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Forreleaseondelivery10:00a.m.EST
November12,2026
AmericanInequalityandtheFutureofAI
Remarksby
MichaelS.Barr
Member
BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem
at
YaleUniversity
NewHaven,Connecticut
November12,2026
Thankyoufortheopportunitytospeaktoyoutoday.1Inaspeechearlierthisyear,Iexploredscenariosinwhichartificialintelligence(AI)couldaffecteconomic
inequality,forbetterorforworse.2MyfocusinthoseremarkswasontheAIsideofthisrelationship,andtodayIwouldliketoreturntothistopicbyfirstprovidingsome
importantcontextaboutinequalityintheUnitedStates.
Inequalityisanaspectofeveryeconomy,andunderstandingtheextentand
evolutionofinequalityintheUnitedStatescanhelpinformingaclearviewofthe
economicoutlookandhowtheeconomyislikelytoreacttonewdevelopments.
Wideninginequalitymayalso,dependingonmanyfactors,reflectadeclineineconomicopportunityformanypeople,whichcanlimittheeconomy’sproductivecapacity.
Today,IwillbeginbysummarizingthecurrentstateofeconomicinequalityintheUnitedStates,assistedbynewresultsfromalong-runningsurveyofhouseholds
conductedbytheFederalReserve,andthenshowwherethisfitsintothehistoryof
inequalityoverthepastcenturyorso.Iwillexploresomeoftheforcesthathaveshapedinequality,andwhattheseforcesmayindicateabouthowAIislikelytoaffectthewaywealthandincomearedistributed.
WealthandIncomeInequalityToday
Up-to-dateanddetailedinformationaboutinequalityintheUnitedStatescomesfromthelatesteditionoftheFederalReserve’striennialSurveyofConsumerFinances,conductedin2025andpublishedjustlastmonth.3Thesurveyconfirmsthatbothwealth
1TheviewsexpressedherearemyownandarenotnecessarilythoseofmycolleaguesontheFederalReserveBoardortheFederalOpenMarketCommittee.
2SeeMichaelS.Barr(2026),“WillArtificialIntelligenceBroadlyRaiseLivingStandardsorDriveIncomeandWealthInequality?”speechdeliveredat“Next-GenFinancialInclusion,”thethirdannualFinancialInclusionConferencehostedbytheFederalReserveBoard,Washington,July14,
https://www.federa/newsevents/speech/barr20260714a.htm.
3Nearly4,500single-personhouseholdsandfamilieswereinterviewed.
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andincomearehighlyconcentratedandthatinequalityisgreaterforwealth.Thetop10percentbyincomeofhouseholdsreceivealmostone-halfofallincomeintheUnitedStatesandthetop1percentreceiveaboutone-fifthofincome.4Asforwealth,the
wealthiest10percentofhouseholdsholdnearlythree-fourthsofallwealth,andthetop1percentholdaboutone-third.Bycontrast,theentirelowerhalfofhouseholds,as
measuredbywealthholdings,haveonly2percentofwealth.Lowwealthmeansit’salsohardertogetbyeveryday.AnotherFedsurveyofhouseholdfinancesconductedeachyear,theSurveyofHouseholdEconomicsandDecisionmaking,findsthat31percentofrespondentsin2025didn’thavethecashtocoveranemergencyexpenseof$500ormore.5
Wealthisevenmorehighlyconcentratedamongtheverywealthiest.One-thirdofwealthisheldbytheupper1percent—that’snearly$60trillion.Thereisevenmore
concentrationattheverytop.Thehouseholdsintheupper0.1percent,whichisonly135,000individualsandfamilies,ownone-sixthofournation’swealth.Ahouseholdattheloweredgeofthetop1percenthas75timesasmuchwealthasthemedianhouseholdinthemiddleofthedistribution—$16.3millioncomparedwith$215,000forahouseholdinthemiddle.Ahouseholdattheloweredgeofthe0.1percentofthewealthiesthas300timesasmuchwealthasthemedianhousehold.
