欧盟-2026 年希腊深度评估报告 In-Depth Review 2026 Greece

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EuropeanCommission

Directorate-GeneralforEconomicandFinancialAffairs

In-DepthReview2026

Greece

EUROPEANECONOMYInstitutionalPaper334

Thisin-depthreviewpresentsthemainfindingsoftheCommission’sstaffassessmentofmacroeconomicvulnerabilitiesforGreeceforthepurposesofthemacroeconomicimbalanceprocedure-Regulation(EU)No1176/2011onthepreventionandcorrectionofmacroeconomicimbalances.ItprovidestechnicalinputtotheCommissionfortheCommunication“EuropeanSemester–2026SpringPackage”thatwillsetouttheCommission’sassessmentastotheexistenceofimbalancesorexcessiveimbalancesinGreece.ThatCommunicationwillbepublishedinJune2026.

Greece

In-DepthReview2026

CONTENTS

1.INTRODUCTION1

2.ASSESSMENTOFMACROECONOMICIMBALANCES2

2.1.Governmentsector2

2.2.ExternalsectorandCompetitiveness4

2.3.Financialsector7

Conclusions12

ANNEX1-RENEWEDMOMENTUMINGREEKCORPORATELENDING17

1.INTRODUCTION

1

Thisin-depthreview(IDR)analysestheevolutionofGreece’svulnerabilitiesmainly

relatedtohighgovernmentdebt,aweakexternalpositionandtheslowworkoutofnon-performingloansoutsidethebankingsector.AnIDRwascarriedoutforGreeceinspring2025,andinJune2025theCommissionconcludedthatGreecewascontinuingtoexperienceimbalances

(

1

).Thisyear’sIDR,whichfollowsthe2026AlertMechanismReport(AMR)publishedinNovember2025

(

2

),assessesthepersistenceorunwindingofthevulnerabilitiesidentifiedlastyear,potentialemergingrisks,andrelevantpolicyprogressandpolicyoptionsthatcouldbeconsideredforthefuture.

ThevulnerabilitiesinGreeceareexaminedinthecontextofcontinuedeconomicgrowth.

TheGreekeconomykeptitsmomentum,andrealGDPgrewby2.1%in2025,atthesamerateasin2024,surpassingtheEUaverageof1.5%.Growthin2025wasbalanced,drivenbyhouseholdconsumption,investmentandnetexports.Privateconsumptionissettoremainanimportantgrowthdriver,boostedbyexpansionaryfiscalmeasuresincreasingnetwagegrowthin2026and2027.Investmentspendingisforecasttoacceleratein2026,thefinalyearoftheimplementationoftheRecoveryandResiliencePlan(RRP).Exportgrowthisexpectedtobesupportedbythegradualrecoveryoftradepartners’economies,butthepositiveeffectonnettradeismorethanoffsetbystrongerimportdemand,giventhehighimportcontentofinvestment.GDPgrowthisforecastat2.2%in2026and1.7%in2027,aseconomicgrowthispredictedtomoderate,oncetheimplementationoftheRRPiscompleted.

Strongdomesticdemand,labourshortagesandminimumwageincreasesareexpectedtocontinuetoexertupwardpressureonprices.Thus,headlineinflationaveraged2.9%in2025andstayedcloseto2024levels.Consumerpricegrowthisexpectedtodeclineto2.4%by2027.Coreinflationcameinat3.6%in2025,andisexpectedtodeclineto2.2%by2027,remainingabovetheeuroareaaverage,albeitwithanarrowinggap.

Thecut-offdateforthedataforpreparingthisIDRwas23April2026.Unlessstatedotherwise,alltheforecastdatausedinthisIDRweretakenfromtheCommission’sAutumn2025Forecast

(

3

)toensurethecoherenceofthevariousfiguresandcalculations.However,ifactualoutturndatabecomeavailableafterthepublicationoftheautumnforecast,thatisused.Assumptionsconcerningenergyprices,othercommoditiesprices,andothergeneralassumptionsweretakenfromtheAutumn2025ForecastanddonotreflectdevelopmentsrelatedtothewarintheMiddleEastanditsimpactonenergyprices

(

4

).

