生成式人工智能与版权法 Generative Artificial Intelligence and Copyright Law

LegalSidebari

GenerativeArtificialIntelligenceandCopyrightLaw

UpdatedJune16,2025

Innovationsinartificialintelligence(AI)haveraisedseveralnewquestionsinthefieldof

copyrightlaw

.

GenerativeAI

programs—suchasOpenAI’s

DALL-E

and

ChatGPT

programs,StabilityAI’s

Stable

Diffusion

program,andMidjourney’s

self-titledprogram

—areabletogeneratenewimages,texts,and

othercontent(or“outputs”)inresponsetoauser’stextualorotherprompts.GenerativeAIprogramsaretrainedtocreatesuchoutputspartlybyexposingthemtolargequantitiesofexistingwritings,photos,

paintings,orotherworks.

ThisLegalSidebarexploresquestionsthatcourtsandtheU.S.CopyrightOfficehaveconfronted

regardingwhethergenerativeAIoutputsmaybecopyrighted,aswellaslegaldebatesaboutwhether

trainingandusinggenerativeAIprogramsmayinfringecopyrightsinotherworks.OtherLegalSidebarsexplorequestionsAIraisesintheintellectualpropertyfieldsof

patents

and

therightofpublicity

.

CopyrightinWorksCreatedwithGenerativeAI

DoCopyrightedWorksRequireaHumanAuthor?

ThequestionofwhethercopyrightprotectionmaybeaffordedtoAIoutputs—suchasimagescreatedbyMidjourneyortextscreatedbyChatGPT—hingeslargelyonthelegalconceptof“authorship.”ArticleI,Section8,Clause8oftheU.S.Constitution,oftenreferredtoastheIntellectualProperty(IP)Clause,

empowers

Congressto“secur[e]forlimitedTimestoAuthors...theexclusiveRighttotheir...

Writings.”Basedonthisauthority,the

CopyrightAct

affordscopyrightprotectionto“originalworksofauthorship.”WhiletheConstitutionandCopyrightActdonotexplicitlydefinewho(orwhat)maybean“author,”U.S.courtstodatehavenotrecognizedcopyrightinworksthatlackahumanauthor—includingworkscreatedautonomouslybyAIsystems.

BeforetheproliferationofgenerativeAI,U.S.courtsdidnotextendcopyrightprotectiontovarious

nonhumanauthors,holdingthat

amonkey

whotookphotosofhimselflackedstandingtosueunderthe

CopyrightAct;thathumanauthorshipwasrequiredtocopyrightabookpurportedlyinspiredby

celestial

beings;

andthata

livinggarden

couldnotbecopyrighted.TheU.S.CopyrightOfficehasalsolong

maintained

thatcopyrightedworksmustbe“createdbyahumanbeing”andtherefore

refused

toregister

CongressionalResearchService

LSB10922

CRSLegalSidebar

PreparedforMembersandCommitteesofCongress

CongressionalResearchService2

worksthatare“producedbyamachineormeremechanicalprocessthatoperatesrandomlyorautomaticallywithoutanycreativeinputorinterventionfromahumanauthor.”

Atleastonelawsuithas—unsuccessfully,thusfar—challengedthehuman-authorshiprequirementinthecontextofAI.InJune2022,StephenThaler

sued

theCopyrightOfficefordenyinghisapplicationto

registeravisualartworkthathe

claims

wasauthored“autonomously”byanAIprogram.Dr.Thaler

arguedthathumanauthorshipisnotrequiredbytheCopyrightAct.InAugust2023,aU.S.districtcourt

granted

summaryjudgmentinfavoroftheCopyrightOffice.Thecourtheldthat“humanauthorshipisanessentialpartofavalidcopyrightclaim,”reasoningthatonlyhumanauthorsneedcopyrightasan

incentivetocreateexpressiveworks.

