iea -2026 年能源政策状况 State of Energy Policy 2026

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

INTERNATIONALENERGYAGENCY

TheIEAexaminesthefullspectrumofenergy

issuesincludingoil,gasandcoalsupplyand

demand,renewableenergytechnologies,

electricitymarkets,energyefficiency,accesstoenergy,demandsidemanagementandmuch

more.Throughitswork,theIEAadvocates

policiesthatwillenhancethereliability,

affordabilityandsustainabilityofenergyinits32MemberCountries,13Associationcountriesandbeyond.

Thispublicationandanymapincludedhereinarewithoutprejudicetothestatusoforsovereigntyoveranyterritory,tothedelimitationof

internationalfrontiersandboundariesandtothenameofanyterritory,cityorarea.

Source:IEA.

InternationalEnergyAgencyWebsite:

IEAMembercountries:

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Canada

CzechRepublicDenmark

Estonia

Finland

France

GermanyGreece

HungaryIreland

ItalyJapanKoreaLatvia

Lithuania

LuxembourgMexico

Netherlands

NewZealandNorway

Poland

Portugal

SlovakRepublic

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

RepublicofTürkiyeUnitedKingdom

UnitedStates

TheEuropeanCommissionalsoparticipatesintheworkoftheIEA

IEAAssociationcountries:

ArgentinaChina

EgyptIndia

Indonesia

Kenya

Morocco

Senegal

Singapore

SouthAfricaThailand

UkraineVietNam

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

Acknowledgements

PAGE|2

Acknowledgements

StateofEnergyPolicy2026waspreparedbytheWorldEnergyOutlookteamintheDirectorateofSustainability,TechnologyandOutlooks(STO).ThereportwasdirectedbyLauraCozzi,STODirectorandChiefEnergyModeller.TheanalyticalteamswereledbyDanielWetzel,HeadoftheTrackingSustainableTransitionsUnit;ChristineBrandstätt,TransitionTrackingandAnalysisTeamLead;andGabrielSaive,ClimateandEnergyPolicyAnalyst.Leadauthorsofthisreportinclude:LeïlouDaunit(governmentspending,climate),NouhounDiarra(energyaccess),JianlanDou(energyefficiency,buildings)andHazelYeo(energysecurity,power).LucíadelaCuerdaandAlvaroLlanomadeimportantcontributionstotheenergysecuritypolicyanalyses.

Valuablecommentsandfeedbackwereprovidedbyseniormanagement,inparticularDanDorner,JasonElliott,TimGould,TimurGül,DennisHesseling,Tae-YoonKim,BrianMotherwayandCeciliaTam.Otherkeyfeedbackandcontributionsinclude:YasminaAbdelilah,OskarasAlsauskas,VasiliosAnatolitis-Pelka,HeribBlanco,LeonardoBolstad,ElizabethConnelly,ChiaraDelmastro,RolandGladushenko,RonanGraham,InsaHandschuch,AndrewKlain,MartinKueppers,LucaLoRe,RafaelMartinez-Gordon,AlexMartinos,MichaelMcGovern,RebeccaMcKimm,TomásdeOliveiraBredariol,MarinaPetrelli,JoyceRaboca,ArthurRogé,ThomasSpencer,RyotaTaniguchi,AnthonyVautrin,FabianVoswinkelandIvoWalinga.

TheanalysisandreportbuildontheannualreviewofthePoliciesandMeasuresdatabaseandtheglobalenergypolicieshubbyIEAmembercountriesenergyadvisors.ThankstogovernmentrepresentativesfromAustria,Australia,Canada,Estonia,theEuropeanUnion,Finland,France,Germany,Hungary,Italy,Japan,Latvia,NewZealand,Norway,Poland,Portugal,Slovakia,Spain,Sweden,theUnitedKingdomfortheirthroughoutreviewandinputs.TheIEACleanEnergyTransitionsProgramme,theflagshipinitiativetotransformtheworld’senergysystemtoachieveasecureandsustainablefutureforall,supportedthiswork.

AdamMajoecarriededitorialresponsibilityforthisreport.SpecialthanksgototheCommunicationsandDigitalOffice(CDO)fortheirhelpinproducingthereportanditswebmaterials,mostnotablyJethroMullen,HeadofCDO,andhisteam:PoeliBojorquez,CurtisBrainard,JonCuster,AstridDumond,LivGaunt,OliverJoy,IsabelleNonain-Semelin,IrinaPaun,AnthonyPietromartire,AndreaPronzati,LucileWall,andWonjikYang.

