2025年全球财富报告强势推进（英文）-

Powering

AheadAllianzGlobalWealthReport202525September2025AllianzResearchContent5ExecutiveSummary18Financialassets:Poweringahead27Liabilities:Norecovery31Realestate:Bottomingout36Distribution:Noprogress38AppendicesAllianzResearch2Poweringahead2024sawanother

yearofsolidgrowthfortheglobaleconomy–

and

another

bumperyearforfinancialassetsofprivatehouseholds,whichroseby+8.7%,surpassingthestronggrowthofthepreviousyear(+8.0%).Bytheendof2024,totalfinancialassetshadreachedanewabsoluterecordofEUR269trn,though

at283%relativetoeconomicactivity,thisisonlyatthesamelevelasin2017asinflation

has“artificially”inflated

the

denominator.TheUSremainsontopAsmightbeexpected,thisenormouswealthisnotdistributedevenlyacrosstheworld.Infact,aroundhalfofallprivatefinancialassetsareconcentratedin

just

oneregion:North

America.Remarkably,

America‘ssharehashardlychangedin

thelast20years,despitetherapidriseofChina,whoseshareisnowaround15%–afivefoldincreasecomparedto2004.China‘srisehascomeattheexpenseofotherdevelopedregions:WesternEuropeandJapanhavelostsignificant

marketshareoverthelasttwodecades,withEuropedown9.1ppsandJapan

down5.9pps;Japan‘ssharehasthusmorethanhalved.GrowthmadeintheUSAOverthepast20years,thefinancialassetsof

Americanhouseholdshavegrown

inlinewiththeglobalaverage.Butin2024,theirgrowthwassignificantlyhigher.

ThisisinstarkcontrasttoWesternEuropeandJapan,wheregrowthlaggedtheglobalaveragebyover2ppsand

justunder4ppsperyear,respectively.Combinedwiththesheersizeof

Americanfinancialassets,thismeansthatin2024morethanhalf(53.6%)ofthegrowthinglobalfinancialassetswasgeneratedinNorth

America.Overthelasttwodecades,thisfigurestoodat48.5%.China,ontheotherhand,accountedfor19.8%,whileWesternEuropeaccountedfor14.1%.Whenitcomestofinancialwealth,theUScontinuestocall

theshots.SmartsaversOwningsecurities,particularlystocks,iskeyforassetgrowth.Inthisrespect,the

lasttwoyearshavebeenextremelygratifyingforsavers.Inboth2023(+11.5%)

and2024(+12.0%),securitiesgrewalmosttwiceasfastastheother

twoasset

classes:insurance/pensions(+6.7%and+6.9%,respectively)andbankdeposits

(+4.7%and+5.7%,respectively).However,theextenttowhichsaversbenefitfromrisingsecuritiespricesvarieswidelybetweencountriesandregionsdueto

differencesinportfoliostructures.Notably,itisprimarilyNorth

Americansavers

whoinvestinsecurities,accountingfor59.2%ofportfolios.InWesternEurope,forexample,thisfigurestandsat

just

34.9%.25

September2025ExecutiveSummaryMichaelaGrimmSeniorEconomist,Demography&SocialProtectionmichaela.grimm@allianArneHolzhausenHeadofInsurance,Wealth&ESGResearcharne.holzhausen@alPatriciaPelayo-RomeroSeniorEconomist,Insurance&ESGpatricia.pelayo-romero@allianz.comKathrinStoffelEconomist,Insurance&Wealthkathrin.stoffel@3HardsaversAmericansaversalsodemonstrateaclearpreferenceforsecuritieswheninvestingnewsavings.In2024,forinstance,theyaccountedfor67%offreshsavings,comparedto

just26%inWesternEurope.Thisconsistentfocusoninvestment

vehicleswithhighpotentialfor

valueappreciationhaspaidoff.While

financialassetsinNorth

Americagrewbyanaverageof+6.2%peryearoverthe

lasttenyears,WesternEuropeachievedanaveragegrowthrateof

just3.8%.However,savingseffortsarehigherinEurope:onaverageoverthelastdecade,

saversheremobilizedanadditional2.3%oftheirfinancialassetsinfreshsavings,

comparedto2.0%intheUS.