(1)EuropeanCommission(2025),Greece–In-depthReview2025,StaffWorkingDocument,SWD(2025)70final(publishedasEuropeanEconomy,

InstitutionalPaper309,

May2025);andEuropeanCommission(2025),2025EuropeanSemester-Springpackage,CommunicationfromtheCommissiontotheEuropeanParliament,theCouncil,theEuropeanCentralBank,theEuropeanEconomicandSocialCommittee,theCommitteeoftheRegionsandtheEuropeanInvestmentBank,

COM(2025)200final.

(2)EuropeanCommission(2025),AlertMechanismReport2026,CommunicationfromtheCommissiontotheEuropeanParliament,theCouncilandtheEuropeanEconomicandSocialCommittee,

COM(2025)956final;

andEuropeanCommission(2025),AlertMechanismReport2026,StaffWorkingDocument,

SWD(2025)956final.

(3)EuropeanEconomy,

InstitutionalPaper327.

(4)TheCommissionisassessingthesensitivityofMemberStatestomajoreconomicshocksoriginatingabroad,includinginthecontexttherecentsharpincreaseinenergypricesandtradetensions.TheresultsofthisanalysiswillbepublishedintheforthcomingEuropeanCommissionInstitutionalPaperdedicatedtospilloversanalysisthataccompanythe2026in-depthreviews.

2.ASSESSMENTOFMACROECONOMICIMBALANCES

2

TheGreekeconomycontinuesbeingmarkedbyhighbutrecedingpublicandexternal

debtratios,whilethecurrentaccountdeficitstayshighandtheworkoutofNPLsoutsidethebankingsectorremainsslow.PrudentfiscalpolicyandsolidnominalGDPgrowthhavesupportedasteepdeclineinthepublicdebt-to-GDPratioinrecentyears.Inparallel,thecurrentaccountdeficithasremainedelevated,thuslimitingtheimprovementinthenetinternationalinvestmentposition(NIIP).Thestrongpost-pandemicrecoveryhasbeenaccompaniedbyfastjobgrowth,bringingtheunemploymentratedowntolevelsseenbeforetheglobalfinancialcrisis.Still,boththeheadlineandlong-termunemploymentratesareamongthehighestintheEUandtheemploymentrateiswellbelowtheEUaverage.TheHellenicAssetProtectionScheme(‘Hercules’)hasenabledbankstotransfertheirlegacynon-performingloans(NPL)andhencecleanuptheirbalancesheets.However,theresolutionofremainingNPLs—nowlargelymanagedbyservicers—hasproceededataslowpace.Hence,theNPLscontinuetobeadragontheeconomy.Overall,thankstogrowinglabourforceparticipation,increasedinvestment,andstructuralreforms,Greece’sgrowthpotentialisestimatedtohaverisenfurther.Nevertheless,strongerGDPgrowthwouldfacilitatefasterdebtreductionaswellasnarrowingtheincomegapversustheEU.

2.1.GOVERNMENTSECTOR

Assessmentofgravity,evolutionandprospectsofvulnerabilities

TheGreekpublicdebt-to-GDPratioisstillthehighestintheEUbuthascontinuedtodropsizeably.Thedebtratiodeclinedfrom154.2%in2024to146.1%in2025,helpedbyrobustnominalGDPgrowth(4.9%),asolidprimarybudgetsurplusandthepartialprepaymentofloansundertheGreekLoanFacility(GLF)

(

5

).Theprimarysurplusincreasedfrom4.8%ofGDPin2024to4.9%in2025,despitetheimplementationofexpansionarymeasuresof0.6%ofGDP,includinga1pp.cutinsocialcontributions,increasesinpublicsectorwages,targetedtransferstohouseholds(suchasrentsupportandbenefitsforvulnerablegroups),andtheabolishmentoftheoverheadtaxofself-employed.Theimprovementwasprimarilydrivenbysubduedgrowthincurrentpublicexpenditure(declininginrealterms)andhighertaxrevenuessupportedbymeasuresenhancingtaxcompliance.Theheadlinegovernmentsurplusincreasedby0.4pp.ofGDPto1.7%ofGDPin2025,morethantheprimarybalance,thankstoareductionininterestexpenditure.

