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AllianzGreenTransitionTracker2026

Theclean-techturningpointandwhyemissionscouldsoonfollow

05November2026

AllianzResearch

AllianzResearch

2

Content

4

ExecutiveSummary

9

Globalclimatetransition:Aturningpointinpower,butnotyetinemissions

31

Countryandregionaldeepdives

34

Balancingthebudget:ScalingCDRandtheroleofnegativeemissions

39

BeyondEmissions:Assessingtheeconomicimpactoftherenewableexpansion

41

TransitionOutlook:Driversandbarriersshapingemissionsto2030

50

Appendix

05November2026

3

Executive

Summary

•Climatetargetsareslippingaway,butthegreentransitionisnot.ThesecondeditionoftheAllianzGreenTransitionTrackershowsthatglobalemissionscontinuetodivergefrompathwaysalignedwiththe2015ParisAgreementgoals,andlimitingwarmingto

1.5°Cappearsincreasinglyoutofreach.However,thegapbetweenambitionandrealityhasfurthernarrowed.Ofthe65countriesassessed–responsiblefor81%ofglobal

greenhouse-gasemissions–56havemovedclosertotheirbenchmarks.Atthecurrentpace,however,theworldwillnotreachnet-zerountil2064.

•Cleantechnologiescontinuetoadvancedespitepoliticalheadwindsandweakeningclimatecommitments.In2025,renewablesendedcoal’scentury-longleadasthe

world’slargestsourceofelectricitysupply,accountingfor33.5%ofglobalgeneration

comparedwithcoal’s33.2%share.Ofallnewpowergeneration,99%camefrom

renewables.Thishelpedslowglobalgreenhouse-gasemissionsgrowthto0.7%,downfrom1.5%inboth2023and2024.Thisyear,globalemissionsareexpectedtostagnate,withfossil-fuelCO₂emissionsprojectedtodeclinebyaround0.5%.Higherfossil-fuel

pricesandincreasinglycompetitivecleantechnologiesaresupportingelectrification,

withtheEVshareofnewcarregistrationsrisingfrom18%to22%betweenQ32025andQ32026.However,risingelectricitydemand,gridbottlenecksandpolicyuncertainty

couldslowprogress,whileAIanddatacenterscouldincreaseglobalemissionsby

around0.6%by2030.Despitetheseheadwinds,aglobalemissionspeakbefore2030remainswithinreachifclean-energyexpansioncontinuestooutpacedemandgrowth.

•Progressisincreasinglyunevenacrosscountries,withleaderspullingfurtheraheadoflaggards.Sincethefirstedition,ProgressScores,whichmeasurethedistancetonetzerotargets,haveimprovedbyanaverageof2.0points,butcountriesinthetophalf

oftherankinghavegainedtwiceasmuchasthoseinthebottomhalf(2.6versus1.3

points).Energyefficiencyhasimprovedmost,whileterritorialemissionspercapitahavedeterioratedonaverage.Thisreflectsthebroaderglobaltrend:since2015,energy-

relatedemissionshaveincreasedbyaround10%,comparedwith35%growthinGDP.Economiesarebecominglesscarbon-intensive,butrisingenergydemandcontinuestooffsetmuchoftheprogress.

•ThefourbiggestCO2emittersshowdifferentdevelopments:Europeleadsbutlosesmomentum,ChinaandIndiashowsignsofaturningpoint,whiletheUSstalls.

EuropeanUnionmembersaccountforfourofthetencountriesshowingstrongest

improvementsintheTracker.Yet,EUemissionsfellbyjust0.2%in2025,comparedwithaverageannualreductionsof4%previously,leavingtheregiononcoursetoreach

net-zero-alignedbenchmarksonlyby2057.TheUSgainedjust1.2pointsandremainsinthebottomhalfoftheprogressranking,witha2.2%jumpinemissions–asecond

consecutiveincrease–drivenbycoal-firedgenerationthatgrewby13%amidrisingelectricitydemand.Chinagained2.3pointsasemissionsgrowthslowedtovirtually

zero,supportedbyrapidelectrification,withEVsaccountingformorethanhalfofnewcarsales.Indiarecordeda4.5-pointimprovement,theseventh-largestintheTracker,

