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ARevolutionofFallingExpectations:

TheMacroeconomicRootsofPopularDiscontent

ThomasFerguson,*ServaasStorm,**andJieChen***

WorkingPaperNo.254

September1,2026

ABSTRACT

ThispaperanalyzesthemacroeconomicrootsofthecollapseofthepoliticalcenterintheUnitedStates.Theargumentisstraightforward:Ofcourse,allsortsofdemagogicpoliticalappeals–racism,sexism,anti-immigrantstereotyping–haveplayedintegralroles,butafundamentalunderlyingdriverispopulardisillusionmentwithaneconomythathasfordecadesfailedmillionsofpeopleandhasnowerodedthesocialunderpinningsofAmerica’seconomytoabreakingpoint.

AdetailedanalysisoftheBidenadministration’srecordshowsthat,contrarytowidelyheraldedclaims,therewasnomajor,transformativebreakintrendsofthewagesofAmericanworkers.ConsumersentimentturnednegativeunderBiden,notbecauseofmysterious“badvibes,”butdue

*

ResearchDirector,InstituteforNewEconomicThinking;ProfessorEmeritusUniversityofMassachusettsBoston.

**

DepartmentEconomicsofTechnologyandInnovation(ETI),FacultyofTechnology,Policyand

***

Management,DelftUniversityofTechnology,TheNetherlands.UniversityStatistician,UniversityofMassachusettsBoston.

TheauthorsaregratefultoWilliamLazonickandJanToporowskifordiscussionsandtoAlessandro

RoncagliaandAntonellaPalumboforcomments.ServaasStormisgratefulforgrantsupportfromthe

InstituteforNewEconomicThinking.Thispaperrepresentstheviewsoftheauthorsandnotthatofanyorganizationwithwhichtheyareaffiliated.

2

todeeplydisappointingrealincomegrowth.Whatdidsurge,however,wasthepercentageofwealthinthehandsofAmerica’smostaffluentcitizens,thanksespeciallytotheFederalReserve’squantitativeeasingpoliciesattheonsetofCOVIDand,later,theAIboom.ThathadapowerfulK-shapedwealtheffectonpersonalconsumptionexpenditures,albeitnotaslargeassometimesclaimed.

Thepaperthenextendstheanalysisbackward,showingthatduringtheNeoliberalerakeymacroeconomictrendsspiraledsteadilydownwardformostAmericanhouseholdsandworkersregardlessofwhichpartyoccupiedtheWhiteHouse.ThepaperscrutinizesthelongfalloftotalemployeecompensationasapercentofGDPandshowsthatthisisnotanartifactofa“Chinashock”oranothersuddenshiftafter2000.ItresultedfromtheNeoliberalpolicyturnofthe1970s,whichprioritizedinflationcontrolover(full)employment,favoredshareholderswhilediscriminatingagainstworkers,promotedderegulatedinsecurejobsoversteadystableemployment,andbroughtpermanentausterityforthosedependentonsocialsecurityandhealthcare.

/10.36687/inetwp254

JELcodes:E0;E5;E6;E62;O23;I12;J08.

Keywords:Inflation;wage-pricespiral;wealtheffectonconsumption;inflation;labormarkets;Bidenomics;monopsony;NewDeal,laborshare.

3

TableofContents

Introduction

1.WhyWereAmericansSoAngryWithBiden?

1.1.Exhibit1:ThePositiveWageTrajectory

1.2.Exhibit2:TheUnexpectedWageCompression

1.3.TheIrrelevanceofVibecession

2.Wealth,Consumption,andtheFederalReserve

3.AffordabilityandPartyCompetitionintheLongRun:

TotalEmployeeCompensation

4.AffordabilityandPartyCompetitionintheLongRun:

OtherMacroeconomicIndicators

Conclusions

References

Appendix1:StatisticalModelsoftheFallinConsumerSentiment

Appendix2:TheWealthEffectonConsumption

Appendix3:TimeSeriesAnalysisoftheLaborIncomeShare(1947-2026)(CompensationofEmployeesasaPercentageofGDP)