ExpertsfromoutsideoftheIEAprovidedinput,commentedontheunderlyinganalyticalworkandreviewedthereport.Theircommentsandsuggestionswereofgreatvalueandincludedinthefinalisationofthereport.

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

Acknowledgements

PAGE|3

Theyinclude:

RinaBohleZellerJosephDixon

CallistoPryorCharlotte

Gardes-Landolfini

CarlosGuadarramaXueHan

DaveJones

LouiseKesslerKevinLane

DanLashofJoyceLeeCangshuLi

SumedhaMalaviyaAnthonyMansell

VenuMothkoorCédricPhilibert

AgoraEnergiewendeWorldBank

InternationalMonetaryFund

WorldBank

DevelopmentResearchCenteroftheStateCouncil

Ember

InstituteforClimateEconomics4E

WorldResourcesInstitute

GlobalWindEnergyCouncil

DevelopmentResearchCenteroftheStateCouncil

WorldResourcesInstitute

WorldBankNITIAayog

FrenchInstituteofInternationalRelations

MichaelPollittArijitSen

LaurenSidner

SamThomas

ZachWhitlock

CatherineWolfram

FengZhao

UniversityofCambridge

InternationalCouncilonCleanTransportation

MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology

RegulatoryAssistanceProjectResourcesfortheFuture

MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology

GlobalWindEnergyCouncil

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

Tableofcontents

PAGE|4

Tableofcontents

Overview 10

Governmentenergyspending 13

Energyefficiencyandfuelswitchingregulations 25

Climatepledges 33

Spotlight1:Deliveringtraditionalandemergingenergysecurity 39

Spotlight2:Acceleratingenergyaccesspolicyadoption 55

Sectorsnapshots 64

Buildings 65

Industry 71

Transport 76

Fuels 80

Power 86

Annex 90

Methodology 91

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

PAGE|5

Executivesummary

Governmentsarenavigatingasustainedperiodofrisksanddisruptions

Inrecentyears,energyhasbeenelevatedtoacoreissueofnationalandeconomicsecurity.GlobalsupplychaindisruptionsaftertheCovid-19pandemic,Russia’sfull-scaleinvasionofUkraine,traderestrictionsonkeyproductsincludingcriticalminerals,severalyearsofextremeheataffectingenergysystemsandconflictsaffectingmajorenergysuppliershaveunfoldedinsuccessivewavesoverthepastfiveyears.Theseeventshavebroughtlong-standingenergysecurityconcernsbackintosharpfocuswhileexposingnewvulnerabilities.Theyalsohighlightenergy’scentralroleingeopolitics,withrecentshocksdrivinganexceptionallyactiveperiodofenergypolicy-makingacrossbothconventionalandemergingdimensionsofsecurity,reminiscentofthewide-rangingandextensivepolicyresponsestotheoilcrisesofthe1970s.

Whilenosinglenarrativedefinestheshiftsseenin2025inenergypolicy,thecostofliving,competitivenessandresilientsupplychainsemergedascentralthemesalongsidelong-standingpolicyprioritiesrelatingtoenergysecurity,efficiencyandsustainability.StateofEnergyPolicy2026drawsontheIEA’s

GlobalEnergyPoliciesHub

,whichtracksmorethan6500measuresacross84countriesandmorethan200policytypes,highlightingwhererecentpolicychangesrepresentamajorshiftfromlonger-termpolicytrends.

Foundationslaidsincethe1970shavestrengthenedtheworld’sabilitytorespondtoenergysupplyshocks,thoughnocountryremainsshieldedfromsuchrisks

Emergencymeasurestomanageoilandnaturalgassupplydisruptionsarenowlegallyinplacein60countries.Sincethe1970s,IEAmembershavebeenrequiredtoholdemergencyoilreserves.Today,countriesaccountingfor95%ofglobaloilimportshaveadoptedstockholdingandemergencyresponselegislation,withrequirementsvaryingfrom16to90daysofnetimports.Morerecently,naturalgasstockholdingrequirementshaveexpanded,withgasstoragerequirementsandstrategicbuffersadoptedincloseto30countriessinceRussia’sinvasionofUkrainein2022.Suchmeasuresarenowinplaceinimportingcountriesaccountingformorethan40%ofnaturalgasimports,comparedwith11%in2010.

