法律专业外文翻译外文文献英文文献-法律和事实在专利诉讼中是形式还是功能.doc

law and fact in patent litigation: form versus function*法律和事实在专利诉讼中是形式还是功能thomas g. field, jr.introductionrecently, the supreme court sent dennison mfg. v. panduit corp. back to the court of appeals for the federal circuit (cafc). it remanded with explicit directions that the lower court consider the extent to which fed. r. civ. p. 52(a) governs appellate review of nonobviousness determinations.介绍：最近，最高法院驳回了丹尼森mfg.诉泛达公司的案件至联邦巡回法院（cafc）。它的驳回带有鲜明的特征，即在考虑了美国联邦民法第52页中所规定的审查基层法院上诉的非显而易见的程度后才发回重审。on remand, the cafc should attempt to relate the issue to the scope of review for other issues that arise in patent appeals. neither the narrow nor the broad problem has ever received the attention it deserves particularly from the standpoint of the fundamental law/fact dichotomy.在发回重审时，联邦巡回法院应该尝试在专利上诉时联系它的复审范围。但是无论是狭义还是广义的问题都没有得到它应有的重视特别是基本的法律/ 事实二分法上的观点。it is by no means certain that nonobviousness determinations should be treated as questions of law. nevertheless, there is ample evidence that courts seek to review these findings more intensely than would be appropriate for questions of fact under “clearly erroneous” or “substantial evidence” standards. this paper argues that, if the courts are inclined to persist in more intense review of nonobviousness, two other matters need to be considered: first,whether more liberal review should be extended to all questions concerning patent validity, and, second, whether such review should be conducted under a “constitutional fact” doctrine.这绝不是说专利的非显而易见性裁定应作为法律问题来对待。然而，现在有充分证据说明法院将更严格地审查这些带有明显错误或者充足证据这么一个层次的审判结果。本文讨论的是，如果法院都倾向于对专利的非显而易见性坚持更严格的审查，则另外两个问题需要考虑：第一，审查是否应当扩大到所有涉及专利的有效性审查，而且，第二，审查是否应根据“宪制上的事实”原则来进行。the former would address apparent inconsistencies in the current law, and the latter would allow appellate courts an expanded role (function) without unduly confusing terminology (form).前者将解决现行法律明显不一致，而后者则允许上诉法院的一个更大的作用（功能），而不会出现过度混乱的专业术语（形式）。the law/fact dichotomy法律/事实二分理论the most directly relevant precedent governing appellate review of patent litigation is cryptic. quoted in the per curiam decision that remands dennison, it consists of one sentence from the courts decision in graham v. john deere co.: “while the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law, . the 103 condition. lends itself to several basic factual inquiries.” 最直接相关的专利诉讼的先例中的上诉审查是比较模糊的。引述一则依法院决定将dennison案发回重审的案例，法院对graham v. john deere co.的决定中的有这么一句话：“虽然专利的有效性问题最终都是法律问题，. 第103项条件.随后又询问了几个基本的事实。” however, what that sentence means is unclear; graham indicated neither reasons nor authority for denominating questions of patent validity, in general, or nonobviousness, specifically, as ones of “law” (as contrasted with “fact”). as shown below, without an analysis of those matters, it is very difficult to determine either whether validity issues other than nonobviousness should be treated as ones of “law” or, in any case, what sort of treatment should be afforded. it is hoped that, following the remand of dennison, some progress will be made toward resolving those important problems. 不过，这句话的意思是什么不清楚，graham表示命名这些专利权的有效性问题既没有原因也没有权威，在一般情况下，非显而易性具体而言是作为“法律”（作为对比的“事实”）的。如下所示，没有对这些事项的分析，它是很难确定专利是否有效的问题比专利的非显而易见性的问题更应被视为“法律”或在任何情况下应该提供的什么样的待遇。人们希望，随着dennison案件的发回重申，能够取得一些进展，解决这些重要问题。while much has been written on the law/fact dichotomy, a brief overview is in order. the terms, “law” and “fact” are used several ways, and it is necessary to define them in the present context. approached that way, the term, “fact,” is more precisely called “adjudicative fact,” and the most accurate definition is operational. in short, a question of adjudicative fact is one of the kind traditionally regarded as appropriate for juries. conversely, a question of “law” is anything that remains including questions of “legislative” fact, the latter being used, even by courts, in conjunction with values, to evolve general rules.