AllianzResearch

4

asrenewableexpansion,slowerelectricitydemandgrowthandfavorableweatherhelpedreducecoal-firedgenerationby2.9%anddeliverthecountry‘sfirstemissionsdeclineoutsideaneconomiccontractionin25years.Colombiarecordedthelargestimprovement(+16.5points),drivenbyrecoveringhydropowergeneration,expandingsolarcapacityanddecliningenergyintensity.Meanwhile,fossil-fuel-dependent

economiesintheMiddleEastremainnearthebottomoftherankings,reflectinghighper-capitaemissionsandcontinuedrelianceonhydrocarbons.

•Thenextphaseofthetransitiondependsasmuchongridsandstorageason

renewablecapacity.Globalclean-energyinvestmentisexpectedtoriseby6.5%to

USD2.2trillionin2026,despitea3.6%decline(USD25bn)inspendingonrenewable

generation.Investmentinelectricitygridsandbatterystoragewillsoarby21%and

36%,respectively,ascountriesseektointegraterenewablesandmeetrisingelectricitydemand.Battery-storageadditionshavesurgedfrom2GWhin2015tomorethan300GWhin2025asinstalledcostsdropped91%.

•Carbonremovalisessential,butdeploymenthastobespedup.Withatemporaryovershootof1.5°Cincreasinglylikely,removingCO₂willbecriticaltooffsetresidual

emissionsandeventuallyloweratmosphericconcentrations.Yetthescale-upgapisenormous:ambitiouspathwayscallforaround9GtCO₂ofannualremovalsby2050,comparedwithlessthan4Gtimpliedbycurrentnationalcommitments.Whilenature-basedsolutionscurrentlydominate,novelcarbon-capturetechnologiesremainatanearlystageandscalingthemtoarequiredlevelcouldcostUSD0.5-1.4trnannually.

Delayingemissionscutsbyadecadecouldincreaseremovalneedsbymorethan50%by2100,reinforcingthatavoidingemissionsinthefirstplacemustremainthepriority,withcarbonremovalcomplementingratherthansubstitutingforrapidemissions

reductions.

05November2026

5

Globalclimatetransition:Aturningpointinpower,butnotyetinemissions

Thegreentransitionisgainingmomentum,but

emissionshaveyettopeak.Globalemissionsincreasedby0.7%in2025,markingaslowdownfromtheannual

growthratesof1.5%inboth2023and2024,and1.2%

in2022.Whilethetrendisencouraging,emissions

continuetorise,andtheglobaltrajectoryisincreasinglydivergingfrompathwaysalignedin2015undertheParisAgreement(Figure1),withcurrenttrendspointingto

warmingofmorethan3°Cbytheendofthecentury.Theslowdownhasprimarilybeendrivenbya0.3%decline

inpower-sectoremissions,whileemissionsfromfuel

production,transportandbuildingscontinuedtogrowbymorethan1.2%.Thisdivergencereflectsastructuralshiftintheglobalpowermix(Figure2).Whereas

coalandgasdominatedgrowthinelectricitysupply

duringthefirsttwodecadesofthiscentury,renewablesemergedasthemaindriverofexpansion,accounting

for99%ofadditionalsupplyin2025.Thisshifthasledtoahistoricmilestoneasrenewablesbecametheworld’slargestsourceofelectricityin2025,unseatingcoalfromapositionithadheldformorethanacentury.1

Figure1:Historicalemission&decarbonizationpathways(MtCo2eq)

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

2020

2022

2024

2026

2028

2030

2032

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2044

2046

2048

2050

60000

50000

40000

30000

20000

10000

0

-10000

LULUCF

CurrentPolicies(3.2°C)NetZero2050(1.5°C)

Historical

Below2°C(1.9°C)UNEPTarget

Sources:AllianzResearchbasedonJRCEDGAR,NGFSandUNEP;NGFSclimatescenariosrepresenta67%probabilityofnotexceedingthefollowingglobalwarmingthresholdsby2100:CurrentPolicies(3.2°C),Below2°CScenario(1.9°C),andNetZero2050(1.5°C).LULUCF(landuse,land-use

changeandforestry)emissionsincludethosefromdeforestation,fires,forestland,organicsoilsandothersources.

