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ARevolutionofFallingExpectations:
TheMacroeconomicRootsofPopularDiscontent
ThomasFerguson,*ServaasStorm,**andJieChen***
WorkingPaperNo.254
September1,2026
ABSTRACT
ThispaperanalyzesthemacroeconomicrootsofthecollapseofthepoliticalcenterintheUnitedStates.Theargumentisstraightforward:Ofcourse,allsortsofdemagogicpoliticalappeals–racism,sexism,anti-immigrantstereotyping–haveplayedintegralroles,butafundamentalunderlyingdriverispopulardisillusionmentwithaneconomythathasfordecadesfailedmillionsofpeopleandhasnowerodedthesocialunderpinningsofAmerica’seconomytoabreakingpoint.
AdetailedanalysisoftheBidenadministration’srecordshowsthat,contrarytowidelyheraldedclaims,therewasnomajor,transformativebreakintrendsofthewagesofAmericanworkers.ConsumersentimentturnednegativeunderBiden,notbecauseofmysterious“badvibes,”butdue
*
ResearchDirector,InstituteforNewEconomicThinking;ProfessorEmeritusUniversityofMassachusettsBoston.
**
DepartmentEconomicsofTechnologyandInnovation(ETI),FacultyofTechnology,Policyand
***
Management,DelftUniversityofTechnology,TheNetherlands.UniversityStatistician,UniversityofMassachusettsBoston.
TheauthorsaregratefultoWilliamLazonickandJanToporowskifordiscussionsandtoAlessandro
RoncagliaandAntonellaPalumboforcomments.ServaasStormisgratefulforgrantsupportfromthe
InstituteforNewEconomicThinking.Thispaperrepresentstheviewsoftheauthorsandnotthatofanyorganizationwithwhichtheyareaffiliated.
2
todeeplydisappointingrealincomegrowth.Whatdidsurge,however,wasthepercentageofwealthinthehandsofAmerica’smostaffluentcitizens,thanksespeciallytotheFederalReserve’squantitativeeasingpoliciesattheonsetofCOVIDand,later,theAIboom.ThathadapowerfulK-shapedwealtheffectonpersonalconsumptionexpenditures,albeitnotaslargeassometimesclaimed.
Thepaperthenextendstheanalysisbackward,showingthatduringtheNeoliberalerakeymacroeconomictrendsspiraledsteadilydownwardformostAmericanhouseholdsandworkersregardlessofwhichpartyoccupiedtheWhiteHouse.ThepaperscrutinizesthelongfalloftotalemployeecompensationasapercentofGDPandshowsthatthisisnotanartifactofa“Chinashock”oranothersuddenshiftafter2000.ItresultedfromtheNeoliberalpolicyturnofthe1970s,whichprioritizedinflationcontrolover(full)employment,favoredshareholderswhilediscriminatingagainstworkers,promotedderegulatedinsecurejobsoversteadystableemployment,andbroughtpermanentausterityforthosedependentonsocialsecurityandhealthcare.
/10.36687/inetwp254
JELcodes:E0;E5;E6;E62;O23;I12;J08.
Keywords:Inflation;wage-pricespiral;wealtheffectonconsumption;inflation;labormarkets;Bidenomics;monopsony;NewDeal,laborshare.
3
TableofContents
Introduction
1.WhyWereAmericansSoAngryWithBiden?