4

Introduction

InMay2024,astheracefortheWhiteHouseenteredthefinalstretch,twoofusanalyzedhow

averageAmericanswerefaringundertheBidenPresidency(

FergusonandStorm2024a

).Atthetime,WhiteHouseandDemocraticpolicycircleswereallinonclaimsthatthenew

administrationwasthemostlabor-friendlysinceFranklinD.Roosevelt’s(

Press2024

).They

backedtheircasebycitingalonglitanyofthePresident’sachievements:Emergencyprograms

thathelpedmillionsofAmericanscopewithCOVID;sweepingreindustrializationinitiativesthattookseriousaccountofclimatechange,majorreformsattheNationalLaborRelationsBoardandDepartmentofLabor,renewedeffortstocleanuptheenvironment,andforthefirsttimein

decades,vigorousantitrustefforts,amongothers(

Bernstein2025;Cassidy2025

).Prominenteconomists1andthinktanks2addedtheirownvoicesinsupportoftheseclaims.3Inparticular,analystshailedstronggainsinrealhourlywagesbythelowestpaidworkersafterdecadesofwagestagnation.

Infact,however,thenewlyexpandedwelfarestate’shalf-lifewasbreathtakinglyshort,almost

brookingcomparisonwithatomicparticles.Wellbeforethe2022election,keyprograms,

includingatleastthreeforworkersusuallyleftoutofmostunemploymentreliefprograms,

beganvanishinglikethegrinofCheshireCat.Thoughyouwouldneverknowitfromtheclamorabouttheallegedroleoftheadministration’sspendinginstokinginflation,thenetcontributiontoGDPoffiscalpolicyatalllevelsofgovernmentturnednegativeafterthesecondquarterof

2021.4MeanwhilesupplyshocksfromCOVID,climatechange,andtheRussianinvasionof

Ukrainesentpricesforfood,fuel,andmanyothergoodssoaring.Overall,thepriceincreasesranfaraheadofbothhourlywagesandweeklyearningsformostworkers,forcingmanyfamiliestoborrowtomakeendsmeet.

ThepolicyshiftsattheNationalLaborRelationsBoardwerereal,butthepercentageofworkersorganizedinunionsdidnotgrowatall(French2024).MeanwhilethewealthofAmerica’smost

1Notably,PaulKrugman(2026),

RobertReich

(2023)and

HeatherBoushey

(2024).Withremarkableaplomb,

BrankoMilanovic(2021)

declaredonX(formerlyTwitter)that“BidengoesfullKalecki.”

2ExamplesincludetheRooseveltInstitutewhichpublished“

TheBidenomicsBrief

”newslettertoassesstheachievementsofthe‘neweconomicparadigm’,theEconomicPolicyInstituteandtheCenterforAmericanProgress.

3Cf.Turneretal.(2025)whoconducted15semi-structuredinterviewswithseniorU.S.policymakersintheaftermathofthe2024U.S.electiontoassessBidenomics.SeeElrod(2024)foramoreseriouscritiqueofBidenomics.

4Seethe

HutchinsCenterFiscalImpactMeasure

,publishedbytheBrookingsInstitution(Asdourian,Salwati&Sheiner2022).Thefiscalimpactmeasurebecamestronglynegativeinthesecondquarterof2021andstayednegativeuntilthefourthquarterof2023.Thefiscalimpactofgovernmentpolicywaspositiveduring2024butverysmall.Forthe3programs,cf.

PandemicOversight(2022

).

5

affluentcitizensswelledmassivelyasanotherroundofquantitativeeasingbytheFederal

Reservesentpricesoffinancialassetsandhousingsoaring(FergusonandStorm2024a,2024b).

WithmedianfamilyincomesunderBidentrailingfarbehindtrendgrowthinTrump1.0,theregime’svulnerabilityshouldhavebeenobvious.MostAmericanworkerswerenotbetteroffthantheyhadbeeninTrump’sfirstterm.Thepaper’ssubtitle,accordingly,didnothedge:

“Trumpvs.Biden:TheMacroeconomicsoftheSecondComing”(FergusonandStorm2024a).

Downtoelectionday,however,thepracticallivingsymboloftheDemocraticPartyremainedtheostrich,notadonkey.The11thhourrealizationthatstickingwithBidenwouldbefatalandthe

clumsyswitchtoKamalaHarrisaspartystandardbearerdidnotprovokebroadersoulsearching:

popularskepticismaboutthenewticketwasascribedtoproblemsofpersonality,age,negativevibes,andcampaignmessagingfailures.