1

GlobalElectricityReview2026(EMBER)

AllianzResearch

6

Figure2:Globalpowersupplygrowthperyearbysource(inTWh)

2000

1500

1000

500

0

-500

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

BioenergyCoalGasHydroNuclearOtherfossilOtherrenewablesSolarWind

Sources:AllianzResearch,EMBER

Emissionsareincreasinglydecouplingfromeconomicgrowth,butthetrendremainsincomplete.In2025,

energy-relatedemissionsrosebyjust0.6%,well

belowglobalGDPgrowthofaround3.4%.TheKaya

decomposition,whichbreaksdownemissionsgrowth

intoitsmaindrivers,showsthatimprovementsinenergyintensity(-1.9%)andthecarbonintensityofenergy

(-0.8%)helpedoffsettheupwardpressurefromrisingGDPpercapitaandpopulationgrowthoverthelast

decade(Figure3).Thesegainsreflectbothamore

efficientuseofenergytogenerateeconomicoutput

andtheongoingshifttowardslow-carbonenergy,

particularlyinpowergeneration.Thetrendisalso

evidentoverthelongerterm,withenergy-related

emissionsrisingbyaround10%since2015,comparedwith35%growthinGDP.However,thesegainshave

notyetbeensufficienttooffsettheupwardpressureonemissionsfromrisingincomesandpopulationgrowth.

Figure3:Kayadecompositionofglobalenergyemissionsgrowth(in%)

8%

6%

4%

2%

0%

-2%

-4%

-6%

-8%

2016201720182019202020212022202320242025

g_Populationg_GDPpcg_EnergyGDP

g_CO2Energyg_Interactiong_Emissions

Sources:AllianzResearch,JRCEDGAR,WorldBank,EnergyInstitute

05November2026

7

Cleanenergyinvestmentcontinuestoexpand,but

thecompositionofspendingisshifting.Totalclean

energyinvestmentisexpectedtogrowby6.5%in

2026,reachingUSD2.2trn.Yetthetrendinrenewablesisbeginningtodiverge:afterseveralyearsofstrong

growthfollowingtheCOVID-19pandemic,investmentisprojectedtofallfromUSD690bnin2025toUSD665bnin2026(Figure4).ThisdeclineislargelyattributabletoChina,whilebothadvancedeconomiesandemerging

marketsanddevelopingeconomies(EMDEs)excludingChinaareexpectedtorecordmodestincreasesofUSD2-3bn.Themoderationinrenewableinvestmentcomesas

manycountriesenteraconsolidationphase,withthefocusincreasinglyshiftingfromexpandinggenerationcapacitytoensuringthatpowersystemscanaccommodateit.

Surgingelectricitydemandcontinuestosupportthe

caseforadditionalcleanpower,whilegridconstraints

andthegrowingneedforsystemflexibilityaredriving

investmentincomplementaryinfrastructure.Accordingly,investmentinelectricitynetworksandenergystorageisexpectedtoriseby20.8%and35.9%,respectively,in2026.Asaresult,theratioofrenewableenergyinvestmentto

gridinvestmenthasreturnedtoaround1.0–1.1in2026,followingseveralyearsofelevatedlevelssince2018.

Figure4:Worldtransitioninvestmenttrends(USDbn)

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

200

0

201520162017201820192020202120222023202420252026

1.81.6

1.4

1.2

1

0.80.60.40.20

Renewables/gridratioRenewablesFossilfuelsBatterystorageElectricitynetworks

Sources:IEA,AllianzResearch

Beyondtherapidexpansionofrenewables,progress

acrossothercleantechnologiesremainsmixed,

reflectingdifferencesincosttrendsandeconomic

incentives.Electricvehiclesandbatterystorageare

benefitingfromfallingcostsandgrowingdemand.