尽管很多案例已经被写进了法律/事实二分法，下面就来一个简单的介绍。法律术语“法律”和“事实”被用于若干方面，在目前的情况下，我们有必要去给这个两个术语下定义。专业术语“事实”，更精确地应该被称为“裁决的事实”，而这个最准确的定义具有可操作性。总之，事实问题的裁决历来是陪审团认为比较合适的裁判种类之一。相反， “法律”问题则是被遗留的问题包括“立法”事实问题，它甚至被法院使用并与价值相结合后，演变成一般规则。the closest one can come to avoiding circularity is to look at whether a fact is critical only to the outcome of the specific dispute or goes to establishing the rights and duties of the classes of which the parties are merely members. see generally, e.g., b. schwartz, administrative law, 213-16 (2d ed. 1984).最接近的一次可以用来避免循环是看事实是否只对具体纠纷的结果，或只是去建立阶级中少数成员的权利和义务。一般见，例如，b. schwartz行政法，16卷213页（1984年第二版）。unfortunately, the water is muddied when courts occasionally resolve fact issues as a“matter of law.” yet, even then, the operational definition stands: if a matter is sufficiently well established in the record that reasonable minds could not differ, it is within the ultimate control of judges, not a jury. hence, in sorting out “law” and “fact” issues, roles of judge and jury are paramount. 不幸的是，在法院偶然的一次将事实问题当做判例法来解决后水还是被搅浑了。然而，即使如此，在操作上它就定义为：如果一个事件被充分地记录了但是合理的分析又不能将它辨别，那么只有法官有最终控制权，而不是陪审团。因此，在对“法律”和“事实”问题进行分类时，法官和陪审团的角色是至关重要的。indeed, this is inherent in rights to jury trials; without the distinction, such rights would be hollow, and appellate judges are as bound as trial judges. while appellate courts may be the ultimate arbiters of issues of law, issues of fact properly entrusted to juries are entitled to exceptional deference under the “substantial evidence” standard. 事实上，这是陪审团的固有权利；没有这些区别，陪审团的这一权利就是被架空的，上诉法官和审判法官也一样。虽然上诉法院可能是法律问题的最终仲裁者，但是为了表示特殊的敬意，法院通常会在有大量充足的证据情况下的将事实案件妥善地交给陪审团。由于某些不同的原因，事实的裁决范围要被扩大，就像在dennison案件中法官的审判，有“明显错误”的审查适用。for somewhat different reasons, deference to fact finding is also extended, as in dennison, to bench trials. there “clearly erroneous” review applies. that standard is less deferential, but the supreme court demonstrated in dennison, and more so in inwood laboratories more than token deference is required. 该标准是不那么恭敬，但最高法院在dennison案件表现出来的，以及在inwood实验室案件中说明超过象征性的尊重是必需的。until 1985, the depth of review sometimes varied depending on whether cases turned on demeanor or documentary evidence. the latter had sometimes been accorded less deference.直到1985年，审查的深度有时视乎案件的行为或书面证据而不等。后者有时不被给予尊重。the principal argument advanced in favor of a more searching appellate review of findings. based solely on documentary evidence is that the rationale of rule but, in explaining the change made that year, the advisory committee said: these considerations are outweighed by the public interest in the stability and judicial economy that would be promoted by recognizing that the trial court, not the appellate tribunal, should be the finder of the facts. to permit courts of appeals to share more actively in the fact-finding function would tend to undermine the legitimacy of the district courts in the eyes of litigants, multiply appeals by encouraging appellate retrial of some factual issues, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority.主要论点有利于推进搜索上诉审查结果.纯粹证据的基础是，规则的理由，但是，在解释改变这一年，咨询委员会说：这些考虑公众舆论的和司法经济会被审判法庭，而不是上诉法庭要允许上诉法院。更加积极地分享实况调查功能往往会破坏在当事人的心目中的区法院的合法性，一些事实问题的上诉重审案件将会速度增加，司法权威将会不必要的重新分配。“constitutional facts”“宪法事实”despite that, and regardless of whether facts were initially before a jury, an argument can be made that courts should give above-average scrutiny to cases where constitutional interests are at stake.indeed, the supreme court held exactly that in bose corp v. consumers union u.s. while the decision concerned freedom of speech and product disparagement, not patents, a modest extension would have substantial impact on the latter. 尽管如此，也不管是否事实发生在审判前，在危急时刻宪法关注的一项争议可以使法院给予高于平均水平的审查。