InMarch2025,theU.S.CourtofAppealsfortheD.C.Circuit

affirmed

thedistrictcourt’sdecisionin

Thalerv.Perlmutter,

holding

thattheCopyrightAct“requiresalleligibleworktobeauthoredinthefirstinstancebyahumanbeing.”Thecourt

reasoned

thatseveralprovisionsoftheCopyrightActimplythatitusestheword“author”onlytorefertohumanbeings,includingprovisions(1)vestingcopyright

ownership

“initiallyintheauthor”;(2)limitingcopyright

duration

to70yearsafter“theauthor’sdeath”;(3)providingfor

inheritance

ofcertainrightsbytheauthor’s“widoworwidower”or“survivingchildrenorgrandchildren”;(4)requiringa

signature

totransfercopyrightownership;(5)extendingprotectionto

unpublishedworks

regardlessoftheauthor’s“nationalityordomicile”;and(6)defininga“

jointwork

”

basedontheauthors’“intention”tomergetheircontributionsinacertainway.Inaddition,thecourt

observed

thattheCopyrightOfficehadadoptedthehuman-authorshiprequirementyearsbeforeCongressenactedthecurrentCopyrightAct.Thecourtthus

inferred

thatCongressmeanttoadoptthehuman-

authorshiprequirementwhenitenactedthelaw.BasedonitsholdingthattheCopyrightActrequires

humanauthorship,thecourtfounditunnecessarytoevaluatetheCopyrightOffice’s

argument

thattheConstitution’sIPClauserequireshumanauthorshipforcopyrightedworks.OnMay12,2025,thecourt

denied

Dr.Thaler’spetitiontorehearthecaseenbanc(i.e.,byallofthecourt’sjudges).

MayHumansCopyrightWorksThatTheyCreateUsingAI?

Assumingthatcopyrightableworksrequireahumanauthor,workscreatedbyhumanswiththeassistanceofgenerativeAImightbeentitledtocopyrightprotectiondependingonthenatureofhumaninvolvementinthecreativeprocess.Asdiscussedbelow,theCopyrightOfficehassoughttodelineatewhatauthors

mustdotosatisfythehuman-authorshiprequirementwhenusinggenerativeAI.

InMarch2023,theCopyrightOfficereleased

CopyrightRegistrationGuidance

regarding“works

containingmaterialgeneratedby[AI]”(theAIGuidance).AllowingthathumanauthorsmayuseAIinthecreativeprocess,theAIGuidance

states

that“whatmattersistheextenttowhichthehumanhadcreativecontroloverthework’sexpression.”Thus,theAIGuidance

states

,whenAI“determinestheexpressive

elementsofitsoutput,thegeneratedmaterialisnottheproductofhumanauthorship.”Ontheotherhand,works

containing

AI-generatedmaterialmaybecopyrightedundersomecircumstances,suchas

“sufficientlycreative”humanarrangementsormodificationsofAI-generatedmaterialorworksthatcombineAI-generatedandhuman-authoredmaterial.TheAIGuidance

states

thatauthorsmayclaimcopyrightprotectiononly“fortheirowncontributions”tosuchworks,andtheymustidentifyand

disclaimAI-generatedpartsoftheworkswhenapplyingtoregistertheircopyright.

CongressionalResearchService3

Threecopyrightregistrationdenials

highlighted

bytheCopyrightOfficeillustratethat,ingeneral,the

officewillnotfindhumanauthorshipwhereanAIprogramgeneratesworksinresponsetouserprompts:

•

ZaryaoftheDawn:

AFebruary2023decisionthatAI-generatedillustrationsforagraphicnovelwerenotcopyrightable,althoughthehuman-authoredtextofthenovelandoverallselectionandarrangementoftheimagesandtextinthenovelcouldbecopyrighted.

•

ThéâtreD,opéraSpatial:

ASeptember2023decisionthatanartworkgeneratedbyAIandthenmodifiedbytheapplicantcouldnotbecopyrighted,sincetheapplicantfailedto

identifyanddisclaimtheAI-generatedportionsoftheworkasrequiredbytheAIGuidance.