Theshareofbattery-electricvehicles(BEVs)innewcar

registrationsrosefromaround2%in2019to18%inQ4

2025,asthepricegapwithinternalcombustionengine

vehiclesnarrowedfrom49%to20%(Figure5a).Battery

storagehasfollowedasimilartrajectory,withannual

additionssurgingfromaround2GWhin2015to307GWhin2025,whileinstalledcostsfellby91%toaboutUSD140/kWh(Figure5b).Heatpumpdeploymentcontinuestoface

barriersfromhighupfrontcostsandelectricitypricesthatremainrelativelyhighcomparedwithgas,weakening

theeconomicincentivetoswitchfromfossil-fuelheating.Globally,salesgrowthhaslostmomentuminrecent

years,althoughdevelopmentsvaryacrossmarkets.In

Europe,salesreturnedtogrowthin2025afterfallingfortwoconsecutiveyears,butremainedbelowtheir2022

peak(Figure5c).TherenewedenergypriceandsecurityshocklinkedtodisruptionsintheStraitofHormuzcould

reinforcethecaseforelectrification,acceleratingEV

adoptionandpotentiallyreversingtherecentstagnationinheatpumpsales,asvolatilefossil-fuelpricesstrengthentheappealofalternativestooilandgas.

AllianzResearch

8

Figure5:Marketgrowthofgreentechnologies:a)Electricvehicles,b)BatteryStorageandc)heatpumps

Qtr1

Qtr3

Qtr1

Qtr3

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Qtr3

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Qtr3

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Qtr3

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Qtr2

20192020202120222023202420252026

BEVregistrations(million,LHS)BEV-ICEpricegap(%,RHS)

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

4.5

4

3.53

2.5

2

1.5

1

0.50

a

Sources:AllianzResearchbasedonIEA,IRENA,EMBER,EHPA

2015

2017

2019

2021

2023

2025

1800

1500

1200

900

600

300

0

GrossBESScapacityadditions(GWh)

Installedcost(2025USD/kWh)

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2025

ChinaUSEUJapan

TheAllianzGreenTransitionTrackerhighlightscountry-levelnuancesbehindtheglobalshifts.

Theanalysis,whichcovers65²countriesresponsible

for80.8%ofglobalGHGemissions,trackstransition

developmentsbyscoringeachbasedonfivekey

indicators:(1)carbonintensityoftheeconomy,(2)

energyintensity,(3)consumption-basedemissionsper

capita,(4)territorialemissionspercapitaand(5)the

shareoflow-carbonsourcesinthenationalpowermix.³Theindividualindicatorsarethenaggregatedintotwocountry-levelscores:TheProgressScore(Figure6),whichmeasuresadvancesfromthe2015baselinetowardnet-zerobenchmarksfor2050andthePeerScore(Figure7),whichcomparescountries‘currentperformance.

Globalprogresstowardsnetzerocontinuedsincelastyear,butremainsinsufficienttomeetParisclimatetargets.ThesecondeditionoftheAllianz

GreenTransitionTrackerfindsthat56ofthe65countries

assessedhavemovedclosertotheirnet-zerobenchmarks,withoverallscoresincreasingbyanaverageof2points.

AmongthefiveKPIs,energyintensityoftheeconomy

recordedthelargestaverageimprovement(+3.1points),

followedbyconsumption-basedemissionspercapita(+2.3points).Carbonintensityoftheeconomyandtheshare

oflow-carbonenergyinthepowermixeachimproved

by1.9pointsonaverage,whileterritorialemissionsper

capitadeteriorated.Despitethisprogress,countriesremainofftracktomeettheir2050targets.Morethan30%of

thetimebetweentheParisAgreementand2050has

alreadyelapsed,yetonlyaroundathirdofthecountrieshaveachievedaProgressScoreabove30,mostoftheminEurope(Figure6).Atthecurrentpace,countrieswouldreachtheirnet-zerobenchmarklevelsonlyaround2064,underscoringtheneedtoacceleratethetransition.4

²Duetodataavailabilitythisyear´sGreenTransitionTrackerusesEMBERinsteadofIRENApowergenerationandcapacitydata.Thishasledtoslightchangesinlastyearsscoringwithfourcountries/regionsbeingdroppedduetoalackofdataupdating(UAE,HongKong,SaudiArabiaandTrinidad&Tobago)

³Foradetaileddescriptionofthetransitionscoringmethodology,seeAppendixA2.

