论文范文AMJ2016- The Impact of Ceo Succession with

1、r Academy of Management Journal 2016, Vol. 59, No. 5, 18451868. /10.5465/amj.2014.0176 THE IMPACT OF CEO SUCCESSION WITH GENDER CHANGE ON FIRM PERFORMANCE AND SUCCESSOR EARLY DEPARTURE: EVIDENCE FROM CHINAS PUBLICLY LISTED COMPANIES IN 19972010 YAN ZHANG Rice University, Houston, Tex

2、as HONGYAN QU Central University of Finance and Economics, China Female corporate leadership has drawn increasing attention from academia and practitioners. We contribute to the literature by examining the impact of CEO succession with gender changei.e., a male CEO succeeded by a female or vice vers

3、a. We propose that due to gender differences in executive leadership positions, CEO succession with gender change may amplify the disruption of the CEO succession process and thus adversely affect post-succession firm performance and increase the likelihood of suc- cessor early departure. Using data

4、 from 3,320 CEO successions in companies listed in Chinas Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 1997 to 2010, we find evidence to support this argument. We also find that the negative (positive) impact of male-to- female succession on firm performance (the likelihood of successor early departur

5、e) may be weakened by positive organizational attitudes toward female leadership as indicated by the presence of other female leaders on the firms board of directors and/or top management team, and the successors inside origin. INTRODUCTION Although women have been making steady prog- ress in moving

6、 up to corporate leadership positions, including positions on boards of directors and as senior executives, progress at the CEO level remains limited (Daily, Certo, Dezs o Helfat, Harris, Hambrick Eagly, Makhijani, Rosette Grusky, 1960, 1964). Therefore, we expect that relative to same-gender succes

7、sion, CEO succession with gender changemayhaveanadverseimpactonpost-succession firm performance and increase the likelihood of the successors early departure. We further examine how organizational contextual factors may moderate the impact of male-to-female succession, a practice representing “devia

8、tion from normal” since men predominately occupy the CEO position (Daily et al., 1999; Dezs o Helfat etal.,2006).Becauseoftheincongruitybetweenleader roles and the female gender role (Eagly et al., 2003) as well as the predominance of males in the CEO post, a female tends to have lower status than a

9、 male in this position (Ryan however,whencontrollingfortherisk-taking tendency, femaleCEOs underperformed male CEOs. Based on panel data of S Grusky, 1960, 1964). Grusky (1964) made the dis- tinction between inside and outside succession and found that inside succession was associated with better pe

10、rformance than outside succession, a find- ing that has been verified by following studies (e.g., Shen Zhang Westphal Zhu Zhang,2008). Early departure of a successor forces the firm to by- pass the normal succession process and select a new CEO in an unplanned manner, which can lead to aviciouscycle

11、inthefirmssuccessions(Shen,2003; Wiersema, 2002; Zhang, 2008). As noted in previous studies on CEO succession, new CEOs face a “liabil- ity of newness” (Shen, 2003; Zhang, 2008). As Finkelstein et al. (2009: 200) have noted, “A new executive, even one internally appointed, enters the position at a d

12、isadvantage in terms of knowledge of the task at hand; pertinent facts, contracts, trends, and issues are not yet well understood.” Compared to a succession with the same gender, a successor in a succession with gender change may face a greater level of “liability of newness” because of his/her lead

13、ership style differences from the predecessor as well as his/her “out-group” status. Thus, we expect that compared with same-gender succession, CEO succession with gender change will have a higher likelihood of successor early departure. Based upon these arguments, we propose, Hypothesis 1a. CEO suc

14、cession with gender changea male CEO succeeded by a female or a female CEO succeeded by a malewill have a negative impact on post-succession firm per- formance, compared with same-gender CEO succession. Hypothesis 1b. CEO succession with gender changea male CEO succeeded by a female or a female CEO

