版权说明:本文档由用户提供并上传,收益归属内容提供方,若内容存在侵权,请进行举报或认领
文档简介
GoldmanResearchSachs
EconoinicsResearch13November2026|7:51PMHKT
ASIAECONOMICSANALYST
StillStrong,StillUneven:AISpilloversinKorea,TaiwanandVietnam
GSMacroOutlook2027
Explore>
■TheAlboomwillkeepdrivinggrowthinKorea,TaiwanandVietnamin2027,
giventheirlargetechsectors.WithglobalAlinvestmentgrowthsettomoderatebutstaystrongin2027,weexpectrealGDPgrowthtoeasebutremainrobust,aboveBloombergconsensus.
■DomestictransmissionoftheAlboomwilldiverge.TechshouldliftexportsandcapexinTaiwanandKorea,withtechcontributing4.8ppand1.4pptorealGDPgrowth.SpilloverstodomesticdemandwillbeweakerinKoreathanTaiwan,
givenitsnarrowertechsector,price-(notvolume-)drivenGDPexpansion,
potentialnegativewealtheffects,andsoftwageandcreditgrowth.Vietnam'sgrowthwillrestmainlyongovernmentcapexandFDItiedtosupplychainshifts.Inflationshouldeaseto2%bymid-2027inKoreaandTaiwan,helpedbyratehikes,strongercurrenciesandpricestabilitymeasures.Administeredprices,onefifthoftheCPIbasketinbotheconomies,willalsoaiddisinflation,asgradual,
calibratedutilitypriceadjustmentsanchorinflationexpectations.InflationinVietnamshouldalsomoderateto4%,belowits4.5%target.
■Currentaccountsshouldclimbtorecord-highsofaround20%ofGDPinbotheconomies,onstrongexportvolumesandfurthertermsoftradegains.Local
currencydemandfromKorea'smemorycompanies(wages,taxes,anddividends)couldincreaseby8%ofGDP,overtwicelastyear'slevelandfivetimesTaiwan'sprojectedgains,supportingtheKRW.Non-banks,whicharelessregulatedthanbanksonforexexposure,havebeenkeytorecyclingsurplusesinbotheconomiesandcouldbevulnerableiflocalcurrenciesappreciaterapidly.
■PolicyOutlook:Monetarypolicyshouldtightenthrough1H,withtwo25bpbikesinKoreaandthree12.5bphikesinTaiwan,takingtheterminalratesto
3.5%/2.375%,whileVietnamremainsonhold.Stronggrowth,largetrade
surplusesandratehikeswillstrengthenbothcurrencies,andFXwilllikelydo
morethanratestobringinflationdown.Headroomforhikesseemstobelimited,notablyinKorea.byhistoricallyhighrealinterestratesandashort-livedFedhikecyclethatnarrowsratedifferentialswiththeUSinlate2027.
GoohoonKwon,CFA
goohoon.kwon@
+852-2978-0048|
GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.L.C.
IreneChoi
+82(2)3788-1722|irene.choi@
GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.LC.,SeoulBranch
AndrewTilton
+852-2978-1802
andrewtilton@
GoldmanSachs(Asia)L.LC.
Investorsshouldconsiderthisreportasonlyasinglefactorinmakingtheirinvestmentdecision.ForRegACcertificationandotherimportantdisclosures,seetheDisclosureAppendix,orgoto
/research/hedge.html.
GoldmanSachsAsi
aho:/iwA.nalyst
RecentMacroDevelopments
Korea,TaiwanandVietnamhavelargetechsectorsexposedtotheAIboom.Their
collectivetechexportshaverecentlyexceeded80%ofmainlandChina’stotaltech
exports(Exhibit1).Thatsaid,theirpositionsintheAIsupplychaindiffersubstantially.Korea’stwochipmakersproducehigh-endmemorychips,abasicinputforallAIservers,whichputthematthestartofthesupplychainasthe“picksandshovels”ofAI.TaiwanisatthecenterofAIserverproduction,includingmajorcomponentssuchasCPUs,
printedcircuitboards,coolingkits,andadvancedpackaging.Vietnamsitsattheendofthesupplychain,producingconsumerelectronics(suchassmartphonesandTVs)thatuseAIapplications.
