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GoldmanResearchSachs

EconoinicsResearch13November2026|7:51PMHKT

ASIAECONOMICSANALYST

StillStrong,StillUneven:AISpilloversinKorea,TaiwanandVietnam

GSMacroOutlook2027

Explore>

■TheAlboomwillkeepdrivinggrowthinKorea,TaiwanandVietnamin2027,

giventheirlargetechsectors.WithglobalAlinvestmentgrowthsettomoderatebutstaystrongin2027,weexpectrealGDPgrowthtoeasebutremainrobust,aboveBloombergconsensus.

■DomestictransmissionoftheAlboomwilldiverge.TechshouldliftexportsandcapexinTaiwanandKorea,withtechcontributing4.8ppand1.4pptorealGDPgrowth.SpilloverstodomesticdemandwillbeweakerinKoreathanTaiwan,

givenitsnarrowertechsector,price-(notvolume-)drivenGDPexpansion,

potentialnegativewealtheffects,andsoftwageandcreditgrowth.Vietnam'sgrowthwillrestmainlyongovernmentcapexandFDItiedtosupplychainshifts.Inflationshouldeaseto2%bymid-2027inKoreaandTaiwan,helpedbyratehikes,strongercurrenciesandpricestabilitymeasures.Administeredprices,onefifthoftheCPIbasketinbotheconomies,willalsoaiddisinflation,asgradual,

calibratedutilitypriceadjustmentsanchorinflationexpectations.InflationinVietnamshouldalsomoderateto4%,belowits4.5%target.

■Currentaccountsshouldclimbtorecord-highsofaround20%ofGDPinbotheconomies,onstrongexportvolumesandfurthertermsoftradegains.Local

currencydemandfromKorea'smemorycompanies(wages,taxes,anddividends)couldincreaseby8%ofGDP,overtwicelastyear'slevelandfivetimesTaiwan'sprojectedgains,supportingtheKRW.Non-banks,whicharelessregulatedthanbanksonforexexposure,havebeenkeytorecyclingsurplusesinbotheconomiesandcouldbevulnerableiflocalcurrenciesappreciaterapidly.

■PolicyOutlook:Monetarypolicyshouldtightenthrough1H,withtwo25bpbikesinKoreaandthree12.5bphikesinTaiwan,takingtheterminalratesto

3.5%/2.375%,whileVietnamremainsonhold.Stronggrowth,largetrade

surplusesandratehikeswillstrengthenbothcurrencies,andFXwilllikelydo

morethanratestobringinflationdown.Headroomforhikesseemstobelimited,notablyinKorea.byhistoricallyhighrealinterestratesandashort-livedFedhikecyclethatnarrowsratedifferentialswiththeUSinlate2027.

GoohoonKwon,CFA

goohoon.kwon@

+852-2978-0048|

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.

IreneChoi

+82(2)3788-1722|irene.choi@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.LC.,SeoulBranch

AndrewTilton

+852-2978-1802

andrewtilton@

GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.LC.

Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegACcertificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto

/research/hedge.html.

GoldmanSachsAsi

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RecentMacroDevelopments

Korea,TaiwanandVietnamhavelargetechsectorsexposedtotheAIboom.Their

collectivetechexportshaverecentlyexceeded80%ofmainlandChina’stotaltech

exports(Exhibit1).Thatsaid,theirpositionsintheAIsupplychaindiffersubstantially.Korea’stwochipmakersproducehigh-endmemorychips,abasicinputforallAIservers,whichputthematthestartofthesupplychainasthe“picksandshovels”ofAI.TaiwanisatthecenterofAIserverproduction,includingmajorcomponentssuchasCPUs,

printedcircuitboards,coolingkits,andadvancedpackaging.Vietnamsitsattheendofthesupplychain,producingconsumerelectronics(suchassmartphonesandTVs)thatuseAIapplications.

Exhibit1:TechexportsfromKorea,TaiwanandVietnamhaverecentlyexceeded80%ofthosefrommainlandChina

Percentpointcontributions,yoyPercentpointcontributions,yoy

100

80

100

80

TechexportsfromAsia

Korea+Taiwan+VietnamMainlandChina

OtherAsianeconomies

TechexportsfromKorea,Taiwan&Vietnam(%ofthosefrommainlandChina)

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

60

40

20

0

-20

-40

060708091011121314151617181920212223242526

Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Economicactivityhascontinuedtodivergebetweenexportsandconsumption,

especiallyinKorea.ExportskeptoutperformingonstrongglobaldemandforAI-relatedproducts(high-endmemorychipsandAIservers),andequipmentinvestmentwasalsostrongasfirmsrushedtomeetsurgingAIdemandamidtightsemiconductorcapacityconstraints.Incontrast,privateconsumptionandnon-techsectorsremainedweak,

especiallyinKorea,wherespillovershavesofarcomemainlythroughhighermemorypricesratherthanthebroadexpansionintechproductionseeninTaiwan(Exhibit2).