AcomparisonwithGermanyisinstructive:Germany

hasalsoachievedrelativelyhighfinancialassetgrowth(+5.9%peryear)overthe

lasttenyears,butinadifferentway:freshsavingsamountedto

3.7%of

existing

financialassetsperyear–almosttwicethefigurefor

theUS.

At

thesame

time,thecontributionofvalueincreaseswasonly32%–lessthanhalfthatoftheUS.Nomoredebt,pleaseAlthoughcentralbanksstartedtolowertheirkeyinterestratesagainin2024,thisdidnotresultinanincreaseindemandforloans.Infact,globalprivatedebt

growthslowedfurther,from+3.8%in2023to+3.1%.Overall,globalhousehold

debttotaledEUR59.6trnattheendof2024.Nearlyallregionsrecordedanemicdebtgrowthin2024,withChinabeingacaseinpoint:Whileprivateliabilitieshadgrownatanaveragerateofalmost+20%peryearovertheprevioustwo

decades,growthin2024was

just+3.4%.SurgingnetfinancialassetsRelativelystronggrowthinassetsandrelativelyweakgrowthindebtledtoasignificantincreaseinnetfinancialassets(financialassetsminusliabilities)in2024.

At+10.3%,thisexceededthestronggrowthofthepreviousyear(+9.4%)by

aconsiderablemargin.Overall,globalnetfinancialassetstotaledEUR210trnbytheendof2024.Thisrepresentsadoublingofassetsoverthepastdecade.Growthlast

yearwaswellabovethelong-termtrendinalmostallregions.EmergingdebtTheglobaldebtratio(liabilitiesasapercentageofGDP)was62.6%,whichisalmost8ppslowerthantwodecadesago.However,thisdoesnotapplytoallregions.DeleveragingwasprimarilypursuedbyhouseholdsinNorth

America(-15.9pps),Japan(-6.1pps)andWesternEurope(-2.5pps).Bycontrast,mostemergingmarketshaveexperiencedasignificantincreaseintheirdebtratiosoverthepasttwodecades.Chinaleadstheway,withitsratiorisingby43.4pps

toreach61.4%.

Aclearpatternisemerging:Inemergingeconomies,netfinancialassetshavegrownsignificantlymoreslowlythangrossfinancialassets,

implyingthatdebtinthesecountrieshasgrownfasterthanassetsonaverage.Inadvancedeconomies,however,theoppositeistrue:debtisgrowingmoreslowly

thanfinancialassets.AllianzResearch4Anotherweakyear

forrealestateIn2024,thevalueofrealestateassetsgrewatmorethantwicethe

speed

thaninthepreviousyear:+3.6%,comparedto+1.7%in2023.However,eventhisfigure

isratherweakinhistoricalterms;growthwasweakeronlyintheaftermathoftheglobalfinancialcrisisin2012.However,pricetrendsvariedfrommarkettomarket.WhilethereweresolidincreasesinNorth

America,pricesinWesternEuropehardlymoved;insomemarkets,suchasFranceandGermany,priceshavefallenacrosstheboard.Overall,thevalueofrealestateassetsinthecountriesweanalyzeamountedtoEUR158trn.PoorcountriesarenolongercatchingupForalongtime,internationalwealthdevelopmentwascharacterizedbyconvergence,withthegapbetweenpoorerandrichercountriesnarrowing.Thisisnolongerthecase,asseenintheratioofnetfinancialassetsbetweenadvanced

andemergingmarkets.Between2004and2014,thisfigurefellsharplyfrom67to24.Thismeansthat,onaverage,thenetfinancialassetsofrichercountrieswere“only”24timeshigherthanthoseofpoorercountriesin2014.However,in

