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Comm

hp

itsi:e/s/wse.vaaruhelist

30March2026|10:48PMEDT

PRECIOUSANALYST

StillConstructiveGoldAmidsttheIranSell-Off

n

n

Goldhasdeclinedby15%to~$4,580sincetheonsetoftheMiddleEastconfiict.Aswediscussed

lastmonth,

theriseincalloptiondemandtorecordlevels

observedearlierthisyearimpliedthatevenmildequitymarketcorrectionscouldgeneratelarger_than_usualdrawdownsingoldprices.Weviewedthelower

boundofsuchapotentialmoveataround$4,700/toz.Thenatureoftheshock—anenergysupplydisruptionwithupsideriskstoinfiation—hasledmarketsto

repricetheFedpathtowardnoratecutsthisyear.UndersuchahypotheticalfiatFedratepath,ourestimateoftoday’sfairvaluewouldbearound$4,550/toz,

assumingthatpre_Januarymacropolicyhedges—whichweviewasrelativelysticky—remaininplace.

Wecontinuetoforecastgoldpricesreaching$5,400/tozbyend_2026,ascentralbankdiversificationcontinues,currentlylowspeculativepositioningnormalizes,andtheFeddeliversthe50bpofcutsoureconomistsexpect.Ourbasecase

assumesnofurtherprivatesectorliquidationofgoldnoranyadditionalprivatesectordiversificationingold(beyondthemodestboostfromFedcuts).While

riskstothisforecastaretwo_sided,theyareskewedtothedownsideinthenearterm,asgoldremainsvulnerabletofurtherliquidationshouldHormuz

disruptionspersistandequitiescorrectfurther(despitemuchofthegold

positioningandcalloptionoverhanghavingbeencleared).Overthemediumterm,risksareskewedtotheupsideiftheIranepisode—togetherwithbroadergeopoliticaldevelopments(e.g.,Greenland,Venezuela)—weretoaccelerate

diversificationintogoldandtoweighonperceptionsofWesternfiscalsustainability.

LinaThomas

+1(212)902-8376|

lina.thomas@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

DaanStruyven

+1(212)357-4172|

daan.struyven@

GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC

Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegACcertificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto

/research/hedge.html

.

GoldmanSachs

htt.

rse:c/iwAnalyst

WeMaintainOurConstructiveBaseCaseofGoldReaching$5,400byDec26

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

30March20262

GoldmanSachs

htt.

rse:c/iwAnalyst

30March20263

StillConstructiveGoldAmidsttheIranSell-Off

Gold’sSellOffAmidsttheIranWar

Q1.Whyhasgolddeclined~15%to~$4,580sincetheonsetoftheMiddleEastconfiict?

Aswediscussed

lastmonth,

therapidriseincalloptiondemandtorecordlevels

observedearlierthisyeardrovegoldpricestoovershootourforecastandimpliedthatevenmildequitymarketcorrections(viamargincall-relatedliquidations)couldgeneratelarger_than_usualdrawdownsingoldprices(Exhibit1).Weviewedthelowerboundofsuchapotentialmoveataround$4,700/toz.

Exhibit1:TheRapidRiseinCallOptionDemandtoRecordLevelsObservedEarlierthisYearDroveGoldPricesto

OvershootOurForecastandImpliedthatEvenMildEquityMarketCorrectionsCouldGenerateLarger_than_UsualGoldPriceDrawdowns

Source:Bloomberg,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Thenatureoftheshock—anenergysupplydisruptionwithupsideriskstoinfiation—hasledmarketstorepricetheFedpathtowardnoratecutsthisyear.Undersucha

hypotheticalfiatFedratepath,ourestimateoftoday’sfairvaluewouldbearound$4,550/toz,assumingthatpre_Januarymacropolicyhedges—whichweviewasrelativelysticky—remaininplace.

Q2.Shouldgoldnotbeahedgeforthisconfiict?Hasgold’sroleasaninfiationhedgeorsafe_havenassetchanged?

No,inourview.Someinvestorsviewgoldasastagfiationhedge—anassetthatalwaysperformswhenbothequitiesandbondssello仟.However,wehavelong

argued

thatgoldonitsownisnotasufficientstagfiationhedgeinportfolios.Thereasonisthattherearetwodistinctstagfiationaryregimesinwhichequity-bondportfoliostendtoperform

poorly,andgoldbehavesdi仟erentlyacrossthem(Exhibit2;Exhibit3).