13November20262

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Exhibit2:Exportsoutpaceconsumption,especiallyinKorea

Index(2024=100)Index(2024=100)

170

160

150

140

130

120

110

100

90

80

Privateconsumptionvolume:Korea

Exportvolume:Korea

Equipmentinvestment:Korea

Retailsalesvolume:Korea

170

160

150

140

130

120

110

100

90

80

20192020202120222023202420252026

Index(2024=100)Index(2024=100)

170

160

150

140

130

120

110

100

90

80

Privateconsumptionvolume:Taiwan

Exportvolume:Taiwan

Capex:Taiwan

Retailsales(deflatedwithCPI):Taiwan

170

160

150

140

130

120

110

100

90

80

20192020202120222023202420252026

Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

ForVietnam,themaingrowthdriverswilllikelybegovernmentcapexandFDI,bothtiedtoongoingsupplychainshifts.USimportsoftechproductshaveshiftedfrommainlandChinatoVietnamandTaiwan,whosecombinedsharejumpedfrom14%to42%since

2019,whileChina’ssharedroppedbynearly38percentagepointsoverthesameperiod(Exhibit3).Smartphonesaccountedforthebulkoftheshift,withChina’ssharefalling

fromnearly60%beforetheglobalpandemictoabout10%by2026.FDIintoVietnamhasalsoremainedstrong,risingat8.25%CAGRoverthelastdecade.Export-orientedeconomiesintheregion,includingSingapore,China,KoreaandJapan,accountedforthreequartersofthetotalincreaseinFDItoVietnamovertheperiod,withKorea

remainingthetopholderofFDIstock.

PercentPercent

Exhibit3:US-boundtechexportsfromVietnamexceededthosefromChina

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

PercentPercent

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Korea

Vietnam

Taiwan

MainlandChina

USimportsoftechproducts*(%oftotal)

02040608101214161820222426

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

*AsdefinedinUSPresidentialMemorandumofApril11,2025.For2026,H1only.

USimportsofmobilephonesbyorigin

(%oftotalUSmobilephoneimports)

India

Mexico

Korea

Vietnam

China

02040608101214161820222426

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

GrowthOutlookfor2027

GiventhatglobalAIinvestmentgrowthwilllikelymoderatebutstillstaystrongin2027,

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13November20264

weexpectrealGDPgrowthintheseeconomiestosoftensomewhatbutremainstrong,aboveBloombergconsensus.WeforecastgrowthinKorea,TaiwanandVietnamto

moderatetostronggrowthratesof3.2%/6.3%/8.5%in2027,downfrom

3.7%/13.0%/9.4%in2026andaboveBloombergconsensusof2.7%/5.9%/8.2%,respectively(seeAppendixtablehereExhibit20).

Akeyfactorforgrowthin2027willlikelybethepaceanddirectionofchangesinglobalAIdemand,particularlyforKoreaandTaiwan.Korea’schipexportsandTaiwan’stechexportshavesurgedamidtheAIboom,andequitymarketsinbothhaverisen.Korea’sequitieshaverecentlycorrectedsharply,however,firstonacorrectioninovershootingfromleveragedinvestmentproductsandthenamidabroadpullbackinglobaltech

stocksafterDemocratswonthemajorityintheHouseandSenateintherecentUSmidtermelectionsandrisingconcernsofFedratehikes(Exhibit4).

GiventheirdifferentpositionsinAIsupplychains,themacroimpactoverthemediumtermdiffersintimingandbreadth,shapedmainlybyindustrypositioning,asnoted

above.Intheshortterm,themacrooutlookwillalsodependonpolicyframeworks,

notablyfiscalandFXarrangements,aswellasstructuralissuessuchasdemographics,financialsectorstructure,andhouseholdbalancesheets.