thefollowingdecade,thedeclinewasonly6points,reachingacurrentvalueof

18.Mostofthisdeclineoccurredinthefirsttwoyears,

withtheratio

falling

to

20

by2016.Since2017convergencebetweenricherandpoorercountrieshasmore

orlesscometoastandstill.Noprogressin20yearsOverall,thedistributionofwealthappearslessunequalinthenationalcontextcomparedtotheglobalcontext.Theshareoftherichest10%is60.4%(unweightedaverage),ratherthan85.1%(globallevel).Thegapbetweenmedianandaveragewealthisalsosignificantlysmaller,withpercapitawealth

beingnot15timesbutonlyaroundthreetimeshigherthanmedianwealth(ratio3.08).However,thenationalsituationisevenmoreworryinginonerespect.Despiteinequalitybeingamajorpoliticalissueforyears,therehasbeennoprogresstowardsgreaterequality.In2004,therichest10%inthecountriesweanalyzehada59.9%shareofwealth,andtheaveragewealthwas

three

times

themedianwealth(ratio3.05).Thesefiguresarealmostexactlythesameaslast

year‘s.China‘s„wild“yearsareoverLookingatindividualcountries,however,changescanalreadybeseen,albeitinonlyafew.Infact,37countries(outof57)havearelativelystabledistribution

ofwealth;theconcentrationofwealthhaschangedbylessthan2pps.Onlyinsevencountrieshasthedistributionimproved,i.e.wealthconcentration,measuredastheshareofthetop10%,hasdeclined.Ontheotherhand,in13countrieswealthconcentrationhasincreasedsignificantly.Chinastandsoutinparticularasnowhereelsehasthewealthshareoftherichest10%risenmoresharply(+17.3pps).Thisisduetotheenormouseconomicandsocialchangesofthelast20years,whichhavenotonlycontributedtoahugeincreaseingeneral

wealth,butalsototheemergenceofagenuineupperclass.

At67.9%,theshare

oftherichest10%intotalwealthisnowwellabovetheglobalaverage.However,itseemsthatChina‘s„wild“yearsareoverastheconcentration

of

wealthhasremainedunchangedoverthelastfiveyears.25

September20255Asin2023,stockmarketsrecordedstronggains.Interest-

ratecutsbycentralbanksandtheongoingexcitementsurroundingartificialintelligence(AI)boostedprices.

At

theendoftheyear,DonaldTrump‘sre-electionasUSpresidentprovidedanadditionalboosttothemarkets.

Overall,USstocks(S&P500),forexample,roseby+23.3%,andevenGermanstocks(DAX)achieveda

+18.8%gaindespitetheeconomyshrinkingagain.Againstthisbackdrop,theglobalfinancialassetsofprivatehouseholdsalsorecordedsignificantgrowth,withanincreaseof+8.7%,exceedingthestronggrowth

ofthepreviousyear(8.0%).Bytheendof2024,totalfinancialassetshadreachedEUR269trn(Figure1).Whilethisisanewabsoluterecord,at283%relativeto

economicactivity,financialassetsareonlyatthesame

levelasin2017.Thisisbecausethesurgeininflationinrecent

yearshas“artificially”inflatedthedenominator.2024sawanother

yearofsolidgrowthfor

theglobaleconomy(+2.8%),despitegeopoliticalchallenges.The

USeconomyonceagaindemonstrateditsresilience,primarilyduetorobustprivateconsumption.Incontrast,EuropeandChinafacedstructuralchallengesthathinderedeconomicgrowth.Theprevioustoughinterest-

rateturnaroundalsosawsuccessin2024:inflationdeclinedinmostregionsandapproachedthetargetof

2.0%bytheendoftheyear.Thisenabledcentralbanks

toeaseinterestratesagain.TheEuropeanCentralBank

(ECB)andtheUSFederalReserve(Fed)bothlowered

theirrespectivekeyinterestratesby100bps.However,long-terminterestratesdidnotfollowsuitasconcernsaboutever-increasinggovernmentdebtgrew.