ContinuednominalGDPgrowthissettosupportfurtherreductionsofthedebtratioin2026and2027.Thebudgetsurplusisforecasttodeclineto0.3%ofGDPin2026andtobeatbalancein2027,duetotheimpactoftheexpansionaryfiscalpackageintroducedin2026.Theprimarybalanceisforecasttodecline,buttoremainabove3%ofGDP.Thefiscalpackage,announcedin2025,includespersonalincomeandpropertytaxreductions,andanincreaseinpensionbenefitsandpublicwages.AccordingtotheCommission2025AutumnForecast,thedebt-to-GDPratioissettodeclineto138%byend-2027.Lowamortisationsandprojectedprimary

(5)In2025,theearlyrepaymentamountedtoEUR5.3billion(2.1%ofGDP)andreducedtheamortisationsovertheyears2033-2041.Greeceusedapartofitscashbuffertofinancemostofthatrepayment.

2.Assessmentofmacroeconomicimbalances

3

budgetsurpluseskeepgrossfinancingneedsbelow10%ofGDPover2026-2028

(

6

).Financingrisksarefurtherreducedbyamplecashreserves

(

7

).Nevertheless,medium-termriskstofiscalsustainabilityremainhighoverall(seeBox2.2).

AssessmentofMIPrelevantpolicies

AccordingtotheassumptionsintheMedium-TermFiscal-StructuralPlan,Greece’sgeneralgovernmentdebtwoulddecreaseto133.4%ofGDPby2028.Greececommitstoanetexpendituregrowth

(

8

)thatdoesnotexceed3.7%,3.6%,3.1%and3.0%perannumin2025,2026,2027and2028,respectively

(

9

).

Greeceadoptedreformsthatareexpectedtofurtherimprovetaxcomplianceandsupportrevenuecollection.TheVATcompliancegapdeclinedby12.7pps.,to11.4%between2019and2023andpreliminaryestimatesfor2024suggestafurtherdeclineto9%,whichcompareswiththeEUaverageof9.5%

(

10

).Greecehasimplementedthefullelectronicbookssystem(myDATA),withdigitalreportingoftransactionalandaccountingdataandpre-filledVATandincometaxreturns.Theabolitionoftheoverheadtaxfortheself-employedandtheintroductionofaminimumincomeforbusinessesreduceddistortionsandstrengthenscomplianceinthetaxationofself-employed

(

11

).Inaddition,authoritiestookactionstoaddresstaxfraudandcorruption

(

12

).For2026,thefurtherextensionofmandatoryelectronicinvoicing,thedevelopmentofanewdigitalplatformforthePropertyOwnershipandManagementRegistry,andtherequirementforallrentalpaymentstobemadeelectronicallyaresettoenhancetaxcompliance(SeeTableA.1onMIPrelevantreforms).Furtherprogresshasalsobeenmadeinreducingtheinformaleconomybyreducingunder-declaredlabourviaadigitalworkcardthatmonitoredworkinghoursinrealtimeandthecontinuedreductionofthetaxwedgeonlabour.Atthesametime,Greecehasacomprehensivereportingsystemontaxexpendituresbutlacksaformalmechanismtoevaluatetheireffectiveness.Numeroustaxexpenditurescanaddcomplexitytothetaxsystemandcouldbebettertargeted,whichcouldmakethemmoreeffectiveatalowerfiscalcost.

(6)ThepartialearlyrepaymentoftheGLFin2024broughtforwardEUR7.9billioninloanamortisationovertheperiodof2026-2028.

(7)GeneralgovernmentdepositsareamongthehighestintheEU,amountingtoEUR39.6billion,or15.9%ofGDP(end-2025).

(8)NetexpenditureasdefinedinArticle2ofRegulation(EU)2024/1263,namelygovernmentexpenditurenetof(i)interestexpenditure,(ii)discretionaryrevenuemeasures,(iii)expenditureonUnionprogrammesfullymatchedbyrevenuefromUnionfunds,(iv)nationalexpenditureonco-financingofprogrammesfundedbytheUnion,(v)cyclicalelementsofunemploymentbenefitexpenditureand(vi)one-offsandothertemporarymeasures.

(9)ThesearealsothegrowthratesthattheCouncilrecommended.CouncilRecommendationof21January2025endorsingthenationalmedium-termfiscal-structuralplanofGreece.