•

SURYAST:

ADecember2023decisionthatanartworkgeneratedbyanAIsystem

combininga“baseimage”(anoriginalphototakenbytheapplicant)anda“styleimage”theapplicantselected(VincentvanGogh’sTheStarryNight)couldnotbecopyrighted,sincetheAIsystemwas“responsiblefordetermininghowtointerpolate[i.e.,combine]thebaseandstyleimages.”

WhiletheCopyrightOffice’sdecisionsindicatethatitmaynotbepossibletoobtaincopyrightprotectionformanyAI-generatedworks,theissueremainsunsettled.AnapplicantmayfilesuitinU.S.districtcourtto

challenge

theCopyrightOffice’sfinaldecisiontorefusetoregisteracopyright.TheputativeauthorofThéâtreD,opéraSpatial,forinstance,has

sued

theCopyrightOfficefordecliningtoregisterthatwork.

WhiletheCopyrightOffice

notes

thatcourtssometimesgiveweighttotheoffice’sexperienceandexpertise,courtsarenotboundtoadopttheoffice’sinterpretationsoftheCopyrightAct,suchasitsapplicationoftheauthorshiprequirementtoAI-assistedworks.

InJanuary2025,theCopyrightOfficepublishedthe

Copyrightability

partofitsCopyrightandArtificialIntelligencereport.SimilartotheAIGuidance’semphasison“creativecontrol,”thereport

concludes

that,“givencurrentgenerallyavailabletechnology,promptsalonedonotprovidesufficienthumancontrolto

makeusersofanAIsystemtheauthorsoftheoutput.”Thereport

contends

thattheCopyrightAct’s

distinctionbetweencopyrightable“works”andnoncopyrightable“

ideas

”precludescopyrightabilityforworksgeneratedbyAIinresponsetouserprompts.Asthereport

argues

,“[p]romptsessentiallyfunctionasinstructionsthatconveyunprotectibleideas”and“donotcontrolhowtheAIsystemprocessesthemingeneratingtheoutput.”

Somecommentators

assertthatcertainAI-generatedworksshouldreceivecopyrightprotection,

comparingAIprogramstoothertoolshumanauthorshaveusedtocreatecopyrightedworks.For

example,theU.S.SupremeCourtheldinthe1884case

Burrow-GilesLithographicCo.v.Sarony

that

photographscanbeentitledtocopyrightprotectionwherethephotographermakesdecisionsregarding

creativeelementssuchascomposition,arrangement,andlighting.Somecopyrightapplicants

argue

thatgenerativeAIprogramsmayfunctionastools,analogoustocameras.TheCopyrightOfficedisputesthe

photographyanalogy,arguingthatAIusersdonotexercisesufficientcontroltocharacterizegenerativeAIasatoolusedbyanauthor.Instead,theCopyrightOfficehas

compared

anAIuserto“aclientwhohiresanartist”andgivesthatartistonly“generaldirections.”Atleastoneapplicant’sattorneyhas

argued

thattheCopyrightActdoesnotrequiresuchexactingcreativecontrol,observingthatcertainphotographsandmodernartincorporateadegreeofhappenstance.

Regardingworksthatcontainacombinationofhuman-authoredandAI-generatedmaterial,theCopyrightOffice

reports

thatit“hasregisteredhundredsofworksthatincorporateAI-generatedmaterial,withtheregistrationcoveringthehumanauthor’scontributiontothework,”inthetimesinceitissuedtheAI

Guidance.Theoffice

contends

thatnewlegislationregarding“thecopyrightabilityofAI-generated

material”iscurrentlynotneeded,indicatingthatcourts“willprovidefurtherguidanceonthehuman

authorshiprequirementasitappliestospecificusesofAI”andthat,sinceeachworkmustbeanalyzedindividually,“greaterclaritywouldbedifficulttoachieve”throughlegislation.

CongressionalResearchService4

CopyrightInfringementbyGenerativeAIPrograms

DoestheAITrainingProcessInfringeCopyrightsinOtherWorks?