⁴FormoreinformationonindividualcountryscorechangesseeAppendixA1.

05November2026

9

Theglobaltransitionisincreasinglyrunningattwospeeds,withleaderspullingfurtherahead,while

laggardsstruggletokeeppace.Countriesinthetophalfofthetransitionprogressrankingimprovedtheirscoresbyanaverageof2.6points,comparedwith1.3pointsinthebottomhalf.ThisdivergenceismirroredinthePeerScore(Figure7andAppendixA1),wherethegapbetweenthetwogroupswidenedby1.4points.

Europeancountriesfeatureprominentlyamongthetopperformers,alongsideColombia,PeruandSri

Lanka.Severalfossil-fuel-producingeconomiesinthe

MiddleEastremainnearthebottom,withIranand

QatarrankingamongthelowestandOmanandKuwaitsharinglastplace.Theworld’slargestemitters,China

andtheUS,improveonlymodestlyandremaininthe

bottomhalfoftheprogressrankingandnearthebottomofthePeerScore.Indiaisthenotableexceptionamongthebigthree,movingupseveralplacesonefficiency

gainsandacleanerpowermix,althoughitremainsinthebottomhalfandrisingelectricitydemandwilltestwhetherprogresslasts.

Figure6:ClimatetransitionProgressScore

Source:AllianzResearch

Figure7:ClimatetransitionPeerScore

Source:AllianzResearch

AllianzResearch

10

Countryandregionaldeepdives

EuropeanUnion–Leadingthetransition,butstrugglingtoaccelerate

TheEUcontinuestoleadthegreentransition,

althoughthepaceofprogressisslowing.Emissionsin

theEUdecreasedby0.2%in2025,markingthefourth

consecutiveyearofreductionssince2021(Figure8a).

However,thepacehasslowedcomparedtoprevious

years,whichshowedanaverageannualreductionrate

of-4%.ProgressScoresacrossEUcountriesimprovedby2.2pointsonaverage,year-on-year,0.2pointsabovetheglobalaverage.Denmark,Estonia,FinlandandCzechiarecordedthestrongestimprovementsamongEUmemberstates,eachgainingmorethanfourpoints.Europe’s

leadingpositionisfurtherreflectedintheoverallrankings:

alltencountriesmakingthegreatestprogresssince

2015areEuropean,sevenofwhichareEUmembers.EUcountriesalsoaccountforhalfofthetoptenPeer-Scoreperformers.

TheseresultssuggestthattheEUdecarbonization

strategyandassociatedmeasuresaredelivering

progress,butthepaceremainsinsufficient.Atthecurrentrateofimprovement,reachingnet-zero-alignedlevels

acrosstheindicatorsassessedwouldtakeuntil2057,

implyingaseven-yearimplementationgap.Theslowdowninemissionsreductionsalsoraisesconcernsabout

Europe’sabilitytostayontrackforitsclimatetargets,withcurrentemissionpathwaysincreasinglydivergingfrom

a1.5°C-compatibletrajectory(Figure8a).Accelerating

implementationwillthereforebecriticaltotranslating

Europe’scontinuedleadershipintotimely,climate-alignedoutcomes.

Figure8:a)Historicalemission&decarbonizationpathways(MtCo2eq)andb)climatetransitionscores

a

b

5000

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-1000

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2014

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2000

LULUCF

Historical

Below2°C(1.9°C)

CurrentPolicies(3.2°C)

Targets

NetZero2050(1.5°C)

GlobalEmissionsShare

-6%

PeerScoreProgressScore

29.4

Rank:21

66.6

Rank:25

Sources:AllianzResearchbasedonJRCEDGAR,NGFSandUNEP;NGFSclimatescenariosrepresenta67%probabilityofnotexceedingthe

followingglobalwarmingthresholdsby2100:CurrentPolicies(3.2°C),Below2°CScenario(1.9°C),andNetZero2050(1.5°C).LULUCF(landuse,land-usechangeandforestry)emissionsincludethosefromdeforestation,fires,forestland,organicsoilsandothersources.