(10)TheVATpolicygap(capturingtherevenuelossduetopolicydecisionsthatnarrowthetaxbaseorreduceVATliabilityforcertainpartsofthetaxbase)was56.5%in2024,thesecondhighestintheEUandalmost10ppsabovetheEUmedian(See:

VATGapinEurope,Report2025

).

(11)Severalfurthermeasureswereimplementedin2025(SeeTableA.1onMIPrelevantreforms).

(12)OPEKEPE,theagencyresponsibleforthemanagementofEUagriculturalfunds,wasabolishedandfullyintegratedintotheIndependentAuthorityforPublicRevenue(IAPR),followingtheimpositionofaEUR415millionfinancialcorrectiononGreeceduetodeficienciesinthemanagementandoversightofEUagriculturalsubsidies.Astrictactionisbeingimplementedincludingreinforcedcross-checks,automatedcontrolalgorithmsandthresholdstopreventover-declaration,aswellasstrengthenedauditandfraud-preventionprocedures.

2.Assessmentofmacroeconomicimbalances

4

2.2.EXTERNALSECTORANDCOMPETITIVENESS

Assessmentofgravity,evolutionandprospectsofvulnerabilities

Thehighcurrentaccountdeficitnarrowedin2025,largelydrivenbytheimprovementintheenergybalance.Thecurrentaccountdeficit,whichremainedwellabovethepre-pandemiclevels,declinedfrom7.2%ofGDP

(

13

)to5.7%ofGDPin2025

(

14

).Thisimprovementwaslargelydrivenbythedeclineinoilpricesandareductioninnetoilimports

(

15

),whilethedeficitofnon-energygoodswasbroadlyunchanged(Graph2.1,panela),withexportsandimportsofnon-energyproductsgrowingatsimilarratesin2025(2.4%vs.2.9%)Importdemandwasfuelledbyprivateconsumption,tourismandinvestments.Theservicesbalancewassupportedbyanotherremarkableyearintourism,butdecliningfreightratesnarrowedthesurplusoftransportservices.TheincomebalancesimprovedthankstothedeclineininterestratesandincreasingcurrenttransferreceiptsfromtheEU

(

16

).

Graph2.1:ThecurrentaccountanditscomponentsandadecompositionofchangesintheNIIP

a)Currentaccountanditscomponents

15

10

Changeinpps.ofGDP(y-o-y)

5

%ofGDP

0

-5

-10

-15

-20

-25

171819202122232425

GoodsexcludingenergyEnergy

ServicesPrimaryincome

SecondaryincomeCurrentaccount

b)DecompositionofchangeofNIIP

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30

19202122232425

ValuationchangesTransaction

InvestmentincomeNominalgrowtheffect

Change

Source:Eurostat,Commission.

Thecurrentaccountdeficitissettoremainrelativelystablein2026and2027.TheRRFandCohesionfundsaresettofinancealargepartofthatdeficit.TheCommission2025AutumnForecastprojectsthecurrentaccountdeficittoincreaseslightlyto6.2%ofGDPin2026,asimportdemandisexpectedtoincrease,drivenbystronginvestmentdemandassociatedwiththeimplementationoftheGreekRRPandCohesionPolicyprogrammes.In2027,thephasingoutoftheRRFisprojectedtoslowtheimportofinvestmentgoods,whileanimprovingexternalenvironmentissettoaccelerateexports.Asaresult,thecurrentaccountdeficitisexpectedtodeclineto5.8%ofGDP,stillremainingwellabovethelevelestimatedtobeconsistentwithGreece’seconomic

(13)lnSeptember2025,theBalanceofPaymentsandlnternationallnvestmentPositionstatisticshavebeenrevisedfrom2013onwards.TherevisionreflectedtheinclusionofdeferredinterestonloansfromtheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacility(EFSF)intheincomebalanceandthedebtstocks.Asaresultoftherevision,thecurrentaccountdeficitincreasedbyabout0.5-0.7%ofGDPin2013-2024,whiletheNllP-to-GDPratiodeclinedby5.4%ofGDPin2024.

(14)Basedonmonthlyoutturndata.