Exhibit1:TechexportsfromKorea,TaiwanandVietnamhaverecentlyexceeded80%ofthosefrommainlandChina
Percentpointcontributions,yoyPercentpointcontributions,yoy
100
80
100
80
TechexportsfromAsia
Korea+Taiwan+VietnamMainlandChina
OtherAsianeconomies
TechexportsfromKorea,Taiwan&Vietnam(%ofthosefrommainlandChina)
60
40
20
0
-20
-40
60
40
20
0
-20
-40
060708091011121314151617181920212223242526
Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
Economicactivityhascontinuedtodivergebetweenexportsandconsumption,
especiallyinKorea.ExportskeptoutperformingonstrongglobaldemandforAI-relatedproducts(high-endmemorychipsandAIservers),andequipmentinvestmentwasalsostrongasfirmsrushedtomeetsurgingAIdemandamidtightsemiconductorcapacityconstraints.Incontrast,privateconsumptionandnon-techsectorsremainedweak,
especiallyinKorea,wherespillovershavesofarcomemainlythroughhighermemorypricesratherthanthebroadexpansionintechproductionseeninTaiwan(Exhibit2).
13November20262
GoldmanSachsAsi
aho:/iwA.nalyst
13November20263
Exhibit2:Exportsoutpaceconsumption,especiallyinKorea
Index(2024=100)Index(2024=100)
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
Privateconsumptionvolume:Korea
Exportvolume:Korea
Equipmentinvestment:Korea
Retailsalesvolume:Korea
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
20192020202120222023202420252026
Index(2024=100)Index(2024=100)
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
Privateconsumptionvolume:Taiwan
Exportvolume:Taiwan
Capex:Taiwan
Retailsales(deflatedwithCPI):Taiwan
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
20192020202120222023202420252026
Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
ForVietnam,themaingrowthdriverswilllikelybegovernmentcapexandFDI,bothtiedtoongoingsupplychainshifts.USimportsoftechproductshaveshiftedfrommainlandChinatoVietnamandTaiwan,whosecombinedsharejumpedfrom14%to42%since
2019,whileChina’ssharedroppedbynearly38percentagepointsoverthesameperiod(Exhibit3).Smartphonesaccountedforthebulkoftheshift,withChina’ssharefalling
fromnearly60%beforetheglobalpandemictoabout10%by2026.FDIintoVietnamhasalsoremainedstrong,risingat8.25%CAGRoverthelastdecade.Export-orientedeconomiesintheregion,includingSingapore,China,KoreaandJapan,accountedforthreequartersofthetotalincreaseinFDItoVietnamovertheperiod,withKorea
remainingthetopholderofFDIstock.
PercentPercent
Exhibit3:US-boundtechexportsfromVietnamexceededthosefromChina
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
PercentPercent
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Korea
Vietnam
Taiwan
MainlandChina
USimportsoftechproducts*(%oftotal)
02040608101214161820222426
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
*AsdefinedinUSPresidentialMemorandumofApril11,2025.For2026,H1only.
USimportsofmobilephonesbyorigin
(%oftotalUSmobilephoneimports)
India
Mexico
Korea
Vietnam
China
02040608101214161820222426
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
GrowthOutlookfor2027
GiventhatglobalAIinvestmentgrowthwilllikelymoderatebutstillstaystrongin2027,
GoldmanSachsAsi
aho:/iwA.nalyst
13November20264
weexpectrealGDPgrowthintheseeconomiestosoftensomewhatbutremainstrong,aboveBloombergconsensus.WeforecastgrowthinKorea,TaiwanandVietnamto
moderatetostronggrowthratesof3.2%/6.3%/8.5%in2027,downfrom
3.7%/13.0%/9.4%in2026andaboveBloombergconsensusof2.7%/5.9%/8.2%,respectively(seeAppendixtablehereExhibit20).
Akeyfactorforgrowthin2027willlikelybethepaceanddirectionofchangesinglobalAIdemand,particularlyforKoreaandTaiwan.Korea’schipexportsandTaiwan’stechexportshavesurgedamidtheAIboom,andequitymarketsinbothhaverisen.Korea’sequitieshaverecentlycorrectedsharply,however,firstonacorrectioninovershootingfromleveragedinvestmentproductsandthenamidabroadpullbackinglobaltech
stocksafterDemocratswonthemajorityintheHouseandSenateintherecentUSmidtermelectionsandrisingconcernsofFedratehikes(Exhibit4).