1.1.Exhibit1:ThePositiveWageTrajectory
1.2.Exhibit2:TheUnexpectedWageCompression
1.3.TheIrrelevanceofVibecession
2.Wealth,Consumption,andtheFederalReserve
3.AffordabilityandPartyCompetitionintheLongRun:
TotalEmployeeCompensation
4.AffordabilityandPartyCompetitionintheLongRun:
OtherMacroeconomicIndicators
Conclusions
References
Appendix1:StatisticalModelsoftheFallinConsumerSentiment
Appendix2:TheWealthEffectonConsumption
Appendix3:TimeSeriesAnalysisoftheLaborIncomeShare(1947-2026)(CompensationofEmployeesasaPercentageofGDP)
4
Introduction
InMay2024,astheracefortheWhiteHouseenteredthefinalstretch,twoofusanalyzedhow
averageAmericanswerefaringundertheBidenPresidency(
FergusonandStorm2024a
).Atthetime,WhiteHouseandDemocraticpolicycircleswereallinonclaimsthatthenew
administrationwasthemostlabor-friendlysinceFranklinD.Roosevelt’s(
Press2024
).They
backedtheircasebycitingalonglitanyofthePresident’sachievements:Emergencyprograms
thathelpedmillionsofAmericanscopewithCOVID;sweepingreindustrializationinitiativesthattookseriousaccountofclimatechange,majorreformsattheNationalLaborRelationsBoardandDepartmentofLabor,renewedeffortstocleanuptheenvironment,andforthefirsttimein
decades,vigorousantitrustefforts,amongothers(
Bernstein2025;Cassidy2025
).Prominenteconomists1andthinktanks2addedtheirownvoicesinsupportoftheseclaims.3Inparticular,analystshailedstronggainsinrealhourlywagesbythelowestpaidworkersafterdecadesofwagestagnation.
Infact,however,thenewlyexpandedwelfarestate’shalf-lifewasbreathtakinglyshort,almost
brookingcomparisonwithatomicparticles.Wellbeforethe2022election,keyprograms,
includingatleastthreeforworkersusuallyleftoutofmostunemploymentreliefprograms,
beganvanishinglikethegrinofCheshireCat.Thoughyouwouldneverknowitfromtheclamorabouttheallegedroleoftheadministration’sspendinginstokinginflation,thenetcontributiontoGDPoffiscalpolicyatalllevelsofgovernmentturnednegativeafterthesecondquarterof
2021.4MeanwhilesupplyshocksfromCOVID,climatechange,andtheRussianinvasionof
Ukrainesentpricesforfood,fuel,andmanyothergoodssoaring.Overall,thepriceincreasesranfaraheadofbothhourlywagesandweeklyearningsformostworkers,forcingmanyfamiliestoborrowtomakeendsmeet.
ThepolicyshiftsattheNationalLaborRelationsBoardwerereal,butthepercentageofworkersorganizedinunionsdidnotgrowatall(French2024).MeanwhilethewealthofAmerica’smost
1Notably,PaulKrugman(2026),
RobertReich
(2023)and
HeatherBoushey
(2024).Withremarkableaplomb,
BrankoMilanovic(2021)
declaredonX(formerlyTwitter)that“BidengoesfullKalecki.”
2ExamplesincludetheRooseveltInstitutewhichpublished“
TheBidenomicsBrief
”newslettertoassesstheachievementsofthe‘neweconomicparadigm’,theEconomicPolicyInstituteandtheCenterforAmericanProgress.
3Cf.Turneretal.(2025)whoconducted15semi-structuredinterviewswithseniorU.S.policymakersintheaftermathofthe2024U.S.electiontoassessBidenomics.SeeElrod(2024)foramoreseriouscritiqueofBidenomics.
4Seethe
HutchinsCenterFiscalImpactMeasure
,publishedbytheBrookingsInstitution(Asdourian,Salwati&Sheiner2022).Thefiscalimpactmeasurebecamestronglynegativeinthesecondquarterof2021andstayednegativeuntilthefourthquarterof2023.Thefiscalimpactofgovernmentpolicywaspositiveduring2024butverysmall.Forthe3programs,cf.
PandemicOversight(2022
).
5
affluentcitizensswelledmassivelyasanotherroundofquantitativeeasingbytheFederal
Reservesentpricesoffinancialassetsandhousingsoaring(FergusonandStorm2024a,2024b).
WithmedianfamilyincomesunderBidentrailingfarbehindtrendgrowthinTrump1.0,theregime’svulnerabilityshouldhavebeenobvious.MostAmericanworkerswerenotbetteroffthantheyhadbeeninTrump’sfirstterm.Thepaper’ssubtitle,accordingly,didnothedge:
“Trumpvs.Biden:TheMacroeconomicsoftheSecondComing”(FergusonandStorm2024a).
Downtoelectionday,however,thepracticallivingsymboloftheDemocraticPartyremainedtheostrich,notadonkey.The11thhourrealizationthatstickingwithBidenwouldbefatalandthe
clumsyswitchtoKamalaHarrisaspartystandardbearerdidnotprovokebroadersoulsearching:
popularskepticismaboutthenewticketwasascribedtoproblemsofpersonality,age,negativevibes,andcampaignmessagingfailures.