Thefirstregimeisoneofgrowingmarketconcernsaboutinstitutionalcredibility.

Whenmarketsdoubtthecentralbank’swillingnessorabilitytocontaininfiation,

infiationmayrunhigh,andbothbondsandequitiessello仟.The1970saretheclassic

30March20264

case:USfiscalexpansionandFedsubordinationletinfiationrunoutofcontrol,andgoldsurgedasinvestorssoughtvalueoutsidethesystem.

Thesecondiswhensupplydisruptionsdrivebothweakergrowthandhigherprices,asin2022whenRussia,thensupplying

~40%

ofEurope’sgas,cutfiows,andcommodities—asthedisruptedinput—wereamongthefewassetswithpositiverealreturns.Likein2022,goldtypicallyunderperformsinitiallyinsupplydisruptionepisodes.Supply_driveninfiationraisestheriskoftightermonetarypolicy,higheryieldsincreasetheopportunitycostofholdinggoldandweighonETFdemand,andequitymarketdrawdownstrigger

margin_relatedliquidations.Whileoureconomistsandstrategistsarguethatmarket

pricingofrateshasovershot,refiectinganover_emphasisontheinfiationchannel

relativetothegrowthdrag,theresultinghawkishrepricingoftheFedpathneverthelessledgoldtofollowthetypicalsupply_disruptionsequenceattheonsetoftheMiddleEastconfiict.

Exhibit2:Equity-BondPortfoliosCanDeliverNegativeRealReturnsWhenHitbyInfiation

ShocksontheSupplySide(AgainstWhichCommoditiesOftenHedge)orontheInstitutionalCredibilitySide(AgainstWhichGoldOftenHedges)

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

30March20265

Exhibit3:DuringAny12-MonthPeriodWhenBothStocksandBondsHadNegativeRealReturns,EitherCommoditiesorGoldDeliveredPositiveRealReturns

MonthlydataofUSbonds,USequities,andgoldfrom1970.CommoditiesarerepresentedbytheEnhancedBCOMTotal

ReturnIndex.Priorto1991,weusetheBCOMTotalReturnIndex,andpriorto1984,weproxycommoditiesusingoil(availablefrom1974),givenitsdominantweightinthecommoditycomplex.Orangeshading:goldprovidedahedgewithpositivereal

returns.Grayshading:commoditiesprovidedahedgewithpositiverealreturns.

Source:Bloomberg,HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Q3.TherehavebeenreportsthatsomecentralbankshavesoldsignificantamountofreservessincetheonsetoftheMiddleEastconfiict.Hasthisdriventhesello仟andwillsellingfromothercentralbanksfollow?

Turkey’scentralbankreportsitmayhavemadegoldsalesandswapsamountingto

around52tonnes(Exhibit4).Our

pricingframework

,whichestimatesanearly2%priceincreaseforeach100oftonnesofextrademandfromthethreekeybuyergroups

(includingcentralbanks)inmonthlydata,thereforesuggeststhatthesecentralbankgoldsaleshavenotbeenadominantdirectdriverofthesello仟.

1

1Tobeclear,inilliquidmarkets,smallamountsofsalescanstillhavemeaningfulpricee仟ects,atleasttemporarily.

30March20266

Exhibit4:TurkishCentralBankDataShowaDeclineinGoldReserves

Source:CentralBankoftheRepublicofTurkiye,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

WeareskepticalaboutconcernsthatGulfcountriesmightalsosellgoldgoingforward.Gulfcountriesholdsignificantlylowergoldsharesintheirreserves.Goldaccountsfor

roughly4%ofreservesintheUAE,10%inSaudiArabia,5%inOman,andaround30%inQatar,comparedtomorethan60%ofTurkey’sFXreserves,anunusuallyhighshareforanEMeconomy(Exhibit5).Gulfeconomiestypicallyoperatedollarpegs,implyingthatFXinterventionismorelikelytooccurthroughUSTreasuryliquidationratherthangoldsales.TheGulf’sreservestructurereducesthelikelihoodthatGulfcentralbankswouldneedtoliquidategoldforFXmanagementpurposes.

