【《关于电子商务环境下线上渠道运营策略的研究国内外文献综述》5900字】_第1页
【《关于电子商务环境下线上渠道运营策略的研究国内外文献综述》5900字】_第2页
【《关于电子商务环境下线上渠道运营策略的研究国内外文献综述》5900字】_第3页
【《关于电子商务环境下线上渠道运营策略的研究国内外文献综述》5900字】_第4页
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第第页共93页关于电子商务环境下线上渠道运营策略的研究国内外文献综述本节对电子商务环境下线上渠道运营策略进行综述,主要包括线上销售模式和物流服务模式两个方面。1.1线上销售模式电子商务的兴起带来了销售模式的革新。电商平台的在线销售模式可分为转售模式、代理销售模式和混合模式。一些国外学者从不同的角度研究了零售企业的线上渠道模式选择策略,比如第三方信息ADDINCSL_CITATION{"citationItems":[{"id":"ITEM-1","itemData":{"DOI":"10.25300/MISQ/2017/41.3.05","ISSN":"02767783","abstract":"Onlineretailingisdominatedbyachannelstructureinwhicharetailereitherbuysproductsfromcompetingmanufacturersandresellstoconsumers(wholesalescheme)orletsmanufacturersdirectlyselltoconsumersonitsplatformforacommission(platformscheme).Easyaccesstopubliclyavailablethird-partyinformationsuchasproductreviewswhichfacilitateconsumers'purchasedecisionsisanotherdistinctiveandubiquitouscharacteristicofonlineretailing.Weshowthatretailerscanusetheupstreampricingscheme,wholesaleorplatform,asastrategictooltobenefitfromthird-partyinformation.Informationonthequalitydimensionhomogenizesconsumers'perceivedutilitydifferencesbetweencompetingproductsandincreasestheupstreamcompetition,whichbenefitstheretailerunderthewholesaleschemebuthurtstheretailerundertheplatformscheme.Informationonthefitdimensionheterogenizesconsumers'estimatedfitstotheproductsandsoftenstheupstreamcompetition,whichhurtstheretailerunderthewholesaleschemebutbenefitstheretailerundertheplatformscheme.Consequently,whentheprecisionofthethird-partyinformationishigh(low),aretailercanbenefitfromthird-partyinformationbyadoptingthewholesale(platform)schemeifthequalitydimensionplaysadominantroleandbyadoptingtheplatform(wholesale)schemeifthefitdimensionplaysadominantrole.Furthermore,theeffectofprecisionimprovementontheretailer'sprofitdependsonpricingschemechoiceandrelativeimportanceofqualityandfitattributesinconsumers'evaluationofproducts.Forinstance,whenthefitdimensionplaysadominantrole,increasingtheprecisioncanhurttheretailerunderwholesaleschemebutbenefitunderplatformscheme.","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Kwark","given":"Young","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Chen","given":"Jianqing","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Raghunathan","given":"Srinivasan","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"MISQuarterly","id":"ITEM-1","issue":"3","issued":{"date-parts":[["2017","3","3"]]},"page":"763-785","title":"PlatformorWholesale?AStrategicToolforOnlineRetailerstoBenefitfromThird-PartyInformation","type":"article-journal","volume":"41"},"uris":["/documents/?uuid=bdfd9094-176e-4af0-b3a3-e835ce68b841"]}],"mendeley":{"formattedCitation":"<sup>[2]</sup>","plainTextFormattedCitation":"[2]","previouslyFormattedCitation":"<sup>[2]</sup>"},"properties":{"noteIndex":0},"schema":"/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"}[2]、营销活动ADDINCSL_CITATION{"citationItems":[{"id":"ITEM-1","itemData":{"DOI":"10.1287/mnsc.2014.2042","ISSN":"0025-1909","abstract":"Intermediariescanchoosebetweenfunctioningasamarketplace(onwhichsuppliersselltheirproductsdirectlytobuyers)orasareseller(purchasingproductsfromsuppliersandsellingthemtobuyers).Wemodelthisasadecisionbetweenwhethercontrolrightsoveranon-contractibledecisionvariable(thechoiceofsomemarketingactivity)arebetterheldbysuppliers(themarketplacemode)orbytheintermediary(thereseller-mode).Whetherthemarketplaceortheresellermodeispreferreddependsonwhetherindependentsuppliersortheintermediaryhavemoreimportantinformationrelevanttotheoptimaltailoringofmarketingactivitiesforeachspecificproduct.Weshowthatthistradeoffisshiftedtowardsthereseller-modewhenmarketingactivitiescreatespilloversacrossproductsandwhennetworkeffectsleadtounfavorableexpectationsaboutsupplierparticipation.Iftheresellerhasavariablecostadvantage(respectively,disadvantage)relativetothemarketplacethenthetradeoffisshiftedtowardsthemarketplaceforlong-tail(respectively,shorttail)products.Wethusprovideatheoryofwhichproductsanintermediaryshouldofferineachmode.Wealsoprovidesomeempiricalevidencethatsupportsourmainresults.","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Hagiu","given":"Andrei","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Wright","given":"Julian","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"ManagementScience","id":"ITEM-1","issue":"1","issued":{"date-parts":[["2015","1"]]},"page":"184-203","title":"MarketplaceorReseller?","type":"article-journal","volume":"61"},"uris":["/documents/?uuid=005f3363-530a-4b96-a188-d2305453984a"]}],"mendeley":{"formattedCitation":"<sup>[3]</sup>","plainTextFormattedCitation":"[3]","previouslyFormattedCitation":"<sup>[3]</sup>"},"properties":{"noteIndex":0},"schema":"/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"}[3]、碳限额交易ADDINCSL_CITATION{"citationItems":[{"id":"ITEM-1","itemData":{"DOI":"10.1080/00207543.2020.1745314","ISSN":"0020-7543","abstract":"Nowadays,manycountriesandgovernmentsimplementthecap-and-traderegulationtocurbcarbonemissions.Thisstudyaimstoexplorehowtheregulationaffectsane-tailer'schoiceofretailingformatsbetweenmarketplaceandreselleraswellasitspartner'sresponsebyconsideringasupplychaincomposedofane-tailerandamanufacturer.Wealsotakethemanufacturer'sinvestmentstrategyintoaccountandthendevelopfourmodelstoexaminethetwomembers'preferencesforretailingformats.First,ourresultsdemonstratethatifaproduct'semissionsintheretailprocessaremedium(low)ortheplatformfeerateisrelativelylow(high),thee-tailerandthemanufacturerbothprefermarketplace(reseller)mode.Second,thee-tailerpreferstoofferresellermodeforonemanufacturerwithastrongabilityofemissionreductionandoffermarketplacemodeotherwise;butthemanufacturer'spreferenceisopposedtothee-tailer's.Third,themanufactureralwaysbenefitsfromherinvestment,regardlessofinmarketplaceorresellermodes;thee-tailer'sattitudetowardsthemanufacturer'sinvestmentvarieswithretailingformats.Specifically,thee-tailerunderresellermodealwaysprefersthemanufacturertoinvest;butundermarketplacemode,heprefersthemanufacturertoinvestonlywhenthelatter'sabilityofemissionreductionisweak.","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Liu","given":"Jinjin","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Ke","given":"Hua","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"InternationalJournalofProductionResearch","id":"ITEM-1","issue":"0","issued":{"date-parts":[["2020","3","27"]]},"page":"1-22","publisher":"Taylor&Francis","title":"Firms'preferencesforretailingformatsconsideringonemanufacturer'semissionreductioninvestment","type":"article-journal","volume":"0"},"uris":["/documents/?uuid=3337aab5-bb07-4cfb-9720-102a36377f58"]}],"mendeley":{"formattedCitation":"<sup>[4]</sup>","plainTextFormattedCitation":"[4]","previouslyFormattedCitation":"<sup>[4]</sup>"},"properties":{"noteIndex":0},"schema":"/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"}[4]和区块链ADDINCSL_CITATION{"citationItems":[{"id":"ITEM-1","itemData":{"DOI":"10.1016/j.tre.2020.102066","ISSN":"13665545","abstract":"Weexaminethevalueofblockchainfordisclosingsecondhandproductqualityinasupplychaininwhichcontributorsconsignsecondhandproductstoanonlineplatformthatresellsthemandcompeteswithsuppliersofnewproducts.Wefindthattheplatformismorelikelytoprovideauniform(differential)pricingstrategywithnewproductswhentherevenuesharingportionoftheconsignmentcontractissufficientlylow(high).Moreover,surprisingly,withoutblockchain,theplatformprefersmoderatelyperceivedandtruequalitysecondhandproducts,insteadofextremelyhighorlowquality.Withblockchain,theplatformpreferssellinglow-uniquenessandlow-quality(orhigh-uniquenessandhigh-quality)secondhandproducts.Furthermore,wefindthatwithblockchain,horizontalintegrationismoreeffectiveinimprovingthesupplychain'stotalprofit.Awin-win-winoutcomecanbeachievedfortheplatform,thesupplier,andconsumersinasupplychainthatsellslow-uniquenessproducts.","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Shen","given":"Bin","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Xu","given":"Xiaoyan","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Yuan","given":"Quan","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"TransportationResearchPartE:LogisticsandTransportationReview","id":"ITEM-1","issued":{"date-parts":[["2020","10"]]},"page":"102066","publisher":"Elsevier","title":"Sellingsecondhandproductsthroughanonlineplatformwithblockchain","type":"article-journal","volume":"142"},"uris":["/documents/?uuid=5ff4000d-0338-414d-8596-e068d80ed76e"]}],"mendeley":{"formattedCitation":"<sup>[5]</sup>","plainTextFormattedCitation":"[5]","previouslyFormattedCitation":"<sup>[5]</sup>"},"properties":{"noteIndex":0},"schema":"/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"}[5]等。Jiang等(2011)ADDINCSL_CITATION{"citationItems":[{"id":"ITEM-1","itemData":{"DOI":"10.1287/mksc.1110.0656","ISSN":"0732-2399","abstract":"Whilemillionsofproductsaresoldonitsretailplatform,Aitselfstocksandsellsonlyasmallfractionofthem.Mostoftheseproductsaresoldbythird-partysellers,whopayAmazonafeeforeachunitsold.EmpiricalevidenceclearlysuggeststhatAmazontendstosellhigh-demandproductsandleavelong-tailproductsforindependentsellerstooffer.WeinvestigatehowaplatformownersuchasAmazon,facingexantedemanduncertainty,maystrategicallylearnfromthesesellers’earlysaleswhichofthe“mid-tail”productsareworthwhileforitsdirectsellingandwhicharebestleftforotherstosell.Theplatformowner’s“cherry-picking”ofthesuccessfulproducts,however,givesanindependentsellertheincentivetomaskanyhighdemandbyloweringhissaleswithareducedservicelevel(unobservedbytheplatformowner).Weanalyzethisstrategicinteractionbetweentheplatformownerandtheindependentsellerusingagame-theoreticmodelwithtwotypesofsellers—onewithhighdemandandonewithlowdemand.Weshowthatitmaynotalwaysbeoptimalfortheplatformownertoidentifytheseller’sdemand.Interestingly,theplatformownermaybeworseoffbyretainingitsoptiontoselltheindependentseller’sproductwhereasbothtypesofsellersmaybenefitfromtheplatformowner’sthreatofentry.Theplatformowner’sentryoptionmayreducetheconsumersurplusintheearlyperiodthoughitincreasestheconsumersurplusinthelaterperiod.Wealsoinvestigatehowconsumerreviewsinfluencethemarketoutcome.","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Jiang","given":"Baojun","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Jerath","given":"Kinshuk","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Srinivasan","given":"Kannan","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"MarketingScience","id":"ITEM-1","issue":"5","issued":{"date-parts":[["2011","9"]]},"page":"757-775","title":"FirmStrategiesinthe“MidTail”ofPlatform-BasedRetailing","type":"article-journal","volume":"30"},"uris":["/documents/?uuid=f85da130-f865-4e54-805d-c82d20daee7e"]}],"mendeley":{"formattedCitation":"<sup>[6]</sup>","plainTextFormattedCitation":"[6]","previouslyFormattedCitation":"<sup>[6]</sup>"},"properties":{"noteIndex":0},"schema":"/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"}[6]研究了电商平台在转售和市场渠道中所销售的“中尾”产品的类别。结果表明,平台识别第三方卖家的需求可能不利于自身,而第三方卖家可能会从平台的进入威胁中获益。Abhishek等(2016)ADDINCSL_CITATION{"citationItems":[{"id":"ITEM-1","itemData":{"DOI":"10.1287/mnsc.2015.2230","ISSN":"0025-1909","abstract":"Inrecentyears,onlineretailers(alsocallede-tailers)havestartedallowingmanufacturersdirectaccesstotheircustomerswhilechargingafeeforprovidingthisaccess,aformatcommonlyreferredtoasagencyselling.Inthispaper,weuseastylizedtheoreticalmodeltoanswerakeyquestionthate-tailersarefacing:Whenshouldtheyuseanagencysellingformatinsteadofusingthemoreconventionalresellingformat?Wefindthatagencysellingismoreefficientthanresellingandleadstolowerretailprices;however,thee-tailersendupgivingcontroloverretailpricestothemanufacturer.Therefore,thereactionbythemanufacturer,whomakeselectronicchannelpricingdecisionsbasedontheirimpactondemandinthetraditionalchannel(brick-andmortarretailing),isanimportantfactorfore-tailerstoconsider.Wefindthatwhensalesintheelectronicchannelleadtoanegativeeffectondemandinthetraditionalchannel,e-tailerspreferagencyselling,whereaswhensalesintheelectronicchannelleadtosubstantialstimulationofdemandinthetraditionalchannel,e-tailerspreferreselling.Thispreferenceismediatedbycompetitionbetweene-tailers-ascompetitionbetweenthemincreases,e-tailersprefertouseagencyselling.Wealsofindthatwhene-tailersbenefitfrompositiveexternalitiesfromthesalesofthefocalproduct(suchasadditionalprofitsfromsalesofassociatedproducts),retailpricesmaybelowerunderresellingthanunderagencyselling,andthee-tailerspreferresellingundersomeconditionsforwhichtheywouldpreferagencysellingwithoutthepositiveexternalities.","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Abhishek","given":"Vibhanshu","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Jerath","given":"Kinshuk","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Zhang","given":"Z.John","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"ManagementScience","id":"ITEM-1","issue":"8","issued":{"date-parts":[["2016","8"]]},"page":"2259-2280","title":"AgencySellingorReselling?ChannelStructuresinElectronicRetailing","type":"article-journal","volume":"62"},"uris":["/documents/?uuid=65ab0115-ece3-440c-be2f-b78b7d883650"]}],"mendeley":{"formattedCitation":"<sup>[7]</sup>","plainTextFormattedCitation":"[7]","previouslyFormattedCitation":"<sup>[7]</sup>"},"properties":{"noteIndex":0},"schema":"/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"}[7]针对一个多渠道制造商和两个相互竞争的电子零售商构成的供应链,考虑渠道效应,研究了竞争电子零售商的线上销售模式选择。他们发现,当渠道效应为负时,电子零售商会选择代理销售模式;否则电子零售商选择转售模式。此外,随着平台之间竞争的加剧,电子零售商倾向于采用代理销售模式。Tian等(2018)ADDINCSL_CITATION{"citationItems":[{"id":"ITEM-1","itemData":{"DOI":"10.1111/poms.12885","ISSN":"10591478","abstract":"Traditionally,onlineretailershaveactedasproductresellers.Recently,theseretailershavealsostartedtoserveasonlinemarketplacesbyprovidingaplatformtodirectlyconnectsellerswithbuyers.Overandabovere-shapingthetraditionale-commercemarket,conventionalwisdomsuggeststhatthisnewformatwillmitigatethedouble-marginalizationeffectandbenefitboththeintermediaryandsuppliersthrougharevenuesharingscheme.However,wefindthatupstreamcompetitionbetweensupplierscriticallymoderatesthispossibility.Wealsofindthattheinteractionoforder-fulfillmentcostsandupstreamcompetitionintensitymoderatestheselectionofanoptimalmodefortheintermediary.Morespecifically,whenorder-fulfillmentcostsarelargeandwhenthesupplierproductofferingsaresimilar(i.e.,competitionintensityishigh),thepureresellermodeisthepreferredchoice;whenorder-fulfillmentcostsaresmallandthesupplierproductofferingsarehighlydifferentiated(i.e.,lowcompetitionintensity),thepuremarketplacemodeisthepreferredchoice.Finally,thehybridmodeispreferredwhenorder-fulfillmentcostsaremoderateandsuppliers’productsaresomewhatsimilar(i.e.,competitionintensityismoderate).Theintuitionbehindtheseresultshingesonthetrade-offbetweentransferofpricingrightsandtheresponsibilityfororderfulfillment.Ourfindingsnotonlycomplementtheemergingonlinemarketplaceliteraturebutalsoprovidetestableempiricalquestionsconcerningtherelationshipandmagnitudeofdifferentfactorssteeringthemodechoice.","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Tian","given":"Lin","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Vakharia","given":"AsooJ.","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Tan","given":"Yinliang(Ricky)","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Xu","given":"Yifan","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"ProductionandOperationsManagement","id":"ITEM-1","issue":"8","issued":{"date-parts":[["2018","8"]]},"page":"1595-1610","title":"Marketplace,Reseller,orHybrid:StrategicAnalysisofanEmergingE-CommerceModel","type":"article-journal","volume":"27"},"uris":["/documents/?uuid=d4262e90-e30e-4eb9-b4b5-69795cf4730f"]}],"mendeley":{"formattedCitation":"<sup>[8]</sup>","plainTextFormattedCitation":"[8]","previouslyFormattedCitation":"<sup>[8]</sup>"},"properties":{"noteIndex":0},"schema":"/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"}[8]考虑两个供应商和一个电子零售商组成的供应链,研究了电子零售商的线上销售模式选择。