DisruptionsresultingfromtheconflictintheMiddleEast

havepromptedtheuseoftheseemergencymeasures,includingthecollectiveactiondecisionof11March2026,whichmade400millionbarrelsofoilfromIEAemergencyreservesavailabletothemarket.Thecurrentdisruptionhasalsotriggeredannouncementsofnewandstrengthenedemergencystoragecapacity,notablyinIndonesiaandVietNam,aswellasexceptionaldemand-restraintmeasures,includingenergyconservationcampaigns,work-from-homepoliciesandfuelrationing.

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

Executivesummary

PAGE|6

Decadesofpolicyeffortshavediversifiedcountries’energymixesandsuppliersandimprovedefficiency.Fueldiversificationefforts,alsorootedintheenergycrises,arenowpresentin150countries,upfromfewerthan20inthe1970s.Asaresult,majoreconomiesnowhavemorediversifiedenergymixesandsupplierbases,reflectingincreaseddeploymentofrenewables,nuclearpower,fuel-switchingpolicies,efficiencystandardsandperformanceregulations.Sincethefirstenergyefficiencyregulationin1975,morethan130countrieshaveadoptedminimumenergyperformancestandards,withmorethan80%ofglobalenergydemandforcoolingandindustrialmotorsnowcoveredbysomeformofefficiencystandard.

Governmentsarealsotakingstepstoaddressemergingrisksinenergysupplychains

Themarketconcentrationofcriticalmineralsandkeyenergytechnologieshasemergedasastrategicvulnerability.

Governmentsaretakingstepstoaddressconcentrationinenergytechnologymanufacturing,particularlyforsolarpanels,batteriesandothercleanenergytechnologies,wherethelargestsupplieraccountsformorethan70%ofmanufacturingcapacityformanykeycomponents.Geopoliticalfrictionshaveheightenedtheserisks.Elevenofthe20criticalmineralsessentialtotheenergysectorweresubjecttoexportcontrolsatsomepointin2025,and45newpoliciesaffectingtradeinkeycleanenergytechnologieswereimplementedinadditiontothebroad-basedtariffmeasuresimplementedbytheUnitedStatesin2025.Supplychaindisruptionrisksalsoextendto

otherenergyequipment,includingtransformers,gasliquefactiontechnologyandotherpowerelectronics,thoughpolicyresponsesintheseareashavebeenmorelimited.

Governmentshaveintroducedmanufacturingincentivesandtrademeasuresinanefforttodiversifysuppliesofcriticalmineralsandkeyenergytechnologies.In2025,35newpoliciesaffectingcriticalmineralswereadoptedin19countries,focusingonfinancialsupportforproduction,refiningorrecycling.Evenso,mostcountriesstillhaveconsiderablescopetoenhanceemergencypreparedness,includingthroughstockpiling.Onlyfourcountriescurrentlymaintainformalstockpilingrequirementsforenergy-relatedequipment,andmanyothersareexploringtheirintroduction.Publicinvestmentinadvancedcleantechnologymanufacturinghasincreasedmorethanten-foldsince2021,makinguproughly12%oftotalinvestmentincleanenergytechnologymanufacturingfacilities,equivalenttoUSD24billion.

Governmentspendingonenergyhasdoubledsince2019

Directfinancialsupportforenergypeakedduringthepreviousenergycrisisandremainsathistoricallyhighlevels.In2025,energy-relatedprovisionsareestimatedtoreachUSD405billionannually,representing1.4%oftotalgovernmentexpenditureinthatyear,upfrom0.8%justadecadeearlier.Somecountries,includingtheUnitedKingdom,GermanyandJapan,sawmuchhighershares,nearing3%ormore.Muchofthisgrowthwaslinkedtopolicy

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

Executivesummary

PAGE|7

responsesfollowingtheCovid-19pandemic,whenenergyinvestmentmeasureswereexpandedinmanyrecoverypackages.Severalofthoseprovisionswerereviseddownwardin2025,includingtherepealofsomeenergy-relatedtaxcreditsintheOneBigBeautifulBillActintheUnitedStates,thescheduledendoffundinglinkedtotheEuropeanRecoveryandResilienceFacilityandthephasedreductionofrenewablessubsidiesinChina.Together,thesechangesreducedanticipatedannualgovernmentenergyspendingfrom2025to2030byone-quartercomparedwith2024expectations.