Themorningaftertheelection,though,scalesfinallystartedfallingfromsomeeyes.Lessthanperfect

exitpolls

showedthattwo-thirdsofthevotersratedtheU.S.economynegatively(Stein2024).Onlyaquarterofrespondentssaidtheirfinancialsituationwasbetterin2024thanfour

yearsbefore;three-quarterssaidinflationhadcausedthemsevereormoderatehardshipoverthepreviousyear;andvoterssaidtheytrustedTrumpmoreontheeconomy.Ofthevoterswhoratedtheeconomynegatively,69percentvotedforTrump.

Addinginsulttoinjury,TrumpwonwithabroaderandmorediversecoalitionofordinaryvotersthanDemocratshadmanagedtoassembleinyears,withmorenon-voterspreferringhimto

Harris.WhilemanyDemocratsprofessedtofindthatmysterious,realitybegantosinkin.

ProminentDemocraticeconomistssuchas

JasonFurman(2026)

franklyadmittedthatduringtheBidenpresidency,realwagesdidinfactfallformostAmericans.

Graduallytheflurryofargumentsaboutmysteriouslynegativeelectoral“vibeshifts”(Krugman2024)thatallegedlymadevotersresistanttotheblandishmentsofBidenomicsebbedaway.Intheirsteadcamewavesofsubsidizedthinktankwarsoveraffordability,AI,“abundance,”andforeignpolicy.

UntillateApril2026,whenthingssuddenlychanged.AspollingnumbersforTrump2.0plungedamidrisinginflationandrenewedwarintheMiddleEast,PaulKrugmanreposedthequestionofthe“vindicationofBidenomics,”askingifitwas“timetoacknowledgeitssuccesses”(

Krugman,

2026a

).Circlingstraightbacktoearliertimes,hedoubleddownonclaimsthat“wagesatthe

bottomrosemorerapidlythanwagesatthetop”duringBiden’spresidency.“DavidAutor,

ArindrajitDube,andAnnieMcGrewdocumentedthattherehadinfactbeenan‘unexpectedcompression’inwhichthewagegapbetweenthehighlypaidandthelesswellpaidsuddenlynarrowed.”HebolsteredtheclaimbycitingseveraltablesinanewstudybyDube(2026)thatrestatedtheearliercontentions.

6

AsHorace,thecelebratedRomanpoetofanothererawhensortingoutrepublicsfrom

authoritarianempireswasnotalwayseasy,famouslyobserved,“evenHomernods.”Our

distinguishedcolleaguesshouldnotpersistinignoringthemountainofevidenceagainsttheircase.

Theclaimsarenotmerelymistaken,theystandinthewayofrecognizingthetruesourceofthepublic’sdark,monochromemoodandwhysomanyvotersinbothpartiesexpressdismaywiththewholepoliticalsystem.5Strikingly,aswithBiden,sonowwithTrump,acottageindustryisspringinguptoexplainwhyconsumersentimentisplummetingtohistoriclowsinthefaceofaboomingstockmarketaccompaniedbyratesofeconomicgrowthandunemploymentthatonthesurfacelookappealing,evenifpriceshavestayedstubbornlyhighandlookpoisedtogohigher.

WearefarfromsuggestingthatthesnowballingoppositiontoTrump2.0issolelyrootedin

macroeconomicdiscontent.ItisobviousthatconcernsaboutICE,civilliberties,racialjustice,blatantcorruptionandself-enrichment,AI,andfearsofanothercycleofendlesswarsagitate

manyvoters,butindignationatTrump’sbrokenpromisetobringdownpricesfromDay1ofhisPresidencyisplainlytopofmindformanyastheshareofemployeecompensationinGDPfallstoarecordlow.Butcarefulstudiesofvoterattitudesshowthatmanyofthosedismayedby

Trump2.0arealsoindignantlycriticalofestablishmentDemocrats,tothepointthattheout-of-power-party’sbranditselfnowdeeplyrepelsmany.6