(15)Oilexportsdroppedinrealterms,whichwaspartlyaresultofafireincidentinthesecondbiggestoilrefineryinlate2024.Productioncapacitywasrestoredinlate2025,thereforeoilexportsaresettoincreasein2026.Lowerexportsofrefinedoil,increasingrelianceonrenewableenergysourcesandtheuseofinventoriescontributedtothedropofoilimportsinrealterms.Furthermore,increasingelectricityexportsalsocontributedtothebetteroutcomeoftheenergybalance.

(16)Onaverage,about17%ofthetransfersinthecontextoftheRecoveryandResilienceFacilityarecurrenttransfersandhencearerecordedinthesecondaryincomebalanceofthecurrentaccount.

2.Assessmentofmacroeconomicimbalances

5

fundamentals(Table2.1).EUfunding,bothRRFandcohesionfunds,aresettolowersignificantlygrossfinancingneeds,to3.9%ofGDPin2026and4.3%ofGDPin2027.

Fromasectoralsavings-investmentperspective,lowanddeclininghouseholdsavingscontinuetoweighontheexternalbalance.Inthefirstthreequartersof2025,householdgrosssavingsdeclinedto-2.1%ofGDP

(

17

).Household’snetborrowingincreased,buttheriseingovernmentandcorporatenetlendingmorethanoffsettheweakeningpositionofhouseholds(Graph2.2,panelc).Hence,netexternalborrowing(basedonnon-financialnationalaccounts)declined,fallingfrom4.4%to2%ofGDP.Bycontrast,thebalanceofpaymentstatisticssuggeststhatexternalborrowingdeclinedfrom7.2%in2024to5%ofGDPin2025(Graph2.2,paneld).ThisdropwasdrivenbytheimprovementinthecurrentaccountbalanceandanincreaseincapitaltransfersthankstoalargerdisbursementoffundsundertheRRF

(

18

)andhighabsorptionofcohesionpolicyfunding.Fromasectoralsavings-investmentperspective,households’netborrowingisexpectedtostartdeclining,consistentwiththeprojectedaccelerationindisposableincome.Thenetlendingofthegovernmentisforecasttodeclineasthegovernmentusesitsfiscalspace,whilethecorporatesector’spositionremainsbroadlystable.

TheNııP-to-GDPratioimprovedmarginallyin2025,remainingthelowestintheEU.TheNIIP-to-GDPratioimprovedonlymarginallyin2025,asthenetborrowingandtheunfavourablevaluationeffectalmostoffsetthepositiveimpactofthenominalGDPgrowth(Graph2.1,panelb).TheNIIP-to-GDPratioincreasedfrom-137.6%ofGDPin2024to–136.8%ofGDPin2025,stillbeingsubstantiallybelowthefundamentalandprudentialcountry-specificNIIPbenchmarks(-49%and-52%respectivelyin2025).Therisksassociatedwithexternalindebtednesscontinuetobemitigated,asclosetohalfoftheexternaldebtisheldbyofficialEUcreditorswithlongmaturities.TheprojectedpersistentandhighcurrentaccountdeficittogetherwiththeexpecteddeclineininflationimpliesonlyamarginalimprovementintheNIIPin2026-2027,whileitislikelytodeteriorateinthemediumterm(seebaselinescenarioinBox2.2).

Thestructureofexternalfinancingimprovedin2025.Foreigndirectinvestment(FDI)inflowsacceleratedandreached4.8%ofGDPin2025

(

19

).Also,thecompositionofFDIbecamemorefavourable:theinflowtorealestatedroppedbyabout25%

(

20

).OutwardFDIalsoincreasedatafastpace.Still,thenetFDIinflowcoveredabout70%ofthetotalexternalfinancingneed(asopposedtoa30%averagecoverageratioobservedover2021-2024).Greekgovernmentpapersattractedstronginterestfromabroad,withnon-residentsbuyingbondsandbillsamountingtoEUR14.5billion(5.8%ofGDP)

(

21

),reflectedinastrongpick-upinportfolioinvestmentinflows.Inparallel,Greece’sFXreservesincreasedbyEUR5.6billion(2.3%ofGDP).