05November2026

11

a

Fouroutofthefivekeyclimateindicatorsimprovedsinceourlastassessment(Figure9).Thestrongestgainscamefromconsumption-basedemissionsper

capita,whichfellby8%intheEU,comparedwitha3%declineinterritorialemissions.⁵Economicefficiency

Emissions(tCO2/pc)

Subsidies(USDbn)

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(t)

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(t)

Territorialemissions

Consumptionemissions

CoalGasOilElectricity

Indicator

Unit

2015

t-1

Latest(t)

Carbonintensity

tCO2/USDmn

183.67

128.09

125.79

Energyintensity

PJ/USDbn

2.78

2.13

2.10

indicatorsimprovedmoremodestly,withthecarbon

intensityoftheEUeconomydecliningby2%andenergyintensitybyjust1%.AlthoughdirectfossilfuelsubsidiesremainedelevatedataroundUSD129bnin2024,totalfossilenergysupportdeclinedbyUSD43.6bn,primarilyreflectinglowersubsidiesforgasandelectricity.

Figure9:a)Climateperformanceindicatorsandb)percentilerankofthecountryforeachindicator

b

1

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0

Sources:AllianzResearchbasedonJRCEDGAR,EnergyInstitute,GlobalCarbonBudget,WorldBank,EMBER,NGFS

DevelopmentsintheEU’senergysupplyandpower

generationweremixedin2025.CoalsupplyintheEU’sprimaryenergymixcontinueditsdownwardtrendin

2025,dropping3.4%(Figure10a).However,ithasbeen

largelyreplacedbya3%pickupinenergyconsumptionfromnaturalgaswhileoilconsumptionremainedbroadlystable.Onthepowergenerationside,solarcontinueditsstrongexpansion,growingbyaround22%annuallysincethe2022energycrisis.However,thiswaspartlyoffsetbya2%declineinwindgenerationin2025which,despite

anadditional12GWofinstalledcapacity,showedloweroutputduetoweakerwindconditionsearlyintheyear.

Lowerhydropowergeneration,reflectinglessfavorablerainfallconditionsthanin2024,furtheroffsetthesegains,leavingtheshareoflow-carbonsourcesinelectricity

generationbroadlyunchangedataround71%(Figure10b).

Country-leveldevelopmentsvariedconsiderably.

Denmarkrecordedthelargestimprovementinthelow-carbonshareofelectricitygeneration(+5pp),followedbyEstonia(+4.1pp),Croatia(+3.0pp)andSlovenia

(+2.3pp).Bycontrast,thesharedeclinedmostsharplyinLithuania(-6.6pp),Belgium(-4.2pp)andAustria(-2.6pp),highlightingdivergingnationaltrajectoriesdespitethebroadlystableEU-wideshare.

5Duetotimelagsinthereportedindicatorslatestvaluesthroughoutthereportrefertodifferentyears:2025:Carbonintensity,Energyintensity,LowCarbonShare,EmissionShare;2024:TerritorialEmissions,Fossilsubsidies;2023:Consumptionemissions

AllianzResearch

12

Figure10:a)Developmentoftotalenergysupply(EJ)andb)low-carbonshareinpowermix(%)ab

Sources:AllianzResearch,EnergyInstitute,EMBER

80

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Coal

Biofuels

NuclearOther

Gas

Wind

Oil

Solar

Hydro

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80%

60%

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20%

0%

57%

71%71%

43%

29%29%

201520242025

FossilLowCarbon

Whileemissionsinmostsectorscontinuetodecline,transportremainstheEU’smaindecarbonization

challenge.Agriculture,buildings,fuelproduction,

processesandindustrialcombustionhaveallrecordedmodestbutsustainedemissionsreductions,averagingaround1–3%annuallyoverthepastfiveyears.

