高盛-亚洲经济分析：中国投资占GDP比重步入结构性下行通道（摘要）-20260531

2026年5月31日|5:42PMHKT中国投资占GDP比重步入结构性下行通道(摘要)n中国投资占GDP的比重近二十年来保持在40%以上，持续时间远超许多预测人士的预期。然而，我们认为支撑这一高占比的结构性力量正在减n从自上而下的角度看，中国的资本存量相对于大多数其他经济体已不再处于低位，其债务负担随着时间的推移急剧上升（债务与GDP之比超300%且资本回报率已经下降。综合来看，这些趋势表明继续依赖债务驱动投弱。从国际经验看，特别是参考其他东亚经济体的发展轨迹，投资占GDP比重最n从自下而上的角度看，经过数十年的快速发展，中国大部分的交通和环保基础设施已较为完善，而人口减少、出生率显著下降等人口发展趋势部分社会基础设施的需求减弱。尽管通信（包括AI相关投资）、能源和医疗保健领域投资仍有增长空间，我们认为这不足以抵消其他领域基础n政策对旧有的投资驱动型增长模式的支持也有所减弱。尽管这一转变可能在十多一些行业的产能过剩问题），以及近年来尽管面临较大的增缩房地产行业规模以及不再出台大规模的刺激政策，均指然，当经济增长未能达到目标时，决策层仍会适度及暂时加快n在我们的基准预测下，中国投资占GDP的比重将从2025年的40%降至2035年的34%。如果在投资需求放缓的同时储蓄率仍然较高，我们认为国内利率可能会长+852-2978-6634|hui.shan@投资者不应视本报告为作出投资决策的唯一因素。有关分析师的申明和其他重要信息，见信息/research/hedge.html。InvestmentShareofGDPonStructurallyDecliningPathChina’sinvestmentshareofGDPhasbeenamongthehighestintheworld.Ithasdefiedmanyforecasters’previouspredictions,remainingabove40%fornearlytwodecades(图表1).However,wethinktheunderlyingdynamicshavestartedtochange.Inthisnote,wediscusstop-down,bottom-up,andpolicyreasonswhyChina’sinvestmentshareofGDPshouldgraduallydeclineinthecomingyears.Inourbaseline,itfallsfrom40%in2025to34%in2035.Withthesavingsratestillhighandinvestmentdemandsoftening,interestratesarelikelytoremainmuchlowerinChinathaninothercountries,search-for-yieldmotivesamongdomesticsaversshouldpersist,exportsshouldstaystrong,andtheRMBshouldappreciateagainsttheUSDandothermajorcurrenciesinresponsetoChina’sgrowingtradesurpluses.图表1:China’sinvestmentshareofGDPhasbeenmuchhigherthanothercountriesforalongtime45454050RelationshipbetweenincomelevelandinvestmentshareofGDP454095%confidence95%confidenceintervalofmodelestimat Modelfit(trainedonnon-Chi5040000Majoreconomieswithpopulation>20m050001000015WeusetheGeneralizedAdditiveModel(GAM)infittingthenon-linearrelationshipbetweenGDPpercapitaandinvestmentshareofGDPusingdatafrom1970to2024.资料来源：HaverAnalytics,高盛全球投资研究部ATop-DownViewIfacountrystartswithalowcapitalstock,investmentcanremainstrongforalongperiodasthecapitalstockisbuiltup.ThiswaspartlytrueforChinainthe1990srelativetobothDMandEMeconomies,helpingdrivestronginvestmentgrowthandrapidcapitalstockaccumulationinthe2000sand2010s(图表2).Bynow,however,China’scapitalstock-to-GDPratiohassurpassedthatofmostDMandEMeconomies.Inotherwords,China’scatch-upphaseofrapidcapitalaccumulationappearstobeover.2026年5月31日22026年5月31日3图表2:China’scapitalstock-to-GDPratiowaslowinthe1990sbuthasnowsurpassedthatofmostDMandEMeconomiesofGDPCapitalofGDPCapitalStocktoGDPRatio(ChinavsEM)ChinaSouthKoreaMexicoTürkiye707580859095000510%ofGDP700600500400300200CapitalStocktoGDPRatio(ChinavsDM)ChinaUnitedStatesJapanGermany%ofGDP700600500400300200%ofGDP7006005004003002007075808590950005101520%700600500400300200OtherEastAsianeconomiessuchasJapan,SouthKorea,andTaiwanprecededMainlandChinainraisinginvestmentandexpandingmanufacturingcapacity.Inthe1970s,theinvestmentshareofGDPinJapanandTaiwanpeakedataround40%(图表3).Today,itiscloseto25%inboth.InSouthKorea,theinvestmentshareofGDPremainedveryhigh—between40%and50%—inthe1990s,buthasstabilizedatslightlybelow35%inrecentyears.IfMainlandChinafollowstheexperienceoftheseEastAsianeconomies,itsinvestmentshareofGDPshouldalsodeclineinthecomingyearsanddecades.Anothertop-downreasonforslowerinvestmentgrowthinChinaisitshighdebt-to-GDPratioandlowreturnoncapital.PBOCdatashowthatChina’snon-financialdebt-to-GDPratiorosefrom139%in2008Q4,beforetheRMB4tninfrastructurestimulus,to209%in2015Q1,beforetheshantytownredevelopmentstimulus,andto309%in2026Q1.