Governmentenergyspendingissettoremainelevatedthrough2030.EvenbeforetheoutbreakofthecurrentconflictintheMiddleEast,governmentenergyspendingwasexpectedtoremainabove2019levelsthroughto2030.Sincethen,manygovernmentshavelaunchednewemergencymeasurestomanagetheimpactsonenergymarkets,oftenpushing2026spendingabovebudgetexpectations.TheIEAwillcontinuetomonitorpolicyresponsesandgovernmentaffordabilityinterventions,asitdidduringthe2022energycrisis.

Governmentsfacepressuretomanageenergypricesandindustrialcompetitivenesswhilebalancingfiscalconstraints

Emergencyenergyaffordabilitymeasureshaveaddedsignificantbudgetaryburdensandhistoricallyhavenotbeentargetedattheconsumersmostinneed.Followingthe2022energycrisis,governmentsintroducedemergencyenergy

affordabilitysupportanddisbursedaroundUSD220billiontohouseholdsbetween2022and2023,roughlytentimespre-crisisannualsupportlevels.RenewedenergypricevolatilitylinkedtotheconflictintheMiddleEastispromptingnewmeasures.Only25%ofshort-terminterventionssince2022havetargetedvulnerablehouseholdsmostexposedtopriceshocks,increasingthestrainonnationalaccounts.Similarly,long-terminvestmentincentivestoreducehouseholds’exposuretopricevolatility,particularlyinroadtransport,haveoftenlackedtargeting.In2025,onlyaboutone-quarterofincentivesforefficientoralternative-fuelvehiclesweretargeted,inlinewithshort-termmeasures.

Manygovernmentshaveshiftedtomarket-basedsupportschemes,particularlyforsolarandwind,helpingtoreducefiscalburdens.Since2010,about20governmentshavemovedawayfromadministrativelysetpricingschemestowardsmoremarket-basedmechanismsasthecostofwindandsolarprojectshascontinuedtodecline.Auctionsandmarket-basedsupportmechanismsarenowexpectedtoaccountfornearly60%ofgrosscapacityadditionsfrom2025to2030,basedonthecurrentpipelineofprojects.Thisshifthasgraduallydecoupledgovernmentspendingfrominvestmentgrowth.Between2021and2025,governmentinvestmentinpowergenerationandtransmissionroseby8%annually,whileprivatesectorinvestmentgrew16%peryear.

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

Executivesummary

PAGE|8

Developingeconomiesarerenewingeffortstoexpandenergyaccess,butglobalshocksthreatenprogress

Followingaperiodofsetbacks,policymomentumoncleancookingandelectricityaccessisbuilding,particularlyinAfrica.

Limitedfiscallatitudeandaffordabilitypressures,compoundedbydisruptionsduringtheCovid-19era,slowedprogressonenergyaccessfrom2020to2024.Politicalmomentumhasreturnedasenergyaccessmovedbacktotheforefrontoftheinternationalagendaandhasbeensupportedbyincreasedinternationalfinanceflows.Governmentshavereinvigorateddomesticefforts,with56newelectricityaccesspoliciesimplementedorannouncedsincethe2024IEASummitonCleanCookinginAfrica,alongside64newcleancookinginitiatives.Sub-SaharanAfricaaccountsforthemajorityofthisrenewedactivity,withcountrieshometo70%ofAfricanpeoplelivingwithoutelectricityaccessand90%ofthosewithoutcleancookingadoptingnewenergyaccesspoliciesoverthepastyear.

DisruptionsarisingfromtheconflictintheMiddleEastarethreateningprogress,especiallyforcleancooking.FollowingtheclosureoftheStraitofHormuz,liquefiedpetroleumgasimportpricesincreasedbyanaverageof80%inMarch2026indevelopingeconomieswhereitiswidelyusedforcooking.Thisrisepromptedmanygovernmentstotakestepstostabiliseprices,oftenstrainingpublicfinancesorthefinancesoflocalenergycompanies.Somecountrieshaveimplementedemergencydemand-restraintmeasures,increaseddomesticproduction,rationednon-essentialusesofliquefiedpetroleumgasandencouragedfuelswitchingwherepossible.