研究发现,当订单履行成本较大且供应商竞争强度较大时,纯转售模式是最优的策略;当订单履行成本较小且竞争强度较低时,纯市场模式是最优的策略;当订单履行成本和竞争强度适中时,混合模式下电子零售商获得的利润最高。Dong等(2018)ADDINCSL_CITATION{"citationItems":[{"id":"ITEM-1","itemData":{"DOI":"10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.07.034","ISSN":"09255273","abstract":"Inthispaper,westudythedynamicsellingstrategyforafirmunderasymmetricmarketandproductinformationovertwoperiods.Ineachperiod,thefirmcanselltheproductdirectlytocustomers,i.e.,directselling,orthroughanintermediaryretailersuchasAmazonandeBay,i.e.,agentselling.Beforethesellingseason,thefirmisuncertainaboutthemarketsizeandthecustomersareunawareofwhethertheproductmatchestheirtastes.However,bydirectlyinteractingwiththecustomers,thefirmunderdirectsellingortheretailerunderagentsellingwillobtainadditionalmarketinformationattheendofthefirstperiod.Meanwhile,customersinthesecondperiodcanresolvetheirproductfituncertaintybyaccessingthereviewcommentspostedbypreviouscustomers,ifagentsellingisadoptedinthefirstperiod.Weshowthatifthefirmandretailerdonotsharetheadditionalmarketinformationwitheachother,agentsellingisneveroptimalinthesecondperiod.However,bothdirectsellingandagentsellingmaybeoptimalinthefirstperiod,duetotherelativeeffectsofthefirm'smarketuncertaintyandcustomers’productfituncertainty.Interestingly,conversetotraditionalwisdom,weshowthatwithinformationsharing,theretailerwillalwayssharetheadditionalmarketinformationwiththefirm.Furthermore,inequilibrium,bothagentsellinganddirectsellingmaybeoptimalinbothperiods,dependingonthebenefitfromtheadditionalmarketinformation.","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Dong","given":"Ciwei","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Yang","given":"Yunpeng","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Zhao","given":"Ming","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"InternationalJournalofProductionEconomics","id":"ITEM-1","issued":{"date-parts":[["2018","10"]]},"page":"204-213","publisher":"ElsevierB.V.","title":"Dynamicsellingstrategyforafirmunderasymmetricinformation:Directsellingvs.agentselling","type":"article-journal","volume":"204"},"uris":["/documents/?uuid=bad7f463-06a9-4d52-a217-e4955857b82e"]}],"mendeley":{"formattedCitation":"<sup>[9]</sup>","plainTextFormattedCitation":"[9]","previouslyFormattedCitation":"<sup>[9]</sup>"},"properties":{"noteIndex":0},"schema":"/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json"}[9]研究了市场和产品信息不对称情形下制造商在两个时期的动态销售策略。结果表明,如果制造商和电子零售商不共享市场信息,在第二阶段代理模式并不是最优的策略,而在第一阶段直销和代理模式都可能是最优的。如果制造商和电子零售商共享市场信息,代理销售和直销在这两个阶段都可能是最优的。Chen等(2019)ADDINCSL_CITATION{"citationItems":[{"id":"ITEM-1","itemData":{"DOI":"10.1016/j.omega.2019.07.001","ISSN":"03050483","author":[{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Chen","given":"Pingping","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Zhao","given":"Ruiqing","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Yan","given":"Yingchen","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""},{"dropping-particle":"","family":"Li","given":"Xiang","non-dropping-particle":"","parse-names":false,"suffix":""}],"container-title":"Omega","id":"ITEM-1","issued":{"date-parts":[["2020","7"]]},"page":"102085","publisher":"ElsevierLtd","title":"Promotionalpricingandonlinebusinessmodelchoiceinthepresenceofretailcompetition","type":"article-journal","volume":"94"},"uris":["/documents/?uuid=eb1f8225-1d0b-4d14-a952-75ea9f6a2503"]}],"mendeley":{"formattedCi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