Exhibit5:Turkey’sGoldShareinFXReservesIsSignificantlyHigherThaninGulfCountries

Source:IFS,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

ReiteratingOurConstructiveOutlook

Q4.Youmaintainyourconstructivebasecaseofgoldreaching$5,400byend-2026.Why?

30March20267

Overthemediumterm,ourconstructiveviewongoldremainsintact,supportedbythreefactors(Exhibit7).

First,wethinkthatgoldnowlooksoversoldasspeculativepositioningislowandas

marketsarepricingasignificantlymorehawkishpolicyshockthanhistoricalexperiencewouldsuggest,accordingtoour

marketstrategists.

Historically,negativeoilsupply

shockstendtobeassociatedwithslightlyhigherpolicyratesinthefirst1-3months,

followedbylowerrates6-9monthsoutasgrowthconcernsdominate.Asaresult,net

speculativepositioningonComexhasdeclinedtothe39thpercentile(Exhibit6),andthecalloptionoverhangthatbuiltupsinceJanuaryhasbeenunwound(Exhibit1).A

normalizationinspeculativepositioningalonewouldbewortharound$195/toz.

Exhibit6:NetSpeculativePositioningHasFallentoAroundthe39thPercentile

Source:CFTC,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Second,ourUSeconomistscontinuetoexpecttwoFedcutsin2026,whichweestimatewouldaddaround$120/toztogoldprices.

Third,centralbankdemandremainsakeymediumtermsupport.Inourbasecaseofnoadditionalprivatesectordiversification,weexpectpricevolatilitytomoderate,allowingcentralbankbuyingtore_accelerateandaveragearound60tonnespermonth(vs.a

12_monthmovingaverageof52tonnes).Underthisscenario,centralbankdemandwouldaddroughly$535/toztogoldprices.

30March20268

Exhibit7:WeMaintainOurConstructiveBaseCaseofGoldReaching$5,400byDec26

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

AWiderRangeforGoldPrices,StillNetUpsideRisk

Q5.Doyouseeanyfurtherpotentialdownsiderisktogoldprices?

Whilepositioninghaslargelybeencleansedandtherapidbuild_upincalloption

demandsinceJanuaryhasbeenunwound,thegoldmarketnowlookscleaner,whichwouldtypicallyargueforamoreattractiveentrypoint.

Thatsaid,tacticaldownsiderisksremain.IfadisruptionintheStraitofHormuzweretopersistlongerthanourenergyteam

expects

andtriggerasharperequitymarket

correction,goldcouldfacerenewedsellingpressure.Insuchascenario,investorswho

hadboughtgoldasastagfiationhedge—andweredisappointedbyitsperformanceinthisepisode,despitegoldnottypicallyhedgingsupply_drivenstagfiation—couldchoosetofullyunwindanyremaining“macropolicyhedges”(lightbluediamondonrightpanelofExhibit8).Goldcouldovershoottothedownside,potentiallyfallingaslowas

$3,800/toz.

2

Weviewthisoutcomeasunlikely,butitdefinesthelowerboundofliquidationrisk.

Undersuchaseverelyadverseoutcome,ourUSeconomistswould

expect

noFedcutsthisyear,ratherthanhikes,ashigherenergypriceswouldlikelyweighongrowthandemployment.Thatsaid,bondmarketsdidpricehikeslastweek,andthismayhappenagain,andweighagainongoldprices.

Theunwindingofcalloptiondemandandtheabsenceofadditionalprivatesectordiversificationwouldlikelyreducegoldpricevolatility,allowingcentralbanksto

re-acceleratetheirpurchases.Asustaineddeclineincentralbankdemandevenas

volatilitynormalizeswouldsignalaregimeinwhichcentralbanksnolongerseestrategic

2Our$3,800/tozestimaterefiectsthemodel_impliedlevelbasedonobservablefiows—COMEXnet

managed_moneypositioning,ETFdemand,andcentralbankpurchases—andthereforeexcludespositive

residualsfromcalloptiondemandandotheruntrackedprivatesectordiversificationchannels,suchasphysicalgoldbuying.

