版权说明:本文档由用户提供并上传,收益归属内容提供方,若内容存在侵权,请进行举报或认领
文档简介
Comm
hp
itsi:e/s/wse.vaaruhelist
30March2026|10:48PMEDT
PRECIOUSANALYST
StillConstructiveGoldAmidsttheIranSell-Off
n
n
Goldhasdeclinedby15%to~$4,580sincetheonsetoftheMiddleEastconfiict.Aswediscussed
lastmonth,
theriseincalloptiondemandtorecordlevels
observedearlierthisyearimpliedthatevenmildequitymarketcorrectionscouldgeneratelarger_than_usualdrawdownsingoldprices.Weviewedthelower
boundofsuchapotentialmoveataround$4,700/toz.Thenatureoftheshock—anenergysupplydisruptionwithupsideriskstoinfiation—hasledmarketsto
repricetheFedpathtowardnoratecutsthisyear.UndersuchahypotheticalfiatFedratepath,ourestimateoftoday’sfairvaluewouldbearound$4,550/toz,
assumingthatpre_Januarymacropolicyhedges—whichweviewasrelativelysticky—remaininplace.
Wecontinuetoforecastgoldpricesreaching$5,400/tozbyend_2026,ascentralbankdiversificationcontinues,currentlylowspeculativepositioningnormalizes,andtheFeddeliversthe50bpofcutsoureconomistsexpect.Ourbasecase
assumesnofurtherprivatesectorliquidationofgoldnoranyadditionalprivatesectordiversificationingold(beyondthemodestboostfromFedcuts).While
riskstothisforecastaretwo_sided,theyareskewedtothedownsideinthenearterm,asgoldremainsvulnerabletofurtherliquidationshouldHormuz
disruptionspersistandequitiescorrectfurther(despitemuchofthegold
positioningandcalloptionoverhanghavingbeencleared).Overthemediumterm,risksareskewedtotheupsideiftheIranepisode—togetherwithbroadergeopoliticaldevelopments(e.g.,Greenland,Venezuela)—weretoaccelerate
diversificationintogoldandtoweighonperceptionsofWesternfiscalsustainability.
LinaThomas
+1(212)902-8376|
lina.thomas@
GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC
DaanStruyven
+1(212)357-4172|
daan.struyven@
GoldmanSachs&Co.LLC
Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegACcertificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto
/research/hedge.html
.
GoldmanSachs
htt.
rse:c/iwAnalyst
WeMaintainOurConstructiveBaseCaseofGoldReaching$5,400byDec26
Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
30March20262
GoldmanSachs
htt.
rse:c/iwAnalyst
30March20263
StillConstructiveGoldAmidsttheIranSell-Off
Gold’sSellOffAmidsttheIranWar
Q1.Whyhasgolddeclined~15%to~$4,580sincetheonsetoftheMiddleEastconfiict?
Aswediscussed
lastmonth,
therapidriseincalloptiondemandtorecordlevels
observedearlierthisyeardrovegoldpricestoovershootourforecastandimpliedthatevenmildequitymarketcorrections(viamargincall-relatedliquidations)couldgeneratelarger_than_usualdrawdownsingoldprices(Exhibit1).Weviewedthelowerboundofsuchapotentialmoveataround$4,700/toz.
Exhibit1:TheRapidRiseinCallOptionDemandtoRecordLevelsObservedEarlierthisYearDroveGoldPricesto
OvershootOurForecastandImpliedthatEvenMildEquityMarketCorrectionsCouldGenerateLarger_than_UsualGoldPriceDrawdowns
Source:Bloomberg,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
Thenatureoftheshock—anenergysupplydisruptionwithupsideriskstoinfiation—hasledmarketstorepricetheFedpathtowardnoratecutsthisyear.Undersucha
hypotheticalfiatFedratepath,ourestimateoftoday’sfairvaluewouldbearound$4,550/toz,assumingthatpre_Januarymacropolicyhedges—whichweviewasrelativelysticky—remaininplace.
Q2.Shouldgoldnotbeahedgeforthisconfiict?Hasgold’sroleasaninfiationhedgeorsafe_havenassetchanged?