GiventheirdifferentpositionsinAIsupplychains,themacroimpactoverthemediumtermdiffersintimingandbreadth,shapedmainlybyindustrypositioning,asnoted
above.Intheshortterm,themacrooutlookwillalsodependonpolicyframeworks,
notablyfiscalandFXarrangements,aswellasstructuralissuessuchasdemographics,financialsectorstructure,andhouseholdbalancesheets.
Exhibit4:Equitiesdecoupledfromtechexports—firstinKoreathenTaiwan
US$bnKOSPIindex
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Korea'smonthlychipexports(LHS)KOSPI(monthlyaverage)
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026
US$bnTAIEXIndex
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Taiwan'smonthlytechexports(LHS)TAIEX(monthlyaverage)
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026
Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
ThesizeandperformanceofthetechsectorsinKoreaandTaiwanwilllikelybeamaindriverofgrowthin2027.Weestimatethatthetechsector’sdirectcontributiontorealGDPgrowththroughtheproductionchannelwas9.3percentagepointsinTaiwan,
accountingfor72%oftheeconomy’sgrowth.Weexpectthecontributiontomoderateto4.8pp,nearlyhalfthe2026level,butitsshareofoverallgrowthtoriseto77%,giventhetechsector’slargeweightintheeconomy(29%ofGDP,comparedwith12%ofGDPinKorea)(Exhibit5).ForKorea,weexpectthetechcontributiontofallfrom2.0ppto
1.4pp,withitsshareoftotalgrowthbyslightlylessthanhalf.
ForVietnam,thetechsector’sdirectcontributiontogrowthisrelativelysmallat0.9ppin2026,andweexpectittofallto0.3ppin2027onweakerglobaldemandforconsumerelectronicssuchassmartphonesandTVs.Publicspendingwillalsosupportgrowth,withstateinvestmentbudgetedtoacceleratetoaround57%yoyin2027,from
GoldmanSachsAsi
aho:/iwA.nalyst
13November20265
approximately35%in2026,giventhegovernment’smandatetoimplementatleast95%oftheannualcapitalallocation.Thiscapexisconcentratedinstrategictransport
infrastructure—specificallynationalexpressways,inter-provincialringroads,andrailwaylinks—alongsideenergygridexpansionanddigitalconnectivity,andistiedto
governmenteffortstoprovidesupporttoFDIinareaslinkedtotheglobalsupplychainshiftsdiscussedabove.
Exhibit5:Tech’sdirectcontributionto2027GDPgrowth:4.8/1.4/0.3ppforTaiwan,KoreaandVietnam,slowingfrom9.3/2.0/0.9ppin2026
PercentagepointsPercentagepoints
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
Techsector'sdirectproductioncontributiontorealGDPgrowth
KoreaTaiwanVietnam
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
0002040608101214161820222426E28F
Source:HaverAnalytics,BankofKorea,TaiwanDirectorate-GeneralofBudgetAccountingandStatistics(DGBAS),AsiaDevelopmentBank(ADB),GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
Fromthedemandside,thetechsectorwillalsogeneratesizablecapexdemandasitworkstomeetthelargeandgrowingglobaldemandforAIinfrastructure.WeestimatethatTaiwan’stechsectoradded10pptonationwidecapexgrowthin2026,andwe
expectthistomoderateto7ppin2027(Exhibit6).Korea’stechsectorcontributiontototalcapexin2026waslowerthanTaiwan’sbutstillsignificant,especiallygivenweakcapexinothersectors.Weexpectthesemiconductorsector’scontributiontocapexgrowthtohalveto2.5ppin2027,which,togetherwithamoderatereboundinothersectors’capex,wouldkeeptotalcapexgrowthin2027largelyflatfrom2026.