Themorningaftertheelection,though,scalesfinallystartedfallingfromsomeeyes.Lessthanperfect
exitpolls
showedthattwo-thirdsofthevotersratedtheU.S.economynegatively(Stein2024).Onlyaquarterofrespondentssaidtheirfinancialsituationwasbetterin2024thanfour
yearsbefore;three-quarterssaidinflationhadcausedthemsevereormoderatehardshipoverthepreviousyear;andvoterssaidtheytrustedTrumpmoreontheeconomy.Ofthevoterswhoratedtheeconomynegatively,69percentvotedforTrump.
Addinginsulttoinjury,TrumpwonwithabroaderandmorediversecoalitionofordinaryvotersthanDemocratshadmanagedtoassembleinyears,withmorenon-voterspreferringhimto
Harris.WhilemanyDemocratsprofessedtofindthatmysterious,realitybegantosinkin.
ProminentDemocraticeconomistssuchas
JasonFurman(2026)
franklyadmittedthatduringtheBidenpresidency,realwagesdidinfactfallformostAmericans.
Graduallytheflurryofargumentsaboutmysteriouslynegativeelectoral“vibeshifts”(Krugman2024)thatallegedlymadevotersresistanttotheblandishmentsofBidenomicsebbedaway.Intheirsteadcamewavesofsubsidizedthinktankwarsoveraffordability,AI,“abundance,”andforeignpolicy.
UntillateApril2026,whenthingssuddenlychanged.AspollingnumbersforTrump2.0plungedamidrisinginflationandrenewedwarintheMiddleEast,PaulKrugmanreposedthequestionofthe“vindicationofBidenomics,”askingifitwas“timetoacknowledgeitssuccesses”(
Krugman,
2026a
).Circlingstraightbacktoearliertimes,hedoubleddownonclaimsthat“wagesatthe
bottomrosemorerapidlythanwagesatthetop”duringBiden’spresidency.“DavidAutor,
ArindrajitDube,andAnnieMcGrewdocumentedthattherehadinfactbeenan‘unexpectedcompression’inwhichthewagegapbetweenthehighlypaidandthelesswellpaidsuddenlynarrowed.”HebolsteredtheclaimbycitingseveraltablesinanewstudybyDube(2026)thatrestatedtheearliercontentions.
6
AsHorace,thecelebratedRomanpoetofanothererawhensortingoutrepublicsfrom
authoritarianempireswasnotalwayseasy,famouslyobserved,“evenHomernods.”Our
distinguishedcolleaguesshouldnotpersistinignoringthemountainofevidenceagainsttheircase.
Theclaimsarenotmerelymistaken,theystandinthewayofrecognizingthetruesourceofthepublic’sdark,monochromemoodandwhysomanyvotersinbothpartiesexpressdismaywiththewholepoliticalsystem.5Strikingly,aswithBiden,sonowwithTrump,acottageindustryisspringinguptoexplainwhyconsumersentimentisplummetingtohistoriclowsinthefaceofaboomingstockmarketaccompaniedbyratesofeconomicgrowthandunemploymentthatonthesurfacelookappealing,evenifpriceshavestayedstubbornlyhighandlookpoisedtogohigher.
WearefarfromsuggestingthatthesnowballingoppositiontoTrump2.0issolelyrootedin
macroeconomicdiscontent.ItisobviousthatconcernsaboutICE,civilliberties,racialjustice,blatantcorruptionandself-enrichment,AI,andfearsofanothercycleofendlesswarsagitate
manyvoters,butindignationatTrump’sbrokenpromisetobringdownpricesfromDay1ofhisPresidencyisplainlytopofmindformanyastheshareofemployeecompensationinGDPfallstoarecordlow.Butcarefulstudiesofvoterattitudesshowthatmanyofthosedismayedby
Trump2.0arealsoindignantlycriticalofestablishmentDemocrats,tothepointthattheout-of-power-party’sbranditselfnowdeeplyrepelsmany.6
ForallthepublicityabouttheparadeofRedTechbillionairesthroughtheWhiteHouseandMar-A-LagoandtheTrumpfamily’sSpiderMan-likeleapbacktothetoprungsoftheForbes400,
manyAmericansconsiderthe
Democratsevenmorecorrupt
.Newscascadesabout“
Epstein
Democrats
”,outspokendefensesbyNancyPelosiandotherpartyinfluentialsoftheirrightto
investevenastheywritelegislation,andtidalwavesofmoneyfromAI,crypto,healthcare
companiesandotherinterestsstreamingintoDemocraticgroupsnourishthepopularrevulsion(Fergusonetal.2026),whichisunlikelytofadeawayaschargesoffraudinsomeBidenerareliefprogramsfillfallcongressionalcampaigns.