No,inourview.Someinvestorsviewgoldasastagfiationhedge—anassetthatalwaysperformswhenbothequitiesandbondssello仟.However,wehavelong
argued
thatgoldonitsownisnotasufficientstagfiationhedgeinportfolios.Thereasonisthattherearetwodistinctstagfiationaryregimesinwhichequity-bondportfoliostendtoperform
poorly,andgoldbehavesdi仟erentlyacrossthem(Exhibit2;Exhibit3).
Thefirstregimeisoneofgrowingmarketconcernsaboutinstitutionalcredibility.
Whenmarketsdoubtthecentralbank’swillingnessorabilitytocontaininfiation,
infiationmayrunhigh,andbothbondsandequitiessello仟.The1970saretheclassic
30March20264
case:USfiscalexpansionandFedsubordinationletinfiationrunoutofcontrol,andgoldsurgedasinvestorssoughtvalueoutsidethesystem.
Thesecondiswhensupplydisruptionsdrivebothweakergrowthandhigherprices,asin2022whenRussia,thensupplying
~40%
ofEurope’sgas,cutfiows,andcommodities—asthedisruptedinput—wereamongthefewassetswithpositiverealreturns.Likein2022,goldtypicallyunderperformsinitiallyinsupplydisruptionepisodes.Supply_driveninfiationraisestheriskoftightermonetarypolicy,higheryieldsincreasetheopportunitycostofholdinggoldandweighonETFdemand,andequitymarketdrawdownstrigger
margin_relatedliquidations.Whileoureconomistsandstrategistsarguethatmarket
pricingofrateshasovershot,refiectinganover_emphasisontheinfiationchannel
relativetothegrowthdrag,theresultinghawkishrepricingoftheFedpathneverthelessledgoldtofollowthetypicalsupply_disruptionsequenceattheonsetoftheMiddleEastconfiict.
Exhibit2:Equity-BondPortfoliosCanDeliverNegativeRealReturnsWhenHitbyInfiation
ShocksontheSupplySide(AgainstWhichCommoditiesOftenHedge)orontheInstitutionalCredibilitySide(AgainstWhichGoldOftenHedges)
Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
30March20265
Exhibit3:DuringAny12-MonthPeriodWhenBothStocksandBondsHadNegativeRealReturns,EitherCommoditiesorGoldDeliveredPositiveRealReturns
MonthlydataofUSbonds,USequities,andgoldfrom1970.CommoditiesarerepresentedbytheEnhancedBCOMTotal
ReturnIndex.Priorto1991,weusetheBCOMTotalReturnIndex,andpriorto1984,weproxycommoditiesusingoil(availablefrom1974),givenitsdominantweightinthecommoditycomplex.Orangeshading:goldprovidedahedgewithpositivereal
returns.Grayshading:commoditiesprovidedahedgewithpositiverealreturns.
Source:Bloomberg,HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
Q3.TherehavebeenreportsthatsomecentralbankshavesoldsignificantamountofreservessincetheonsetoftheMiddleEastconfiict.Hasthisdriventhesello仟andwillsellingfromothercentralbanksfollow?
Turkey’scentralbankreportsitmayhavemadegoldsalesandswapsamountingto
around52tonnes(Exhibit4).Our
pricingframework
,whichestimatesanearly2%priceincreaseforeach100oftonnesofextrademandfromthethreekeybuyergroups
(includingcentralbanks)inmonthlydata,thereforesuggeststhatthesecentralbankgoldsaleshavenotbeenadominantdirectdriverofthesello仟.
1
1Tobeclear,inilliquidmarkets,smallamountsofsalescanstillhavemeaningfulpricee仟ects,atleasttemporarily.
30March20266
Exhibit4:TurkishCentralBankDataShowaDeclineinGoldReserves
Source:CentralBankoftheRepublicofTurkiye,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
WeareskepticalaboutconcernsthatGulfcountriesmightalsosellgoldgoingforward.Gulfcountriesholdsignificantlylowergoldsharesintheirreserves.Goldaccountsfor
roughly4%ofreservesintheUAE,10%inSaudiArabia,5%inOman,andaround30%inQatar,comparedtomorethan60%ofTurkey’sFXreserves,anunusuallyhighshareforanEMeconomy(Exhibit5).Gulfeconomiestypicallyoperatedollarpegs,implyingthatFXinterventionismorelikelytooccurthroughUSTreasuryliquidationratherthangoldsales.TheGulf’sreservestructurereducesthelikelihoodthatGulfcentralbankswouldneedtoliquidategoldforFXmanagementpurposes.