ForallthepublicityabouttheparadeofRedTechbillionairesthroughtheWhiteHouseandMar-A-LagoandtheTrumpfamily’sSpiderMan-likeleapbacktothetoprungsoftheForbes400,

manyAmericansconsiderthe

Democratsevenmorecorrupt

.Newscascadesabout“

Epstein

Democrats

”,outspokendefensesbyNancyPelosiandotherpartyinfluentialsoftheirrightto

investevenastheywritelegislation,andtidalwavesofmoneyfromAI,crypto,healthcare

companiesandotherinterestsstreamingintoDemocraticgroupsnourishthepopularrevulsion(Fergusonetal.2026),whichisunlikelytofadeawayaschargesoffraudinsomeBidenerareliefprogramsfillfallcongressionalcampaigns.

Inthefaceoftheseheadwinds,manyDemocraticleadersarecertainlycalculatingthattheirbeststrategyistostandbackandwatchwhileTrumpandtheRepublicansdisintegrate.AsJames

5Resultsofanationwide

NewYorkTimes/Sienapoll

of1,507registeredvotersconductedfromMay11to15,2026,findsthat43%ofvotersaredissatisfiedwithbothmajorpoliticalparties.Only26%ofrespondentsfeltsatisfiedwiththeDemocraticPartyand33%feltsatisfiedwiththeRepublicanParty.Nearlytwo-thirdsofrespondentsundertheageof30expresseddissatisfactionwithbothparties.TheNewYorkTimesarticleconcludesthatithasbeennearlyaquarter-centurysinceamajorityofvotersthoughtthecountrywasheadedintherightdirection.

6See,amongmanysources:

Morris(2026a

);Morris(2026b);French(2025).

7

Carville,aformertopClintonadviserwithclosetiestogroupsbackedbymajorDemocraticcontributorsmemorablyadvised:“

don’tjuststandthere,donothing.

”7

ButmuchoftheDemocraticbaseissimmeringattheirleaders’inaction.Manyrankandfile

partyadherentsperceiveestablishmentDemocratsastimeservingfatcats

whowillnot,ina

crunch,standupforordinaryvoters

andwhoregardvolleysofresonantfundraisingappealsas

stepsofalmostNapoleonicboldness.InsurgentcandidatesarechallengingDemocraticincumbentsinmanyraces,oftenwithsuccess.

ThisimpasseisdeepeningasAI,thestockmarketbubble,aworldwideriseininterestrates,andprospectsoffurthermilitaryinterventionsheightenanxietiesthateventsmaybespiralingoutofanyone’scontrol.

Nooneshouldunderestimatethegravityofwhatishappening.ComingsoswiftlyontheheelsofBiden’sdisintegration,Trump2.0’sdownwardlurchisrecreatingconditionsstrikingly

reminiscentof2014,whenthe

historiccollapseofvoterturnout

inthatoff-yearelectionpresagedthechallengesofTrumpandSenatorBernieSanderstwoyearslater.

Butthisisthesecondtimearound.Jokesabouthistorynotrepeatingitself,butrhyming,we

suspect,maysoonnotsoundfunny,especiallyassomepoliticalgroupsshowcontinuinginterestindrasticallyreengineeringelectionprocedures.

Itishightimeforamorefundamentalassessmentoftherootsofthisdisquiet.Asthisessay

explains,thepublic’sapprehensionsarenotrootedinsuddenwrongturnsbyeitherDemocratsorRepublicans.Decadesoffailedmacroeconomicpoliciesarenowgeneratingasystemcrisisof

historicproportions.ThesuccessofDemocraticsocialistswhoshockedthepoliticalsystembyinjecting“affordability”intopoliticaldebateshouldnotbesurprising,whenleadersofSiliconValleyinvokethespecterofajobapocalypseastheirdemandsformore“compute”sendutilityratessoaringforeveryoneelse(Storm2026),amidthedownwardspiraloftheU.S.healthcaresystemandpurposefulattacksonSocialSecurity,Medicare,andMedicaid.

WestartourreconsiderationbyreviewingtheevidenceabouttheeconomiceffectsoftheBidenpresidency.Thisissimplyameanstoanend:tohighlightmacroeconomicpolicy’swrenchingimpactonthepopulationasawholeoveralongperiodoftime.Thisistheroyalroadto

understandingwhythecenterhascollapsedinAmericanpolitics.