15、succeeded by a malewill in- crease the likelihood of the successors early departure, compared with same-gender CEO succession.2 The Moderating Effects of Organizational Attitudes toward Female Leadership Whilebothmale-to-femalesuccessionandfemale- to-male succession represent gender changes, these t

16、wo scenarios differ. More specifically, because men predominately occupy the position of CEO (Daily et al., 1999; Dezs o Helfat et al., 2006), theCEOpositionisperceivedtobemoreconsistent 2 Lower post-succession performance associated with CEO succession with gender change, as proposed in Hypothesis

17、1a, may also increase the likelihood of the successors early departure. Hypothesis 1b proposes the impact of CEO succession with gender change on the likelihood of the successors early departure above and beyond the possible effect of post-succession firm performance. 1848OctoberAcademy of Managemen

18、t Journal with a male gender role and incongruent with a fe- malegenderrole(Eagly Hambrick and (2) female directors contribute to a female-friendly corporate culture that encourages cooperation and in- formation exchange at the top, which can improve the quality of board advice and accordingly impro

19、ve a female CEOs task performance. 20161849Zhang and Qu Hypothesis 2b. The impact of male-to-female succession on the likelihood of the successors early departure will be weakened by a higher proportion of female directors on a firms board. Hypothesis 3a. The impact of male-to-female succession on p

20、ost-succession firm perfor- mance will be weakened by a higher pro- portion of females in a firms top management team. Hypothesis 3b. The impact of male-to-female succession on the likelihood of the successors early departure will be weakened by a higher proportion of females in a firms top manage-

21、ment team. Successor origin. The origin of the successor (a firm insider vs. outsider) may also affect the impact of male-to-female succession. Relative to an inside succession, an outside succession suf- fers from a greater level of information asymmetry in which the board of directors lacks inform

22、ation on a CEO candidates competence as well as the fit between his/her competence and the firms task contingencies (Zhang, 2008). As a result, a poor selectionofasuccessorCEOismorelikelytooccur in an outside succession (Zhang, 2008). Moreover, Shen and Cannella (2002a) argued that inside successors

23、 have more firm-specific knowledge and are more likely to face a supportive top man- agement team. We expect that the impact of male-to-female succession on post-succession firm performance and on the likelihood of the successors early de- parture to be weaker in an inside succession than in an outs

24、ide succession. In an inside succession, the female successor had been a member of the firmstopmanagementteampriortothesuccession. As top management team members sociallyinteract and exchange information with each other, initially perceived differences based upon surface-level demographic attributes

25、 may diminish over time (Barkema Harrison et al., 2002). Theco-workingexperienceallowsthesuccessorand other top management members to develop a com- mon identity of “who we are.” A common identity based upon organizational membership can reduce the salience of the female successors “out-group” statu

26、s based upon gender, thus weakening the disruption associated with male-to-female suc- cession. As evidence, Lee and James (2007) found that stock market reactions to announcements of femaleCEOswerelessnegativeforwomeninsiders than for women outsiders. In contrast, the disruption associated with mal

27、e- to-female succession should be stronger in an out- side succession. In this situation, the female outside successor not only has an “out-group” status based upon gender but also based upon firm experience or the lack of it. The social identification and categori- zation theory suggests that subgr

28、oups are particu- larly likely to be formed when they differ in terms of several demographic characteristics at the same time (Barkema Lau Lo, Wong, Wang Shen Zhang Zhang, 2008). Accordingly, we coded these cases as “early routine departures.” How- ever, coding these cases as “early non-routine depa

29、rtures” would not materially change our results. 20161851Zhang and Qu were considered early non-routine departures (e.g., termination, resignation, unspecified personal rea- sons, or unspecified other reasons, etc.). Successor early routine departure (successor early non-routine departure) was coded

30、 as a dummy, “1” for an early routine departure (an early non-routine departure), and “0” otherwise. We divided successor early departures into “early routine departures” vs. “early non-routine departures” rather than “voluntary turnovers” vs. “dismissals” because if a successor felt a lack of fit d