Exhibit5:Turkey’sGoldShareinFXReservesIsSignificantlyHigherThaninGulfCountries
Source:IFS,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
ReiteratingOurConstructiveOutlook
Q4.Youmaintainyourconstructivebasecaseofgoldreaching$5,400byend-2026.Why?
30March20267
Overthemediumterm,ourconstructiveviewongoldremainsintact,supportedbythreefactors(Exhibit7).
First,wethinkthatgoldnowlooksoversoldasspeculativepositioningislowandas
marketsarepricingasignificantlymorehawkishpolicyshockthanhistoricalexperiencewouldsuggest,accordingtoour
marketstrategists.
Historically,negativeoilsupply
shockstendtobeassociatedwithslightlyhigherpolicyratesinthefirst1-3months,
followedbylowerrates6-9monthsoutasgrowthconcernsdominate.Asaresult,net
speculativepositioningonComexhasdeclinedtothe39thpercentile(Exhibit6),andthecalloptionoverhangthatbuiltupsinceJanuaryhasbeenunwound(Exhibit1).A
normalizationinspeculativepositioningalonewouldbewortharound$195/toz.
Exhibit6:NetSpeculativePositioningHasFallentoAroundthe39thPercentile
Source:CFTC,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
Second,ourUSeconomistscontinuetoexpecttwoFedcutsin2026,whichweestimatewouldaddaround$120/toztogoldprices.
Third,centralbankdemandremainsakeymediumtermsupport.Inourbasecaseofnoadditionalprivatesectordiversification,weexpectpricevolatilitytomoderate,allowingcentralbankbuyingtore_accelerateandaveragearound60tonnespermonth(vs.a
12_monthmovingaverageof52tonnes).Underthisscenario,centralbankdemandwouldaddroughly$535/toztogoldprices.
30March20268
Exhibit7:WeMaintainOurConstructiveBaseCaseofGoldReaching$5,400byDec26
Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
AWiderRangeforGoldPrices,StillNetUpsideRisk
Q5.Doyouseeanyfurtherpotentialdownsiderisktogoldprices?
Whilepositioninghaslargelybeencleansedandtherapidbuild_upincalloption
demandsinceJanuaryhasbeenunwound,thegoldmarketnowlookscleaner,whichwouldtypicallyargueforamoreattractiveentrypoint.
Thatsaid,tacticaldownsiderisksremain.IfadisruptionintheStraitofHormuzweretopersistlongerthanourenergyteam
expects
andtriggerasharperequitymarket
correction,goldcouldfacerenewedsellingpressure.Insuchascenario,investorswho
hadboughtgoldasastagfiationhedge—andweredisappointedbyitsperformanceinthisepisode,despitegoldnottypicallyhedgingsupply_drivenstagfiation—couldchoosetofullyunwindanyremaining“macropolicyhedges”(lightbluediamondonrightpanelofExhibit8).Goldcouldovershoottothedownside,potentiallyfallingaslowas
$3,800/toz.
2
Weviewthisoutcomeasunlikely,butitdefinesthelowerboundofliquidationrisk.
Undersuchaseverelyadverseoutcome,ourUSeconomistswould
expect
noFedcutsthisyear,ratherthanhikes,ashigherenergypriceswouldlikelyweighongrowthandemployment.Thatsaid,bondmarketsdidpricehikeslastweek,andthismayhappenagain,andweighagainongoldprices.
Theunwindingofcalloptiondemandandtheabsenceofadditionalprivatesectordiversificationwouldlikelyreducegoldpricevolatility,allowingcentralbanksto
re-acceleratetheirpurchases.Asustaineddeclineincentralbankdemandevenas
volatilitynormalizeswouldsignalaregimeinwhichcentralbanksnolongerseestrategic
2Our$3,800/tozestimaterefiectsthemodel_impliedlevelbasedonobservablefiows—COMEXnet
managed_moneypositioning,ETFdemand,andcentralbankpurchases—andthereforeexcludespositive
residualsfromcalloptiondemandandotheruntrackedprivatesectordiversificationchannels,suchasphysicalgoldbuying.