Exhibit4:Equitiesdecoupledfromtechexports—firstinKoreathenTaiwan

US$bnKOSPIindex

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

Korea'smonthlychipexports(LHS)KOSPI(monthlyaverage)

14000

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

0

201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026

US$bnTAIEXIndex

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

Taiwan'smonthlytechexports(LHS)TAIEX(monthlyaverage)

70000

60000

50000

40000

30000

20000

10000

0

201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026

Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

ThesizeandperformanceofthetechsectorsinKoreaandTaiwanwilllikelybeamaindriverofgrowthin2027.Weestimatethatthetechsector’sdirectcontributiontorealGDPgrowththroughtheproductionchannelwas9.3percentagepointsinTaiwan,

accountingfor72%oftheeconomy’sgrowth.Weexpectthecontributiontomoderateto4.8pp,nearlyhalfthe2026level,butitsshareofoverallgrowthtoriseto77%,giventhetechsector’slargeweightintheeconomy(29%ofGDP,comparedwith12%ofGDPinKorea)(Exhibit5).ForKorea,weexpectthetechcontributiontofallfrom2.0ppto

1.4pp,withitsshareoftotalgrowthbyslightlylessthanhalf.

ForVietnam,thetechsector’sdirectcontributiontogrowthisrelativelysmallat0.9ppin2026,andweexpectittofallto0.3ppin2027onweakerglobaldemandforconsumerelectronicssuchassmartphonesandTVs.Publicspendingwillalsosupportgrowth,withstateinvestmentbudgetedtoacceleratetoaround57%yoyin2027,from

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13November20265

approximately35%in2026,giventhegovernment’smandatetoimplementatleast95%oftheannualcapitalallocation.Thiscapexisconcentratedinstrategictransport

infrastructure—specificallynationalexpressways,inter-provincialringroads,andrailwaylinks—alongsideenergygridexpansionanddigitalconnectivity,andistiedto

governmenteffortstoprovidesupporttoFDIinareaslinkedtotheglobalsupplychainshiftsdiscussedabove.

Exhibit5:Tech’sdirectcontributionto2027GDPgrowth:4.8/1.4/0.3ppforTaiwan,KoreaandVietnam,slowingfrom9.3/2.0/0.9ppin2026

PercentagepointsPercentagepoints

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

Techsector'sdirectproductioncontributiontorealGDPgrowth

KoreaTaiwanVietnam

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

0002040608101214161820222426E28F

Source:HaverAnalytics,BankofKorea,TaiwanDirectorate-GeneralofBudgetAccountingandStatistics(DGBAS),AsiaDevelopmentBank(ADB),GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Fromthedemandside,thetechsectorwillalsogeneratesizablecapexdemandasitworkstomeetthelargeandgrowingglobaldemandforAIinfrastructure.WeestimatethatTaiwan’stechsectoradded10pptonationwidecapexgrowthin2026,andwe

expectthistomoderateto7ppin2027(Exhibit6).Korea’stechsectorcontributiontototalcapexin2026waslowerthanTaiwan’sbutstillsignificant,especiallygivenweakcapexinothersectors.Weexpectthesemiconductorsector’scontributiontocapexgrowthtohalveto2.5ppin2027,which,togetherwithamoderatereboundinothersectors’capex,wouldkeeptotalcapexgrowthin2027largelyflatfrom2026.

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13November20266

Exhibit6:AI-relatedcapexwillmoderatebutremainstrongespeciallyinTaiwan

Percentchange,yoyPercentchange,yoy

Percentchange,yoyPercentchange,yoy

20

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

20

15

10

20

15

10

5

5

0

0

-5

-5

-10

-10

Korea:Contributiontorealfixedinvestmentgrowth

SemiconductorsectorOthersectors

Totalfixedinvestment

GS

fcast

11121314151617181920212223242526E27E

Taiwan:Contributiontorealfixedinvestmentgrowth

Semiconductorsector

Othersectors*

Totalfixedinvestment

GS

fcast

11121314151617181920212223242526E27E

20

15

10

5

0

-5

-10

*CouldincludeothertechsectorsincludingthoseexposedtoAIdemand

Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,HaverAnalytics,Bloomberg,Quantiwise

Incontrast,theconsumptionoutlookdivergeswidelybetweenKoreaandTaiwan,

reflectingdifferencesinwagegrowth,wealtheffects,andstructuralfactors.Wage

growthinTaiwanacceleratedfrom3.1%in2025to5.7%inthefirsteightmonthsof

2026,drivenbymanufacturingwagegainsofnearly8%.InKorea,overallwagegrowth

fellfrom3.2%in2025to2.2%overthesameeightmonths,about40%ofTaiwan’space(Exhibit7).WeexpecttheimpactofbonusesatthetwomajorchipcompaniesinKorea,roughlyKRW65trn(1.8%ofestimated2027GDP),tobelimitedforoverallconsumption,astheyarecapital-intensivecompanieswhichemploylessthan1.5%oftotalworkers

andnetafter-taxcashpaymentswouldfalltojustKRW3trn-23trn(0.1%-0.6%ofGDP).