31、ue to the “gender change effect,” s/he may have voluntarily left even if s/he was not dismissed. Thus, our definition of “non-routine departures” was broader than the definition of “dismissals” used in the prior literature and more consistent with our theoretical arguments. We used a multinomial- lo

32、gistic regression to compare early routine depar- tures and early non-routine departures to the base comparison groupthat is, successors remaining in office. We expected that our hypotheses (Hypotheses 1b/2b/3b/4b) should mainly apply to early non- routine departures, because early routine departure

33、s have obvious alternative explanations. Predictors. Because male-to-female succession and female-to-male succession represent differ- ent scenarios that may vary in the magnitude of effects, and our moderating hypotheses were on the contingent effects of male-to-female succession, we created the fo

34、llowing two dummy variables. Male-to-female succession was coded as “1” if the predecessor CEO was a male and the successor was a female, and “0” otherwise; female-to-male succession was coded as “1” if the predecessor CEO was a female and the successor was a male, and “0” otherwise. These two group

35、s of CEO successions were compared to same-gender suc- cessions (i.e., male-to-male or female-to-female successions).Table1summarizesthedistribution of predecessorsuccessor gender combinations by year. Not surprisingly, most successions were male-to-male successions (3,007 out of 3,320, or 90.6%) an

36、d a few were female-to-female suc- cessions (24 out of 3,320, or 0.7%). Gender change occurred in 289 successions (8.7%):159 male- to-female successions and 130 female-to-male successions. Moderators. Proportion of female directors was measured by the proportion of female directors (otherthanthefema

37、leCEOsuccessorifthesuccessor was a female) on the firms board in the year of suc- cession. Proportion of female top managers was measured by the proportion of females (other than the female CEO successor if the successor was a fe- male) in the top management team as reported in the firms annual repo

38、rt in the year of succession. Inside successor was coded as a dummy variable, “1” if the successor CEO was promoted from within the firm and “0” if hired from outside. Controls.Wecontrolledforalternativeex- planations for post-succession firm performance and/or the successors early departure that ha

39、ve been suggested in previous studies (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Shen Zhang Zhang Weisbach, 1988; Zajac Wiersema Ocasio,1994; Zhang, 2008), we included the following predictors: prior firm performance (ROA in the prior year), firm size, firm age, founder CEO, CEO tenure, and CEO age (in the last thr

40、ee variables, CEO referred to the predecessor CEO in the observations with CEO suc- cession).Wealsoincluded3-digitindustrydummies and year dummies as the rate of CEO turnover may vary across industries and differ over time. CEO age was used as the instrument variable, which likely affects the likeli

41、hood of experiencing CEO succes- sion, but is unlikely to impact post-succession firm performanceorthesuccessors earlydeparture(both were empirically confirmed). Since some firm-year observations were associated with the same firm, we clustered the observations at the firm level. The results are rep

42、orted in Appendix A. As ex- pected, prior ROA (b 5 20.01, p , 0.001), firm size (b520.18,p,0.001),firmage(b520.02,p,0.05), and thefounder status ofCEO (b 520.18,p,0.001) are negatively related to the likelihood of experi- encing CEO succession. CEO tenure (b 5 20.01, p , 0.01) has a negative relatio

43、nship and CEO age (b 5 3.48E-3, p , 0.01) has a positive relationship with the likelihood of experiencing CEO succes- sion. This model generated an Inverse Mills ratio, which denoted the hazard of non-selection. This rationamed“InverseMillsratioonexperiencing CEO succession”was included in the model

44、s on post-succession firm performance and the succes- sors early departure. Moreover, the selection of a female successor may beendogenoustosomecontextualfactorssuchasthe availability of female candidates in the firm. To address this issue, we ran a selection model to pre- dict the likelihood of hav

45、ing a female CEO for those 3,320 firm-year observations that experienced CEO succession. The model included pre-succession performance, firm size, and the proportion of fe- male directors on the board in the year prior to suc- cession,theproportionoffemaletopmanagersinthe year prior to succession, a