30March20269
valueinholdinggold—similartothehyper_globalizationperiodofthe1990s,when
geopoliticalandfinancialriskswereperceivedtobelowandcentralbanksbecamenetsellers.Wemonitorthisriskthroughourcentralbankgolddemandnowcast,particularlywhetherdemandweakensasvolatilitydeclines(ascentralbankstypicallystepback
duringperiodsofelevatedvolatilityandre_enteronceconditionsstabilize).Wedonotbelieverecenteventsreducethelikelihoodofcontinuedcentralbankdemand.If
anything,demand—particularlyfromemergingmarketcentralbanksthatremain
structurallyunderweightgold—shouldremainresilientoncevolatilitynormalizes,asamorepolarizedgeopoliticalenvironmentandlesspredictablepolicylikelyraises
incentivestohedgebothfinancialandgeopoliticalrisks.
Exhibit8:InaSeverelyAdverseScenarioofNoFedCutsandaFullUnwindof“MacroPolicyHedges”SinceApril2025,
LowerPrivateSectorBuyingWouldReducePriceVolatility,AllowingCentralBankDemandtoRe_accelerateandLeavingGoldat~$4,335/tozbyDec26
Source:Bloomberg,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
30March202610
Exhibit9:CentralBanksTypicallyStepBackDuringPeriodsofElevatedPriceVolatility—DrivenByPrivateSectorDiversification—andRe_enterOnceConditionsStabilize
OurcentralbanknowcastforJanuarywas12tonnes(witha10tonnescontributionfromChina)amidaspikeingoldpricevolatility.
Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
Q6.Whilerecenteventshavehighlightedsomedownsiderisk,youcontinuetoseesignificantupsidetotheforecastof$5,400/tozbyDec26.Whyandhowdorecenteventsa仟ecttheupsidetogoldprices?
Upsideriskstoourforecastremainsignificant.IftheIranepisode—togetherwith
broadergeopoliticaldevelopments(e.g.,Greenland,Venezuela)—weretoaccelerate
privatesectordiversificationawayfromtraditionalWesternassets,andiftheMiddle
EastconfiictweretoweighonperceptionsofWesternfiscalsustainability(e.g.viaan
upgradeofthemarket’sperceptionoflong-termdefensespendinglevels),theupsidetogoldcouldbesubstantial.Arebuildingofmacropolicyhedgestowardpre_sell_o仟levels(reddiamondonrightpanelofExhibit10)wouldaddaround$750/toz,liftingpricestoroughly$5,700/toz.Acontinuationofthepriorbuild_uptrend(lightbluediamondon
rightpanelofExhibit10)wouldaddafurther~$425/toz,liftingpricestoward$6,100/toz.
Privatesectordiversificationwouldlikelyreintroducetheelevatedvolatilityobservedin
recentmonths,whichcouldtemporarilysoftencentralbankdemandto30tonnes/monthonaverage.
However,long-termupsiderisksextendbeyondthesescenarios.Goldallocationsin
Westernprivateportfoliosremainverylow(ETFgoldholdingsaccountforaround0.2%ofprivatesectorportfoliosintheUS).Our
estimates
suggestthateach1bpincreaseinUSprivatesectorportfolioallocationtogoldraisespricesbyroughly1.5%,underscoringthenon-linearityofupsiderisks.
30March202611
Exhibit10:WeContinuetoSeeSignificantUpsidetoOur$5,400/tozForecastbyDec26
Source:Bloomberg,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
GoldmanSachs
htt.
rse:c/iwAnalyst
30March202612
DisclosureAppendix
RegAC
We,LinaThomasandDaanStruyven,herebycertifythatalloftheviewsexpressedinthisreportaccuratelyrefiectourpersonalviews,whichhavenotbeeninfiuencedbyconsiderationsofthefirm’sbusinessorclientrelationships.