Yieldson

governmentbondsroseinbothEuropeandtheUS.Financialassets:PoweringaheadAllianzResearch6Sources:Eurostat,nationalcentralbanks,financialsupervisoryauthorities,financialassociationsandstatisticaloffices,IMF,LSEG,

AllianzResearch.¹TheNorth

AmericanregionislargelyidenticaltotheUS.Canada‘sshareintheregionislessthan6%(2024).WithoutCanada,theUSaloneac-

countsfor46.7%oftheglobalmarketshare.In2004,itwas49.3%.TheUSremainsontopAsmightbeexpected,thisenormouswealthisnotdistributedevenlyacrosstheworld.Infact,aroundhalfofallprivatefinancialassetsareconcentratedin

justone

region:North

America(Figure2)¹.Remarkably,

America‘s

sharehashardlychangedinthelast20years,despitetherapidriseofChina,whoseshareisnowaround15%–afivefoldincreasecomparedto2004.Infact,China‘s

risehascomeattheexpenseofotherdevelopedregions:WesternEuropeand

Japanhavelostsignificantmarketshareoverthelasttwodecades,withEuropedown9.1pps

andJapandown5.9pps;Japan‘ssharehasthusmorethan

halved.NorthAmericaWesternEurope

JapanChinaAsiaexJPN&CHNLatinAmericaAUS/NZEasternEurope6.53.811.1200427.3Sources:Eurostat,nationalcentralbanks,financialsupervisoryauthorities,financialassociationsandstatisticaloffices,IMF,LSEG,

AllianzResearch.20

2451.7

49.5Figure2:Rich

AmericansGrossfinancialassets,regionalsplit2004and2024,in2024EUR,in%Figure1:PoweringaheadGrossfinancialassets,in2024EURtrnandannualchangein%in2024trnEUR

y/y,in%(rhs)300250200150100500151050-5-1014.65.325

September202518.27Thefactthatfinancialassetsin

theUSaregrowingfasterthantheglobalaverageisarelativelyrecentphenomenon(exceptfor2022,aparticularlychallengingyear).Inpreviousyears,especiallyaftertheglobalfinancialcrisis,theUSalsolaggedsignificantlybehind.

Theturningpointcanbedatedfairlypreciselyto2017,thefirstyearofPresidentTrump‘sterm,

when

tradeconflictsbetweentheUSandChinabecameopenlyapparent,effectivelymarkingtheendofuninterruptedglobalizationandtheever-increasingintegrationofemergingeconomiesintotheglobaldivisionoflabor.Sincethen,theirgrowthadvantageoveradvancedeconomieshasshrunksignificantly.By2024,itisexpectedtoriseagainto4pps;however,thiscompareswithanaveragegrowthgapof

justunder14ppsinthedecadepriorto2017(Figure4).Examiningthedevelopmentoffinancialassetsrevealsthat,inanincreasinglyfragmentedglobaleconomy,theprocessofconvergencebetweenricherandpoorercountriesis

stalling.Thisbroadstabilityinthe

Americansharemeansthatthefinancialassetsof

Americanhouseholdshavegrown

inlinewiththeglobalaverageoverthepast20

years.In2024,however,theirgrowthwassignificantlyhigher.

ThisisinstarkcontrasttoWesternEuropeandJapan,wheregrowthlaggedtheglobalaveragebyover2pps

peryearinEuropeand

justunder4ppsperyearinJapan(Figure3).Whenadjustedforinflationandpopulation

growth,asimilarpictureemerges(seebox:“Theimpact

ofinflation”).Combinedwiththesheersizeof

American

financialassets,thismeansthat,forexamplein2024,morethanhalf(53.6%)ofthegrowthinglobalfinancial

assetswasgeneratedinNorth

America.Overthelast

twodecades,thisfigurestoodat48.5%.China,

on

the

otherhand,accountedforonly19.8%,whileWesternEuropeaccountedfor14.1%.Whenitcomestofinancial

wealth,theUScontinuestocallthe

shots.