Costcompetitivenessdevelopmentsremainrelativelybenign.Followingadecadeoflowinflationandnegativecoreinflationdifferentialsvis-à-vistheeuroarea,headlineandcoreinflationhavebeenstandingabovetheeuroareasince2024fortheformer,since2022forthelatter.This

(17)Therearestatisticaldiscrepanciesbetweendifferentdatasources:datafromthefinancialtransactionsaccountsimplyapositivegrosssavingsratiosince2019(seeformoredetails,Annex1ofthe2025IDRforGreece).

(18)Theindicatorconsistentwiththenetinternationalinvestmentposition(NIIP),showsa4.0%ofGDPnetexternalborrowing(financialaccount–BalanceofPayments).SeeAnnex1of

In-DepthReview2025

forexplanationsonthedifferences.

(19)Theinflowincreasedevenaftercorrectingforalargetechnicaltransactionrelatedtothechangeinthefinancingstructure ofasinglecompany.TheexchangeofsharesofMetlenEnergy&MetalsPLCfortheacquisitionofcommonregistered sharesofMetlenEnergy&MetalsS.A.withanestimatedvalueofoverEUR4billion(1.6%ofGDP)recordedinAugust 2025affectedthefinancingstructureofthecurrentaccountwithoutgeneratingnewcapitalinflowtoGreece.

(Newsin

Brief–October2025-

).

(20)FDIinflowrecordedin2025comparedto2024(See

BankofGreecedata

).ThedeclineislikelytoreflectthetighteningoftheGoldenVisarequirementsandtheregulationofshort-termrentals.Bothmeasuresareaimedtohelpthelong-termrentalmarketandalleviatehousingaffordability.

(21)See

BankofGreece:BalanceofPayments,December2025.

2.Assessmentofmacroeconomicimbalances

6

hasbeendrivenbytheservicecomponent,duetostrongdomesticdemand,labourshortages,andsubstantialincreasesintheminimumwageoverthelastfiveyears.Increasesinunitlabourcost(ULC)havebeenmodest(3%)overthelastthreeyearsandbelowtheeuroareaaverage(4.6%),supportedbymoresolidlabourproductivitygrowth.In2025,ULCgrowth(1.7%)remainedbelowtheeuroareaaverageinacontextofmodestpayincreasesandcontinuedlabourproductivitygrowth.Despitebroadlyconstantrealeffectiveexchangerate(REER),exportperformanceagainstadvancedeconomiesdroppedslightlyin2025andforthethirdyearinrow,undoingasmallpartofthestrongincreaseobservedin2021-2022.

BoththeopennessoftheGreekeconomyandthecomplexityofexportgoodsincreased.

Overthelastdecade,thetradeopenness(sumofexportsandimportsinpercentofGDP)increasedby18.2ppsto83.5%ofGDP,albeitstillwellbelowthe(unweighted)EUaverageof132%ofGDP.Greeceincreaseditsglobalmarketshareinminerals(mainlyrefinedoil),chemicals,electronicsandmetals(Graph2.2,panela).Thecomplexityofexportproducts

(

22

)hasgrown(Graph2.2,panelb),buttheshareofexportsofmedium-andhigh-technologyproductsintotalexportsremainslow,onlyat22.9%oftheEUaveragein2024

(

23

).

ContinuedGDPgrowthoverrecentyearshassupportedrebalancing,butthereremainsscopeforfurtherimprovement.LabourproductivityhasbeengrowingfasterthantheEUaveragesincemid-2024(Graph2.2,panele),helpedbystrengtheninginvestmentandreforms.Theinvestment-to-GDPratioincreasedto16.9%in2025

(

24

),butremainsbelowtheEUaverage(21.3%in2025).However,alargepartofthisgapisexplainedbythelowerinvestmentindwellingsandotherconstructions,whileinvestmentinICTandmachinery(excludingtransport)surpassedtheEUlevel(Graph2.2,panelf).Inaddition,structuralreformssupportedproductivitygrowth.Competitivenessgainsareconstrainedbythedominanceofmicro-andsmallenterprises,whichlackeconomyofscale,alsolimitingthepotentialforinnovationandbroadeningtheexportbase.Lackofavailableland(duetobottlenecksinspatialplanning)andadequaterailandroadconnectionsareimpedingcompaniesfromgrowing.Labourmarketperformanceimprovedfurther,butcontinuestolagbehindtheEUaverage.Theunemploymentratedroppedto8.4%in2025-Q4,stillamongthehighestintheEU.The