4TheSurveyofConsumerFinancesmeasuresincomeforthecalendaryearbeforethesurvey—inthemostrecentcase,for2024.Thesourcesofincomecollectedinthesurveyincludewages,self-employmentandbusinessincome,taxableandtax-exemptinterest,dividends,realizedcapitalgains,unemploymentinsurance,foodstampsandotherrelatedsupportprogramsprovidedbythegovernment,pensionsandwithdrawalsfromretirementaccounts,SocialSecurity,alimonyandothersupportpayments,and
miscellaneoussources.Notethissurveygathersinformationfromsingle-personhouseholdsandfamilies,referredtoheresimplyashouseholds.
5SeeBoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem(2026),EconomicWell-BeingofU.S.Householdsin2025(Washington:BoardofGovernors,May),/publications/files/2025-report-economic-well-being-us-households-202605.pdf.
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Wealthconcentrationhasincreasedattheverytop.UsingForbesmagazine’stallyofthe400wealthiestindividuals,togetherwithdatafromtheSurveyofConsumerFinances,aroughestimateisthattheirshareoftotalwealthrosefrom3percentin2022to4percentinthemostrecentsurvey.Forbescountsnearly1,000U.S.billionaires.6
Diggingintothesourcesofwideninginequality,thewealthofthoseatthetopisprimarilyheldintheformofbusinessassets.ResearchusingdatafromtheSurveyofConsumerFinancesbacktothe1940sshowsthatreturnsonbusinessequityhavebeenamajorsourceofwideningwealthinequalityoverthedecades.7Mostoftheincomeforthesewealthyhouseholdsisincapitalincome—interest,dividends,capitalgains,andbusinessprofits—ratherthanwagesandsalaries.Unlikethesehigher-incomeor
wealthierhouseholds,mostincomeformiddle-classhouseholdscomesfromtheirpaychecks.Andit’shardertobuildwealththatway.
Althoughthelargestassetclassforwealthyhouseholdsistypicallystocksandotherfinancialassets,asubstantialamountoftheircapitalincomealsocomesfrom
ownershipofprivatebusinesses.Theseprivatebusinessescomeintwobroadtypes:anactivelymanagedbusiness—suchasaplumbingbusiness,retailstore,ormanufacturingfirm—andapassiveinvestmentinabusiness,commonlyknownasprivateequity.
Owningandrunningabusinesshaslongbeenawaythathouseholdsbecomewealthy.Butprivateequityinvestmentsarepassivelyrunandaretypicallyonlyopentothe
wealthiestindividualsandfamilies.Theseprivateinvestmentshavedeliveredreturnsto
6SeeChasePeterson-WithornandMattDurot(2026),“Forbes400:TheDefinitiveRankingofAmerica’sRichestPeople2026,”Forbes,September15,/forbes-400.
7SeeMoritzKuhn,MoritzSchularick,andUlrikeI.Steins(2020),“IncomeandWealthInequalityinAmerica,1949–2016,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy,vol.128(September),pp.3469–3519.ThispaperdiscusseshowdifferentialchangesinequityandhousepricesshapedwealthdynamicsinpostwarAmerica.
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theirownershigherthanthetypicalmixofassetsheldbymiddle-incomehouseholds.Privateequityinvestmentsare12percentoftheassetsofthewealthiest0.1percentofhouseholdsinthemostrecentFedsurvey.
Forhouseholdsabovethemedianbutbelowthe90thpercentile,themost
prevalentassetsarehousingandstocks,butthevalueofhousingequityhasgrownmoreslowlythanthatofbusinessequity.Aboutthree-fourthsofhouseholdsinthisgrouphavestockholdings,mostlythroughretirementaccounts.Althoughownershipofpubliclytradedcompanieshasbecomemorewidespreadacrosstheincomespectrumas401(k)planshavebecomecommonoverthepastfewdecades,stockownershipbyvalueremainshighlyconcentratedamongthewealthiesthouseholds.Thegroupofhouseholdsinthe50ththroughthe90thpercentilesofwealthholdonly17percentofallpublicstocksbyvalue,underscoringhowmuchwealthisconcentrated.8
Finally,onnet,householdsinthebottomhalfofthewealthdistributionholdjustover2percentofallwealth,anaverageof$52,000.About40percentofthemhaveequityinhomes,andnearly40percentownbusinessequity,eitherthrougharetirementaccountorastheirownbusiness.Butthevaluesarelowcomparedwiththeupperhalfofhouseholds.