Unlessotherwisestated,theindividualslistedonthecoverpageofthisreportareanalystsinGoldmanSachs’GlobalInvestmentResearchdivision.ContributingAuthors:LinaThomasGoldmanSachs&Co.LLC,DaanStruyvenGoldmanSachs&Co.LLC.
Unlessotherwisestated,theindividualslistedintheContributingAuthorsdisclosureofthisreportareanalystsinGoldmanSachs’GlobalInvestmentResearchdivision.
Disclosures
Regulatorydisclosures
DisclosuresrequiredbyUnitedStateslawsandregulations
Seecompany-specificregulatorydisclosuresaboveforanyofthefollowingdisclosuresrequiredastocompaniesreferredtointhisreport:managerorco-managerinapendingtransaction;1%orotherownership;compensationforcertainservices;typesofclientrelationships;managed/co-managedpublico仟eringsinpriorperiods;directorships;forequitysecurities,marketmakingand/orspecialistrole.GoldmanSachstradesormaytradeasa
principalindebtsecurities(orinrelatedderivatives)ofissuersdiscussedinthisreport.
Thefollowingareadditionalrequireddisclosures:Ownershipandmaterialconfiictsofinterest:GoldmanSachspolicyprohibitsitsanalysts,
professionalsreportingtoanalystsandmembersoftheirhouseholdsfromowningsecuritiesofanycompanyintheanalyst’sareaofcoverage.Analystcompensation:AnalystsarepaidinpartbasedontheprofitabilityofGoldmanSachs,whichincludesinvestmentbankingrevenues.Analystasofficer
ordirector:GoldmanSachspolicygenerallyprohibitsitsanalysts,personsreportingtoanalystsormembersoftheirhouseholdsfromservingasanofficer,directororadvisorofanycompanyintheanalyst’sareaofcoverage.Non-U.S.Analysts:Non-U.S.analystsmaynotbeassociatedpersonsofGoldmanSachs&Co.LLCandthereforemaynotbesubjecttoFINRARule2241orFINRARule2242restrictionsoncommunicationswithasubject
company,publicappearancesandtradinginsecuritiescoveredbytheanalysts.
AdditionaldisclosuresrequiredunderthelawsandregulationsofjurisdictionsotherthantheUnitedStates
Thefollowingdisclosuresarethoserequiredbythejurisdictionindicated,excepttotheextentalreadymadeabovepursuanttoUnitedStateslawsandregulations.Australia:GoldmanSachsAustraliaPtyLtdanditsaffiliatesarenotauthoriseddeposit-takinginstitutions(asthattermisdefinedinthe
BankingAct1959(Cth))inAustraliaanddonotprovidebankingservices,norcarryonabankingbusiness,inAustralia.Thisresearch,andanyaccesstoit,isintendedonlyfor“wholesaleclients”withinthemeaningoftheAustralianCorporationsAct,unlessotherwiseagreedbyGoldmanSachs.In
producingresearchreports,membersofGlobalInvestmentResearchofGoldmanSachsAustraliamayattendsitevisitsandothermeetingshostedby
thecompaniesandotherentitieswhicharethesubjectofitsresearchreports.InsomeinstancesthecostsofsuchsitevisitsormeetingsmaybemetinpartorinwholebytheissuersconcernedifGoldmanSachsAustraliaconsidersitisappropriateandreasonableinthespecificcircumstancesrelatingtothesitevisitormeeting.Totheextentthatthecontentsofthisdocumentcontainsanyfinancialproductadvice,itisgeneraladviceonlyandhasbeenpreparedbyGoldmanSachswithouttakingintoaccountaclient’sobjectives,financialsituationorneeds.Aclientshould,beforeactingonanysuch
advice,considertheappropriatenessoftheadvicehavingregardtotheclient’sownobjectives,financialsituationandneeds.Acopyofcertain
GoldmanSachsAustraliaandNewZealanddisclosureofinterestsandacopyofGoldmanSachs’AustralianSell-SideResearchIndependencePolicy
Statementareavailableat:
/disclosures/australia-new-zealand/index.html