Transport,bycontrast,hasyettoachieveacomparabledecline.ItovertookthepowersectorastheEU’slargestemittingsectorin2022andnowaccountsforaround

25.6%oftotalEUemissions.

However,theoutlookmaybeshiftingasEVsbecomemoreaffordableandhigherfuelpricesstrengthen

theincentivetoswitchfrompetrolanddieselcarstoelectricalternatives.Low-emissioncaruptakehasbeenontherisesince2020,buthigherfuelcostsfollowingtheclosureoftheStraitofHormuzhavegiventhistrenda

furtherboostin2026.Registrationsofelectricvehiclesinparticularhaveincreasedstrongly,risingby32–56%year-on-yearacrossthefirstthreequartersoftheyear(Figure11a).Thismomentumhasacceleratedinrecentmonths,withbattery-electricvehicles(BEVs)accountingfor30%ofnewcarregistrationsinSeptember,11.2pp

higherthanayearearlier.Improvingaffordabilityis

alsosupportingadoption,withthepricegapbetweenbattery-electricandinternalcombustionenginevehiclesnarrowingfromUSD30,500in2010toUSD6,000in

2025(Figure11b).Lookingahead,theintroductionoftheEU’sETS2carbon-pricingsystemforroadtransportfuelsin2028couldfurtherstrengthentheeconomic

incentivetoswitchtoelectricvehicles,helpingsustainthisshiftbeyondthecurrentperiodofelevatedfuelprices.

05November2026

13

Figure11:a)ShareofquarterlycarregistrationsbypowertrainintheEU(in%)andb)averagecitycarpricesacrossmajorEuropeanmarkets(inUSD)

a

Qtr1

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100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

20222023202420252026

BatteryelectricPlug-inhybridHybrid

DieselPetrolOther

b

BEVICEV

Sources:

EVSalesDataTracker

(EMBER),IEA,AllianzResearch;Note:priceaveragesarecalculatedacrossGermany,ItalyandFrance

14

Box1:FromHormuztotheshowroom:fuelpriceswillacceleratetheelectricvehicletransition

Geopoliticalshockscangeneratepricesignalsfarstrongerthanthosetypicallyseenunderclimatepolicy.TheIranconflictandresultingdisruptionsintheStraitofHormuzhavesubstantiallyincreaseddieselprices.Reproducingthis

increasethroughcarbonpricingalonewouldrequireaCO₂priceexceedingEUR200/tCO₂(Figure12a).Additionally,

includingexistingfueltaxesandothercharges,thetotalpricepremiumoverthepre-taxdieselpriceisequivalenttoacarbonpriceofmorethanEUR600/tCO₂(Figure12b).Consequently,thecurrentconflict-relateddieselpriceincreaseaccountsforaroundone-thirdofthistotalpremium.Suchpriceshocksleadtoincreasedelectricvehicleadoptionwhichinturnreducesthedependenceonunstableglobaloilmarkets.

Onceelectricvehiclesgainafoothold,markettransformationprogressesconsistently.Acrosstheobservedcountries,thebattery-electricvehicle(BEV)shareofnewcarregistrationsfollowsasurprisinglylinearaveragetrajectoryonce

itcrossedthe10%thresholdfornewBEVregistrations(Figure13).The12-monthrollingaverage(calculatedacross

countrieswithavailabledataateachpoint)suggeststhat,onaverage,thetransitionfrom10%tonearly100%ofnew

registrationstakesaround12years.AlthoughthefinalyearsoftheshowntrajectoryarerepresentedbyNorwayalone(beingtheonlycountrytopassthe10%thresholdalready12yearsago),thebroadercountrysampleinearlieryearsalsofollowstheaggregatetrendrelativelyclosely,despitesubstantialdifferencesinindividualcountrytrajectories.

Importantly,severalmajorautomotivemarketshaveyettoreachthe10%take-offthreshold,includingItaly(8%),theUSandCanada(7%),India(6%),Brazil(5%),Japan(3%)andMexico(2%).Higherfuelpricespotentiallyprovideanadditionalpushtotransitionthemobilitysectorinthesecountries.However,unliketemporarygeopoliticalprice

shocks,predictableclimatepolicies

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