GoldmanSachsAsi
aho:/iwA.nalyst
13November20266
Exhibit6:AI-relatedcapexwillmoderatebutremainstrongespeciallyinTaiwan
Percentchange,yoyPercentchange,yoy
Percentchange,yoyPercentchange,yoy
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
20
15
10
20
15
10
5
5
0
0
-5
-5
-10
-10
Korea:Contributiontorealfixedinvestmentgrowth
SemiconductorsectorOthersectors
Totalfixedinvestment
GS
fcast
11121314151617181920212223242526E27E
Taiwan:Contributiontorealfixedinvestmentgrowth
Semiconductorsector
Othersectors*
Totalfixedinvestment
GS
fcast
11121314151617181920212223242526E27E
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
*CouldincludeothertechsectorsincludingthoseexposedtoAIdemand
Source:GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch,HaverAnalytics,Bloomberg,Quantiwise
Incontrast,theconsumptionoutlookdivergeswidelybetweenKoreaandTaiwan,
reflectingdifferencesinwagegrowth,wealtheffects,andstructuralfactors.Wage
growthinTaiwanacceleratedfrom3.1%in2025to5.7%inthefirsteightmonthsof
2026,drivenbymanufacturingwagegainsofnearly8%.InKorea,overallwagegrowth
fellfrom3.2%in2025to2.2%overthesameeightmonths,about40%ofTaiwan’space(Exhibit7).WeexpecttheimpactofbonusesatthetwomajorchipcompaniesinKorea,roughlyKRW65trn(1.8%ofestimated2027GDP),tobelimitedforoverallconsumption,astheyarecapital-intensivecompanieswhichemploylessthan1.5%oftotalworkers
andnetafter-taxcashpaymentswouldfalltojustKRW3trn-23trn(0.1%-0.6%ofGDP).
Exhibit7:WagegrowthhasbeenmorerapidinTaiwanthaninKorea
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
Index(2018=100)Index(2018=100)
Korea:Totalwages(sa,3mma)
Total
Manufacturing
181920212223242526
Index(2018=100)Index(2018=100)
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
Taiwan:Totalwages(sa,3mma)
TotalManufacturing
181920212223242526
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
Source:HaverAnalytics
UnevenConsumptionSpillovers
SpilloverstoconsumptionwilldivergethemostbetweenKoreaandTaiwan,morethan
GoldmanSachsAsi
aho:/iwA.nalyst
13November20267
forexportsandcapex,owingtostructuralfactorsincludingindustrialstructure,
demographics,andhouseholdbalancesheets.PrivateconsumptioninKoreawilllikelyfollowa2%trendgrowthrateinrealterms,meaningfullybelowTaiwan’s3%.Thegap
reflectsKorea’srelativelysmalltechsector,asnotedabove;price-drivenGDPexpansioninKoreavsvolume-drivengrowthinTaiwan(whichinturnreflectsdifferencesinthe
semiconductorindustry);andhigherelderlysavingsratesinKorea,associatedwithdifferencesinhouseholdbalancesheets.
WeestimatethatthepositiveconsumptionimpactoftheAIboom—includinghighermemorysectorwagesanddividendpayments,fiscalstimulus,andKRWappreciation—willbealmostfullyoffsetbylargelystructuralfactorsthatarestrongerinKorea.Theseincluderegionalovercapacityinnon-semiconductorsectors(notablyauto,steel,and
petrochemical),agingdemographics,negativewealtheffectsfromtherecentstock
marketcorrectionsandweakhousingmarkets,andhigherrealinterestrates(Exhibit8).Asdiscussedabove,specialbonuspaymentsatthetwomajorchipcompanieswillbelimitedtoarangeof0.1%-0.6%of2027GDPonanetafter-taxpaymentbasis.The
broaderconsumptionimpulsefromthetwochipmakers’KRW150trndividendpayoutwouldalsobeconstrainedbylimitedretailshareholding.Domesticequitiesalsofell
sharplyinJulyandOctoberafterahistoricrallyinthefirsthalfoftheyear.Wealtheffectsaredistinctlyasymmetric,asshowninarecentBOKstudy:positivegainsfadewithintwotothreequarters,whilenegativeshocksarelargerandmoreenduring.
Negativewealtheffectscouldthereforeweighlyonprivate
consumptionintonextyear,unlessequitymarketsreboundmateriallyinthecomingweeks.