事实上，最高法院认为正是在bose公司诉美国消费者联盟案件，虽然决定有关于言论自由和诋毁产品，而不是专利，适度延伸审查范围会对后者产生重大影响。in bose, it was held that appellate courts are obligated to exercise independent judgment in determining when one should be liable to another for misstatements of fact (in this situation, as contrasted with “opinion”) concerning the others products. one commentator has argued that the courts reasoning makes it difficult to restrict that rule to first amendment cases. he also urges that deep review of constitutional facts is compelling when they have been found by administrative agencies. 在bose案件中，有人认为，上诉法院有责任决定当一方应该对另外乙方的非事实描述信任的时候独立裁判（在此种情况下，与“意见”相反的东西）。一位评论家认为，法院的自由裁量难以限制的第一修正案。他还对当一项宪法事实被行政机关发现时它的审查深度时候可信度表示怀疑。 consider whether findings that deal with patent validity do not fit in either instance. at least when no new art is introduced in the litigation, a challenge to validity involves not only issues of constitutional interest (art. i 8 cl. 8) but also a collateral challenge to findings of the patent and trademark office. it is doubtful that the supreme court had occasion to consider the implications of this. yet, it may well have had bose (perhaps unconsciously) in mind when it remanded dennison. if the cafc, or ultimately the supreme court, believes that extraordinary review of facts in patent cases is warranted, consideration should be given to whether the “constitutional fact” doctrine might be usefully extended. patent attorneys are fond of referring to the constitutional underpinnings of the patent system. yet rarely will a case turn on them, and it is doubtful that any supreme court validity decision ever did. 考虑专利的有效性不适合其他任何实例的结果是否成立。至少在没有新的发现在诉讼中出现，对涉及的有效性提出挑战，不仅宪法利益的问题（第一条第8款第8项），也是一个对于专利和商标是局的调查结果的变相挑战。这是令人怀疑的是，最高法院有机会考虑有关的影响。然而，在考虑dennison 案件是很可能有bose公司（也许不自觉地）在潜意识里。如果美国联邦巡回法院，或者最高法院认为，在专利案件事实的特殊审查是非常必要的，应考虑 “宪制上的事实”学说是否可能是有益的延长。专利代理人喜欢专利制度的宪法基础这一理论。然而，很少有案件会转移到这方面来，任何最高法院所作出的有效性裁决都是值得怀疑的。 even an 1850 case often regarded as the genesis of the nonobviousness requirement was not based on the constitution. on the contrary, notwithstanding a dissent claiming otherwise, justice nelson did not admit to adding a new requirement much less one mandated by the constitution. indeed, he insisted that mere novelty, even coupled with market success, had long been inadequate to support patent validity. 即使是1850年的情况通常认为非显而易见性的要求不是以宪法为依据的。相反，尽管声称异议，法官纳尔逊不承认加入了新的要求更不用说一个由宪法规定的。事实上，他坚持认为，单纯的新颖性，即使加上市场的成功，早已不足以支持专利的有效性。the first supreme court allusion to constitutional interests being involved in standards of patentability does not seem to have occurred until the 1950 almost exactly a century later. moreover, it arose in the context of the courts addressing the scope of appellate review in patent cases. while it had a rule against re-examining findings consistently made by two lower courts, the court nevertheless found the patent invalid. the majority maintained, however, that it was reversing because the wrong legal standard had been applied.第一最高法院针对宪法的利益被参与到专利标准的事实似乎并未有发生，直到1950年 - 几乎整整一个世纪之后。此外，在它的背景下出现了法院在处理在专利案件上诉时规定了审查范围。虽然它必须有两个下级法院进行结果检查规定，但法院从来没有判定专利无效。然而大多数人认为，这是因为错误的法律标准的应用。the most noteworthy aspect of that case, for present purposes, is a concurring opinion by justice douglas. there, it was argued that the majority would have been justified in reversing, notwithstanding the two-court rule. he reasoned that validity is a question of law because “the standard of patentability is a constitutional standard; and the question of validity is a question of law.” for authority he cited mahn v.harwood, an 1884 case in which the court reviewed a decision of the patent commissioner. yet, mahn merely points out that, while the commissioner might be entitled to some deference on questions of fact, courts need not defer on questions of law hardly an earth-shaking proposition. 