TheEvolutionofInequality
Bymanyestimates,today’sinequalitylevelsareamongthehighestinthepast
100years.9ButwealthandincomeinequalityinAmericahavechangedsignificantly
8Thisis20percentofallcorporateequitiesheldbyU.S.households,consistingofbothdirectandindirectholdingsofstockmutualfundsandexchange-tradedfunds,includingthroughretirementaccounts.
9SeeEmmanuelSaezandGabrielZucman(2016),“WealthInequalityintheUnitedStatessince1913:EvidencefromCapitalizedIncomeTaxData,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,vol.131(May),pp.519–78;also,seeVincentJ.Geloso,PhillipMagness,JohnMoore,PhilipSchlosser(2022)“HowPronouncedIstheU-Curve?RevisitingIncomeInequalityintheUnitedStates,1917–60,”EconomicJournal,vol.132(October),pp.2366–91.
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overourhistory,wideningand,attimes,alsonarrowing,drivenbyavarietyoffactors,includingboomsandbustsinfinancialassets,structuralchangesintheeconomy,andchangesintaxandregulatorypolicy.IntheGildedAge,roughly1870to1910,incomesrosestronglyformostpeople,butitwasalsotheerawhenlargefortuneswere
accumulatedbyindustrialistsandtheirfamilies.Withnoincometaxorestatetaxforthewealthiestandlimitedpubliceducationforeveryone,thegapbetweenthoseatthetop
andmostotherswidened.10Butoverthesubsequentdecades,especiallyduringtheNewDeal,legalandinstitutionalchangestrengthenedworkerpower,andtheintroductionandbroadeningofprogressiveincomeandestatetaxeshelpedlimittheconcentrationof
incomeandwealth.
InequalitynarrowedinthedecadesafterWorldWarII,aneraoffasteconomicexpansionthatbenefitedmanyhouseholds.Therewereimprovementsinpublic
education,includingtheGIBill,incometaxchangesthatmaderatesmoreprogressive,andgrowingunionizationthatraisedwagesforworkers.11
Beginninginthelate1970s,however,wealthandincomeinequalitybeganto
increaseagain.Thiswasaperiodofslowereconomicgrowthandsometimeshigh
inflation.Topincometaxratesdeclined,andfewerhouseholdswererequiredtopaytheestatetax.Asinthe1910sand1920s,businessequitygrewasashareoftotalassets,helpingthewealthiesthouseholdsbecomewealthier.12Thewealthgeneratedfromthetypicalmiddle-classasset—housing—increasedbutataslowerpacethanbusinessassets,
10SeePeterH.LindertandJeffreyG.Williamson(2016),UnequalGains:AmericanGrowthandInequalitysince1700(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress).
11SeeSaezandZucman,“WealthInequalityintheUnitedStates”(innote9).
12SeeSaezandZucman,“WealthInequalityintheUnitedStates”(innote9);also,seeJesseBricker,JosephBriggs,SarahFriedman,andKamilaSommer(2025),“TheBusinessCycleDynamicsoftheWealthDistribution,”JournalofPoliticalEconomyMacroeconomics,vol.3(September),pp.343–81.
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exacerbatedbythedeclineinhousingwealthduringtheGlobalFinancialCrisis.Overthesameperiod,realwagesgrewslowly.Moreover,minimumwagelawsfailedtokeepupwithinflationandthegrowthoftheeconomy.13
ThelessonfromthishistoryisthatthelevelofinequalityinAmericansocietyisnotimmutable—itchangesovertime.Thesehistoricalpatternssuggestthatpolicy
choicesplayacrucialroleinshapinginequalitylevels.Economicgrowth,technologicalchange,education,andglobalizationalsoplaykeyroles.14
TheEvolutionoftheLaborandCapitalSharesofNationalIncome
Someofthesetrendsaremostclearlyseeninthedeclineintheshareofnationalincomegoingtolaboroverthepast25years.Thoughindividualsandfamiliesacrossthespectrumholdbusinessequityfromwhichtheyreceiveincome,themainsourceof
incomeformosthouseholdsiswagesandsalaries—laborearnings.Sincelower-andmiddle-incomehouseholdsdependheavilyonwages,anotherusefulwayofexploringincomeandwealthinequalityistoconsiderhowtheshareofnationalincomeearnedfromlaborhaschangedovertime,comparedwithincomeearnedfromcapital—
dividends,interest,andprivatebusinessearnings.