AIsystemsare

trained

tocreateliterary,visual,andotherartisticworksbyexposingthesesystemsto

largeamountsofdata,whichmayincludetext,images,andotherworksdownloadedfromtheinternetorotherwiseobtainedbyAIcompanies.Thistrainingprocessofteninvolvesmakingdigitalcopiesof

existingworks.AstheU.S.PatentandTrademarkOfficehas

described

,theprocess“willalmostby

definitioninvolvethereproductionofentireworksorsubstantialportionsthereof.”OpenAI,forexample,

acknowledged

thatitsprogramsaretrainedon“large,publiclyavailabledatasetsthatincludecopyrightedworks”andthatthisprocess“involvesfirstmakingcopiesofthedatatobeanalyzed”(althoughitnow

offersanoption

toremoveimagesfromtrainingfutureAImodels).

SomecopyrightownersandcommentatorshaveassertedthatcreatingdigitalcopiesofworkswithoutpermissiontotrainAIinfringestheowners’

exclusiveright

tomakereproductionsoftheirwork.

Copyrightownershavefiled

severaldozenlawsuits

againstAIcompaniesmakingsomeversionofthisclaim.

Incontrast,anumberofAIcompaniesandsomelegal

scholars

arguethatAItrainingprocessesconstitutefairuseandarethereforenoninfringing.Whetherornotcopyingconstitutesfairusedependson

four

nonexclusivefactors

thatCongresssetforthintheCopyrightAct:

1.thepurposeandcharacteroftheuse,includingwhethersuchuseisofacommercialnatureorisfornonprofiteducationalpurposes;

2.thenatureofthecopyrightedwork;

3.theamountandsubstantialityoftheportionusedinrelationtothecopyrightedworkasawhole;and

4.theeffectoftheuseuponthepotentialmarketfororvalueofthecopyrightedwork.

AstheSupremeCourthas

stated

,fairuseisa“flexible”doctrine,and“itsapplicationmaywellvary

dependinguponcontext.”Astothefirstfactor,theCourthas

held

thatsomeuseswitha“transformative”purpose(suchasparodies)maybefair,althoughin2023it

cautioned

thattransformativenessis“amatterofdegree.”TheCourthas

described

thefourthfactorasthe“mostimportant”one.

Regardingthefirstfactor,OpenAI

hasargued

itspurposeis“transformative”becausethetrainingprocesscreates“ausefulgenerativeAIsystem”thatdidnotpreviouslyexist.Forsupport,OpenAIcites

The

AuthorsGuild,Inc.v.Google,Inc.

,inwhichtheU.S.CourtofAppealsfortheSecondCircuitheldthat

Google’scopyingofentirebookstocreateasearchabledatabasethatdisplayedexcerptsofthosebooksconstitutedfairuse.Ontheotherhand,somestakeholdershaveobservedthatmanygenerativeAI

programshaveacommercialpurposeand

claim

thatusingcopyrightedworkstotrainAItocreatesimilarkindsofworksisnot“transformative.”

Regardingthefourthfair-usefactor,stakeholdersandcommentatorsdisputewhetherAIoutputsarelikelytocompetewithorharmthemarketforcopyrightedworksusedintheirtrainingdataand,ifso,what

kindsofcompetitionarerelevanttothefair-useanalysis.Some

argue

thatthefourthfactorweighsagainstfairusetotheextentthat“outputsthatmimicorareotherwisebasedontheingestedworksundermine

marketdemandforthoseworks.”Others

contend

thatcompetitionfromAIoutputsshouldweighagainstfairuseonlywherethoseoutputsreproduce“thecopyrightowner’soriginalexpression.”Insomecases,AIcompanieshavevoluntarilyadoptedmeasuresthatmayarguablymitigateconcernsaboutharmingthemarketforworksusedtotraintheAI.Forinstance,OpenAI

states

thatDALL-E3“isdesignedtodeclinerequeststhataskforanimageinthestyleofalivingartist.”