Exhibit7:WagegrowthhasbeenmorerapidinTaiwanthaninKorea

150

140

130

120

110

100

90

150

140

130

120

110

100

90

Index(2018=100)Index(2018=100)

Korea:Totalwages(sa,3mma)

Total

Manufacturing

181920212223242526

Index(2018=100)Index(2018=100)

150

140

130

120

110

100

90

Taiwan:Totalwages(sa,3mma)

TotalManufacturing

181920212223242526

150

140

130

120

110

100

90

Source:HaverAnalytics

UnevenConsumptionSpillovers

SpilloverstoconsumptionwilldivergethemostbetweenKoreaandTaiwan,morethan

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13November20267

forexportsandcapex,owingtostructuralfactorsincludingindustrialstructure,

demographics,andhouseholdbalancesheets.PrivateconsumptioninKoreawilllikelyfollowa2%trendgrowthrateinrealterms,meaningfullybelowTaiwan’s3%.Thegap

reflectsKorea’srelativelysmalltechsector,asnotedabove;price-drivenGDPexpansioninKoreavsvolume-drivengrowthinTaiwan(whichinturnreflectsdifferencesinthe

semiconductorindustry);andhigherelderlysavingsratesinKorea,associatedwithdifferencesinhouseholdbalancesheets.

WeestimatethatthepositiveconsumptionimpactoftheAIboom—includinghighermemorysectorwagesanddividendpayments,fiscalstimulus,andKRWappreciation—willbealmostfullyoffsetbylargelystructuralfactorsthatarestrongerinKorea.Theseincluderegionalovercapacityinnon-semiconductorsectors(notablyauto,steel,and

petrochemical),agingdemographics,negativewealtheffectsfromtherecentstock

marketcorrectionsandweakhousingmarkets,andhigherrealinterestrates(Exhibit8).Asdiscussedabove,specialbonuspaymentsatthetwomajorchipcompanieswillbelimitedtoarangeof0.1%-0.6%of2027GDPonanetafter-taxpaymentbasis.The

broaderconsumptionimpulsefromthetwochipmakers’KRW150trndividendpayoutwouldalsobeconstrainedbylimitedretailshareholding.Domesticequitiesalsofell

sharplyinJulyandOctoberafterahistoricrallyinthefirsthalfoftheyear.Wealtheffectsaredistinctlyasymmetric,asshowninarecentBOKstudy:positivegainsfadewithintwotothreequarters,whilenegativeshocksarelargerandmoreenduring.

Negativewealtheffectscouldthereforeweighlyonprivate

consumptionintonextyear,unlessequitymarketsreboundmateriallyinthecomingweeks.

Exhibit8:StricturalheadwindsandratehikeslimitKorea’sconsumptionupside

KRWtrn

After-taxwagegains*

After-taxdividendincomegains

Fiscalimpulse

Forexgains

AgingdemographicsHighernetinterestburdensNegativewealtheffect

Housingmarketdownturn

Total

KRWtrn

Estimatedimpactonprivateconsumption

factors

PositivefactorsNegative

024681012

*Showingmid-pointoftherangeofimpactdependingonsalesoftreasurystocks

Source:BankofKorea,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

WeakercreditgrowthinKorea,especiallyforhouseholds,isafurtherheadwindtotheconsumptionrecovery.OverallcreditgrowthinKoreawaslimitedto4.4%yoyin

September,weigheddownbyweakhouseholdcreditgrowth(uponly2.6%)amidbroadgovernmenteffortsathouseholddeleveraging(Exhibit9).InTaiwan,domesticbank

loanshaveincreasedforbothcorporatesandhouseholds,helpingbroadenspillovers

13November20268

fromstrongtechexports.Corporateloansrose13.6%yoyinAugust,thestrongestsincethelate1990s,andaccountedforslightlymorethanhalfoftotalloangrowth.

Householdloangrowthwasalsostrongatabout9%,threetimesKorea’space(Exhibit9).