AfterWorldWarII,thelaborshareofnationalincomewasfairlysteadybetween60percentand65percent,butitbeganfallinginfitsandstartsbeginningin2001.Thedeclineacceleratedafterthepandemicandhasbeenespeciallysteepinthepastyear,reachingarecordlowof52.8percentinthesecondquarterof2026.15Someofthis
13SeeAnnHarrison(2024),“DisentanglingVariousExplanationsfortheDecliningLaborShare:EvidencefromMillionsofFirmRecords,”NBERWorkingPaperSeries32015(Cambridge,Mass.:NationalBureauofEconomicResearch,January;revisedJuly2025),/papers/w32015.
14SeeLindertandWilliamson,UnequalGains(innote10).
15Someofthesteepdeclineinthelaborshareforseveralyearsafterthepandemicwasduetotherelativeriseoflesslabor-intensiveindustries;seeRichardAudoly,MilesGuerin,SrinidhiNarayanan,andRachelSchuh(2026),“ThePost-COVIDDeclineintheLaborShare,”FederalReserveBankofNewYork,Liberty
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reflectsmeasurementissuesassociatedwithhowincomehasbeenallocatedtolaborand
capitalovertime.16But,evenafteradjustingforthosefactors,thereisacleardownwardtrend.
Economicresearchsuggeststhreecausesofthedecades-longtrendinlaborversuscapitalincome,eachhighlyrelevanttothepotentialeffectsofAIoninequality.Thefirstistechnologicalinnovationsthathavereduceddemandforlaboranddecreasedwages;thesecondistheconcentrationofmarketpowerinmanyindustrieswithasmallnumberoffirms;andthethirdrelatedcauseisthereductioninthebargainingpowerofworkers.
Technologyreplacinglaborhasbeengoingonforcenturies,butnewtechnologycanalsoaugmenttheproductivityofexistingjobsandcreatenewjobs,includingthosethatarehardtoenvisionwhenthetechnologyisinitiallyadopted,apointIhavenotedinanumberofspeeches.17Theinternetandthebusinessesitcreatedreducedemploymentinsomeoccupations—suchastravelagents—andeliminatedothers:Thinkvideostoreworkers.Butthedevelopmentofnewtechnologieshasexpandedjobsinotherareas.Considerthattherearemillionsoffull-timesocialmediacreatorsearningalivingtodayintheUnitedStates,somethingunimaginableadecadeago.18
StreetEconomics(blog),June24,/2026/06/the-post-covid-decline-in-the-labor-share.Butthatdeclinehascontinued.
16SeeMatthewSmith,DannyYagan,OwenZidar,andEricZwick(2022),“TheRiseofPass-ThroughsandtheDeclineoftheLaborShare,”AmericanEconomicReview:Insights,vol.4(September),pp.323–40.Thispaperestimatesthatthedeclineinthelaborsharebetween1986and2017isoverstatedby
approximatelyone-thirdasaresultoftheshifttopass-throughfirms.
17See,forexample,MichaelS.Barr(2026),“WhatWillArtificialIntelligenceMeanfortheLaborMarketandtheEconomy?”speechdeliveredattheNewYorkAssociationforBusinessEconomics,NewYork,February17,https://www.federa/newsevents/speech/barr20260217a.htm.
18SeeMarkSchaefer(2023),“HowBigIstheCreatorEconomy?ThreeTimesLargerThanWeThought!”LinkedIn,November14,/pulse/how-big-creator-economy-three-times-larger-than-we-thought-schaefer-pihac.