CAGR2005-20242024*Compoundannualgrowthrate,in2024EUR.Sources:Eurostat,nationalcentralbanks,financialsupervisoryauthorities,financialassociationsandstatisticaloffices,IMF,LSEG,

AllianzResearch.JapanWesternEurope

LatinAmerica

AUS/NZL

WORLDNorthAmericaAsiaexJPN&CHNChinaEasternEurope4.04.67.5

7.26.15.811.38.48.79.4Figure3:Dynamic

AmericansGrossfinancialassets,CAGR*2005-2024andgrowth2024/2023,in%9.09.812.2

11.115.015.0AllianzResearch2.23.98397,570370,160252,110245,920197,900193,280191,160189,540184,530165,510141,510119,200118,370112,720112,550112,240106,640100,96099,92088,58078,96069,24065,14055,29044,910istherichestEurozonecountrybutonlyateighthplaceintheranking,downfromthirdplacein2004.

AwordaboutGermany,whichhasmovedupfrom17thto15th

placethisyear,thankstoan

extensive

datarevision

thatledtoasignificantlyhigher

valuationofunlistedequity

interests.ThismakesitoneofthefewEurozonecountries

–alongsidetheBalticstatesandMalta–thathavebeenabletoimprovetheirrankinginrecentyears.

AndChina?

Itnowranks31st,upnineplacesfrom2004.Americansupremacyisalsoreflectedinpercapitafinancialassets,atleastwhenlookingataverages:infact,onlytheSwissarericherthan

Americans.

Allother

countriesfollowataconsiderabledistance(Figure5).

Whilethetoptwospotshaveremainedunchangedforyears,therehasbeensomemovementamongthetop

ten.Twodecadesago,Taiwan,Swedenand

Australia

werenotyetpartofthisillustriouscircle,whichincluded

Belgium,theUK,andJapaninstead.TheNetherlandsSwitzerlandUnitedStates

Denmark

Singapore

Taiwan

Canada

Sweden

Netherlands

AustraliaNewZealand

Belgium

NorwayUnited

Kingdom

Japan

Germany

IrelandFrance

Italy

Austria

MaltaFinland

South

KoreaSpain

PortugalCzech

RepublicSources:Eurostat,nationalcentralbanks,financialsupervisoryauthorities,financialassociationsandstatisticaloffices,IMF,LSEG,

AllianzResearch..Sources:Eurostat,nationalcentralbanks,financialsupervisoryauthorities,financialassociationsandstatisticaloffices,IMF,LSEG,

AllianzResearch.Figure4:Thenewrealityofde-globalizationGrossfinancialassetsin2024EUR,annualchangein%Figure5:The

top25Grossfinancialassetspercapita,in2024EUR302520151050-5-10-15AdvancedEconomiesEmergingMarkets25

September20259TheimpactofinflationDoestheextraordinarygrowthin

Americanfinancialassetsholdupundercloserscrutinywhenadjustedforpopulation

growthandinflation?Figure6providestheanswer.Onapercapitabasis,theannualgrowthrateis0.8ppslowerglobally.Thisdeclineaffectsallregionsexcept

Japan,wherepercapitagrowthisslightlyhigherduetothefallingpopulation.

Adjustingforinflationhasadisproportionatelygreaterimpact.Globally,growththenfallsbymorethanhalf,

toaroundone-thirdinEasternEuropeandLatin

America.Onlytwomarketsstandoutinthisregard:

JapanandChina.Althoughrealgrowthislowerheretoo,thediscrepancyisnotverylarge.Infact,realpercapitawealthin

JapanhasgrownslightlyfasterthaninWesternEuropeoverthelast20years.China‘sleadovertherestoftheworldissubstantialinrealterms,withagrowthadvantageofalmost10ppsperyear.Infact,thepurchasingpowerofaveragepercapita

financialassetshasincreasedalmosttenfoldinChinain

just20years.ThecountriesclosesttoachievingthislevelofprosperityareBulgaria,whererealpercapitafinancialassetshaveincreasedbyafactorofeight,aswellasRomania

andIndia,wheretherehasbeenafivefoldincrease.