Substantialregulatoryreformsin2025have,on

balance,relaxedcurrentandfutureenergystandards

Whilesomecountrieshaveintroducedmorestringentefficiencystandards,broaderregulatoryrollbacks,particularlyintheUnitedStates,werethedominantforcein2025.Lastyear,regulatoryrollbacksoutweighedmeasuresthatincreasedstringencyorcoverage,with30%ofenergyconsumptionunderregulationexperiencingsomeformofrollback,comparedwith17%subjecttonew,stricterrules.Themostsignificantchangesoccurredinpassengercars,drivenprimarilybytheresettingoffueleconomystandardsintheUnitedStates,affectingroughlyone-fifthofend-usescoveredbyminimumefficiencystandards,andbydelaystocompliancetimelinesfornewvehicleemissionsstandardsintheEuropeanUnion.Carbonpricingschemeswerealsorevised,inpartduetogreaterscrutinyofenergymeasuresthatcouldaffecthouseholdbillsandindustrialcompetitiveness.Themostsignificantshiftsoccurredinbuildingsandtransportfuelpricing,throughtheeliminationofconsumercarbonpricesinCanada,thedelayedimplementationoftheEuropeanUnion’sEmissionsTradingSystem2from2027to2028andevolvingdiscussionsoncarbonborderadjustmentmeasures.

Asaresult,mandatedenergyefficiencyimprovementsareexpectedtoprogressataslowerpacethroughto2030.Globalcoverageandstringencyofenergyefficiencyandfuel-switchingpoliciesareexpectedtoriseby30%overthenextfiveyears.Withouttherelaxed,delayedandrolledbackregulationsintroducedin2025,

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

Executivesummary

PAGE|9

energyefficiencystringencywouldhaveincreasedby50%.Whileintendedtoeaseshort-termcostimpacts,thesechangescouldleavehouseholdsandbusinessesmoreexposedtoenergypriceswingsinthefuture.

Inaggregate,climatetargetssubmittedin2025reflectamoremoderatefocusonemissionsreductionsin

near-termenergypolicy

Thelatestclimatepledges,inaggregate,donotimplyanaccelerationinmitigationintheenergysectorby2035comparedwithpreviouscommitments.Overall,policyshiftsin2025havetemperedthepaceoffutureemissionsreductions,eventhoughclimateobjectivesremainastatedpriorityinmanycountries.AsofApril2026,65ofthe194partiestotheParisAgreementhadyettosubmitnewnationallydeterminedcontributions(NDCs)settingmitigationgoalsfor2035.AmongthosethathadsubmittednewNDCs,morethan80%setouttargetsimplyingsimilarorslowerratesofdeclineinenergy-relatedemissionsthanthoseenvisagedintheirearlierNDCswith2030targets.IftheenergycomponentofallNDCsweremet,energy-relatedemissionswoulddeclineby0.3%annuallyuntil2035.ThesemitigationlevelsarebroadlycomparablewiththeIEAStatedPoliciesScenario,whichprojectsglobalenergy-relatedemissionsdecliningby0.8%annually.

Likethe1970s,thecurrentenergycrisismaypromptaperiodofsignificantenergypolicychange

WhilemostgovernmentresponsesasofApril2026havefocusedonemergencymeasures,pastshockshaveoftentriggeredmorestructuralshiftsinenergypolicy.Manycountriesarebuildingonexistingpolicyfoundationstoreducelong-termdependenceonoilandgasimports,curbexposuretofossilfuelpricevolatilityandacceleratetheshifttolow-emissionsalternatives,alongsideanear-termreturntodomesticcoalinsomejurisdictions.AsofApril2026,150countrieshaveactivepoliciestoadvancerenewableandnucleardeployment,130haveenergyefficiencyandelectrificationpolicies,and32havepoliciestoincentivisesupplychainresilienceanddiversificationacrosscriticalmineralsandcleanenergytechnologies.Unlikeinthe1970s,thetechnologicalandpolicyfoundationsarenowinplacetoenablefasterandmoresubstantialreductionsinoilandgasconsumption.Governmentsmayalsoreinvigorateenergyinnovationforalternativefuelsandgreaterefficiency,reversingthedeclineinspendingonenergyresearchanddevelopmentsince2023.TheIEAwillcontinuetotrackpolicyresponsestothecurrentcrisis,offeringinsightintohowtheseevolvingmeasurescouldreshapelong-termenergytrendsandstrengthenglobalenergysecurity.

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

Overview

PAGE|10

Overview

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

Overview

PAGE|11

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

Overview

PAGE|12

UnderstandingtheStateofEnergyPolicy2026report

StateofEnergyPolicy2026providesanoverviewoftheenergypolicylandscapein2025,highlightingthekeydevelopments.Itexpandsthecoverageofthepreviouseditiontoincludenewindicatorsthatshowtheevolutionofpolicyacrossallenergysectorssince2015.