图表4showsthatthereturntocapitalinChinahasdeclinedsignificantlysincethe1990s.1Moreover,before2009,eachadditionalyuanofGDPwasassociatedwithanaverage1.5yuanincreaseindebt;overthepastthreeyears,ithastaken5.5yuanofadditionaldebttogenerateoneyuanofGDPgrowth.Highdebtlevelsandlowreturnsimplylessopportunitiesforproductiveinvestmentgoingforward.1WeuseasimplifiedversionofChong-EnBai,Chang-TaiHsieh,andYingyiQian(2006),“TheReturntoCapitalinChina”,BrookingsPapersonEconomicActivityinourcalculation.Thepreciselevelsoftheestimatesaresensitivetocapitaldepreciationrateassumptions,butthebroadtrendisnot.2026年5月31日4图表3:InvestmentsharesofGDPinJapan,SouthKoreaandTaiwaneventuallydeclined%of%ofGDP%ofGDP6060InvestmenttoGDPratio(PPP)505560657075808590950005101520MainlandChinaJapanSouthKoreaTaiwan5040302050403020图表4:TherateofreturntocapitalhasdeclinedinChinasincethe1990sLowerreturntoLowerreturntocapital,moredebtneededforeachYuanofgrowthRateofreturntocapitalDebtgrowthperYuanofGDPgrowth(inverted,right)1962197219821992200220122022Percent864201952Yuan02468资料来源：FederalReserveBankofSt.Louis,PWT,HaverAnalytics,高盛全球ABottom-UpLookAfterthreedecadesofrapidbuildout,China’sinfrastructurehasbecomeamongthemostadvancedintheworldinmanyareas.Byend-2024,Chinahad191,000kmofexpressways,covering99%ofcitieswithpopulationsabove200,000.China’shigh-speedrailnetworkreached48,000km,accountingformorethan70%oftheglobaltotal.图表5comparestheBeijing-Shanghai,London-Paris,andNewYorkCity-WashingtonDChigh-speedraillines;theBeijing-Shanghairouteisbothfasterandmorefrequentthantheothertwo.图表5:TheBeijing-Shanghaihigh-speedtrainisfasterandmorefrequentthanLondon-ParisandNewYorkCity-WashingtonDChigh-speedraillinesHigh-speedrailRaildistanceTopspeedFastesttraveltimeFrequencyBeijing-Shanghai1318km(819miles)350km/h4h18m50dailydeparturesLondon-Paris491km(306miles)300km/h2h16m15-18dailydeparturesNewYorkCity-WashingtonDC364km(226miles)257km/h2h55m35-40dailydeparturesNote:StatisticsarebasedoninformationcollectedinMayInportsandmaritimetransport,China’scontainerthroughputreached354millionTEUsin2025,equalto36%oftheglobaltotal.Chinanowaccountsforeightoftheworld’stoptenportsbycargothroughputandsixofthetoptenbycontainerthroughput.Bycomparison,in2000,ShanghaiwastheonlyMainlandChinaportintheglobaltopten(图表6).2026年5月31日5图表6:SixofthetoptenportsgloballybycontainerthroughputwereinChinain2025ThroughputThroughput11Shanghai2Singapore2Singapore3344Shenzhen556Shanghai674.9784.6894.39JebelAliAntwerp4.1Incommunicationsinfrastructure,Chinaalsoadvancedrapidly.AlthoughtheUSwasfaraheadofChinainthe2000s,by2024China’spercapitasubscriptionsformobilephonesandfixedbroadbandexceededthoseintheUSbyameaningfulmargin.Inmid-2025,thenumberof5GbasestationsinChinareached4.6million,representingmorethan60%oftheglobaltotal.NumberNumber5050Fixedbroadbandsubscriptionsper100people404030302020China020002005201020152020图表7:China’spercapitaNumberNumber5050Fixedbroadbandsubscriptionsper100people404030302020China020002005201020152020NumberNumberMobilephonesubscriptionsper100people8060402001990199520002005201020152020604020ChinaNumber资料来源：HaverAnalytics,高盛全球投资研究部Beyondtheseexamples,wealsoexaminesub-sectorswithinChina’sofficialfixedassetinvestment(FAI)series.Admittedly,FAIdatahavesignificantmeasurementissuesandattimesdivergefromalternativemeasuresofconstructionandinvestmentsuchassteelandcementconsumption.Thatsaid,wethinkthelong-termtrendsandrelativeperformanceacrosssectorsarestillinformative.Specifically,wedivideinfrastructureFAIintosevencategories:(1)environment(i.e.,waterconservancy,environment,andpublicutilitiesmanagement),(2)transportation(i.e.,railway,road,water,aviation,andcitypublictransportation),(3)energy(includingcoal,oil,andgasmining),(4)communication(i.e.,informationtransmission,computer,andsoftware),(5)community(i.e.,culture,publicmanagement,andresidentservices),(6)education,and(7)healthcare2026年5月31日6infrastructure.2In2025,environment,transportation,andenergywerethelargestinfrastructuresectors,accountingfor80%oftotalinfrastructureinvestmentcombined(图表8).图表8:Sector-specifictrendsdonotsupportcontinuedincreasesininfrastructureinvestmentTypeofinfrastructureShareoftotalin2025Peakedinofficialdata?GrowthoutlookincomingyearsEconomicinfrastructureEnvironment29%YesModeratedeclineTransportation27%YesNotabledeclineEnergy25%NoModerateincreaseCommunicationSocialinfrastructure4%NoNotableincreaseCommunity6%YesModeratedeclineEducation6%YesModeratedeclineHealthcare4%YesModerateincreaseTotal100%YesModestdeclineWeexaminethesesevencategoriesseparatelyanddrawfourconclusions.nNotableincreasesincommunicationinfrastructureinvestment:GiventheongoingAIcapexboom,wethinkinvestmentincommunicationinfrastructurehassignificantupsideoverthenextfewyears.Thatsaid,itscontributiontooverallinvestmentshouldnotbeoverstatedascommunicationinfrastructureinvestmentwasonly4%oftotalinfrastructureinvestmentin2025.Moreover,byourequityanalysts’estimates,Chinesehyperscalers(Alibaba,Baidu,BytedanceandTencent)areinvestingaboutatenthasmuchastheirUScounterparts.nModerateincreasesinenergyandhealthcareinfrastructureinvestment:Afterthe2021poweroutages,Chinesespendingonenergyinfrastructurerosesignificantly.Despitethealreadyheightenedlevelsofspending,wethinkenergyinfrastructureinvestmentmayincreasefurther,albeitataslowerpacethanin2022-24,givenChina’sdeterminationtopursueenergyself-relianceandenergysecurity.Separately,populationagingwillacceleraterapidlyinChina.Currently,2.5%ofthepopulationisaboveage80;by2050,itwillincreasetoover10%.Populationagingimplieshigherdemandforhealthcarefacilitiesdespitefallingtotalpopulation.nModeratelydeclininginvestmentincommunity,educationandenvironmentalinfrastructure:Forsocialinfrastructuresuchascommunityandeducationfacilities,demographictrendsarekeydriversofdemand.AccordingtoUNprojections,China’stotalpopulationmaydecline3%from2025to2035underthemedium-fertilityscenarioand5%underthelow-fertilityscenario,whilethenumberofschool-agedchildren(ages6–15)mayfallbynearlyhalfoverthenext2NotethatthereisnosingleunifieddefinitionofinfrastructureinvestmentinChina.Inourmonthlytrackingandanalysisofofficialactivitydata,wealsoincludeinvestmentinscientificresearchbutexcludeinvestmentincoal,oilandgasminingininfrastructureinvestment.2026年5月31日7decade(图表9and图表10).Asaresult,itwilllikelybedifficultforphysicalinvestmentintheseareastoincreaseoverthecomingdecade.Forenvironmentalinfrastructure,thepeakinvestmentlikelyoccurredinthepastdecade.From2014to2018,thegovernmentwageda“waronpollution”andreducedPM2.5levelsbyabout40%.3Hence,pollutionclean-uprelatedinvestmentshouldbelowerinthefuture.Evenforwaternetworkswhichthe15thFive-YearPlanemphasizesasanimportantareaofinvestmentduring2026-30,theimpliedannualaveragespendingofRMB1.4tnappearstobebroadlyinlinewith2024levels.Altogether,wethinktotalenvironmentalinfrastructureinvestmentshoulddeclinemoderatelyinthecomingyears.nNotabledeclinesintransportationinfrastructureinvestment:GiventhescaleofpastinvestmentandtheadvancedstateofChina’stransportationinfrastructurerelativetoothercountries,includingdevelopedeconomies,weexpectinvestmentinthissectortodeclineinthecomingyears.Takingaweightedaverageacrossthesesevencategories,weestimatethatoverallinfrastructureinvestmentfacesamodestdownwardtrend.Afterall,roadsandbridgesneedtobebuiltonlyonce.Inourview,thecurrentlevelofinfrastructureinvestment—38%oftotalinvestmentand15%ofGDPinChina—isunlikelytobesustainedinthecomingdecades.图表9:UNprojectsChina’spopulationtodecline3%and5%underthemediumandlowfertilityassumptions,respectivelyChinesepopuationActualUNprojection(mediumfertilityscenario)UNprojection(lowfertilityscenario)90950005101520253035404550BillionpersonsBillionpersons资料来源：UnitedNations,高盛全球投资研究部图表10:China’sschool-agedpopulationisexpectedtocontractbyhalfoverthecomingdecadeduetolowerbirthratesChinesepopulationage3-18Chinesepopulationage3-18Age3-5Age6-15(mandatoryschooling)Age16-18UNprojectionMillionpersons400300200Millionpersons40030020001990200020102020203020402050资料来源：UnitedNations,高盛全球投资研究部ShiftingPolicyStanceApartfromtop-downandbottom-upfundamentals,policymakers’stancealsomattersforChina’sinvestmenttrajectory.BecauseChinahashighsavings,aclosedcapitalaccount,andindependentmonetarypolicy,debt-driven,government-ledinvestmentcouldpersistforyearsifpolicymakersdisregardreturnstocapitalandrisingdebtlevels.However,signalsoverthepastfewyearssuggestthat3SeeGreenstone,Li,HeandZou(2021),“China’sWaronPollution:EvidencefromtheFirstFiveYears”,NBERWorkingPaper28467formoredetailsofChina’seffortsinreducingairandwaterpollutionin2014-18.2026年5月31日8policymakers’appetiteforthepreviousinvestment-drivengrowthmodelhaswaned.Manufacturinginvestmenthasoutperformedothertypesofinvestmentinrecentyears.During2021-24,itgrewbyalmost10%peryear,comparedwithanaverageof4%forheadlineFAIand-8%forpropertyFAI.Theincreaseinmanufacturinginvestmenthasledtosevereovercapacityandlowutilizationratesinmanyindustries(图表11).China’sPPIaveraged-2.6%in2023-25.InJuly2025,PresidentXichairedaCentralCommissionforEconomicandFinancialAffairs(CCEFA)meeting,callingforreformstocombatexcessivecompetitionandprice-cutting.Theensuing “anti-involution”campaign,alongwitheffortstocurblocalgovernmentimplicitdebtandurgelocalofficialsto“establishacorrectviewofperformance,”clearlyshowsthetopleadership’sdesiretoreducelocalgovernments’relianceonthedebt-fueled,investment-drivengrowthmodel.Therefore,eventhoughhigh-techmanufacturingshouldcontinuetoseerobustinvestmentgrowth—especiallyinareassuchassemiconductorswhereChinastillreliesheavilyonforeignsupply—thepaceofoverallmanufacturinginvestmentgrowthshouldmoderategoingforward.Thepropertymarkethasbeendecliningforfiveyears,withnewstartsandpropertyFAI80%and46%belowtheirrespectivepeaksin2020Q4.OurpreviousresearchshowsthatChina’slong-termurbandemandfornewhomeconstructionislikelytoremainlowforalongtime,mainlybecauseofpopulationdecline,slowingurbanization,andstill-elevatedvacancyrates(图表12).Assuch,propertyinvestmentisunlikelytorisemeaningfullyinthecomingdecade.