AndwhatabouttheUS?Here,thepurchasingpoweroffinancial

assetshas‚only‘increasedbyafactorof1.6overthelasttwodecades.However,thisfigureissignificantlyhigherthan

thoseforWesternEurope(1.3)andJapan(1.4)andisroughlyinlinewithglobaltrends.Therefore,evenafteradjustingforpopulationgrowthandinflation,

Americanfinancialassetsarekeepingpacewithglobaldevelopments.Figure6:InflationhalveswealthGrossfinancialassetspercapita,nominalandrealCAGR*2005-2024,in%*Compoundannualgrowthrate,in2024EUR.Sources:Eurostat,nationalcentralbanks,financialsupervisoryauthorities,financialassociationsandstatisticaloffices,IMF,LSEG,

AllianzResearch.However,inflationonlybecametrulypainfulintheaftermathofthepandemic,reachingdouble-digitratesinsomeparts

ofEurope.Thecontinenthasnotyetrecoveredfromthis;in2024,realfinancialassetsinWesternEuropeareexpectedto

be2.4%belowtheir2019level.Theglobaltrendisslightlymorefavorable,withrealgrowthof16%recordedoverthelast

fiveyears.However,realfinancialassetsremainbelowtheir2021level(Figure7).Therearesignificantregionaldifferences.

Asia(excluding

JapanandChina)experiencedstrongrealgrowthoverthepastfiveyearsduetorelativelylowinflationrates.Realfinancialassetsattheendof2024willbe29%higherthanin2019.China‘sgrowthisevenmoreimpressive,at56%.GrowthinJapan(9%)andNorth

America(14%)wasmoremodest.

UnlikeWesternEurope,however,theseregionsalsoachievedrealgainsinprosperity.Infact,WesternEuropeistheonlyregionthatcanlookbackonfivelostyears.2.25.05.35.93.67.83.810.43.910.912.0JapanWesternEurope

NorthAmerica

WorldAUS/NZLAsiaexJPN&CHNLatinAmerica

EasternEurope

China3.6

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real

nominal14.53.1101.61.4Asiaex

JPN&CHNJapanChinaLatinAmericaEasternEuropeWesternEuropeNorthAmericaAUS/NZLGlobalFigure7:LongCovidGrossfinancialassets,nominalvs.realdevelopment(indexed,2019=100)andaveragecpi(2020-2024,in%)Sources:Eurostat,nationalcentralbanks,financialsupervisoryauthorities,financialassociationsandstatisticaloffices,IMF,LSEG,

AllianzResearch.

Nominal(lhs)Real(lhs)Averagecpi,(rhs)190170150130110901412108642020192020202120222023202420192020202120222023202420192020202120222023202420192020202120222023202420192020202120222023202420192020202120222023202420192020202120222023202420192020202120222023202420192020202120222023202411SmartsaversWhatexplainsthesignificant

variationintheperformanceoffinancialassets?Thebestwaytoanswer

thisquestionistobreakdowntheincreaseinassetsinto

itstwocomponents:savingsandpriceincreases.First,let‘sconsiderthelatter.Itisprimarilysecurities,especiallystocks,thatleadtoincreasesinportfoliovalue.Inthisrespect,thelasttwoyearshavebeenextremelygratifyingforsavers,withthecontinued

stock

marketboombringingstronggains.Thisisreflectedinthesignificantlydifferentgrowthratesofthe

threemainassetclasses:bankdeposits,securities(including

investmentfunds)andinsurance/pensions(Figure8).Inboth2023(+11.5%)and2024(+12.0%),securitiesgrew

almosttwiceasfastastheother

twoasset

classes:insurance/pensions(+6.7%and+6.9%,respectively)

andbankdeposits(+4.7%and+5.7%,respectively).Thisgrowthadvantagealsopersistsinthelongterm,thoughitislesspronouncedasstockmarketsdonotonly

experiencegoodyears.Nevertheless,overthelast20years,securitieshaveachievedanaveragegrowthrateof+6.9%,whichissignificantlyhigherthanthegrowth

rateoftotalfinancialassets(+6.1%).