30March20269

valueinholdinggold—similartothehyper_globalizationperiodofthe1990s,when

geopoliticalandfinancialriskswereperceivedtobelowandcentralbanksbecamenetsellers.Wemonitorthisriskthroughourcentralbankgolddemandnowcast,particularlywhetherdemandweakensasvolatilitydeclines(ascentralbankstypicallystepback

duringperiodsofelevatedvolatilityandre_enteronceconditionsstabilize).Wedonotbelieverecenteventsreducethelikelihoodofcontinuedcentralbankdemand.If

anything,demand—particularlyfromemergingmarketcentralbanksthatremain

structurallyunderweightgold—shouldremainresilientoncevolatilitynormalizes,asamorepolarizedgeopoliticalenvironmentandlesspredictablepolicylikelyraises

incentivestohedgebothfinancialandgeopoliticalrisks.

Exhibit8:InaSeverelyAdverseScenarioofNoFedCutsandaFullUnwindof“MacroPolicyHedges”SinceApril2025,

LowerPrivateSectorBuyingWouldReducePriceVolatility,AllowingCentralBankDemandtoRe_accelerateandLeavingGoldat~$4,335/tozbyDec26

Source:Bloomberg,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

30March202610

Exhibit9:CentralBanksTypicallyStepBackDuringPeriodsofElevatedPriceVolatility—DrivenByPrivateSectorDiversification—andRe_enterOnceConditionsStabilize

OurcentralbanknowcastforJanuarywas12tonnes(witha10tonnescontributionfromChina)amidaspikeingoldpricevolatility.

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Q6.Whilerecenteventshavehighlightedsomedownsiderisk,youcontinuetoseesignificantupsidetotheforecastof$5,400/tozbyDec26.Whyandhowdorecenteventsa仟ecttheupsidetogoldprices?

Upsideriskstoourforecastremainsignificant.IftheIranepisode—togetherwith

broadergeopoliticaldevelopments(e.g.,Greenland,Venezuela)—weretoaccelerate

privatesectordiversificationawayfromtraditionalWesternassets,andiftheMiddle

EastconfiictweretoweighonperceptionsofWesternfiscalsustainability(e.g.viaan

upgradeofthemarket’sperceptionoflong-termdefensespendinglevels),theupsidetogoldcouldbesubstantial.Arebuildingofmacropolicyhedgestowardpre_sell_o仟levels(reddiamondonrightpanelofExhibit10)wouldaddaround$750/toz,liftingpricestoroughly$5,700/toz.Acontinuationofthepriorbuild_uptrend(lightbluediamondon

rightpanelofExhibit10)wouldaddafurther~$425/toz,liftingpricestoward$6,100/toz.

Privatesectordiversificationwouldlikelyreintroducetheelevatedvolatilityobservedin

recentmonths,whichcouldtemporarilysoftencentralbankdemandto30tonnes/monthonaverage.

However,long-termupsiderisksextendbeyondthesescenarios.Goldallocationsin

Westernprivateportfoliosremainverylow(ETFgoldholdingsaccountforaround0.2%ofprivatesectorportfoliosintheUS).Our

estimates

suggestthateach1bpincreaseinUSprivatesectorportfolioallocationtogoldraisespricesbyroughly1.5%,underscoringthenon-linearityofupsiderisks.

30March202611

Exhibit10:WeContinuetoSeeSignificantUpsidetoOur$5,400/tozForecastbyDec26

Source:Bloomberg,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

GoldmanSachs

htt.

rse:c/iwAnalyst

30March202612

DisclosureAppendix

RegAC

We,LinaThomasandDaanStruyven,herebycertifythatalloftheviewsexpressedinthisreportaccuratelyrefiectourpersonalviews,whichhavenotbeeninfiuencedbyconsiderationsofthefirm’sbusinessorclientrelationships.

Unlessotherwisestated,theindividualslistedonthecoverpageofthisreportareanalystsinGoldmanSachs’GlobalInvestmentResearchdivision.ContributingAuthors:LinaThomasGoldmanSachs&Co.LLC,DaanStruyvenGoldmanSachs&Co.LLC.

Unlessotherwisestated,theindividualslistedintheContributingAuthorsdisclosureofthisreportareanalystsinGoldmanSachs’GlobalInvestmentResearchdivision.

Disclosures

Regulatorydisclosures

DisclosuresrequiredbyUnitedStateslawsandregulations

Seecompany-specificregulatorydisclosuresaboveforanyofthefollowingdisclosuresrequiredastocompaniesreferredtointhisreport:managerorco-managerinapendingtransaction;1%orotherownership;compensationforcertainservices;typesofclientrelationships;managed/co-managedpublico仟eringsinpriorperiods;directorships;forequitysecurities,marketmakingand/orspecialistrole.GoldmanSachstradesormaytradeasa

principalindebtsecurities(orinrelatedderivatives)ofissuersdiscussedinthisreport.