Exhibit8:StricturalheadwindsandratehikeslimitKorea’sconsumptionupside
KRWtrn
After-taxwagegains*
After-taxdividendincomegains
Fiscalimpulse
Forexgains
AgingdemographicsHighernetinterestburdensNegativewealtheffect
Housingmarketdownturn
Total
KRWtrn
Estimatedimpactonprivateconsumption
factors
PositivefactorsNegative
024681012
*Showingmid-pointoftherangeofimpactdependingonsalesoftreasurystocks
Source:BankofKorea,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
WeakercreditgrowthinKorea,especiallyforhouseholds,isafurtherheadwindtotheconsumptionrecovery.OverallcreditgrowthinKoreawaslimitedto4.4%yoyin
September,weigheddownbyweakhouseholdcreditgrowth(uponly2.6%)amidbroadgovernmenteffortsathouseholddeleveraging(Exhibit9).InTaiwan,domesticbank
loanshaveincreasedforbothcorporatesandhouseholds,helpingbroadenspillovers
13November20268
fromstrongtechexports.Corporateloansrose13.6%yoyinAugust,thestrongestsincethelate1990s,andaccountedforslightlymorethanhalfoftotalloangrowth.
Householdloangrowthwasalsostrongatabout9%,threetimesKorea’space(Exhibit9).
Exhibit9:Broad,double-digitcreditgrowthinTaiwancontrastswithsubduedlendinginKorea,especiallytohouseholds
Percentagepointchange,yoyPercentagepointchange,yoy
Percentagepointchange,yoyPercentagepointchange,yoy
16
16
Taiwan:Contributiontobankloangrowth
16Korea:Contributiontobankloangrowth16
Corporate
14
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
14Corporate
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
IndividualsandothersTotal
IndividualsandothersTotal
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
1011121314151617181920212223242526
1011121314151617181920212223242526
Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
InflationOutlook
WeexpectinflationtomoderateinKorea,Taiwan,andVietnam.Inourbaselinescenario,headlineinflationinKoreaandTaiwanwillreach2%bymid-2027onmonetary
tightening,currencystrength,andpricestabilitymeasures(Exhibit10).Ourtop-downmodelsuggeststhatinflationinKoreacouldovershoottoward4%inourupsiderisk
scenario,whichassumeshighercommoditypricesandaweakerKRW,andwouldnot
returntothe2%targetuntilearly2028.InflationinTaiwanfollowsasimilartrajectory,althoughtheupsideismorelimitedbecauseTaiwan’sconsumerpriceshavehistoricallybeenlesssensitivetoimportcosts.InVietnam,inflationwillmoderatefrom4.6%yoyto4.0%in2027,belowitsinflationtargetof4.5%,asstabilizingglobalenergyand
commoditypricessoftenimportedcostpressures.
Thedirectionandscopeofadministeredprices—accountingforaboutonefifthofthebasketandofrecentinflationinKoreaandTaiwanandlikelymoreinVietnam—willalsobeanimportantdriverofinflationandinflationexpectations.InVietnam,the
governmentplanstostaggeradjustmentstoadministeredprices-specificallyacross
electricity,healthcare,andeducation—pairedwithtargetedfiscalandadministrative
interventions,includingcutstoretailelectricitytariffsandgasolinetaxes.Weexpect
administeredpricesinTaiwantofallfurther,alongwithdeclinesinpublictransportationcoststiedtoglobalcommodityprices,whiletheirmomentuminKoreawilllikelystabilizeataround2%,helpingtoreduceheadlineinflation(Exhibit11).Deferredadjustmentsbystate-runutilitieswouldposeslightupsideriskstoourinflationforecasts,butanytariffincreasesarelikelytobegradualandcalibratedtopreventinflationaryspillovers.
Governmenteffortstofreezepublicservicefeesandphaseoutfueltaxcuts
incrementallyfurtherreinforcedisinflationinKorea,andrecentBOKassessmentshighlightbothascriticalforanchoringcoreinflationexpectations.