.Brazil:DisclosureinformationinrelationtoCVMResolutionn.20isavailableat
/worldwide/brazil/area/gir/index.html
.Whereapplicable,theBrazil-registeredanalyst
primarilyresponsibleforthecontentofthisresearchreport,asdefinedinArticle20ofCVMResolutionn.20,isthefirstauthornamedatthebeginningofthisreport,unlessindicatedotherwiseattheendofthetext.Canada:Thisinformationisbeingprovidedtoyouforinformationpurposesonlyandisnot,andundernocircumstancesshouldbeconstruedas,anadvertisement,o仟eringorsolicitationbyGoldmanSachs&Co.LLCforpurchasersof
securitiesinCanadatotradeinanyCanadiansecurity.GoldmanSachs&Co.LLCisnotregisteredasadealerinanyjurisdictioninCanadaunder
applicableCanadiansecuritieslawsandgenerallyisnotpermittedtotradeinCanadiansecuritiesandmaybeprohibitedfromsellingcertainsecuritiesandproductsincertainjurisdictionsinCanada.IfyouwishtotradeinanyCanadiansecuritiesorotherproductsinCanadapleasecontactGoldman
SachsCanadaInc.,anaffiliateofTheGoldmanSachsGroupInc.,oranotherregisteredCanadiandealer.HongKong:Furtherinformationonthe
securitiesofcoveredcompaniesreferredtointhisresearchmaybeobtainedonrequestfromGoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.India:Furtherinformation
onthesubjectcompanyorcompaniesreferredtointhisresearchmaybeobtainedfromGoldmanSachs(India)SecuritiesPrivateLimited,Research
Analyst-SEBIRegistrationNumberINH000001493,10thFloor,Ascent-Worli,SudamKaluAhireMarg,Worli,Mumbai-400025,India,Corporate
IdentityNumberU74140MH2006FTC160634,Phone+912266169000,Fax+912266169001.GoldmanSachsmaybeneficiallyown1%ormoreof
thesecurities(assuchtermisdefinedinclause2(h)theIndianSecuritiesContracts(Regulation)Act,1956)ofthesubjectcompanyorcompanies
referredtointhisresearchreport.Investmentinsecuritiesmarketaresubjecttomarketrisks.Readalltherelateddocumentscarefullybeforeinvesting.RegistrationgrantedbySEBIandcertificationfromNISMinnowayguaranteeperformanceoftheintermediaryorprovideanyassuranceofreturnstoinvestors.GoldmanSachs(India)SecuritiesPrivateLimitedcomplianceofficerandinvestorgrievancecontactdetailscanbefoundat:
/worldwide/india/documents/Grievance-Redressal-and-Escalation-Matrix.pdf
,andacopyoftheannualaudit
compliancereportcanbefoundatthislink:
/content/site/india-annual-compliance-report.html
.Japan:Seebelow.Korea:
Thisresearch,andanyaccesstoit,isintendedonlyfor“professionalinvestors”withinthemeaningoftheFinancialServicesandCapitalMarketsAct,
unlessotherwiseagreedbyGoldmanSachs.Furtherinformationonthesubjectcompanyorcompaniesreferredtointhisresearchmaybeobtained
fromGoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.,SeoulBranch.NewZealand:GoldmanSachsNewZealandLimitedanditsaffiliatesareneither“registeredbanks”nor“deposittakers”(asdefinedintheReserveBankofNewZealandAct1989)inNewZealand.Thisresearch,andanyaccesstoit,isintendedfor
“wholesaleclients”(asdefinedintheFinancialAdvisersAct2008)unlessotherwiseagreedbyGoldmanSachs.AcopyofcertainGoldmanSachs
AustraliaandNewZealanddisclosureofinterestsisavailableat:
/disclosures/australia-new-zealand/index.html
.
Russia:ResearchreportsdistributedintheRussianFederationarenotadvertisingasdefinedintheRussianlegislation,butareinformationandanalysisnothavingproductpromotionastheirmainpurposeanddonotprovideappraisalwithinthemeaningoftheRussianlegislationonappraisalactivity.