Thefollowingareadditionalrequireddisclosures:Ownershipandmaterialconfiictsofinterest:GoldmanSachspolicyprohibitsitsanalysts,

professionalsreportingtoanalystsandmembersoftheirhouseholdsfromowningsecuritiesofanycompanyintheanalyst’sareaofcoverage.Analystcompensation:AnalystsarepaidinpartbasedontheprofitabilityofGoldmanSachs,whichincludesinvestmentbankingrevenues.Analystasofficer

ordirector:GoldmanSachspolicygenerallyprohibitsitsanalysts,personsreportingtoanalystsormembersoftheirhouseholdsfromservingasanofficer,directororadvisorofanycompanyintheanalyst’sareaofcoverage.Non-U.S.Analysts:Non-U.S.analystsmaynotbeassociatedpersonsofGoldmanSachs&Co.LLCandthereforemaynotbesubjecttoFINRARule2241orFINRARule2242restrictionsoncommunicationswithasubject

company,publicappearancesandtradinginsecuritiescoveredbytheanalysts.

AdditionaldisclosuresrequiredunderthelawsandregulationsofjurisdictionsotherthantheUnitedStates

Thefollowingdisclosuresarethoserequiredbythejurisdictionindicated,excepttotheextentalreadymadeabovepursuanttoUnitedStateslawsandregulations.Australia:GoldmanSachsAustraliaPtyLtdanditsaffiliatesarenotauthoriseddeposit-takinginstitutions(asthattermisdefinedinthe

BankingAct1959(Cth))inAustraliaanddonotprovidebankingservices,norcarryonabankingbusiness,inAustralia.Thisresearch,andanyaccesstoit,isintendedonlyfor“wholesaleclients”withinthemeaningoftheAustralianCorporationsAct,unlessotherwiseagreedbyGoldmanSachs.In

producingresearchreports,membersofGlobalInvestmentResearchofGoldmanSachsAustraliamayattendsitevisitsandothermeetingshostedby

thecompaniesandotherentitieswhicharethesubjectofitsresearchreports.InsomeinstancesthecostsofsuchsitevisitsormeetingsmaybemetinpartorinwholebytheissuersconcernedifGoldmanSachsAustraliaconsidersitisappropriateandreasonableinthespecificcircumstancesrelatingtothesitevisitormeeting.Totheextentthatthecontentsofthisdocumentcontainsanyfinancialproductadvice,itisgeneraladviceonlyandhasbeenpreparedbyGoldmanSachswithouttakingintoaccountaclient’sobjectives,financialsituationorneeds.Aclientshould,beforeactingonanysuch

advice,considertheappropriatenessoftheadvicehavingregardtotheclient’sownobjectives,financialsituationandneeds.Acopyofcertain

GoldmanSachsAustraliaandNewZealanddisclosureofinterestsandacopyofGoldmanSachs’AustralianSell-SideResearchIndependencePolicy

Statementareavailableat:

/disclosures/australia-new-zealand/index.html

.Brazil:DisclosureinformationinrelationtoCVMResolutionn.20isavailableat

/worldwide/brazil/area/gir/index.html

.Whereapplicable,theBrazil-registeredanalyst

primarilyresponsibleforthecontentofthisresearchreport,asdefinedinArticle20ofCVMResolutionn.20,isthefirstauthornamedatthebeginningofthisreport,unlessindicatedotherwiseattheendofthetext.Canada:Thisinformationisbeingprovidedtoyouforinformationpurposesonlyandisnot,andundernocircumstancesshouldbeconstruedas,anadvertisement,o仟eringorsolicitationbyGoldmanSachs&Co.LLCforpurchasersof

securitiesinCanadatotradeinanyCanadiansecurity.GoldmanSachs&Co.LLCisnotregisteredasadealerinanyjurisdictioninCanadaunder

applicableCanadiansecuritieslawsandgenerallyisnotpermittedtotradeinCanadiansecuritiesandmaybeprohibitedfromsellingcertainsecuritiesandproductsincertainjurisdictionsinCanada.IfyouwishtotradeinanyCanadiansecuritiesorotherproductsinCanadapleasecontactGoldman