Inthefaceoftheseheadwinds,manyDemocraticleadersarecertainlycalculatingthattheirbeststrategyistostandbackandwatchwhileTrumpandtheRepublicansdisintegrate.AsJames
5Resultsofanationwide
NewYorkTimes/Sienapoll
of1,507registeredvotersconductedfromMay11to15,2026,findsthat43%ofvotersaredissatisfiedwithbothmajorpoliticalparties.Only26%ofrespondentsfeltsatisfiedwiththeDemocraticPartyand33%feltsatisfiedwiththeRepublicanParty.Nearlytwo-thirdsofrespondentsundertheageof30expresseddissatisfactionwithbothparties.TheNewYorkTimesarticleconcludesthatithasbeennearlyaquarter-centurysinceamajorityofvotersthoughtthecountrywasheadedintherightdirection.
6See,amongmanysources:
Morris(2026a
);Morris(2026b);French(2025).
7
Carville,aformertopClintonadviserwithclosetiestogroupsbackedbymajorDemocraticcontributorsmemorablyadvised:“
don’tjuststandthere,donothing.
”7
ButmuchoftheDemocraticbaseissimmeringattheirleaders’inaction.Manyrankandfile
partyadherentsperceiveestablishmentDemocratsastimeservingfatcats
whowillnot,ina
crunch,standupforordinaryvoters
andwhoregardvolleysofresonantfundraisingappealsas
stepsofalmostNapoleonicboldness.InsurgentcandidatesarechallengingDemocraticincumbentsinmanyraces,oftenwithsuccess.
ThisimpasseisdeepeningasAI,thestockmarketbubble,aworldwideriseininterestrates,andprospectsoffurthermilitaryinterventionsheightenanxietiesthateventsmaybespiralingoutofanyone’scontrol.
Nooneshouldunderestimatethegravityofwhatishappening.ComingsoswiftlyontheheelsofBiden’sdisintegration,Trump2.0’sdownwardlurchisrecreatingconditionsstrikingly
reminiscentof2014,whenthe
historiccollapseofvoterturnout
inthatoff-yearelectionpresagedthechallengesofTrumpandSenatorBernieSanderstwoyearslater.
Butthisisthesecondtimearound.Jokesabouthistorynotrepeatingitself,butrhyming,we
suspect,maysoonnotsoundfunny,especiallyassomepoliticalgroupsshowcontinuinginterestindrasticallyreengineeringelectionprocedures.
Itishightimeforamorefundamentalassessmentoftherootsofthisdisquiet.Asthisessay
explains,thepublic’sapprehensionsarenotrootedinsuddenwrongturnsbyeitherDemocratsorRepublicans.Decadesoffailedmacroeconomicpoliciesarenowgeneratingasystemcrisisof
historicproportions.ThesuccessofDemocraticsocialistswhoshockedthepoliticalsystembyinjecting“affordability”intopoliticaldebateshouldnotbesurprising,whenleadersofSiliconValleyinvokethespecterofajobapocalypseastheirdemandsformore“compute”sendutilityratessoaringforeveryoneelse(Storm2026),amidthedownwardspiraloftheU.S.healthcaresystemandpurposefulattacksonSocialSecurity,Medicare,andMedicaid.
WestartourreconsiderationbyreviewingtheevidenceabouttheeconomiceffectsoftheBidenpresidency.Thisissimplyameanstoanend:tohighlightmacroeconomicpolicy’swrenchingimpactonthepopulationasawholeoveralongperiodoftime.Thisistheroyalroadto
understandingwhythecenterhascollapsedinAmericanpolitics.