Exhibit9:Broad,double-digitcreditgrowthinTaiwancontrastswithsubduedlendinginKorea,especiallytohouseholds

Percentagepointchange,yoyPercentagepointchange,yoy

Percentagepointchange,yoyPercentagepointchange,yoy

16

16

Taiwan:Contributiontobankloangrowth

16Korea:Contributiontobankloangrowth16

Corporate

14

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

14Corporate

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

IndividualsandothersTotal

IndividualsandothersTotal

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

1011121314151617181920212223242526

1011121314151617181920212223242526

Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

InflationOutlook

WeexpectinflationtomoderateinKorea,Taiwan,andVietnam.Inourbaselinescenario,headlineinflationinKoreaandTaiwanwillreach2%bymid-2027onmonetary

tightening,currencystrength,andpricestabilitymeasures(Exhibit10).Ourtop-downmodelsuggeststhatinflationinKoreacouldovershoottoward4%inourupsiderisk

scenario,whichassumeshighercommoditypricesandaweakerKRW,andwouldnot

returntothe2%targetuntilearly2028.InflationinTaiwanfollowsasimilartrajectory,althoughtheupsideismorelimitedbecauseTaiwan’sconsumerpriceshavehistoricallybeenlesssensitivetoimportcosts.InVietnam,inflationwillmoderatefrom4.6%yoyto4.0%in2027,belowitsinflationtargetof4.5%,asstabilizingglobalenergyand

commoditypricessoftenimportedcostpressures.

Thedirectionandscopeofadministeredprices—accountingforaboutonefifthofthebasketandofrecentinflationinKoreaandTaiwanandlikelymoreinVietnam—willalsobeanimportantdriverofinflationandinflationexpectations.InVietnam,the

governmentplanstostaggeradjustmentstoadministeredprices-specificallyacross

electricity,healthcare,andeducation—pairedwithtargetedfiscalandadministrative

interventions,includingcutstoretailelectricitytariffsandgasolinetaxes.Weexpect

administeredpricesinTaiwantofallfurther,alongwithdeclinesinpublictransportationcoststiedtoglobalcommodityprices,whiletheirmomentuminKoreawilllikelystabilizeataround2%,helpingtoreduceheadlineinflation(Exhibit11).Deferredadjustmentsbystate-runutilitieswouldposeslightupsideriskstoourinflationforecasts,butanytariffincreasesarelikelytobegradualandcalibratedtopreventinflationaryspillovers.

Governmenteffortstofreezepublicservicefeesandphaseoutfueltaxcuts

incrementallyfurtherreinforcedisinflationinKorea,andrecentBOKassessmentshighlightbothascriticalforanchoringcoreinflationexpectations.

13November20269

Exhibit10:Inflationsettoeaseto2%bymid-2027inbothKoreaandTaiwan

Percentchange,yoyPercentchange,yoy

7

CPIinflationprojections

Korea-riskscenario*Taiwan-riskscenarioKorea-baseline

6

5

Taiwan-baselineGS

4

projections

3

2

1

0

-1

20182019202020212022202320242025202620272028

*Riskscenarioentails5%weakercurrencyand15%highercommodityprices

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

-1

Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

Exhibit11:Weexpectadministeredpriceinflationtostaystableoverallin2027

Percentchange,yoy(2QMA)Percentchange,yoy(2QMA)

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

-8

-10

CPIadministeredprices

GS

fcast

KoreaTaiwan

10

8

6

4

2

0

-2

-4

-6

-8

-10

2018201920202021202220232024202520262027

Note:DottedlinesdenoteGSforecasts

Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch

DivergentSurplusRecyclingAndIdiosyncraticStructuralFactors

Thebalanceofpaymentsoutlookisoverallpositive.BothTaiwan’sandKorea’scurrentaccountsurpluseshavereachedrecordhighs.Taiwan’scurrentaccountbalancejumpedfrom14%ofGDPin2022-23to20%ofGDPin2025,andweexpectthebalanceto

reacharecordhighof24%ofGDPin2026andstayhighataround23%2027.Likewise,Korea’scurrentaccountbalancejumpedfrom6.5%ofGDPin2025to20.5%in2026,andweexpectthesurplustoremainhighataround18%ofGDPin2027.InthecaseofVietnam,itscurrentaccountbalancedeterioratedinthefirsthalfof2026toadeficitofUS$8bn(-3.3%ofGDP)fromalargesurplusofUS$33bn(6.7%ofGDP)in2025.Giventheprospectofapullbackinenergyprices,weexpectitscurrentaccountbalanceto

recovertoamoderatesurplusin2027.

OnthefinancialaccountsideinTaiwan,offshoredeposits,loansandreceivableshaveincreasedsharplysincetheTWDappreciatedinQ22025,reachingacumulative11.5%ofGDP(orUS$146bn),whichsuggestsampleroomforfuturerepatriationbyTaiwaneseexporters(Exhibit12).Incontrast,cumulativerisesinKorea’sexternalassetsoverthesame6quarterswerelimitedto2.9%ofGDP,withalargepartofthecurrentaccountsurplusrepatriatedbacktoKorea.

13November2026

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