CongressionalResearchService5

InFebruary2025,aU.S.districtcourt

ruled

thatitwasnotfairuseforacompany(RossIntelligence)tocopycasesummariesfromWestlaw,alegalresearchplatform,totrainanAIprogramtoquotepassagesfromlegalopinionsinresponsetouserquestions.Thecourtconcludedthatthe

firstfactor

weighed

againstfairuse,sincethecopyinghadacommercialpurpose.Further,sinceRoss’sAIprogramand

Westlawhadthesamepurposeofassistinglegalresearch,thecourtfoundthatthecopyingwasnot

sufficiently“

transformative

”tosupportfairuse.Thecourtruledthatthe

fourthfactor

alsoweighed

againstfairuse,asRossmeanttocompetewithWestlawbycreatingasubstitutelegalresearchplatformwhilepotentiallyunderminingWestlaw’sabilitytolicenseitscasesummariestotrainAIsystems.The

courtconcludedthatthe

secondandthirdfactors

supportedfairuse—sincetheWestlawcasesummariesshowedonly“minimal”creativity(factor2)andRoss’sproductdidnotmakethosesummariesavailabletothepublic(factor3)—butthatthesefactorswereoutweighedbytheothers.Theimportanceofthis

decisiontoongoinglitigationregardinggenerativeAIprogramsisdebatable,sincefairuseisafact-specificanalysisand,asthecourt

observed

,theRossAItechnologywas“non-generativeAI.”

InMay2025,theCopyrightOfficereleasedaprepublicationversionofthe

GenerativeAITraining

partofitsCopyrightandArtificialIntelligencereport.Basedonitsanalysisofthefourfair-usefactors,thereportsection

concluded

that“itisnotpossibletoprejudgelitigationoutcomes,”anticipatingthat“someusesofcopyrightedworksforgenerativeAItrainingwillqualifyasfairuse,andsomewillnot.”

DoAIOutputsInfringeCopyrightsinOtherWorks?

SomeoutputsofAIprogramsmightinfringecopyrightsinotherworkstheyresemblethatwereusedto

traintheAI.Copyrightownersmaybeabletoestablishthatsuchoutputsinfringetheircopyrightsifthe

AIprogramboth(1)hadaccesstotheirworksand(2)created“

substantiallysimilar

”outputs.First,to

establishcopyrightinfringement,aplaintiffmustprovetheinfringer“

actuallycopied

”theunderlying

work.Thiselementissometimesprovencircumstantiallybyevidencethattheinfringer“

hadaccesstothe

work

.”ForAIoutputs,accessmightbeshownbyevidencethattheAIprogramwastrainedusingthe

underlyingwork.Suchevidencemightshow,forinstance,thatacopyoftheunderlyingworkwaslocatedonaninternetsitethatwasdownloadedor“scraped”totraintheAIprogram.

Second,aplaintiffmustprovethatthenewworkis“

substantiallysimilar

”totheunderlyingworkto

establishinfringement.Thesubstantialsimilaritytestisdifficulttodefine.Courtshavevariously

describedthetestasrequiring,forexample,thattheworkshave“asubstantiallysimilar

totalconceptand

feel

”or“

overalllookandfeel

”orthat“

theordinaryreasonablepersonwouldfailtodifferentiatebetween

thetwoworks

.”Leadingcaseshavealsostatedthatthisdeterminationconsidersboth“

thequalitativeand

quantitativesignificanceofthecopiedportioninrelationtotheplaintiff’sworkasawhole

.”ForAI-

generatedoutputs,nolessthanfortraditionalworks,the“substantialsimilarity”analysismayrequirecourtstomakethesekindsofcomparisonsbetweentheAIoutputandtheunderlyingwork.

OpenAI

hasargued

that“[w]ell-constructedAIsystemsgenerallydonotregenerate,inanynontrivialportion,unaltereddatafromanyparticularworkintheirtrainingcorpus.”Thus,

according

toOpenAI,copyright-infringingoutputswouldbe“anunlikelyaccidentaloutcome”ofsuchsystems.

Onestudy

found“asignificantamountofcopying”inlessthan2%oftheimagescreatedbyStableDiffusion,

thoughtheauthorsclaimedthattheirmethodology“likelyunderestimatesthetruerate”ofcopying.