SachsCanadaInc.,anaffiliateofTheGoldmanSachsGroupInc.,oranotherregisteredCanadiandealer.HongKong:Furtherinformationonthe

securitiesofcoveredcompaniesreferredtointhisresearchmaybeobtainedonrequestfromGoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.India:Furtherinformation

onthesubjectcompanyorcompaniesreferredtointhisresearchmaybeobtainedfromGoldmanSachs(India)SecuritiesPrivateLimited,Research

Analyst-SEBIRegistrationNumberINH000001493,10thFloor,Ascent-Worli,SudamKaluAhireMarg,Worli,Mumbai-400025,India,Corporate

IdentityNumberU74140MH2006FTC160634,Phone+912266169000,Fax+912266169001.GoldmanSachsmaybeneficiallyown1%ormoreof

thesecurities(assuchtermisdefinedinclause2(h)theIndianSecuritiesContracts(Regulation)Act,1956)ofthesubjectcompanyorcompanies

referredtointhisresearchreport.Investmentinsecuritiesmarketaresubjecttomarketrisks.Readalltherelateddocumentscarefullybeforeinvesting.RegistrationgrantedbySEBIandcertificationfromNISMinnowayguaranteeperformanceoftheintermediaryorprovideanyassuranceofreturnstoinvestors.GoldmanSachs(India)SecuritiesPrivateLimitedcomplianceofficerandinvestorgrievancecontactdetailscanbefoundat:

/worldwide/india/documents/Grievance-Redressal-and-Escalation-Matrix.pdf

,andacopyoftheannualaudit

compliancereportcanbefoundatthislink:

/content/site/india-annual-compliance-report.html

.Japan:Seebelow.Korea:

Thisresearch,andanyaccesstoit,isintendedonlyfor“professionalinvestors”withinthemeaningoftheFinancialServicesandCapitalMarketsAct,

unlessotherwiseagreedbyGoldmanSachs.Furtherinformationonthesubjectcompanyorcompaniesreferredtointhisresearchmaybeobtained

fromGoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.,SeoulBranch.NewZealand:GoldmanSachsNewZealandLimitedanditsaffiliatesareneither“registeredbanks”nor“deposittakers”(asdefinedintheReserveBankofNewZealandAct1989)inNewZealand.Thisresearch,andanyaccesstoit,isintendedfor

“wholesaleclients”(asdefinedintheFinancialAdvisersAct2008)unlessotherwiseagreedbyGoldmanSachs.AcopyofcertainGoldmanSachs

AustraliaandNewZealanddisclosureofinterestsisavailableat:

/disclosures/australia-new-zealand/index.html

.

Russia:ResearchreportsdistributedintheRussianFederationarenotadvertisingasdefinedintheRussianlegislation,butareinformationandanalysisnothavingproductpromotionastheirmainpurposeanddonotprovideappraisalwithinthemeaningoftheRussianlegislationonappraisalactivity.

ResearchreportsdonotconstituteapersonalizedinvestmentrecommendationasdefinedinRussianlawsandregulations,arenotaddressedtoa

specificclient,andarepreparedwithoutanalyzingthefinancialcircumstances,investmentprofilesorriskprofilesofclients.GoldmanSachsassumesnoresponsibilityforanyinvestmentdecisionsthatmaybetakenbyaclientoranyotherpersonbasedonthisresearchreport.Singapore:GoldmanSachs(Singapore)Pte.(CompanyNumber:198602165W),whichisregulatedbytheMonetaryAuthorityofSingapore,acceptslegalresponsibilityforthis

research,andshouldbecontactedwithrespecttoanymattersarisingfrom,orinconnectionwith,thisresearch.Taiwan:Thismaterialisforreferenceonlyandmustnotbereprintedwithoutpermission.Investorsshouldcarefullyconsidertheirowninvestmentrisk.Investmentresultsarethe

responsibilityoftheindividualinvestor.UnitedKingdom:PersonswhowouldbecategorizedasretailclientsintheUnitedKingdom,assuchtermisdefinedintherulesoftheFinancialConductAuthority,shouldreadthisresearchinconjunctionwithpriorGoldmanSachsresearchonthecovered

GoldmanSachs

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