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Whatmattersforthefocusoftoday’sdiscussionishowreturnstolaborcomparewiththosetocapitalfromtheadoptionofnewtechnology.Theavailableevidencefromacrosstheglobesuggeststhatadvancesindigitaltechnologyhaveloweredthepriceofinvestmentintechnologyrelativetolabor.19Ifcapitalischeaperrelativetolabor,firmsuserelativelymoreofit.Capitalcansubstituteforlabor,too—forexample,throughtheadoptionofautomationandrobots.20Someevidenceshowsthatfirmsthatadoptrobotsmayalsobecomemoreproductiveandexpandtheirlaborforce.Butinthisexpansion,laborisoutpacedbytheexpansionincapital,seeninrisingprofitsandequity
appreciation,whichwidensinequality.21Itwillbeimportanttowatchthese
developmentscloselygiventheimmensecapitalinvestmentgoingintotheAIsector.
Anotherfactordrivingthedeclineinthelaborshareofnationalincomeismarketconcentration,whichresearchersestimatehasincreasedsignificantlyinthree-quartersofU.S.industriessince2000.Sincethattime,wageshavegrownataslowerratethanlaborproductivity.22Sincelargerfirmsareoftenmoreproductive,thesenewtechnologies,inturn,cancontributetomarketconsolidation,withso-called“superstar”firmsasthe
result.23Superstarfirmsalsohavelowerlaborsharesofincomebecausetheycan
establishhigherproductmarkups—thedifferencebetweentheircostsandwhattheycan
19SeeLoukasKarabarbounisandBrentNeiman(2014),“TheGlobalDeclineoftheLaborShare,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,vol.129(February),pp.61–103.
20SeeDaronAcemogluandPascualRestrepo(2020),“RobotsandJobs:EvidencefromU.S.LaborMarkets,”JournalofPoliticalEconomy,vol.128(June),pp.2188–2244.
21SeeDaronAcemoglu,ClaireLelarge,andPascualRestrepo(2020),“CompetingwithRobots:Firm-LevelEvidencefromFrance,”AEAPapersandProceedings,vol.110(May),pp.383–88.
22SeeRocArmenter(2015),“ABitofaMiracleNoMore:TheDeclineoftheLaborShare,”FederalReserveBankofPhiladelphia,BusinessReview,https://www.philadelphia/the-economy/macroeconomics/a-bit-of-a-miracle-no-more-the-decline-of-the-labor-share;also,seeGustavoGrullon,YelenaLarkin,RoniMichaely(2019),“AreU.S.IndustriesBecomingMoreConcentrated?”ReviewofFinance,vol.23(July),pp.697–743.
23SeeEminDinlersozandZoltanWolf(2024),“Automation,LaborShare,andProductivity:Plant-LevelEvidencefromU.S.Manufacturing,”EconomicsofInnovationandNewTechnology,vol.33(May),pp604–26.
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selltheirproductfor—becausetheremaybelesspricecompetitionandfeweralternativesforcustomers.24Atthesametime,evenwithhighermarkups,theirabilitytodeploynewtechnologiesmeansthesefirmsmaybeabletochargelowerpricesthanbefore,whichcouldservetofurtherincreasetheirsizeandmayresultinlowercostsforconsumers.
Theseforces—technologicalchange,marketconcentration,anddeclining
bargainingpowerforworkers—mayhavecontributedtothedecliningshareoflaborincomeovertime.25Allthesechangeshavetendedtofavorthosewiththehighest
incomesandwealth,drivinggreaterwealthinequality.
HowWillAIAffecttheLaborShareofIncome?
Thediscussionofsuperstarfirmsprobablybroughttomindthehandfulof
companiesthataredominatingAI:thehyperscalersandfrontierAIlabs.WehaveseentremendousinvestmentintheAIsector,withannouncedplanssuggestingthatcapitaldeepeninginthissectorwillescalatefurther.AIcouldbewhatsomeresearcherscallcapital-biasedinnovation,inwhichthereturnsgoprimarilytocapitalratherthanto
labor.26Inpreviousremarks,IhaveexploredscenariosforhowAIcouldevolveasatechnologyandhowitcouldaffectlabormarkets.KeyquestionsincludetheextenttowhichAIwillsubstituteforhumanworkers—orlargelycomplementthem—andthe
degreetowhichAIwillcreatenewjobs.Marketcompetitionandthebargainingpowerofworkerswillalsoaffectthelaborshareofincome.ThenatureofAI,particularlyits
24SeeDavidAutor,DavidDorn,LawrenceF.Katz,ChristinaPatterson,JohnVanReenen(2020),“TheFalloftheLaborShareandtheRiseofSuperstarFirms,”QuarterlyJournalofEconomics,vol.135(May),pp.645–709.