ResearchreportsdonotconstituteapersonalizedinvestmentrecommendationasdefinedinRussianlawsandregulations,arenotaddressedtoa
specificclient,andarepreparedwithoutanalyzingthefinancialcircumstances,investmentprofilesorriskprofilesofclients.GoldmanSachsassumesnoresponsibilityforanyinvestmentdecisionsthatmaybetakenbyaclientoranyotherpersonbasedonthisresearchreport.Singapore:GoldmanSachs(Singapore)Pte.(CompanyNumber:198602165W),whichisregulatedbytheMonetaryAuthorityofSingapore,acceptslegalresponsibilityforthis
research,andshouldbecontactedwithrespecttoanymattersarisingfrom,orinconnectionwith,thisresearch.Taiwan:Thismaterialisforreferenceonlyandmustnotbereprintedwithoutpermission.Investorsshouldcarefullyconsidertheirowninvestmentrisk.Investmentresultsarethe
responsibilityoftheindividualinvestor.UnitedKingdom:PersonswhowouldbecategorizedasretailclientsintheUnitedKingdom,assuchtermisdefinedintherulesoftheFinancialConductAuthority,shouldreadthisresearchinconjunctionwithpriorGoldmanSachsresearchonthecovered
GoldmanSachs
温馨提示
- 1. 本站所有资源如无特殊说明,都需要本地电脑安装OFFICE2007和PDF阅读器。图纸软件为CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.压缩文件请下载最新的WinRAR软件解压。
- 2. 本站的文档不包含任何第三方提供的附件图纸等,如果需要附件,请联系上传者。文件的所有权益归上传用户所有。
- 3. 本站RAR压缩包中若带图纸,网页内容里面会有图纸预览,若没有图纸预览就没有图纸。
- 4. 未经权益所有人同意不得将文件中的内容挪作商业或盈利用途。
- 5. 人人文库网仅提供信息存储空间,仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理,对用户上传分享的文档内容本身不做任何修改或编辑,并不能对任何下载内容负责。
- 6. 下载文件中如有侵权或不适当内容,请与我们联系,我们立即纠正。
- 7. 本站不保证下载资源的准确性、安全性和完整性, 同时也不承担用户因使用这些下载资源对自己和他人造成任何形式的伤害或损失。
最新文档
- 2026广东深圳市龙岗区平湖街道天鹅湖畔幼儿园招聘2人备考题库及答案详解(名师系列)
- 2026浙江大学宁波国际科创中心未来计算技术创新中心工程师招聘备考题库附参考答案详解(黄金题型)
- 四川省内江市农业科学院关于2026年公开考核招聘事业单位工作人员的备考题库及答案详解【有一套】
- 2026福建医科大学附属第一医院招聘非在编合同制人员20人备考题库(二)附答案详解(巩固)
- 2026黑龙江黑河市嫩江市乡镇卫生院招聘医学相关专业毕业生2人备考题库及答案详解【夺冠】
- 2026甘肃甘南州舟曲县城关镇社区卫生服务中心招聘3人备考题库及参考答案详解(培优)
- 2026内蒙古呼和浩特职业技术大学第二批人才引进23人备考题库带答案详解(综合题)
- 2026济南能源集团春季校园招聘11人备考题库附答案详解(完整版)
- 穿透性颅脑损伤专家共识2026
- 2026甘肃平凉崆峒区乡镇卫生院招聘乡村医生1人备考题库附参考答案详解(夺分金卷)
- DB15∕T 3413-2024 住宅小区和商业用房供配电设施规范
- GB/T 30117.6-2025灯和灯系统的光生物安全第6部分:紫外线灯产品
- 新加坡安全培训考试题库及答案解析
- 2025年数据标注工程试题及答案
- 标准化项目立项管理流程优化研究
- 消费者就是学习者课件
- 2025年四川省从“五方面人员”中选拔乡镇领导班子成员考试历年参考题库含答案详解(5套)
- 《钢筋桁架楼承板应用技术规程》TCECS 1069-2022
- 中国智·惠世界(2025)案例集-中国人工智能产品和技术在亚洲、非洲、南美洲、欧洲等国家和地区赋能发展的生动实践
- 2025年春节后家具制造行业复工复产安全技术措施
- 2025年甘肃省中考英语试卷真题(含标准答案及解析)
评论
0/150
提交评论