WebeginwiththeBidenrecordonwagesandincomes.Nosurpriseshere.Theearlierconclusiondoesnotchange:therewasnomajorbreakintrendsofthewagesofAmericanworkers,union

7Fortheadvice,cf.Luciano(2025);forthetiestoDemocraticbillionairefundedgroups,cf.Moore(2026a).

8

strengthdidnotincrease,andthebottomrungsoftheAmericanincomeladderdidnotleapupward.

Whatdidsoar,however,wasthepercentageofwealthinthehandsofAmerica’smostaffluent

citizens.AsseveralearlierpapersbyFergusonandStormspotlightedwellbeforethenewrealitybecametooobtrusivetoignore,thewealthsurgeamongAmerica’srichestresulteddirectlyfromrenewaloftheFederalReserve’squantitativeeasingpoliciesattheonsetofCOVID.Conflatedwiththenotionofa“K-shapedeconomy”thatoriginallyreferredtoincomeratherthanwealth,thisexplosionhasnowbecomewidelydiscussed,sinceitdrivessomuchoftotalconsumption.

Interpretedintermsofwealth,the“K-shapedeconomy”isareality.Itispossible,however,torunagoodideaintotheground:WeconsidersomeestimatesofhowmuchconsumptionstemsfromAmerica’ssuper-richtobeimprobablyhigh,sowerestatewhatwethinkisacautious

minimumestimate.

Unfortunately,asthecurrentTrump2.0tailspinillustrates,thisincreasinglylopsidedwealth

distributiondoesnotresultfrompolicymistakesbyanysingleadministration.Bothpolitical

partiesshareresponsibility.Thenexttwosectionsofourpaperanalyzethelongsweepof

macroeconomicpolicysincetheNewDealtomakethiscase.ContrarytosomewidelyheraldedclaimsthatmacroeconomicoutcomesweremorefavorableformostAmericanswhenDemocratsheldthepresidency(Bartels2018;BlinderandWatson2016;Bivens2024),weshowthatkey

trendsspiraledsteadilydownwardregardlessofwhichpartyoccupiedtheWhiteHouseduringtheNeoliberalera.

ThatpartofourdiscussionbeginsbyexaminingthelongfalloftotalemployeecompensationasapercentofGDP.StartingfromthewaningdaysoftheNewDeal,itstrajectoryarceddownwardunderbothDemocraticandRepublicanpresidencies.Itisnotanartifactofalatedeveloping

“Chinashock”orothersuddenshiftafter2000.Thesameholdsfortheriseintheshareof

incomegarneredbythesuperrichandthefallinsharesofthemiddleclassandthepooroverseventyyears.Overtheperiodasawhole,noimportantdifferenceinthese(macroeconomic)outcomesistraceabletoonepoliticalparty.

TheseresultsmakeiteasytounderstandgrowingsuspicionsthattheAmericanpartysystemis

reallydominatedbya“uni-party”—onebigpartywithtwowingscontrolledbytheveryrich

thatisalwaysinpower.Wethink,though,thatthisimpressionisjustcloseenoughtothetruthtobeseriouslymisleading.Weshowhowdataonlifeexpectancyandotherissuesshowthatthat

conclusionistoosimple.

Thefinalsectionofthepaperdrawsoutthelessonsforthefuture,focusingonhowtheevidenttensionswithintheDemocraticpartymayaffectitsresponsetothespiralingcollapseofTrump2.0.Weemphasize,though,thatthispaperisnotaboutelections;itssubjectismacroeconomics.

9

1.WhyWereAmericansAngryWithBiden?

TheharshrebuketotheBidenadministrationinthe2024ballotcompletelybaffledliberal

economistsandcentristDemocratswhohadconvincedthemselvesthatBiden’seconomywas“

theenvyoftheworld

”(TheEconomist2024).Intheireyes,Bidenomicshadmanagedtonotjustruntheeconomy‘hot’,byspendingbigonpublicinvestmentsininfrastructureandthe

domesticeconomy,but,evenmoreimportantly,the‘mostpro-unionPresidentsinceFDR’hadbeentransformativeforworkersbylayingthefoundationsfora‘post-neoliberal’full-

employmenteraofinclusiveandgreengrowth(

Press2024

).