25SeeGeneM.GrossmanandEzraOberfield(2022),“TheElusiveExplanationfortheDecliningLaborShare,”AnnualReviewofEconomics,vol.14(August),pp.93–124;also,seeStansburyandSummers,“TheDecliningWorkerPowerHypothesis”(innote13).
26SeeKarabarbounisandNeiman,“TheGlobalDecline”(innote20);also,seeGrossmanandOberfield,“TheElusiveExplanation”(innote26).
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abilitytolearnhowtocompletecomplex,nonroutinetasksthatrequireextensive
knowledgedifficultforhumanstoachieve,raisesthequestionofwhetherAI’seffectsonthelabormarketwillbestrongerthanothertechnologies.27InpreviousspeechesIhaveexploredwhetherlabordisplacementcouldbelargerthaninthepast,andtodayI
considertheriskthatthebenefitsofthistechnologicalrevolutioncouldbemorenarrowly
sharedthanthosethatcamebefore.28
Therearequestionsalsoabouttheconcentrationofmarketpower.CompetitionanddistributedinnovationcouldmakeAIacheapandubiquitouscommodity,withgainswidelyshared.Inthiscase,mostbusinesseswouldhaveaccesstoAIresourcessufficienttosupportimprovedproductivityandfurtherinnovation.AIcoulddemocratizeaccesstoskillsandinformationneededforsmallbusinessestothrive.
ButsomeresearchersbelievethatAIhascharacteristicsthathave,inpast
examplesofhigh-techadvances,reinforcedconcentrationofmarketpower.29AIdependsonaccesstodata,modelimprovements,andcomputingpower,soitbenefitsfrom
economiesofscaleandscope.AIitselfisapowerfultooltotrainandacceleratethedevelopmentofnewAImodels,includingthroughself-reinforcementlearning.
TheextentoftheadvantagepossessedbyAIleadersmayprovetobe
unprecedented.IfasmallnumberofAIfirmsdominatethemarketandreceivethelion’sshareofinvestmentreturns,thenthewealthofthemanagersandownersofthesefirmswillsurge.LargebusinessescouldaffordAIinvestmentsandcontinuetogrow,while
27SeeDavidH.Autor(2025),"Polanyi'sParadoxandtheShapeofEmploymentGrowth,"inRe-EvaluatingLaborMarketDynamics:ASymposiumSponsoredbytheFederalReserveBankofKansasCity(Kansas
City:FederalReserveBankofKansasCity,pp.129–77).
28See,forexample,Barr,“WhatWillArtificialIntelligenceMean,”(innote18).
29SeeAntonKorinekandJaiVipra(2025),“ConcentratingIntelligence:ScalingandMarketStructureinArtificialIntelligence,”EconomicPolicy,vol.40(January),pp.225–56.
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smallerfirmswouldseedecliningmarketshare.Inthisscenario,thevastmajorityofbusinessesandtheiremployeeswouldhavelimitedaccesstoever-improvingAI
resources,whichmeanstheywouldseesmallerreturns.Overall,thelaborshareof
incomewoulddecline,marketconcentrationwouldincrease,andinequalitywouldgoup.
Sofar,therehasbeenrelativelylittledisplacementofworkersbyAIandsomesignificantevidencethatthetransitiontoAIisenhancingtheproductivityofsome
workers,increasingdemandinsomesectors,andevencreatingnewoccupations.
VigorouscompetitionamongtheAIfirmssofarhasmeantthataccesstoAIremainsfairlybroad.SomebelievethatmanybusinesseswillfindthatmostoftheirAIneedscanbefulfilledbysmaller-scalelanguagemodelsthatwillnotneedtobeonthecuttingedgeoftechnology.Andinthatcase,benefitswouldbemorebroadlyshared.
AsfastasAIhasgrown,itsimplementationisstilllimitedsofar,andnoone
knowsthedegreetowhichitsbenefitswillbeshared.WearealreadyseeingsignsthatAImaybealaborsubstituteinsomesectors,especiall
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