DepositsSecuritiesInsurance&pensionsSources:Eurostat,nationalcentralbanks,financialsupervisoryauthorities,financialassociationsandstatisticaloffices,IMF,LSEG,

AllianzResearch.Figure8:SecuritiessetthepaceGrossfinancialassetsin2024EUR,annualchangein%20151050-5-10-15-20-25AllianzResearch1228.612.522.89.731.832.326.625.823.233.022.148.335.534.945.359.245.145.754.551.927.422.147.630.421.011.726.7Asiaex

JPN&CHNChinaJapanAUS/NZLEasternEuropeWesternEuropeLatinAmericaNorthAmericaWorldHowever,tobenefitfrompositivedevelopmentsinthestockmarket,saversmustfirstincludethesesecuritiesintheirportfolios.Securitiesare,infact,byfarthemostimportantassetclass.

Attheendof2024,theyaccountedfor45.1%ofglobalfinancialassets.

Thisisa

newrecord.Despitesomesetbacksonthestockmarkets,theimportanceofstocks,investmentfundsandothersecuritieshasrisensteadilyoverthelasttwodecades:overall,theirshareofportfoliosincreasedbyalmost7pps

comparedto2004.Conversely,theshareofinsurance/pensionsdeclinedbyalmost7ppsto25.8%overthesameperiod–alsoanew“record”.Finally,bankdeposits

increasedtheirshareslightlyto26.7%(Figure9).Theseglobalfiguresmasklargedifferencesbetweencountriesandregions,andthustheextenttowhich

savers

benefitfromrisingsecuritiesprices.Notably,itisprimarily

North

Americansaverswhoareinvestinginsecurities,withaportfolioshareof59.2%.Thiswasnotalwaysthe

case;aftertheglobalfinancialcrisis,this

figure

fellbelow

46%.SecuritiesalsoplayadisproportionatelylargeroleinSouth

America,althoughthesearemorelikelytobeothertypesofequitythanlistedshares.In

Asia,ontheotherhand,securitiesgenerallyplayonlyaminorrole,

likelydueinlargeparttotheunderdevelopedstateoffinancialmarketsintheregion.Thisexplainstheimportanceofbankdepositsintheregion(asinEastern

Europe).However,thisargumentcertainlydoesnotapplyto

Australia,wheremanysaversareindirectlyinvolvedincapitalmarketsthroughpensionproducts(so-calledsuperannuations).WesternEurope,ontheotherhand,ischaracterizedbyabalancedportfoliostructure,withsecuritiessignificantlylessimportantthaninNorth

America.Thesedifferentportfoliostructuresdemonstratethewide

variationinsavingsbehavioraroundtheworld.Theyalsoexplain

why,incontrasttotheir

JapaneseandEuropeancounterparts,NorthAmericansavershavesucceededinincreasingtheirfinancialassetsinlinewithglobaldevelopmentsinrecentyears.Thisiseventhoughthealready

veryhigh

levelwouldactuallysuggestweakergrowth,ascanalsobeobservedinotherdevelopedregions.

DepositsSecuritiesInsurance&pensionsOthersSources:Eurostat,nationalcentralbanks,financialsupervisoryauthorities,financialassociationsandstatisticaloffices,IMF,LSEG,

AllianzResearch.Figure9:HugedifferencesinportfoliostructuresGrossfinancialassets,byassetclassin2024EUR,in%oftotalgrossfinancialassets25

September202513Hardsavers²In2024,savingsincreasedsharplybyalmost35%,reachingatotalofEUR4.2trn(Figure10).