46、nd the historical presence of female CEO(s) before the predecessor of the focal succession in the firms history. The presence of fe- male CEO(s) in industry peer firms was used as an instrumentvariable,codedas“1”iftherewasatleast one female CEO in other firms in the same 3-digit industry in the year

47、 prior to the focal succession and “0”otherwise.ThepresenceoffemaleCEO(s)inpeer firms may increase the likelihood of selecting a fe- male CEO in the focal firm due to the inter-firm mi- meticeffect(Hillman,Shropshire, when all these criteria were met, the firm-year observation withtheclosest firmsiz

48、e was chosen. Wepooledthe6,640 observations together to predict whether a firm-year ob- servation would experience CEO succession. We gener- ated an Inverse Mills ratio and included it in the models that predicted post-succession firm performance and the modelthatpredictedthelikelihoodofthesuccessor

49、searly departure. The results are highly consistent with those reported in Tables 3 and 4. Moreover, we repeated this procedure by using 2-digit industry to construct the matched sample (everything else remained the same) and obtained virtually the same results. 1854OctoberAcademy of Management Jour

50、nal (Cooks D) and found that all Cooks D values were far less than 1.0, confirming that influences of out- liers were not a concern. We further tested for multicollinearity and found no indication of such problems. (No variable inflation factor was greater than 2.4, well below the level indicating p

51、otential problems.) RESULTS Descriptivestatisticsandacorrelationmatrixofall variables, except industry and year dummies, are presented in Table 2. Table 3 presents the results of GLS regressions on post-succession firm perfor- mance. Model 1 only includes control variables. As expected,pre-successio

52、nperformance(b50.14,p, 0.001) is positively related to post-succession per- formance. Firm size (b 5 1.49, p , 0.001) and suc- cessor ownership (b 5 0.44, p , 0.001) have asignificantlypositiveandSOE(b520.51,p,0.05) has a significantly negative relationship with post- succession performance. Hypothe

53、sis 1a proposes that CEO succession with gender change has a negative effect on post- succession performance. Model 2 in Table 3 adds the two predictors of “male-to-female succession” and “female-to-male succession,” in which succes- sion with the same gender is used as the base com- parison group.7

54、The coefficient for “male-to-female succession” (b 5 21.57, p , 0.01) is negatively sig- nificant; however, that for “female-to-male succes- sion” (b 5 20.60, n.s.) is not statistically significant. Thus, Hypothesis 1a is partially supported. Practi- cally, these results show that compared with same

55、- gendersuccession,male-to-femalesuccessionscores 1.57 percentage points lower ROA. Model3addsthethreemoderatingvariables,none of which is significant. Hypothesis 2a proposes that the negative impact of “male-to-female succession” on post-succession performance will be weakened by a higher proportio

56、n of female directors on the board.Model4addstheinteractiontermof“male-to- female succession” and “proportion of female di- rectors.” Its coefficient is positive and significant (b 5 0.10, p , 0.001), consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2a. In additional analyses (which will be discussed la

57、ter), we found that having two or more female di- rectors (other than the female CEO if the CEO was a female) on the board does not offer incremental valuecomparedtohavingonefemaledirector.Thus, to ease interpretation, in Model 5, we replace “pro- portion of female directors” with a dummy variable,

58、“presence of other female directors,” coded as “1” if there were other female director(s) on the board, and “0” otherwise. We also add two interaction terms: “male-to-female succession with presence of other female directors” and “male-to-female succession without presence of other female directors”

59、 (“male- to-female succession” is dropped).8The coefficient for “male-to-female succession with presence of other female directors” is not statistically significant (b 5 1.02, n.s.), whereas that for “male-to-female succession without presence of other female direc- tors” is significant and negative (b 5 24.62, p , 0.001). A x2test revealed that these two coefficients are significantly different (x25 18.48, p , 0.001). Practically, without the presence of other female directors, male-to-female succession scored 4.62 percentage points lower ROA t