在那种情况下对于当前的目的最值得注意的方面，就是让大法官douglas赞成这个意见。在那里，有人认为，多数是可以扭转，尽管有两法庭规则。他的理由是有效性是法律的问题，因为他说：“专利标准是宪法标准;以及有效性问题是一个法律问题。”对于权威，他引用mahn v.harwood在1884年审判的一个案件中，法院审查了专利专员的决定。然而，mahn 只指出，虽然可能专利专员过度尊重事实问题，但是法院不必在这个法律问题上推迟因为这根本就不是什么惊天动地的问题。 had graham cited justice douglas opinion in a&p, it would have been helpful in understanding what was meant by calling validity a question of law. nevertheless, the explicit constitutional origins of the patent system, perhaps coupled with the fact that validity may involve collateral review of administrative action, could serve as a basis for de novo review of questions of fact. whether the constitutional fact doctrine or anything else should be used to that end, however, is another question. before attending to it, a closer examination of nonobviousness may be useful.如果graham引述司法部douglas在ap公司的观点，这将对理解什么是调用法律效力问题是有帮助的。然而，宪法明确了专利制度的起源，也许事实有效性可能涉及抵押品的行政行为的审查，可以作为一个从头对事实问题审查的基础上加上。但是，无论在宪法或其他任何学说应当用于这一目的，就转变成了另外一个问题。在致力于这个事实之前，对非显而易见性更仔细的考察可能是有用的。is nonobviousness a special case?非显而易见性是一个特殊的情形吗？whatever the cafc decides about the appropriate standard of review fornonobviousness, it ought also to address why that standard should differ from that applied to other validity requirements. while nonobviousness was the primary concern in graham and companion cases, that decision calls validity a question of law. if the cafc chooses to single out nonobviousness for special treatment, it should justify its approach.无论联邦巡回法院决定为非显而易见性决定适当的审查标准，它应该也能解释为何该标准应有所区别于应用到其他的有效性要求。虽然非显而易见性是在graham案件和同样的案件中的主要关注点，该决定被称为一个法律问题的有效性。如果联邦巡回法院选择对非显而易见性进行特殊待遇，应该证明它的做法。it might do so based on the origins of the nonobviousness requirement. yet, even if nonobviousness had been found in hotchkiss to be constitutionally mandated, an implicit requirement would hardly be more important than the utility requirement, which is about as explicit as the constitution gets. thus, even if the “constitutional fact” doctrine were used to justify more appellate review, nonobviousness would not stand out.也许这样做是基于非显而易见性要求的起源。然而，然而,尽管非显而易见性已经被发现在hotchkiss是具有宪法，一个隐含要求将很难超过与宪法同样明晰的实用要求。因此，即使是“宪法事实”学说被用于辩护更多的上诉评审，非显而易见性也不会脱颖而出。the cafc might also attempt to distinguish nonobviousness on the basis of its technical difficulty and the tendency of fact finders to see inventions as obvious through hindsight. still, neither that nor the tendency to monday-morning quarterback should any more justify extraordinary appellate review than it would justify withholding nonobviousness (or, for that matter, medical malpractice) from the jury altogether.美国联邦巡回法院也可能试图在技术难度和事实发现者在看到事后明显的虚构物时的倾向基础上，分辨非显而易见性。不过，既不是那样，也不是有放马后炮倾向的人可能再替特别上诉评审辩护会而不是替来自陪审团隐瞒的非显而易见性辩护（或与此有关的医疗事故）。the bottom line例外情况the cafc has full control of issues of patent law, subject only to legislative and supreme court oversight. when reviewing infringement litigation, whether there is a jury or not, it has the capacity, for example, to correct for the application of erroneous legal standards, to expand the application of principles, or to carve out exceptions to rules.根据最高人民法院的立法和监督，美国联邦巡回法院有专利法的完全控制权。在审查侵权诉讼时，无论有没有陪审团，它有能力改正错误法律标准的应用，扩大原则的应用，或开拓出规则的例外。it can also correct clear errors of fact. its power is even greater where no jury is involved. yet, regardless of the standard of review, it cannot second-guess the resolution of disputes that turn on the relative credibility of witnesses. if a case turns on credibility, it is difficult to justify reversal. that would leave trial courts and the bar guessing.它也可以纠正事实的清楚错误。如果没有陪审团参与，它就有更大的权利。然而，忽略审查标准，它不能依赖证人相对可靠性来猜测纠纷的解决。如果一个案件转向可靠，这就难以解释逆转。这将猜想留给了审判法庭和法庭栏杆了。 if closer review of certain issues of fact seems justified notwithstanding, e.g., problems with demeanor evidence, perhaps on the basis of (often correct) judicial intuition, it behooves the cafc to confront the i