ThereportbuildsonanIEA-wideefforttotrackindetailtheenergypoliciesofitsMember,AccessionandAssociationcountries,alongwithothermajorenergyeconomiesthatdriveglobalenergydemand.Itcovers84countries,whichtogetherrepresentmorethan90%ofglobalenergydemandandemissions.Thereportassessespolicyprogressacrossalldemandsectors,namelybuildings,industry,passengercars,andmassandalternativetransit,aswellaspowergeneration,fuelproductionandshort-termenergyaffordabilitymeasures.Allpolicydatausedintheanalysisarepubliclyavailableonthe

GlobalEnergyPoliciesHub

,forwhichIEAofficialsreviewthepolicyentriesfortheirrespectivecountrieseachyear.TheHubsummarisesmorethan6500energypoliciesandprovidesalinktoanofficialsourceforeach.

Thisyear’sreportexpandsitsanalyticalcoverageinseveralimportantways.Itbroadensitsexaminationofenergysecuritypoliciestotheperiod1973-2025,alongwithincentiveschemesandtrademeasuresintroducedforemergingtechnologiesandcommodities.Italsointroducesthefirst-evertrackingofgovernmentenergyspendingdisbursementsagainstbudgetedprovisions,using

officialbudgetdocuments.Inaddition,itprovidesin-depthanalysisofhowenergyefficiencystandardshaveevolvedinbothcoverageandstringencysincetheirinitialimplementation,benchmarkingcurrentstandardsagainstthebestavailabletechnologies.

Thisyear’seditionincludes:

•Anoverviewofthestateofenergypolicyin2025,withaspecialfocusongovernmentspending,energyefficiencyregulations,andthecontributionoftheenergysectortonationallydeterminedcontributionsandlong-termnetzeropledges.

•Aspotlightontraditionalandemergingenergysecuritypolicies,coveringoil,naturalgas,criticalmineralsandcleanenergytechnologies,includingheatpumps,electrolysers,batteries,andwindandsolartechnologies.

•Afocusonenergyaccess,includingroadmaps,incentives,programmesandstandardstosupportuniversalaccesstocleancookingandelectricityglobally,withaspecialfocusonsub-SaharanAfrica.

•Energysectorsnapshots,withconciseinformationbysectoronthekeypolicyevolutionsin2025.

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

Governmentenergyspending

PAGE|13

Governmentenergyspending

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

Governmentenergyspending

PAGE|14

Governmentenergyspendinghasclimbedsharplyoverthepastfiveyears

Governmentenergyspendingbycategory,2015-2025

BillionUSD(2024,MER)

100

20152016201720182019202020212022202320242025e

Others

EnergyaffordabilityPassengercars

Massand

alternativetransit

Powergeneration

500

400

300

200

IndustryBuildings

IEA.CCBY4.0.

Notes:MER=marketexchangerate.Othergovernmentenergyspendingincludesfossilandlow-emissionsfuelproductionandinnovationfunds.FurtherinformationonthecontentofeachsectorcanbefoundintheAnnex.

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

Governmentenergyspending

PAGE|15

Spendingishigheracrossallcategoriesrelativeto2015levels

Governmentenergyspendingbycategory,2015-2025

BillionUSD(2024,MER)

on(,)

BilliUSD2024MER

20152025e20152025e20152025e

BuildingsPassengercarsIndustry

60

30

EnergyaffordabilityMassandalternativetransitPowergeneration

20152025e20152025e20152025e

150

100

50

IEA.CCBY4.0.

StateofEnergyPolicy2026

Governmentenergyspending

PAGE|16

Governmentenergyspendingdeclinedasaffordabilitymeasureswererolledbackafter2022crisis,thoughinvestmentsupportcontinuesabovehistoricallevels

Theenergysectorhashistoricallyaccountedforarelativelysmallshareofgovernmentbudgets,averagingaround1%inmostcountries.Overthepastfiveyears,however,governmentspendingonenergyhasthandoubledcomparedwith2019levels,reachingaround1.4%oftotaldirectgovernmentexpenditurein2025.Levelshavevariedbycountry,withsomereachingupto5%ofgeneralexpenditure.Althoughspendingfellfromitspeakin2023,disbursementsin2024and2025r