WebeginwiththeBidenrecordonwagesandincomes.Nosurpriseshere.Theearlierconclusiondoesnotchange:therewasnomajorbreakintrendsofthewagesofAmericanworkers,union
7Fortheadvice,cf.Luciano(2025);forthetiestoDemocraticbillionairefundedgroups,cf.Moore(2026a).
8
strengthdidnotincrease,andthebottomrungsoftheAmericanincomeladderdidnotleapupward.
Whatdidsoar,however,wasthepercentageofwealthinthehandsofAmerica’smostaffluent
citizens.AsseveralearlierpapersbyFergusonandStormspotlightedwellbeforethenewrealitybecametooobtrusivetoignore,thewealthsurgeamongAmerica’srichestresulteddirectlyfromrenewaloftheFederalReserve’squantitativeeasingpoliciesattheonsetofCOVID.Conflatedwiththenotionofa“K-shapedeconomy”thatoriginallyreferredtoincomeratherthanwealth,thisexplosionhasnowbecomewidelydiscussed,sinceitdrivessomuchoftotalconsumption.
Interpretedintermsofwealth,the“K-shapedeconomy”isareality.Itispossible,however,torunagoodideaintotheground:WeconsidersomeestimatesofhowmuchconsumptionstemsfromAmerica’ssuper-richtobeimprobablyhigh,sowerestatewhatwethinkisacautious
minimumestimate.
Unfortunately,asthecurrentTrump2.0tailspinillustrates,thisincreasinglylopsidedwealth
distributiondoesnotresultfrompolicymistakesbyanysingleadministration.Bothpolitical
partiesshareresponsibility.Thenexttwosectionsofourpaperanalyzethelongsweepof
macroeconomicpolicysincetheNewDealtomakethiscase.ContrarytosomewidelyheraldedclaimsthatmacroeconomicoutcomesweremorefavorableformostAmericanswhenDemocratsheldthepresidency(Bartels2018;BlinderandWatson2016;Bivens2024),weshowthatkey
trendsspiraledsteadilydownwardregardlessofwhichpartyoccupiedtheWhiteHouseduringtheNeoliberalera.
ThatpartofourdiscussionbeginsbyexaminingthelongfalloftotalemployeecompensationasapercentofGDP.StartingfromthewaningdaysoftheNewDeal,itstrajectoryarceddownwardunderbothDemocraticandRepublicanpresidencies.Itisnotanartifactofalatedeveloping
“Chinashock”orothersuddenshiftafter2000.Thesameholdsfortheriseintheshareof
incomegarneredbythesuperrichandthefallinsharesofthemiddleclassandthepooroverseventyyears.Overtheperiodasawhole,noimportantdifferenceinthese(macroeconomic)outcomesistraceabletoonepoliticalparty.
TheseresultsmakeiteasytounderstandgrowingsuspicionsthattheAmericanpartysystemis
reallydominatedbya“uni-party”—onebigpartywithtwowingscontrolledbytheveryrich
thatisalwaysinpower.Wethink,though,thatthisimpressionisjustcloseenoughtothetruthtobeseriouslymisleading.Weshowhowdataonlifeexpectancyandotherissuesshowthatthat
conclusionistoosimple.
Thefinalsectionofthepaperdrawsoutthelessonsforthefuture,focusingonhowtheevidenttensionswithintheDemocraticpartymayaffectitsresponsetothespiralingcollapseofTrump2.0.Weemphasize,though,thatthispaperisnotaboutelections;itssubjectismacroeconomics.
9
1.WhyWereAmericansAngryWithBiden?
TheharshrebuketotheBidenadministrationinthe2024ballotcompletelybaffledliberal
economistsandcentristDemocratswhohadconvincedthemselvesthatBiden’seconomywas“
theenvyoftheworld
”(TheEconomist2024).Intheireyes,Bidenomicshadmanagedtonotjustruntheeconomy‘hot’,byspendingbigonpublicinvestmentsininfrastructureandthe
domesticeconomy,but,evenmoreimportantly,the‘mostpro-unionPresidentsinceFDR’hadbeentransformativeforworkersbylayingthefoundationsfora‘post-neoliberal’full-
employmenteraofinclusiveandgreengrowth(
Press2024
).