Atfirstsight,theempiricalevidencemarshalledinsupportofBidenomicsappearstospeakforitself.OnBiden’swatch,theU.S.economyrecoveredquicklyfromtheunprecedented2020

COVIDrecessionandsuccessfullynavigatedthe2021-2023surgeininflation.NotonlydidtheBidenadministrationavoidawidelyfearedprotractedperiodofsubstantialunemployment,butitspoliciesledtowhatseemedtobeasuper-tightlabormarket—oneinwhichworkersfounditeasytogetjobsandemployersfoundithardtogetworkers(Dube2026).

Thefollowingtwopiecesofevidence—eachoneconcerningrealhourlyearningsofU.S.

workers—havebeenputonthetabletocorroboratethetransformativepowerofBidenomics:

1.Exhibit1:AveragerealhourlyearningsforthemedianAmericanworkerswerehigherin2024thanwhatwouldbeexpectedbasedontheirpre-pandemictrend.Bidenomicsenabledastructuralbreakinmedianwagegrowth,inotherwords.This“positivewagetrajectoryisnotafluke,butratheratestamenttotheeffectivenessoftheproactivefiscalpoliciesimplementedduringthepandemic,particularlyU.S.PresidentJoeBiden’sAmericanRescuePlan,”writes

ArindrajitDube(2024)

.

2.Exhibit2:Higher-than-averagerealhourlyearningsgrowthatthebottomofthehourly

earningsdistributionledtoamajor,evenhistoric,reversalofthetrendofrisingearningsinequalitythathadrunformorethanageneration.Infact,rapidrelativewagegrowthofthebottom10%workersunderBiden“counteractednearly40%ofthefour-decade

increaseinaggregate90-10logwageinequality”,accordingto

DavidAutor,Arindrajit

DubeandAnnieMcGrew(2024)

,whoattributethe‘unexpectedwagecompression’to

thetransformativeeffectsofrunningtheeconomy‘hot’underBiden’spro-worker

presidency.“AmericaattheendoftheBidenyearswasstillahugelyunequalsociety,butlesssothanithadbeenforageneration,”concludes

PaulKrugman(2026a)

.

Whilethetwopiecesofprimafacieevidencelookclearandnotcontroversial,acloserlookrevealsthatthereisalotmoretothe‘rosy’picturedrawnabovethantheseexhibitsindicate.

10

1.1.Exhibit1:ThePositiveWageTrajectory

Figure1plotstheannualrealmedianhourlyearnings(withbase-year2019=1)fortheperiod2012-2025andcomparestheseactualearningstothepre-pandemictrend(during2012-2019).Itisevidentthat,contrarytotheclaimunderExhibit1,medianhourlyearningscontinuedto

increasealongtheirpre-pandemictrendunderBiden’swatch—weareunabletoidentifyanythingresemblingabreak.

Thisisremarkable,becausebymanyconventionalindicatorstheU.S.labormarketwasarguably‘extremelytight’during2021-2024.

However,hourlyearningsrepresentaone-sidedpictureoftheoverallearningsandincomesofU.S.workers(seeFergusonandStorm2023,2024a).Thefiguretakesnoaccountof(a)hoursworked,whichisacrucialdeterminantofincomefromworkovertime;and(b)government

socialbenefits,whichincludesocialsecuritybenefits,MedicareandMedicaidandunemploymentbenefits.

Figure1

RealMedianHourlyEarningsofWage&SalaryWorkers

(2019=1.0)

1.10

1.05

1.00

0.95

0.90

0.85

20122013201420152016201720182019202020212022202320242025

Source:CalculatedbasedondatafromEconomicPolicyInstitute(2026),StateofWorking

AmericaDataLibrary.Notes:Thedatarepresentearningsbeforetaxesandotherdeductionsanddonotincludeanyovertimepay,commissions,ortipsusuallyreceived.ThenominalearningshavebeendeflatedusingtheCPI(2025=100).Thedashedlineis

11

thelineartrendlineestimatedusingOLSforthe(pre-pandemic)period2012–2019.TheshadedareaindicatestheBidenera.Thefreakincreaseinrealearningsin2020isaspuriousanomalycausedbythefactthatthelowest-paidworkersdisproportionallylostjobsin2020andgainedthembackin2021.

