewofAIandtechnology.Thus,itisnotsurprisingthatPaxSilicamembersaregrowingmorethantwiceasfastthantheirpeers,witha2.5percentaveragerealGDPgrowthratebetweenthereleaseofChatGPTinQ42022andthelatestdatainQ32025,versus1.1percentonaverageforG7countries.

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2.4ImpactofAIonLaborandJevons’Paradox

CurrentevidencepresentsamixedpictureofAI’semploymenteffects.Brynjolfssonetal.(2025)showthatemploymentisfallingforearly-careerworkersinAI-exposedoccupationslikecomputercodingandcustomerservice.

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OtherstudieshavefoundnocorrelationbetweenAIexposureandcurrentunemploymentrates.

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Stillothershavefoundthat,whileemploymentfellinsectorswhereAIcandirectlysubstituteforhumanlabor,AIexposureactuallyincreasesemploymentinsectorsreliantonAI-capabletasks(JohnstonandMakridis,2025).

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NotwithstandingthecurrentimpactofAI,overallunemploymentiscurrentlyatarateofjust4.4percentinDecember2025.

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Intheshortrun,ifAIincreaseslabor’sefficiency,thatreducestheamountoflaborneededtocreateagivenamountofoutput,potentiallydecreasingemployment.Buthistoricalprecedentsuggeststhatefficiencygainscanoftenincrease(ratherthandecrease)totalutilizationofthatresource—aphenomenonknownasJevons’Paradox.

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Jevons’Paradoxoccursifatechnologicaladvancereducestheamountofaresource(likelabor)neededforaspecificapplication.Thisactuallycausesoverallusageofthatresourcetoincreaseasusageexpandstonewapplications.ForJevons’ParadoxtooccurandthusemploymenttoincreasewithAIadoption,threeconditionsmustbesatisfied:first,AImustmeaningfullyboostworkerproductivity;second,

40“GDPbasedonPPP,shareofworld,”IMF,2025,

/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/EU/CHN

41AlexHaag,“TheStateofAICompetitioninAdvancedEconomies,”FederalReserveSystem,October6,2025,

/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-state-of-ai-competition-in-advanced-economies-

20251006.html#:~:text=US%20private%20investment%20in%20AI,10

42“PaxSilica,”U.S.StateDepartment,2025,

/pax-silica

43“TheUnitedStatesWelcomesQatar’sSigningofPaxSilicaDeclaration,”U.S.StateDepartment,2025,

/releases/office-of-

the-spokesperson/2026/01/the-united-states-welcomes-qatars-signing-of-pax-silica-declaration

44TheUnitedArabEmiratesisincludedintheaverageforallquartersexceptthefinalquarter,asthatdatahasnotyetbeenreleased.

45ErikBrynjolfssonetal.,“CanariesintheCoalMine?SixFactsabouttheRecentEmploymentEffectsofArtificialIntelligence,”August26,2025,

/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Canaries_BrynjolfssonChandarChen.pdf

46MarthaGimbeletal.,“EvaluatingtheImpactofAIontheLaborMarket:CurrentStateofAffairs,”TheBudgetLab,October1,2025,

/research/evaluating-impact-ai-labor-market-current-state-affairs

47AndrewC.JohnstonandChristosMakridis,“TheLaborMarketEffectsofGenerativeAI:ADifference-in-DifferencesAnalysisofAIExposure,”SSRN,July31,2025,

/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5375017

48“EconomicNewsRelease,”U.S.BureauofLaborStatistics,November20,2025,

/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm

49BlakeAlcott,“Jevons'paradox,”EcologicalEconomics,July1,2005,

/science/article/abs/pii/S0921800905001084

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theresultingcostsavingsmusttranslatetolowerprices;and,third,thelowerpricesmustincreaseconsumerdemandfasterthanefficiencygainsreduceper-unitlaborneeds.

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Althoughthesemayseemlikestrongconditions,Jevons’Paradoxhasbeenobservedoccurringinmanydifferentfields.Jevonsfirstdescribedtheparadoxin1865whenincreasingefficiencyincoalinironenginesactuallyincreasedthedemandforcoal,iron,andotherresources.

51

Inagriculture,increasesinirrigationefficiencymayincreasewaterconsumption.

52

Improvementsinenergy-efficientlightinghaveincreasedboththenumberoflightbulbsdemandedandtheamountofelectricityusedinlighting.

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Jevons’Paradoxevenoccursintopicsseeminglyunrelatedtoproduction:increasesinroadcapacitywillincreasethenumbersofdriversontheroad.

545556

AndspecificallyforAIandjobs,asimilarsituationmaybeoccurringforradiologists,ajoboncepredictedtobereplacedbyAI,

57

butwhichisnowseeinghistoricallyhighemploymentrates.

58

Inthelongerterm,thekeyissueiscomparingandcontrastingAItopriordisruptivetechnologies.Historicalanalogiessuggestdisruptivetechnologies(steampower,electricity,computers,theinternet,etc.)ultimatelyleadtogreateremploymentandearnings.

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AIcouldbetheexceptionifthetechnologyeitherdevelopsagency(sothatitcanworkasindependentlyashumansdo)orifitdramaticallyincreasesworkerproductivitywithoutgeneratingnewlabordemand(Ayres,1990;Donaldson,2018;FeigenbaumandGross,2024).

606162

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Butthegeneralprecedentofpasttechnologicalchangesisthattheycreateavarietyofnewfields.In1860,43percentofU.S.employmentwasinagriculture,comparedto1.2percentin2015.

64

Inthattime,ahugerangeofnewprofessionshavebeencreated,manyreliantonthenewtechnology.Nowthemajorityof

50GregRosalsky,“WhytheAIworldissuddenlyobsessedwitha160-year-oldeconomicsparadox,”NPR,February4,2025,

/sections/planet-money/2025/02/04/g-s1-46018/ai-deepseek-economics-jevons-paradox

51BlakeAlcott,“Jevons'paradox,”EcologicalEconomics,July1,2005,

/science/article/abs/pii/S0921800905001084

52YanyunWangetal.,“TheverificationofJevons’paradoxofagriculturalWaterconservationinTianshanDistrictofChinabasedonWaterfootprint,”AgriculturalWaterManagement,September1,2020,

/10.1016/j.agwat.2020.106163

53DeborahDibal,“JevonsParadox:TheCaseofEnergy-EfficientLighting,”Medium,February22,2025.

/babson-

germany/jevons-paradox-the-case-of-energy-efficient-lighting-1d682483d7ab

54GillesDurantonandMatthewA.Turner,“TheFundamentalLawofRoadCongestion:EvidencefromUSCities,”AmericanEconomicReview,October6,2011,

/articles?id=10.1257/aer.101.6.2616

55KentHymel,“Ifyoubuildit,theywilldrive:Measuringinduceddemandforvehicletravelinurbanareas,”TransportPolicy,2019,

/a/eee/trapol/v76y2019icp57-66.html

56Wen-TaiHsuandHongliangZhang,"Thefundamentallawofhighwaycongestionrevisited:EvidencefromnationalexpresswaysinJapan,"JournalofUrbanEconomics,2014,

/a/eee/juecon/v81y2014icp65-76.