图表11:Industrialcapacityutilizationratefellfollowedbythegovernment’s“anti-involution”campaignPercentPercentPercent8080Chinaindustrialcapacityutilizationrate(seasonallyadjusted)797978787777Supply-sideAnti-involution76reform7675757474737372727171707020132014201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026资料来源：HaverAnalytics,高盛全球投资研究部图表12:China’surbandemandfornewhomeconstructionislikelytostaylowforalongtimeMillionMillionTotaldemandforurbanhousing(unit)InvestmentDemolitionDemographicTotal202520302035204020452050Million2420840-420102420840-420152020Localgovernmentshavefinancedinfrastructureprojectsmainlythroughoff-budgetchannelssuchaslocalgovernmentspecialbonds(LGSBs),localgovernmentfinancingvehicles(LGFVs),andlandsalerevenues.4In2020,duringtheCovidpandemic,andagainin2024-25,centralgovernmentspecialbonds(CGSBs)werealsoissuedpartlytofinanceinvestmentinstrategicprojectsandsectors.图表134Hereweusenetlandsalesrevenueasopposedtogrosslandsalesrevenuetocapturethelikelyamountspentoninfrastructurebuilding.Inaddition,duetodataavailabilitylimitations,wedonotobserveLGFVloansanduseLGFVbondsasaproxyforLGFVborrowing.2026年5月31日9showsthatthesumofthesechannelspeakedin2020andhassincedeclined,refiectingsharplylowerlandsalesandLGFVdeleveragingoverthepastfewyears.Inotherwords,thetopleadershipisalsopushinglocalgovernmentstobemoreselectiveininfrastructureinvestmentbylimitingtheirfinancingchannels.Lastly,ourChinadomesticmacropolicyproxy—asummaryofmonetary,fiscal,credit,andpropertypolicies—showsthegovernment’sreluctancetostimulatetheeconomyinthefaceofrecentgrowthheadwinds.Comparedwith2009,2015-16,and2020,themagnitudeofpolicyeasingappearsmuchmoremutedoverthepastfewyears(图表14).Ourinterpretationisthatpolicymakersareincreasinglyconcernedaboutdeficitsanddebtlevelsandwillusecyclicaleasingonlytoputafioorunderaslowingeconomy,ratherthantoprovidemeaningfulstimulus.Thatimpliessubduedgovernment-ledinvestmentgoingforward.Althoughrecentpolicycommunicationshaveemphasized“investinginpeople”ratherthan“investinginthings,”wethinkthisprobablymeansmoregovernmentconsumptionspendingratherthanmoregovernmentinvestment.图表13:Variousoff-budgetchannelstofinanceinfrastructureinvestmenthavedeclinedfrom2020%%ofGDPChinamajoroff-budgetfundingsources00910111213141516171819202122232425%ofGDP8642LGSBLGFVbondsLandsales(netrevenue)CGSB(excl.bankrecap)8642图表14:Domesticmacropolicyeasinghasbeenmoremutedinrecentyearscomparedto2009,2015-16and2020ChinadomesticmacropolicyChinadomesticmacropolicyproxyMorepolicystimulus-2.5-2.50708091011121314151617181920212223242526Note:ShadedareasrefertoperiodswhenChinaCAI3mmagrowthwasbelow5%.Z-score2.00.50.0-0.5-1.0-1.5-2.0Z-score2.00.50.0-0.5-1.0-1.5-2.0RatestoStayLowandExportstoRemainHighBecausebothfundamentalsandpolicysuggestmorelimitedroomforinvestmentgrowth,weexpectChina’sinvestmentshareofGDPtomovelowerinthecomingyears(图表15).Ifweassumeannualaveragegrowthof-1%forinfrastructureinvestment,0%forpropertyinvestment,5%formanufacturing,and5%forotherinvestment(e.g.,agricultureand