Letusfirstconsider‘usualweeklyearnings’,whichdirectlycapturechangesinhourlyearningsaswellasinhoursworkedperweek.InFigure2weplotthequarterlyrealmedianweekly

earnings(withbase-year2019=1.0)fortheperiod2012q1-2026q1andcomparetheseactualweeklyearningstotheirpre-pandemictrend.Realmedianweeklyearningsdropbelowtrendin2021andremainbelowtrendduring2022-2024.

Figure2

RealWeeklyEarningsAttheMiddle:

RealMedianUsualWeeklyEarningsofWageandSalaryWorkers

(2019=1.0)

1/07/21

1/07/22

1/07/23

1/07/24

1.1001.075

1.0501.025

1.0000.975

0.9500.925

0.9000.875

1/07/12

1/07/13

1/07/14

1/07/15

1/07/16

1/07/17

1/07/18

1/07/19

1/07/20

1/07/25

0.850

Source:Authors’calculationsbasedonusualweeklynominalearnings(median)ofwage

andsalaryworkers(aged16-65years)ofBureauofLaborStatistics.Notes:Thedata

12

representearningsbeforetaxesandotherdeductionsandincludeanyovertimepay,commissions,ortipsusuallyreceived.ThenominalearningshavebeendeflatedusingtheCPI(2024=100).ThedashedlineisthelineartrendlineestimatedusingOLSforthe(pre-pandemic)period2012q1–2019q4.TheshadedareaindicatestheBidenera.Thefreakincreaseinmedianrealearningsinthesecondquarterof2020isaspuriousanomalycausedbythefactthatthelowest-paidworkersdisproportionallylostjobsin2020andgainedthembackin2021.

DuringBiden’sterm,thetypicalAmericanworker’sweeklyearningsgrewconsiderablyslowerthanshecouldhaveexpectedbasedonherexperienceduring2012-2019.Ofcourse,the

inflationaryfalloutofthepandemicandgeopoliticalconflictswasamajorfactorinthe

stagnationofrealmedianweeklyearnings,andBiden’sproactivefiscalpoliciesdidhelpto

amelioratethedamage.Butthereisnoevidenceoftransformativechangetowardsome‘post-neoliberal’utopia.

Thestagnationofrealmedianweeklyearningsisduetothesteadydeclineinaverageweeklyworkinghoursforprivate-sectoremployees(by2%)duringJanuary2021andDecember2024(Figure3).Thisdeclineinaverageweeklyhoursworked,whichcontributedtostagnatingrealweeklyearnings,isatoddswithclaimsthattheU.S.labormarketintheBidenyearswas

‘extremelytight’.Ifanything,declining,orstagnating,weeklyworkinghourssignalsluggishlabordemand.8

8ThediagnosisthattheU.S.labormarketwas‘extremelytight’wasbasedonthefactthatthenumberofjobvacancieswasmuchhigherthanthenumberofunemployedworkers.However,asarguedbyFergusonandStorm(2024c),post-COVID,thedataonjobopeningsappeartohavebecomeunreliablebecausemanyfirmsnowadvertisepositionswithnointentionofanyimminenthiring.Suchinformationallowsthemtotrackthereplacementcostoftheircurrentworkforceinreal-timeandremindcurrentemployeesthattheycouldbedispensedwith.Evidencesuggeststhatthepercentageoffauxjobadsincreasedslowlyintheyearsbeforethepandemic,thenshotupdramaticallyonceCOVIDhit.

13

Figure3

AverageWeeklyHoursWorkedforAllEmployees,PrivateSector

(16YearsandOver)duringJanuary2017-April2026(2017=100)

105

104

103

102

101

100

99

98

97

96

1/01/17

1/06/17

1/11/17

1/04/18

1/09/18

1/02/19

1/07/19

1/12/19

1/05/20

1/10/20

1/03/21

1/08/21

1/01/22

1/06/22

1/11/22

1/04/23

1/09/23

1/02/24

1/07/24

1/12/24

1/05/25

1/10/25

1/03/26

95

Source:FREDdatabase.Notes:A

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