Atfirstsight,theempiricalevidencemarshalledinsupportofBidenomicsappearstospeakforitself.OnBiden’swatch,theU.S.economyrecoveredquicklyfromtheunprecedented2020
COVIDrecessionandsuccessfullynavigatedthe2021-2023surgeininflation.NotonlydidtheBidenadministrationavoidawidelyfearedprotractedperiodofsubstantialunemployment,butitspoliciesledtowhatseemedtobeasuper-tightlabormarket—oneinwhichworkersfounditeasytogetjobsandemployersfoundithardtogetworkers(Dube2026).
Thefollowingtwopiecesofevidence—eachoneconcerningrealhourlyearningsofU.S.
workers—havebeenputonthetabletocorroboratethetransformativepowerofBidenomics:
1.Exhibit1:AveragerealhourlyearningsforthemedianAmericanworkerswerehigherin2024thanwhatwouldbeexpectedbasedontheirpre-pandemictrend.Bidenomicsenabledastructuralbreakinmedianwagegrowth,inotherwords.This“positivewagetrajectoryisnotafluke,butratheratestamenttotheeffectivenessoftheproactivefiscalpoliciesimplementedduringthepandemic,particularlyU.S.PresidentJoeBiden’sAmericanRescuePlan,”writes
ArindrajitDube(2024)
.
2.Exhibit2:Higher-than-averagerealhourlyearningsgrowthatthebottomofthehourly
earningsdistributionledtoamajor,evenhistoric,reversalofthetrendofrisingearningsinequalitythathadrunformorethanageneration.Infact,rapidrelativewagegrowthofthebottom10%workersunderBiden“counteractednearly40%ofthefour-decade
increaseinaggregate90-10logwageinequality”,accordingto
DavidAutor,Arindrajit
DubeandAnnieMcGrew(2024)
,whoattributethe‘unexpectedwagecompression’to
thetransformativeeffectsofrunningtheeconomy‘hot’underBiden’spro-worker
presidency.“AmericaattheendoftheBidenyearswasstillahugelyunequalsociety,butlesssothanithadbeenforageneration,”concludes
PaulKrugman(2026a)
.
Whilethetwopiecesofprimafacieevidencelookclearandnotcontroversial,acloserlookrevealsthatthereisalotmoretothe‘rosy’picturedrawnabovethantheseexhibitsindicate.
10
1.1.Exhibit1:ThePositiveWageTrajectory
Figure1plotstheannualrealmedianhourlyearnings(withbase-year2019=1)fortheperiod2012-2025andcomparestheseactualearningstothepre-pandemictrend(during2012-2019).Itisevidentthat,contrarytotheclaimunderExhibit1,medianhourlyearningscontinuedto
increasealongtheirpre-pandemictrendunderBiden’swatch—weareunabletoidentifyanythingresemblingabreak.
Thisisremarkable,becausebymanyconventionalindicatorstheU.S.labormarketwasarguably‘extremelytight’during2021-2024.
However,hourlyearningsrepresentaone-sidedpictureoftheoverallearningsandincomesofU.S.workers(seeFergusonandStorm2023,2024a).Thefiguretakesnoaccountof(a)hoursworked,whichisacrucialdeterminantofincomefromworkovertime;and(b)government
socialbenefits,whichincludesocialsecuritybenefits,MedicareandMedicaidandunemploymentbenefits.
Figure1
RealMedianHourlyEarningsofWage&SalaryWorkers
(2019=1.0)
1.10
1.05
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
20122013201420152016201720182019202020212022202320242025
Source:CalculatedbasedondatafromEconomicPolicyInstitute(2026),StateofWorking
AmericaDataLibrary.Notes:Thedatarepresentearningsbeforetaxesandotherdeductionsanddonotincludeanyovertimepay,commissions,ortipsusuallyreceived.ThenominalearningshavebeendeflatedusingtheCPI(2025=100).Thedashedlineis
11
thelineartrendlineestimatedusingOLSforthe(pre-pandemic)period2012–2019.TheshadedareaindicatestheBidenera.Thefreakincreaseinrealearningsin2020isaspuriousanomalycausedbythefactthatthelowest-paidworkersdisproportionallylostjobsin2020andgainedthembackin2021.