TwokindsofAIoutputsmayraisespecialconcerns.First,someAIprogramsmaybeusedtocreateworksinvolvingexistingfictionalcharacters.Theseworksmayrunaheightenedriskofinfringement,since

characters

sometimesenjoycopyrightprotection

distinctfromthespecificworksinwhichtheyappear.

Second,someAIprogramsmaybepromptedtocreateworks“inthestyleof”aparticularartistorauthor,although—asnotedabove—someAIprogramsmaynowbedesignedto“

decline

”suchprompts.Theseoutputsarenotnecessarilyinfringing,ascopyrightlawgenerallyprotectsonlyagainstthecopyingof

specificworksratherthananartist’soverallstyle.Forexample,asonggeneratedbyAIinthestyleand

CongressionalResearchService6

simulatedvoiceofahumanperformer

mightnotinfringe

anycopyright,althoughvoicesimulationsmaypotentiallyviolatesome

stateright-of-publicitylaws

.Asaseparateissuefromwhethertheoutputitselfisinfringing,theCopyrightOffice

contends

thattheuseofAItocreateoutputsinthestyleofanauthor

couldpotentiallyweighagainstafair-usedefenseforcopyingtheauthor’sworktotraintheAI,assuchoutputsmayreducedemandfortheauthor’sworkvia“

marketdilution

.”Asnotedabove,somelegal

scholars

disagree

thatthecreationofnoninfringingoutputsshouldweighagainstfairusefortrainingAI.

IfagenerativeAIoutputinfringesacopyrightinanexistingwork,boththeAIuserandtheAIcompanycouldpotentiallybeliableundercurrentlaw.Forinstance,theusermightbedirectlyliableforpromptingtheAIprogramtogenerateaninfringingoutput.Itmaybechallengingtoanalyzetheuser’sliabilityin

somecases,sincetheusermightnothavedirectaccessto—orevenbeawareof—acopyrightedworkpurportedlyinfringedbyanAIoutput.TheAIcompanycouldalsopotentiallyfaceliabilityunderthedoctrineof“vicariousinfringement.”Vicariousinfringement

applies

todefendantswhohave“therightandabilitytosupervisetheinfringingactivity”and“adirectfinancialinterestinsuchactivities.”

ConsiderationsforCongress

CongressmayconsiderwhethertoaddressanyofthecopyrightlawquestionsraisedbygenerativeAI

programsthroughamendmentstotheCopyrightActorotherlegislation.Congressmay,forexample,

considerlegislationclarifyingwhetherAI-generatedworksarecopyrightableorunderwhatcircumstancestheprocessoftraininggenerativeAIprogramsmayconstitutefairuse.Giventhelimitedtimecourtshavehadtoaddresstheseissues,Congressmayalternativelyadoptawait-and-seeapproach.Asthecourts

decidecasesinvolvinggenerativeAI,theymaybeabletoprovidegreaterguidanceandpredictabilityinthisarea.Basedontheoutcomesofthesecases,Congressmayreassesswhetherlegislationisneeded.

CongressmayalsoconsiderthepracticalimplicationsofrequiringAIcompaniestoidentify,seek

permissionfrom,orcompensatecopyrightownersshouldcourtdecisionsorfuturelegislationdeterminethattraininggenerativeAIsystemsisnotafairuseofcopyrightedworks.Commentatorshavedebatedwhetheritisfeasibletorequirecompaniestoidentifyandpayownersofthelargenumberofworks

neededtotrainAIsystems,aswellaswhetherthevalueofsuchcompensationtoownerswouldbe

outweighedbytransactionoradministrationcosts.Onescholar,

acknowledging

that“[i]twould...beimpossibleforanAIdevelopertoidentifyandclearbillionsofrightsclaimsonanindividualbasis,”

arguesthatitmaybefeasibleinsteadtocreatemarketsforAItrainingdataviameanssuchascontent

aggregation(e.g.,TVstreamingservices),collectivemanagementorganizations(orCMOs,suchasthosethatmanagerightsto

musicalworks)

,compulsory