13November20269
Exhibit10:Inflationsettoeaseto2%bymid-2027inbothKoreaandTaiwan
Percentchange,yoyPercentchange,yoy
7
CPIinflationprojections
Korea-riskscenario*Taiwan-riskscenarioKorea-baseline
6
5
Taiwan-baselineGS
4
projections
3
2
1
0
-1
20182019202020212022202320242025202620272028
*Riskscenarioentails5%weakercurrencyand15%highercommodityprices
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
Exhibit11:Weexpectadministeredpriceinflationtostaystableoverallin2027
Percentchange,yoy(2QMA)Percentchange,yoy(2QMA)
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
CPIadministeredprices
GS
fcast
KoreaTaiwan
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
2018201920202021202220232024202520262027
Note:DottedlinesdenoteGSforecasts
Source:HaverAnalytics,GoldmanSachsGlobalInvestmentResearch
DivergentSurplusRecyclingAndIdiosyncraticStructuralFactors
Thebalanceofpaymentsoutlookisoverallpositive.BothTaiwan’sandKorea’scurrentaccountsurpluseshavereachedrecordhighs.Taiwan’scurrentaccountbalancejumpedfrom14%ofGDPin2022-23to20%ofGDPin2025,andweexpectthebalanceto
reacharecordhighof24%ofGDPin2026andstayhighataround23%2027.Likewise,Korea’scurrentaccountbalancejumpedfrom6.5%ofGDPin2025to20.5%in2026,andweexpectthesurplustoremainhighataround18%ofGDPin2027.InthecaseofVietnam,itscurrentaccountbalancedeterioratedinthefirsthalfof2026toadeficitofUS$8bn(-3.3%ofGDP)fromalargesurplusofUS$33bn(6.7%ofGDP)in2025.Giventheprospectofapullbackinenergyprices,weexpectitscurrentaccountbalanceto
recovertoamoderatesurplusin2027.
OnthefinancialaccountsideinTaiwan,offshoredeposits,loansandreceivableshaveincreasedsharplysincetheTWDappreciatedinQ22025,reachingacumulative11.5%ofGDP(orUS$146bn),whichsuggestsampleroomforfuturerepatriationbyTaiwaneseexporters(Exhibit12).Incontrast,cumulativerisesinKorea’sexternalassetsoverthesame6quarterswerelimitedto2.9%ofGDP,withalargepartofthecurrentaccountsurplusrepatriatedbacktoKorea.
13November2026
温馨提示
- 1. 本站所有资源如无特殊说明,都需要本地电脑安装OFFICE2007和PDF阅读器。图纸软件为CAD,CAXA,PROE,UG,SolidWorks等.压缩文件请下载最新的WinRAR软件解压。
- 2. 本站的文档不包含任何第三方提供的附件图纸等,如果需要附件,请联系上传者。文件的所有权益归上传用户所有。
- 3. 本站RAR压缩包中若带图纸,网页内容里面会有图纸预览,若没有图纸预览就没有图纸。
- 4. 未经权益所有人同意不得将文件中的内容挪作商业或盈利用途。
- 5. 人人文库网仅提供信息存储空间,仅对用户上传内容的表现方式做保护处理,对用户上传分享的文档内容本身不做任何修改或编辑,并不能对任何下载内容负责。
- 6. 下载文件中如有侵权或不适当内容,请与我们联系,我们立即纠正。
- 7. 本站不保证下载资源的准确性、安全性和完整性, 同时也不承担用户因使用这些下载资源对自己和他人造成任何形式的伤害或损失。
最新文档
- 初中八年级心理健康《解放被困的思维》教学设计
- 初中语文八年级《渔家傲·天接云涛连晓雾》教学设计:意境重构与家国情怀的深度对话
- 度安全工作总结
- 6G低延迟赋能智能光谱美容仪:实时远程光疗指导新范式
- 2026年化工实验考试题库及参考答案
- 2026年物业消防监控类模拟试卷(含答案)
- 2026年高级茶叶加工题库及参考答案
- 上海交规考试题库大全及参考答案
- 2026年应急普法模拟试卷(含答案)
- 2026年信息技术应用与创新竞赛题库及参考答案
- 运动素质知到课后答案智慧树章节测试答案2025年春浙江大学
- 图纸保密协议
- 计算机组成原理(第6版)课件全套 纪禄平 第0-6章 概论-输入输出设备及其接口
- 江苏省苏州市昆山、太仓、常熟、张家港四市2024-2025学年八年级上学期期末阳光测试历史试题(含答案)
- 2024版科研项目合作协议书
- 陶瓷厂工艺设计概论(山东联盟)智慧树知到期末考试答案章节答案2024年齐鲁工业大学
- 加强核电国产设备供货管理
- 驾照体检表完整版本
- 上门按摩项目融资计划书
- 视神经脊髓炎护理
- DB32T 4063-2021建筑工程施工质量鉴定标准
评论
0/150
提交评论