Letusfirstconsider‘usualweeklyearnings’,whichdirectlycapturechangesinhourlyearningsaswellasinhoursworkedperweek.InFigure2weplotthequarterlyrealmedianweekly
earnings(withbase-year2019=1.0)fortheperiod2012q1-2026q1andcomparetheseactualweeklyearningstotheirpre-pandemictrend.Realmedianweeklyearningsdropbelowtrendin2021andremainbelowtrendduring2022-2024.
Figure2
RealWeeklyEarningsAttheMiddle:
RealMedianUsualWeeklyEarningsofWageandSalaryWorkers
(2019=1.0)
1/07/21
1/07/22
1/07/23
1/07/24
1.1001.075
1.0501.025
1.0000.975
0.9500.925
0.9000.875
1/07/12
1/07/13
1/07/14
1/07/15
1/07/16
1/07/17
1/07/18
1/07/19
1/07/20
1/07/25
0.850
Source:Authors’calculationsbasedonusualweeklynominalearnings(median)ofwage
andsalaryworkers(aged16-65years)ofBureauofLaborStatistics.Notes:Thedata
12
representearningsbeforetaxesandotherdeductionsandincludeanyovertimepay,commissions,ortipsusuallyreceived.ThenominalearningshavebeendeflatedusingtheCPI(2024=100).ThedashedlineisthelineartrendlineestimatedusingOLSforthe(pre-pandemic)period2012q1–2019q4.TheshadedareaindicatestheBidenera.Thefreakincreaseinmedianrealearningsinthesecondquarterof2020isaspuriousanomalycausedbythefactthatthelowest-paidworkersdisproportionallylostjobsin2020andgainedthembackin2021.
DuringBiden’sterm,thetypicalAmericanworker’sweeklyearningsgrewconsiderablyslowerthanshecouldhaveexpectedbasedonherexperienceduring2012-2019.Ofcourse,the
inflationaryfalloutofthepandemicandgeopoliticalconflictswasamajorfactorinthe
stagnationofrealmedianweeklyearnings,andBiden’sproactivefiscalpoliciesdidhelpto
amelioratethedamage.Butthereisnoevidenceoftransformativechangetowardsome‘post-neoliberal’utopia.
Thestagnationofrealmedianweeklyearningsisduetothesteadydeclineinaverageweeklyworkinghoursforprivate-sectoremployees(by2%)duringJanuary2021andDecember2024(Figure3).Thisdeclineinaverageweeklyhoursworked,whichcontributedtostagnatingrealweeklyearnings,isatoddswithclaimsthattheU.S.labormarketintheBidenyearswas
‘extremelytight’.Ifanything,declining,orstagnating,weeklyworkinghourssignalsluggishlabordemand.8
8ThediagnosisthattheU.S.labormarketwas‘extremelytight’wasbasedonthefactthatthenumberofjobvacancieswasmuchhigherthanthenumberofunemployedworkers.However,asarguedbyFergusonandStorm(2024c),post-COVID,thedataonjobopeningsappeartohavebecomeunreliablebecausemanyfirmsnowadvertisepositionswithnointentionofanyimminenthiring.Suchinformationallowsthemtotrackthereplacementcostoftheircurrentworkforceinreal-timeandremindcurrentemployeesthattheycouldbedispensedwith.Evidencesuggeststhatthepercentageoffauxjobadsincreasedslowlyintheyearsbeforethepandemic,thenshotupdramaticallyonceCOVIDhit.
13
Figure3
AverageWeeklyHoursWorkedforAllEmployees,PrivateSector
(16YearsandOver)duringJanuary2017-April2026(2017=100)
105
104
103
102
101
100
99
98
97
96
1/01/17
1/06/17
1/11/17
1/04/18
1/09/18
1/02/19
1/07/19
1/12/19
1/05/20
1/10/20
1/03/21
1/08/21
1/01/22
1/06/22
1/11/22
1/04/23
1/09/23
1/02/24
1/07/24
1/12/24
1/05/25
1/10/25
1/03/26
95
Source:FREDdatabase.Notes:A
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